Behind the Conflict: Support for Prigozhin and Public Reaction
A certain level of support from Prigozhin’s network, including various influential regional and federal actors, partly explains the rapid movement of Wagner’s troops towards Moscow on 24 June. Given the quality and quantity of weapons used in the “coup” attempt, it seems that Prigozhin had planned it in advance but was waiting for the right moment. In an interview Prigozhin did with Russian military correspondent Semyon Pegov in April 2023, the latter mentioned a perceived threat in Moscow to give Prigozhin more weapons due to Wagner’s autonomy and, indeed, “the possibility of attacking Moscow.” Therefore, if this warning was circulating in Moscow, no one in the Kremlin took it seriously, and Wagner’s capabilities were misjudged.
The Russian Army’s Support for Prigozhin
Firstly, without assured backing, Prigozhin would have unlikely started his “March of Justice” due to the very high risk of Putin’s reprisal. It is likely that he received support from influential Russian oligarchs. However, it is hard to estimate who it could be. In the upcoming months, potential internal destabilisation in Russia could shed more light on the growing splits among the Russian elite.
Secondly, Prigozhin has privileged contacts with the military elite. One of them is General Surovikin, former commander of the Russian forces in the Russian-Ukrainian war until January 2023. According to Prigozhin, General Surovikin commanded Wagner’s operation in the Donetsk region after being replaced by Valery Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Troops of Russia. Meanwhile, General Mikhail Mizintsev, known for leading the siege of the city of Mariupol, became Wagner’s deputy commander in May 2023. Several media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, reported the detention of General Surovikin in the wake of the attempted coup. As stated, the general was aware of an upcoming uprising against Russia's military leadership but did not participate in it.
Thirdly, both Surovikin and Mizintsev still enjoy great prestige among middle-ranking Russian officers. This could have positively influenced the perception of Wagner’s leader in the officers’ eyes, which was beneficial for Prigozhin. Months before the rebellion, Prigozhin changed his rhetoric into a more comprehensive critique of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s management of the war, shared by a growing number of low-ranking Russian soldiers. In sum, some soldiers' sympathy for Prigozhin and Wagner may have ensured a neutral stance towards Wagner's actions and the non-intervention of a large part of the regular Russian army and law enforcement agencies.
Prigozhin’s mercenaries did not face any resistance from the border officers at the entry points of Rostov-on-Don oblast or from the Russian army and police in Rostov and Voronezh. It indicates either the unpreparedness and inability to manage the crisis of Russian security and law enforcement agencies or their support for Wagner’s actions. Indeed, both of these factors were instrumental in enabling the movement of Wagner’s troops within Russia. Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, mentioned that neither the Rosgvardia nor the Capital Police could match Wagner’s capabilities, equipment and arms. Moreover, the fact that senior and middle-ranking officers could stand aside and not react to direct military rebellion highlights the divisions within the Russian army and underlines the possible disloyalty of the military command to Putin.
The Public’s Reaction to the Rebellion
The reaction of Russian society to the attempted “coup” remains uncertain. Unsurprisingly, people were disoriented when Wagner’s forces entered Rostov-on-Don, took over the administrative buildings and managed to move further on. Prigozhin insisted that Wagner had received strong support from citizens, who were allegedly disappointed when the “march” stopped, as they had hoped that the fight against bureaucracy and the resolution of other problems in the country would be pursued after the rebellion. Contrary to Prigozhin’s statements, Wagner mercenaries dispersed demonstrations against their “march” in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Therefore, on 24 June, the population of Rostov was divided with a big share of those ready to resist Wagner not to let them overthrow the legitimate government.
Russian non-governmental research organisation Levada Analytical Center conducted a comprehensive social poll on the Russian public’s perception of the Wagner rebellion. Anxiety was the most common reaction on 24 June, but its level was not comparable to that of February and September 2022, when a partial mobilisation was announced. The report concluded that because it all happened so rapidly, people did not have time to be truly terrified. Moreover, most respondents (44%) followed the events on television, thus consuming the information as interpreted by the authorities.
