Behind the Conflict: Support for Prigozhin and Public Reaction
A certain level of support from Prigozhin’s network, including various influential regional and federal actors, partly explains the rapid movement of Wagner’s troops towards Moscow on 24 June. Given the quality and quantity of weapons used in the “coup” attempt, it seems that Prigozhin had planned it in advance but was waiting for the right moment. In an interview Prigozhin did with Russian military correspondent Semyon Pegov in April 2023, the latter mentioned a perceived threat in Moscow to give Prigozhin more weapons due to Wagner’s autonomy and, indeed, “the possibility of attacking Moscow.” Therefore, if this warning was circulating in Moscow, no one in the Kremlin took it seriously, and Wagner’s capabilities were misjudged.
The Russian Army’s Support for Prigozhin
Firstly, without assured backing, Prigozhin would have unlikely started his “March of Justice” due to the very high risk of Putin’s reprisal. It is likely that he received support from influential Russian oligarchs. However, it is hard to estimate who it could be. In the upcoming months, potential internal destabilisation in Russia could shed more light on the growing splits among the Russian elite.
Secondly, Prigozhin has privileged contacts with the military elite. One of them is General Surovikin, former commander of the Russian forces in the Russian-Ukrainian war until January 2023. According to Prigozhin, General Surovikin commanded Wagner’s operation in the Donetsk region after being replaced by Valery Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Troops of Russia. Meanwhile, General Mikhail Mizintsev, known for leading the siege of the city of Mariupol, became Wagner’s deputy commander in May 2023. Several media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, reported the detention of General Surovikin in the wake of the attempted coup. As stated, the general was aware of an upcoming uprising against Russia's military leadership but did not participate in it.
Thirdly, both Surovikin and Mizintsev still enjoy great prestige among middle-ranking Russian officers. This could have positively influenced the perception of Wagner’s leader in the officers’ eyes, which was beneficial for Prigozhin. Months before the rebellion, Prigozhin changed his rhetoric into a more comprehensive critique of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s management of the war, shared by a growing number of low-ranking Russian soldiers. In sum, some soldiers' sympathy for Prigozhin and Wagner may have ensured a neutral stance towards Wagner's actions and the non-intervention of a large part of the regular Russian army and law enforcement agencies.
Prigozhin’s mercenaries did not face any resistance from the border officers at the entry points of Rostov-on-Don oblast or from the Russian army and police in Rostov and Voronezh. It indicates either the unpreparedness and inability to manage the crisis of Russian security and law enforcement agencies or their support for Wagner’s actions. Indeed, both of these factors were instrumental in enabling the movement of Wagner’s troops within Russia. Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, mentioned that neither the Rosgvardia nor the Capital Police could match Wagner’s capabilities, equipment and arms. Moreover, the fact that senior and middle-ranking officers could stand aside and not react to direct military rebellion highlights the divisions within the Russian army and underlines the possible disloyalty of the military command to Putin.
The Public’s Reaction to the Rebellion
The reaction of Russian society to the attempted “coup” remains uncertain. Unsurprisingly, people were disoriented when Wagner’s forces entered Rostov-on-Don, took over the administrative buildings and managed to move further on. Prigozhin insisted that Wagner had received strong support from citizens, who were allegedly disappointed when the “march” stopped, as they had hoped that the fight against bureaucracy and the resolution of other problems in the country would be pursued after the rebellion. Contrary to Prigozhin’s statements, Wagner mercenaries dispersed demonstrations against their “march” in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Therefore, on 24 June, the population of Rostov was divided with a big share of those ready to resist Wagner not to let them overthrow the legitimate government.
Russian non-governmental research organisation Levada Analytical Center conducted a comprehensive social poll on the Russian public’s perception of the Wagner rebellion. Anxiety was the most common reaction on 24 June, but its level was not comparable to that of February and September 2022, when a partial mobilisation was announced. The report concluded that because it all happened so rapidly, people did not have time to be truly terrified. Moreover, most respondents (44%) followed the events on television, thus consuming the information as interpreted by the authorities.
As a result, the “coup” had relatively little effect on the Russian public’s perception of their government. Only the popularity rating of Sergei Shoigu, the main target of the rebellion, has been affected, while Putin’s indicators “as a whole” have remained the same as in the previous poll (no specific figure was mentioned; however, the last poll (22-28 June) concluded with a positive perception of 81%). The Levada Center has concluded that the failed rebellion has had no impact on the power of the Russian government. According to a third of respondents, society will continue to consolidate, and the state will become stronger. Conversely, the Russian youth, traditionally more opposed to the government, is more inclined not to believe that the Kremlin's authority has not been affected.
Slightly different conclusions were presented by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, which is considered to be pro-government. Although sociologists claim that Putin is still trusted by 77.2% of Russian citizens, according to a poll published on 14 July, this is the lowest value since 27 February 2022. Notably, the indicators for trust decreased after Wagner’s rebellion (on 23 June, the indicator was 78,9%).
The Russian government-backed media play a crucial role in keeping Putin's confidence indicators high, emphasising the Russian government’s success in preventing the Wagner troops from entering Moscow. They also downplayed Wagner's activities in Ukraine and tried to create an information vacuum about subsequent events concerning Wagner and the circumstances of 24 June in order to avoid raising the subject as a point of discussion among Russian citizens. Notably, Putin recently denied the very existence of Wagner, claiming that private military companies are forbidden in Russia and, therefore, cannot exist.
Conclusion
Prigozhin's rebellion ended the Russian government’s total control over critical viewpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian war and allowed these discussions to reach a larger section of the Russian public. The “March of Justice” has become a clear signal of Putin’s vulnerabilities and the uncertainties surrounding his inner circle and Russia’s senior military leadership. Moreover, the rebellion revealed the internal divisions between the Russian militaries and the growing discontent within the Russian army, specifically among senior and middle-ranking officers. However, now that Prigozhin has announced Wagner’s definite withdrawal from Ukraine, his instigations against the current Russian military leadership are likely to cease which will avoid fuelling conflicts within the Russian army and society. Moreover, it will be easier for the Russian Ministry of Defence to manage its war in Ukraine without an independent Wagner-style military force. At the same time, it would be wrong to believe that the rebellion has had a significant impact on Putin’s regime. Although the attempted “coup” has demonstrated the internal instability that Russia is currently experiencing, it had little impact on the way the Russian people perceive their government and the current course of domestic politics. Consequently, it is likely that Putin will retain public support even after the events of 24 June, reducing the possibility of a civil uprising.