The ELN - Colombia's last guerrilla
Discussing the National Liberation Army (ELN) can be challenging due to its origins in 1964, following a violent period in Colombia known as "la violencia." The group had an urban beginning and was initially associated with the National University of Colombia. It was formed by brothers Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño who were former members of the Brigada Pro Liberación Nacional, a scholarship programme in Cuba. Therefore, this guerrilla group was established in response to the rise of Fidel and Raul Castro's communist regime in Cuba, which inspired many leftist movements throughout the region to defend the victims of social, political, and economic injustices perpetrated by the Colombian state during the Guillermo Leon Valencia Government.
It was also heavily influenced by liberation theory, which argues that the liberation of poor Christians should happen in the present, rather than in the future. Two significant Christian academics, Camilo Torres and Manuel Perez, led the group until their deaths. Torres, a priest who founded the first sociology department at National University of Colombia in 1959, and Perez, a Spanish priest, were instrumental in shaping the guerrilla's ideology. Initially operating in the Magdalena Medio region, the group faced a significant setback in 1970 when a military offensive almost wiped them out. In response, they relocated to Arauca, where they established a foothold and maintained a presence for several years. In 1980, the group launched a bold attack on the police station in the town of Betoyes, successfully overpowering the officers and seizing their weapons. They then rallied the townspeople to announce the formation of the Domingo Lain Front.
This guerrilla is composed of seven fronts: Domingo Lain, Camilo Torres, Che Guevara, José Antonio Galán, Manuel Hernández, El Boche, and Cimarrón. These war fronts operate in several regions of Colombia, including Arauca, Antioquia, Chocó, Cesar, Magdalena, Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Boyacá, Casanare, Nariño, Bolívar, Cesar, and Guajira. Its control over the border with Venezuela has allowed it to branch out into the states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Anzoátegui and to dispose of funds derived from smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping. The central command, known as COCE (Comando Central), oversees all these war fronts. COCE is led by seven leaders: Eliécer Herlinto Chamorro Acosta, Israel Ramírez Pineda, Jaime Galvis Rivera, Jose Benigno Guzman Mora, Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo Quinchia, Rafael Cierra Granados, and Arturo Archila Rincon.
The ELN is a guerrilla group that requires special attention in the current peace initiative. For a long time, the ELN has relied on dispersing and granting autonomy to its fronts to avoid forceful attacks from the Public Force. As a result, these fronts have varying degrees of military and financial capabilities. Additionally, the ELN's decentralised structure, with patrols consisting of a maximum of 30 people, has created an obstacle in the peace talks with the government. This decentralisation has led to the emergence of numerous power groups that have not always agreed with the Central Command.
The ELN is currently undergoing a significant historical moment. Composed of approximately five thousand members, mostly former FARC guerrilla fighters who believe that the government did not fully implement the peace agreement, this guerrilla group has a binational presence in Venezuela and Colombia. In Venezuela, it operates as a paramilitary force, aiding in strengthening the Nicolás Maduro regime, while in Colombia, it engages in guerrilla warfare against the government. The group's strategy of patrolling in small groups, as well as its increasing membership, has made it challenging to combat them in both countries. Furthermore, their presence in two nations and differing missions add to the complexities of addressing this guerrilla group.
This guerrilla's movement between Venezuela and Colombia serves as an escape route for them when they sense the presence of the Colombian national army. Additionally, their finances have seen significant growth due to illegal activities in both countries. Furthermore, when they patrol in groups of up to thirty people, it becomes challenging to counter them with direct force. Moreover, their increasing numbers have allowed them to occupy a substantial territory and coordinate military attacks against the public forces with relative ease. For instance, on March 29th, 2023 despite being in a bilateral ceasefire while negotiating peace with the Colombian government in Mexico, the group carried out an attack on a military base in Catatumbo, resulting in the death of nine soldiers and serious injuries to eight others.
Currently, the ELN is engaged in combat with various adversaries in different regions. One of its primary enemies is the Urabeños, also known as Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, a paramilitary group with a presence in Antioquia and Chocó. Additionally, since the beginning of this year, the ELN has been vying for territory with FARC dissidents, resulting in the Colombian National Army being drawn into the conflict to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. Furthermore, there have been clashes between the ELN and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in the Catatumbo region. Notably, the only recognised allies of the ELN are the Second Marquetalia group and the Border Commands.
Despite the violation of the ceasefire and ongoing territorial disputes with other armed groups, the national government persists in negotiating with the ELN in pursuit of what is called 'Total Peace.' From an analytical perspective, it can be observed that negotiation is widely considered as the most viable means of resolving conflicts that have endured for an extended period of time. Despite this, the persistent attacks launched by the ELN on unarmed civilians and the national army, coupled with their aggressive pursuit of territorial disputes with other armed groups to expand their military power, present significant challenges in terms of having confidence in the potential success of peace talks. Moreover, due to the decentralised nature of this guerrilla group, not all of its members may identify with the ideology of the COCE (Central Command), and even if negotiations with the ELN are successful, Colombia may still face challenges with ELN dissidents and other residual groups with their own political agendas, if the root causes of the conflict are not effectively addressed.
The six points being negotiated by the government and the ELN in Mexico hold great significance. First and foremost, involving society in peacebuilding is crucial as they possess invaluable expertise that should not be overlooked. Additionally, creating a democratic framework for peace and transformation, which includes rural development, equitable land access, and a sustainable economic model, can potentially drive equitable growth in the country. Furthermore, repairing the social fabric of the victims, as well as preserving the memory of the conflict, is essential to establishing a sustainable peace. Lastly, a comprehensive execution plan must be developed to ensure the conflict is brought to an end and the agreements made at the negotiation table are executed successfully.
Hence, the Colombian government should not only concentrate on military efforts, but also on strengthening its presence throughout the country in other areas such as public universities, hospitals, schools, aqueducts, and communication routes. These investments would facilitate the transport of food, improve mobility, and provide access to basic necessities, thereby contributing to the reduction of inequality and inequity in rural areas. By addressing the fundamental needs of the people, the government can create a more inclusive and equitable society which avoids the creation of new guerrilla groups with political and social discourse in the future.