As a result, the “coup” had relatively little effect on the Russian public’s perception of their government. Only the popularity rating of Sergei Shoigu, the main target of the rebellion, has been affected, while Putin’s indicators “as a whole” have remained the same as in the previous poll (no specific figure was mentioned; however, the last poll (22-28 June) concluded with a positive perception of 81%). The Levada Center has concluded that the failed rebellion has had no impact on the power of the Russian government. According to a third of respondents, society will continue to consolidate, and the state will become stronger. Conversely, the Russian youth, traditionally more opposed to the government, is more inclined not to believe that the Kremlin's authority has not been affected.
Slightly different conclusions were presented by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, which is considered to be pro-government. Although sociologists claim that Putin is still trusted by 77.2% of Russian citizens, according to a poll published on 14 July, this is the lowest value since 27 February 2022. Notably, the indicators for trust decreased after Wagner’s rebellion (on 23 June, the indicator was 78,9%).
The Russian government-backed media play a crucial role in keeping Putin's confidence indicators high, emphasising the Russian government’s success in preventing the Wagner troops from entering Moscow. They also downplayed Wagner's activities in Ukraine and tried to create an information vacuum about subsequent events concerning Wagner and the circumstances of 24 June in order to avoid raising the subject as a point of discussion among Russian citizens. Notably, Putin recently denied the very existence of Wagner, claiming that private military companies are forbidden in Russia and, therefore, cannot exist.
Conclusion
Prigozhin's rebellion ended the Russian government’s total control over critical viewpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian war and allowed these discussions to reach a larger section of the Russian public. The “March of Justice” has become a clear signal of Putin’s vulnerabilities and the uncertainties surrounding his inner circle and Russia’s senior military leadership. Moreover, the rebellion revealed the internal divisions between the Russian militaries and the growing discontent within the Russian army, specifically among senior and middle-ranking officers. However, now that Prigozhin has announced Wagner’s definite withdrawal from Ukraine, his instigations against the current Russian military leadership are likely to cease which will avoid fuelling conflicts within the Russian army and society. Moreover, it will be easier for the Russian Ministry of Defence to manage its war in Ukraine without an independent Wagner-style military force. At the same time, it would be wrong to believe that the rebellion has had a significant impact on Putin’s regime. Although the attempted “coup” has demonstrated the internal instability that Russia is currently experiencing, it had little impact on the way the Russian people perceive their government and the current course of domestic politics. Consequently, it is likely that Putin will retain public support even after the events of 24 June, reducing the possibility of a civil uprising.
The Triangular Tightrope: Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko
The intricate power dynamics in authoritarian regimes demand a nuanced comprehension of the multifarious relationships and political manoeuvres defining their leadership. A detailed analysis of Russia's recent political scene perfectly illustrates these complexities. It particularly highlights potential shifts threatening President Vladimir Putin's well-established power base, a structure built on loyalty, fear, and fiscal incentives.
This article in particular hinges on the events of June 24, 2023, when a deliberate move by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a significant figure in Russia's military-industrial complex, revealed a potential rift in the Russian command. Prigozhin's audacious manoeuvres seemed to question Putin's supremacy, sparking queries about his ability to maintain control amid rising disputes within his administration.
Putin's Russia is well known for its staunch tactics and dissent suppression. Opponents and potential threats are neutralised by legal or other means, with a clear message: loyalty yields rewards, while treachery attracts severe punishment. His inner circle, military, security forces, and wider bureaucracy are driven by prospects of wealth and influence, fostering a kleptocratic system where corruption and favouritism thrive. Public wealth is redirected to those in power, biassing the economy towards the elites, while a large segment of the population remains impoverished. Despite the stark socio-economic disparities this generates, Putin secures the loyalty of his subordinates by ensuring their stake in his regime's survival.
The anatomy of a power structure
The interplay between Putin's strategies, Prigozhin's ambitions, and Lukashenko's actions paints a complex picture of power dynamics in authoritarian regimes. Claims that Putin's iron grip on power weakened due to the short-lived revolt of the Wagner mercenaries under Prigozhin merit a closer examination of how Putin’s power and relationships are truly calibrated.
