The Wagner Rebellion: Implications for the War in Ukraine
Recap
The Wagner Group, under the command of Yevgeny Prigozhin, made headlines when they marched on Moscow in response to allegations that top Russian defence officials, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov had authorised the bombing of Wagner troops in Ukraine. Seizing control of parts of Rostov-on-Don, including the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) headquarters of the Southern Military District, the Wagner Group initiated its march towards Moscow. Prigozhin’s reported objective was to remove senior military leadership, but the Wagner troops’ advance halted 200 kilometres short of the capital. Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, intervened and mediated between Putin, Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. As a result, Prigozhin agreed to go into exile in Belarus, accompanied by any remaining loyal Wagner troops, and criminal charges against all involved were eventually dropped. Currently, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unclear.
Short-term
The 24-hour rebellion seems to have left minimal vulnerabilities for Ukrainian troops to exploit. Ukraine's troops could have been expected to look for weaknesses along the line of contact and possibly target sites in Russia to create a heightened sense of danger for the Kremlin. This could have forced Russia to divert troops and military assets from Ukraine to internal security. However, these actions have not materialised, indicating that Ukrainian forces remain focused on executing their counter-offensive plans.
Similarly, the Wagner forces had no major role to play in Russia's line of defence and instead played a central role in the Bakhmut conflict. However, as tensions arose between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defence, the troops had already withdrawn from the region. One further factor explaining why the rebellion had little effect on the war in Ukraine in the short term is that the mutiny ended without the need to withdraw Russian units from Ukraine to counter it.
Wagner troops in Belarus
On 11 July, the Belarusian Defence Ministry announced on Telegram that the Wagner mercenaries will train the Belarussian and Russian troops. Joint training would allow the Belarussian army to “benefit from the combat experience of Wagner commanders” according to Lukashenko.
Movement around the Russian training facilities in Belarus had added to speculation as to the future of what the partnership between the military structures of Belarus, Russia and the private structures would look like. On 27 June, satellite images showed activity at a disused military base near Asipovichy. The military dismantled training grounds in 3 locations: Abuz-Lyasnouski, Lepel and Repishch, and instead a larger camp with a capacity to host 15,000 soldiers was built in Tsel located 80 kilometres southeast of Minsk.
By sending more Wagner and Russian troops to Belarus, the Kremlin could be seeking to distract Ukrainian intelligence services and sow doubt as to Russia's next steps. Indeed, Ukrainian President Zelenskiy convened a meeting to discuss bolstering the nation's defence along the border with Belarus on 5 July, reflecting growing concern about the increased presence of Russian troops in Belarus.
Wagner troops in Russia
Russia's Defence Ministry announced that the Wagner Group should surrender its supply of weapons, while Putin invited its fighters to join the Russian Army instead of leaving for Belarus. This follows an original plan announced mid-June which was to have all Wagner troops (dubbed "volunteer detachments") sign contracts with the Defence Ministry by 1 July to increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian Army. This would have given the mercenaries legal status and effectively unified the military approaches. However, Prigozhin rejected signing such contracts, which further escalated tensions between him and the top military chiefs – particularly defence minister Sergei Shoigu –, ultimately contributing to the outbreak of the rebellion. As of 3 July though, Wagner Group was still officially recruiting to train in Russia’s Krasnodar region, thereby defying the truce brokered by Lukashenko.
Integrating Wagner fighters into the Russian army would be challenging, as Russian soldiers appear to be poorly or irregularly paid, undertrained, and suffer from low morale. In addition, mercenaries are relatively well paid and would struggle in respecting the chain of command. The nature of mercenaries remains self-serving, as highlighted in Olivia Gibson’s article. They are used to working independently from the Russian state and its chain of command, so collaboration could undermine rather than strengthen the Defence Ministry’s military goals. Because of these difficulties, it is more likely that the Wagner troops will continue to fight as mercenaries, possibly under a different name and with a new command, one far more subordinate to the Kremlin.
A profound mistrust exists between the public and private entities. Still, the prospect of another mutiny attempt is highly unlikely. This implies that a majority of Wagner's soldiers will be prepared to accept an alternative leadership closer to, or even part of, the Russian Defence Ministry. On the day of the rebellion, Chechen leader Kadyrov expressed his support for Putin, and reportedly sent troops to counter Wagner’s march. Therefore, we can also expect Putin to replace some Wagner forces with Chechen soldiers.
Conclusion
Although no tangible military effects have been observed, Russian forces risk suffering a setback in Ukraine if Russia loses a large number of Wagner fighters in the long term. It is also likely that Wagner's rebellion will have a long-term negative impact on the already low morale of Russian front-line soldiers and on the cohesion of the command structure of the military operation. The repercussions, therefore, go beyond the immediate, as senior Russian officials could be diverted from the ongoing war effort should a government reshuffle occur at senior military levels. One might have expected Putin to assign responsibility for the failure to suppress the uprising at its outset and to imprison Prigozhin. However, he did not do so and met Prigozhin five days after the failed mutiny. Nevertheless, internal conflicts are likely to emerge, as the Wagner troops require tighter supervision, something that could weaken the management of the Russian army in Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian attack forces to exploit certain vulnerabilities.
The Kremlin's ability to effectively operate the Wagner troops in Prigozhin's absence will be crucial in ensuring that the rebellion does not have a long-term impact on the invasion of Ukraine. However, if the Kremlin concentrates on dismantling the Wagner group and assigning blame to its senior officials, Ukraine could benefit from Priogozhin's failed march.