Situational Assessment: Moldova
By: Mathilda Minakova
Date: 24/02/2023 - ICOD: 23/02/2023 - 2330 GMT
Source: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY/LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Key figures
· February 23, Russia’s Defence Ministry announced that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including the Ukrainian far-right nationalist Azov Regiment, “in the near future” are planning an armed “provocation” of the self-proclaimed, Moscow-supported separatist ‘Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic’ in the far-east of Moldova.
· Later the same day, it added that the Kiev regime had “activated preparations for an intrusion” into the region, promising an “adequate response” to the “provocation”.
· The region, internationally recognised as Transnistria, is in effect under Russian military control, stationing the roughly 1,500-man Operational Group of Russian Forces and an estimated 22,000 tonnes of mostly Cold-War era ammunition in its town of Cobasna, and borders southwest Ukraine.
· Russia’s Defence Ministry further claims that Ukrainian soldiers will be wearing Russian uniforms as a guise during the military “provocation”.
· These announcements come 2 days after Putin nullified a 2012 decree that previously ensured Moldova’s territorial integrity in resolving the future of the separatist region.
· Earlier this month, Moldova’s president repeated Ukraine’s President Zelensky’s claim that Ukrainian intelligence services had intercepted Russia’s plans to destabilise the Moldovan government, in one scenario capturing the Chisinau airport near Moldova’s capital.
· Ukraine has reportedly deployed more troops to its border with Moldova.
Analysis & Implications
· The escalation of Russia’s rhetoric towards Moldova is worrying for its nearby states and NATO alliance members, given Moldova’s strategic value as a safeguard between Russian aggression in Ukraine and its bordering Romania, a NATO member.
· Russia’s Defence Ministry announcements point towards a worrying new narrative by Moscow to justify any potential future Russian aggression towards Moldova. Russia’s announcements could function as a set-up for the narrative that the Russia-friendly Transnistria region must be ‘protected’ from Ukrainian nationalists, echoing the rationale used by the Kremlin one year prior to invade Ukraine under the pretence of protecting the separatist Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Spreading confusion regarding the use of military uniforms to distinguish Russian troops from Ukrainian troops would make the attribution of any potential aggression more difficult.
· The decree and the announcements do however not point towards any concrete Russian violent activities in the nearby future. Although at the start of the war, Transnistria was feared to become the southwest starting point for a third Russian offensive enclosing Ukraine, one year later most Russian troops have stalled in Ukraine’s south-eastern regions. According to Ukrainian intelligence services, Russia reportedly does not have enough military capability to a start a new offensive near the southwest of Ukraine. Moreover, Russian forces would have to find a way past Odessa to ensure troop and supplies movement, which it so far has not succeeded in capturing.
· In the case Russia would further increase their presence in Moldova, it would likely first do so by through increasing its indirect backing of pro-Russian groups in efforts to undermine the pro-Western government. There is a possibility this would not be met with widespread internal opposition. In the past weeks, a rising amount of opposition protests against the pro-Western Moldavian government, which began in fall 2022, took place in Chisinau and echoed pro-Russian sentiments.
· It is likely that Moldovan and Ukrainian troops will keep strengthening their position around the Transnistria region’s borders in the upcoming days to weeks. It is also likely that Moldova’s current pro-Western government will keep strengthening its relations and cooperation with NATO.