The unfolding chaos was initiated with an alleged assault on a Wagner camp by Russian regular forces. This surprise attack prompted Prigozhin to take control of the Russian armed forces' headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and set into motion a troop mobilisation towards Moscow. However, these hostile activities were brought to a standstill through subsequent negotiations, which halted the advancement of the Wagner group.
But the group was neither dissolved nor effectively exiled to Belarus. In reaction to this Wagner incident, Putin employed a strategic purge, disciplining those who either backed Prigozhin or facilitated his actions. Moreover, Russian media initiated a rigorous campaign against Prigozhin. This consisted of broadcasting footage from an FSB raid on his residences, and the portrayal of his business empire's downfall.
Rather impactful factors in this peculiar sequence of events:
Power Dynamics: Putin and Prigozhin share a complex relationship and a long-time friendship. Prigozhin's capacity to leverage state resources for personal gain mirrors Putin's tactics. However, a pressing challenge for Prigozhin lies in securing sufficient financial backing to sustain the operations of the Wagner group.
Wagner's Role: The Wagner Group, a Private Military Company (PMC) led by Prigozhin, serves as an extension of the Russian state. Despite being heavily state-subsidised, the group has managed to extract mineral resources for its own benefit, hinting at a drive for autonomy.
Information Warfare: After Russia's strategic loss in Ukraine in 2023, Prigozhin capitalised on the nation's propaganda machine and claimed a victory for Wagner in Bakhmut, arguably attempting to take sole ownership in the media limelight. In response, Putin lauded Prigozhin--a tactic that is perceived as a public relations manoeuvre designed to keep Prigozhin within his limits.
Prigozhin's Accusations: Prigozhin's narrative about Putin's war motivations—purportedly resource-driven rather than a response to NATO enlargement or Ukrainian aggression—undermines Putin's credibility. At first glance, Prigozhin's actions and narratives certainly appear as a tangible threat to Putin's regime, underscoring a power struggle and the vulnerability of the Russian state.
Lukashenko-Prigozhin-Putin: The Lukashenko-Prigozhin-Putin triangle forms a complex nexus of power that influences the stability of the region. While certain aspects of their relationship are established, their future dynamics remain uncertain and subject to a multitude of internal and external factors. How each player responds to these pressures could significantly influence their alliances and power dynamics and the uniqueness of each context makes accurate forecasts immensely very difficult.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Vladimir Putin
From a restaurateur in St. Petersburg to a pivotal figure in Russia's foreign policy, Yevgeny Prigozhin's ascent exemplifies the nuanced power dynamics within Russia, largely facilitated by his intricate association with President Putin. Despite lacking a formal role in Putin's administration, Prigozhin participated in high-stakes defence contract negotiations. His discreet involvement in a 2018 Kremlin meeting between Putin and Madagascar's then President, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, hinted at his growing influence.
Prigozhin, through his association with the Wagner Group, has emerged as an effective tool for Russia's overseas interference and also places him as a cog in Russia's Ukraine strategy. Prigozhin's influence and control over a formidable military faction, coupled with his populist anti-elite rhetoric echoing that of Alexei Navalny, is met with–at least–scepticism within Russia’s political and military elite. His ascent presents an intriguing examination of the intricate and opportunistic power dynamics within Putin's Russia.
Essentially: Yevgeny Prigozhin, through his control over the Wagner Group, has become an influential figure in Russian foreign policy. His hatred for the elites combined with the ability to leverage state resources and command a formidable military faction positions him as a potential adversary within Putin's power structure.
Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin
The political bond between Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin is a blend of political necessity and mutual advantage. Lukashenko, ruling Belarus for nearly three decades, has relinquished significant autonomy to Russia. Despite this, he managed to preserve enough sovereignty to ensure his rule. Putin's instrumental support for Lukashenko during the 2020 pro-democracy protests in Belarus illustrates the alliance's reciprocal benefits. Belarus's strategic location allowed Russia to stage its invasion of Ukraine in 2021. Lukashenko's unwavering loyalty effectively transformed Belarus into a Russian vassal state, securing political stability and economic aid.
The crisis involving Prigozhin further elucidates the Lukashenko-Putin alliance. Lukashenko's intervention to broker a deal with Prigozhin highlights his political relevance and utility to both domestic and international players. Belarus's future, under Lukashenko, is inherently linked to Russia and the evolution of the Lukashenko-Putin relationship.
Essentially: Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin share a political bond that blends political necessity and mutual advantage. Their alliance has weathered various international and domestic challenges. Lukashenko's loyalty to Putin has transformed Belarus into a de facto vassal state of Russia, which has secured political stability and economic aid for Belarus.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Alexander Lukashenko
Yevgeny Prigozhin has been noticeably absent from public sight since 24 June and Lukashenko decidedly distanced himself from Prigozhin, asserting that neither the Wagner CEO nor his forces are stationed in Belarus, with their future presence in the country remaining uncertain.
Lukashenko is said to have intervened to resolve Prigozhin’s potential insurrection in Russia last month, a mediation allegedly made possible due to their personal acquaintance and friendship of close to two decades. For context, Prigozhin's persistent clashes with the Russian Defence Ministry culminated when he resisted their insistence that Wagner mercenaries enter contracts with the Russian government; Lukashenko made clear that if Wagner were to operate in Belarus as a consequence of the Putin-Prigozhin fall-out, its mercenaries would need to formalise their presence with the Belarusian government.
A critical concern shaping the relationships between Prigozhin and Lukashenko, as well as between Prigozhin and Putin, is the continued funding of the Wagner Group. That begs the question of whether Lukashenko would actually be willing and capable of picking up the tab for the Wagner troops.
Essentially: The viability of the Wagner Group hangs in the balance. Unless funding from Russia continues or another financier – like Lukashenko – steps in, the survival of Prigozhin's Wagner Group remains unclear. Ultimately, without financial support, their operations are unlikely to advance.
And its fault lines
The crux of this triangular stakeholder map lies in interpreting Putin's response to the Wagner incident, specifically the resulting purge. Does it reveal control at last or indicate serious cracks within his power structure?
Autocratic leaders often resort to purges to sustain their hold on power. However, the necessity for an extensive purge might point to substantial internal dissension. Putin's power structure, encompassing a complex network of security organisations, forms a crucial pillar of his regime. Yet, Prigozhin's brief insubordination suggests that Putin's control may not be absolute.
Further, Putin's broader power structure includes control over the state apparatus, media, economy, and the narrative of Russian imperialism. This comprehensive system, with Putin at its centre, has demonstrated resilience in the face of multiple pressures. However, its reliance on a singular figure may induce potential instability.
The Wagner incident, triggered by Prigozhin, exposed possible fractures in Putin's power structure. Nonetheless, Putin's rapid response to contain the threat also bears witness to adept leadership. The intricate network of control and loyalty forms the backbone of Putin's system, but whether it can withstand future internal or external pressures remains to be seen. This underscores the complexity of autocratic systems and the factors contributing to their longevity or rapid downfall.
One especially volatile stimulus is Putin's self-destructive quest for victory. His determination to reassert Russia's place in the world, notably through the annexation of Crimea and ongoing involvement in Ukraine, has resulted in international sanctions and a shaky economy. These actions, though initially boosting his popularity at home, are beginning to yield diminishing returns as the economic realities bite and the true pillars of his power structure, the self-interest of those involved, and their fealty towards him are increasingly strained.
External pressures, such as the war in Ukraine, combined with internal dissent from figures like Prigozhin, could precipitate significant shifts in Russia's political landscape. Furthermore, Russia's internal power struggles have often spilt over its borders, impacting neighbouring states and international relations. The Ukraine crisis and Belarus's strategic predicaments are only recent examples.
Putin's power matrix is thus a complex interplay of aspiration, fear, nationalism, and aggression. Each of these components serves a particular function in maintaining his control. However, this carefully constructed structure is far from invulnerable. The real test of its resilience lies in its ability to adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining its core power structure. Until now, it has withstood the pressures. However, fatigue infiltrates subtly, until collapse is imminent.
The Wagner Rebellion: Implications for the War in Ukraine
Recap
The Wagner Group, under the command of Yevgeny Prigozhin, made headlines when they marched on Moscow in response to allegations that top Russian defence officials, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov had authorised the bombing of Wagner troops in Ukraine. Seizing control of parts of Rostov-on-Don, including the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) headquarters of the Southern Military District, the Wagner Group initiated its march towards Moscow. Prigozhin’s reported objective was to remove senior military leadership, but the Wagner troops’ advance halted 200 kilometres short of the capital. Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, intervened and mediated between Putin, Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. As a result, Prigozhin agreed to go into exile in Belarus, accompanied by any remaining loyal Wagner troops, and criminal charges against all involved were eventually dropped. Currently, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unclear.
Short-term
The 24-hour rebellion seems to have left minimal vulnerabilities for Ukrainian troops to exploit. Ukraine's troops could have been expected to look for weaknesses along the line of contact and possibly target sites in Russia to create a heightened sense of danger for the Kremlin. This could have forced Russia to divert troops and military assets from Ukraine to internal security. However, these actions have not materialised, indicating that Ukrainian forces remain focused on executing their counter-offensive plans.
Similarly, the Wagner forces had no major role to play in Russia's line of defence and instead played a central role in the Bakhmut conflict. However, as tensions arose between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defence, the troops had already withdrawn from the region. One further factor explaining why the rebellion had little effect on the war in Ukraine in the short term is that the mutiny ended without the need to withdraw Russian units from Ukraine to counter it.
Wagner troops in Belarus
On 11 July, the Belarusian Defence Ministry announced on Telegram that the Wagner mercenaries will train the Belarussian and Russian troops. Joint training would allow the Belarussian army to “benefit from the combat experience of Wagner commanders” according to Lukashenko.
Movement around the Russian training facilities in Belarus had added to speculation as to the future of what the partnership between the military structures of Belarus, Russia and the private structures would look like. On 27 June, satellite images showed activity at a disused military base near Asipovichy. The military dismantled training grounds in 3 locations: Abuz-Lyasnouski, Lepel and Repishch, and instead a larger camp with a capacity to host 15,000 soldiers was built in Tsel located 80 kilometres southeast of Minsk.
By sending more Wagner and Russian troops to Belarus, the Kremlin could be seeking to distract Ukrainian intelligence services and sow doubt as to Russia's next steps. Indeed, Ukrainian President Zelenskiy convened a meeting to discuss bolstering the nation's defence along the border with Belarus on 5 July, reflecting growing concern about the increased presence of Russian troops in Belarus.
Wagner troops in Russia
Russia's Defence Ministry announced that the Wagner Group should surrender its supply of weapons, while Putin invited its fighters to join the Russian Army instead of leaving for Belarus. This follows an original plan announced mid-June which was to have all Wagner troops (dubbed "volunteer detachments") sign contracts with the Defence Ministry by 1 July to increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian Army. This would have given the mercenaries legal status and effectively unified the military approaches. However, Prigozhin rejected signing such contracts, which further escalated tensions between him and the top military chiefs – particularly defence minister Sergei Shoigu –, ultimately contributing to the outbreak of the rebellion. As of 3 July though, Wagner Group was still officially recruiting to train in Russia’s Krasnodar region, thereby defying the truce brokered by Lukashenko.
Integrating Wagner fighters into the Russian army would be challenging, as Russian soldiers appear to be poorly or irregularly paid, undertrained, and suffer from low morale. In addition, mercenaries are relatively well paid and would struggle in respecting the chain of command. The nature of mercenaries remains self-serving, as highlighted in Olivia Gibson’s article. They are used to working independently from the Russian state and its chain of command, so collaboration could undermine rather than strengthen the Defence Ministry’s military goals. Because of these difficulties, it is more likely that the Wagner troops will continue to fight as mercenaries, possibly under a different name and with a new command, one far more subordinate to the Kremlin.
A profound mistrust exists between the public and private entities. Still, the prospect of another mutiny attempt is highly unlikely. This implies that a majority of Wagner's soldiers will be prepared to accept an alternative leadership closer to, or even part of, the Russian Defence Ministry. On the day of the rebellion, Chechen leader Kadyrov expressed his support for Putin, and reportedly sent troops to counter Wagner’s march. Therefore, we can also expect Putin to replace some Wagner forces with Chechen soldiers.
Conclusion
Although no tangible military effects have been observed, Russian forces risk suffering a setback in Ukraine if Russia loses a large number of Wagner fighters in the long term. It is also likely that Wagner's rebellion will have a long-term negative impact on the already low morale of Russian front-line soldiers and on the cohesion of the command structure of the military operation. The repercussions, therefore, go beyond the immediate, as senior Russian officials could be diverted from the ongoing war effort should a government reshuffle occur at senior military levels. One might have expected Putin to assign responsibility for the failure to suppress the uprising at its outset and to imprison Prigozhin. However, he did not do so and met Prigozhin five days after the failed mutiny. Nevertheless, internal conflicts are likely to emerge, as the Wagner troops require tighter supervision, something that could weaken the management of the Russian army in Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian attack forces to exploit certain vulnerabilities.
The Kremlin's ability to effectively operate the Wagner troops in Prigozhin's absence will be crucial in ensuring that the rebellion does not have a long-term impact on the invasion of Ukraine. However, if the Kremlin concentrates on dismantling the Wagner group and assigning blame to its senior officials, Ukraine could benefit from Priogozhin's failed march.
Unleashing the Semistate: Russia’s dance with PMCs and the Geopolitical Game
Russia’s increased employment of semistate forces raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic concerns, particularly regarding the state’s deliberate lack of accountability, transparency, and regard for international and humanitarian law. Given the successful operations of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria as well as their perceived effectiveness in achieving geopolitical objectives, it is highly probable that Putin's regime will continue to rely on Private Military Companies (PMCs) as a means to further its interests. Thus it is imperative to gain a more nuanced understanding of the risks and weaknesses associated with the dynamic relationship between Russia and PMCs.
Although Russian PMCs are officially designated as private entities, they are often owned by the Russian oligarchy and operated by former members of the Russian military or intelligence services who maintain close working relationships with the Kremlin. Consequently, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have adopted the phrase “semistate” to more accurately describe Russia’s PMCs. These semistate forces work outside of the conventional military and legal structures and can be employed to further state interests through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Russia's synergistic relationship with these semistate forces is marked by a complex interplay of power dynamics; an intricate web of connections upheld by the country's inherently vague legal structure.
Russia’s ambiguous legal framework is a key component for the facilitation of the state’s interconnected relationship with semistate forces. While PMCs remain illegal, Private Security Companies on the other hand are officially registered entities that have been legally operating since 1992. In essence, this provides a legal loophole for Russia’s private commodity powerhouses, such as Gazprom and Transneft, to employ security units authorized to engage in predominately law enforcement-like activities at the facilities and, increasingly, engage in war activities. Although PMCs remain illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, perversely it is the illegal status that has facilitated the growth of the PMC industry, as the vague legal framework is used as a leveraging tool to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin. Given that Russia operates under a patronage system, the ambiguous laws ensure Putin’s cronies, like Prighozin, remain loyal to the Kremlin’s power vertical while also guaranteeing a portion of the PMC’s accumulated wealth will be shared with the state, or more specifically its officials.
Under this ambiguous legal system, state power and influence are undoubtedly augmented, as the capricious application of law generates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within the industry. Not to mention, evidence has revealed the oligarchy’s personal involvement in the funding and leadership of PMCs, with the most prominent example being the infamous Wagner Group reportedly funded by close Putin ally Yevgeny Prighozin.
The Wagner Group is believed to have been established in 2014 to provide offensive capabilities during the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent combat support to separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner would then go on to continue cutting its teeth by gaining notoriety for their involvement in Syria, where it acted as a force multiplier for President Bashar al-Assad’s army and safeguarded valuable infrastructure such as oil and gas plants. By fighting alongside Syrian forces and propping up Assad’s regime, Wagner enabled Russia to extend its influence in the region and project power beyond its traditional sphere of influence while remaining below the threshold of direct military involvement. Moreover, the Wagner Group’s relative success in Syria empowered the Kremlin to further cultivate lucrative relationships with client states, particularly in Africa, as Russia’s semistate forces had presented themselves to be reliable partners in the sectors of counterterrorism, regime control, and either a formidable source of stability or instability depending on the client’s specific needs.
Indeed Wagner’s status as a PMC has sanctioned operations that would be difficult for official actors to undertake, as the organization can deploy of militarily trained fighters to do the bidding of the Kremlin under the guise of ostensibly commercial PMCs to conflict zones that would normally require the approval of the Russian parliament. The group’s participation in conflicts also provides the Russian military with an invaluable testing ground for new weapon systems and tactics, which has serious implications for future disputes. The relationship between the state and its semistate forces is further complicated by the presence of a symbiotic relationship with military special forces operators. For instance, Dmitry Utkin, the former commander of Russia’s special forces foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU’s Spetsnaz, was found to be the true operator of the Wagner Group in 2014. Consequently, PMCs are an appealing marketplace for former military and intelligence professionals seeking to leverage their expertise for financial revenue. In this way, Russian military and intelligence agencies can amplify the state’s exertion of influence and control. Showcasing this dynamic relationship, reports have revealed the subordination of the Wagner Group, as it shares a military base with the GRU’s Spetsnaz near Mol’kino and has conducted training exercises in at least two camps affiliated with the elite unit. Overall, an ambiguous legal system and multifaceted relationship between state apparatuses, the oligarchy, and PMCs enable the Kremlin to employ expeditionary semistate forces with relative ease. This arrangement allows the state to operate outside the bounds of conventional legal frameworks and enjoy multiple benefits.
The employment of semistate forces offers Russia such benefits as plausible deniability; casualty avoidance, (as PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny as military losses); increased manoeuvrability associated with rapid deployment and withdrawal capacities; and cost efficiency, as PMCs often receive substantive funding through private channels. Moreover, the relatively inconspicuous, deniable operations undertaken by these security companies allow the state to conduct low-risk foreign policy experiments where new modes of international influence can be tried without much cost to the Russian state if they go wrong. For instance, the Wagner Group's unsuccessful attempt in 2018 to seize the Conoco gas plant in Deir al-Zhour was an effort to gain control of a valuable economic asset while gauging the United States' determination. Although the Wagner Group suffered substantial casualties, the Kremlin maintained political distance while gaining a better understanding of the political and military environment. Considering this litany of advantages, it comes as no surprise that a seven-fold increase from 2015- 2021 was found in the number of countries where Russian PMCs are conducting operations, most notably within Africa and the Middle East.
After the recent attempted Wagner military coup, which was supposedly led by Prighozin, Putin made a surprising announcement. He openly admitted that the Kremlin fully finances Wagner and has provided the PMC with nearly $1 billion in the past year. This marks a significant departure from the previous stance of the state, which always maintained that PMCs and the government were separate entities. This change in narrative seems to be a strategic move by Moscow to bolster Putin's authority while discrediting Prighozin. The Kremlin now claims that Wagner's leader has been lying about the company's independence from the state, launching an information campaign to that effect. The question arises whether the Wagner Group will be considered a state organ. Despite Putin's assertion that the group is "fully" funded by the state, Wagner also receives funds from various sources, including other states. As for the command relationship between the PMC and the state, it remains unclear and varies from operation to operation, even when the state appears to exert control. The recent rebellion further underscores Wagner's distinct identity and ability to act in its own interests, exemplifying the unreliability of PMCs self-serving opportunist nature. Moreover, the recent attempted Wagner coup serves as a poignant reminder that PMCs consistently retain the capability to act as regime usurpers, underscoring their potential to challenge and undermine the authority of established governments.