The Wagner Rebellion: Implications for the War in Ukraine
Recap
The Wagner Group, under the command of Yevgeny Prigozhin, made headlines when they marched on Moscow in response to allegations that top Russian defence officials, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov had authorised the bombing of Wagner troops in Ukraine. Seizing control of parts of Rostov-on-Don, including the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) headquarters of the Southern Military District, the Wagner Group initiated its march towards Moscow. Prigozhin’s reported objective was to remove senior military leadership, but the Wagner troops’ advance halted 200 kilometres short of the capital. Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, intervened and mediated between Putin, Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. As a result, Prigozhin agreed to go into exile in Belarus, accompanied by any remaining loyal Wagner troops, and criminal charges against all involved were eventually dropped. Currently, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unclear.
Short-term
The 24-hour rebellion seems to have left minimal vulnerabilities for Ukrainian troops to exploit. Ukraine's troops could have been expected to look for weaknesses along the line of contact and possibly target sites in Russia to create a heightened sense of danger for the Kremlin. This could have forced Russia to divert troops and military assets from Ukraine to internal security. However, these actions have not materialised, indicating that Ukrainian forces remain focused on executing their counter-offensive plans.
Similarly, the Wagner forces had no major role to play in Russia's line of defence and instead played a central role in the Bakhmut conflict. However, as tensions arose between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defence, the troops had already withdrawn from the region. One further factor explaining why the rebellion had little effect on the war in Ukraine in the short term is that the mutiny ended without the need to withdraw Russian units from Ukraine to counter it.
Wagner troops in Belarus
On 11 July, the Belarusian Defence Ministry announced on Telegram that the Wagner mercenaries will train the Belarussian and Russian troops. Joint training would allow the Belarussian army to “benefit from the combat experience of Wagner commanders” according to Lukashenko.
Movement around the Russian training facilities in Belarus had added to speculation as to the future of what the partnership between the military structures of Belarus, Russia and the private structures would look like. On 27 June, satellite images showed activity at a disused military base near Asipovichy. The military dismantled training grounds in 3 locations: Abuz-Lyasnouski, Lepel and Repishch, and instead a larger camp with a capacity to host 15,000 soldiers was built in Tsel located 80 kilometres southeast of Minsk.
By sending more Wagner and Russian troops to Belarus, the Kremlin could be seeking to distract Ukrainian intelligence services and sow doubt as to Russia's next steps. Indeed, Ukrainian President Zelenskiy convened a meeting to discuss bolstering the nation's defence along the border with Belarus on 5 July, reflecting growing concern about the increased presence of Russian troops in Belarus.
Wagner troops in Russia
Russia's Defence Ministry announced that the Wagner Group should surrender its supply of weapons, while Putin invited its fighters to join the Russian Army instead of leaving for Belarus. This follows an original plan announced mid-June which was to have all Wagner troops (dubbed "volunteer detachments") sign contracts with the Defence Ministry by 1 July to increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian Army. This would have given the mercenaries legal status and effectively unified the military approaches. However, Prigozhin rejected signing such contracts, which further escalated tensions between him and the top military chiefs – particularly defence minister Sergei Shoigu –, ultimately contributing to the outbreak of the rebellion. As of 3 July though, Wagner Group was still officially recruiting to train in Russia’s Krasnodar region, thereby defying the truce brokered by Lukashenko.
Integrating Wagner fighters into the Russian army would be challenging, as Russian soldiers appear to be poorly or irregularly paid, undertrained, and suffer from low morale. In addition, mercenaries are relatively well paid and would struggle in respecting the chain of command. The nature of mercenaries remains self-serving, as highlighted in Olivia Gibson’s article. They are used to working independently from the Russian state and its chain of command, so collaboration could undermine rather than strengthen the Defence Ministry’s military goals. Because of these difficulties, it is more likely that the Wagner troops will continue to fight as mercenaries, possibly under a different name and with a new command, one far more subordinate to the Kremlin.
A profound mistrust exists between the public and private entities. Still, the prospect of another mutiny attempt is highly unlikely. This implies that a majority of Wagner's soldiers will be prepared to accept an alternative leadership closer to, or even part of, the Russian Defence Ministry. On the day of the rebellion, Chechen leader Kadyrov expressed his support for Putin, and reportedly sent troops to counter Wagner’s march. Therefore, we can also expect Putin to replace some Wagner forces with Chechen soldiers.
Conclusion
Although no tangible military effects have been observed, Russian forces risk suffering a setback in Ukraine if Russia loses a large number of Wagner fighters in the long term. It is also likely that Wagner's rebellion will have a long-term negative impact on the already low morale of Russian front-line soldiers and on the cohesion of the command structure of the military operation. The repercussions, therefore, go beyond the immediate, as senior Russian officials could be diverted from the ongoing war effort should a government reshuffle occur at senior military levels. One might have expected Putin to assign responsibility for the failure to suppress the uprising at its outset and to imprison Prigozhin. However, he did not do so and met Prigozhin five days after the failed mutiny. Nevertheless, internal conflicts are likely to emerge, as the Wagner troops require tighter supervision, something that could weaken the management of the Russian army in Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian attack forces to exploit certain vulnerabilities.
The Kremlin's ability to effectively operate the Wagner troops in Prigozhin's absence will be crucial in ensuring that the rebellion does not have a long-term impact on the invasion of Ukraine. However, if the Kremlin concentrates on dismantling the Wagner group and assigning blame to its senior officials, Ukraine could benefit from Priogozhin's failed march.
Unleashing the Semistate: Russia’s dance with PMCs and the Geopolitical Game
Russia’s increased employment of semistate forces raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic concerns, particularly regarding the state’s deliberate lack of accountability, transparency, and regard for international and humanitarian law. Given the successful operations of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria as well as their perceived effectiveness in achieving geopolitical objectives, it is highly probable that Putin's regime will continue to rely on Private Military Companies (PMCs) as a means to further its interests. Thus it is imperative to gain a more nuanced understanding of the risks and weaknesses associated with the dynamic relationship between Russia and PMCs.
Although Russian PMCs are officially designated as private entities, they are often owned by the Russian oligarchy and operated by former members of the Russian military or intelligence services who maintain close working relationships with the Kremlin. Consequently, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have adopted the phrase “semistate” to more accurately describe Russia’s PMCs. These semistate forces work outside of the conventional military and legal structures and can be employed to further state interests through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Russia's synergistic relationship with these semistate forces is marked by a complex interplay of power dynamics; an intricate web of connections upheld by the country's inherently vague legal structure.
Russia’s ambiguous legal framework is a key component for the facilitation of the state’s interconnected relationship with semistate forces. While PMCs remain illegal, Private Security Companies on the other hand are officially registered entities that have been legally operating since 1992. In essence, this provides a legal loophole for Russia’s private commodity powerhouses, such as Gazprom and Transneft, to employ security units authorized to engage in predominately law enforcement-like activities at the facilities and, increasingly, engage in war activities. Although PMCs remain illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, perversely it is the illegal status that has facilitated the growth of the PMC industry, as the vague legal framework is used as a leveraging tool to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin. Given that Russia operates under a patronage system, the ambiguous laws ensure Putin’s cronies, like Prighozin, remain loyal to the Kremlin’s power vertical while also guaranteeing a portion of the PMC’s accumulated wealth will be shared with the state, or more specifically its officials.
Under this ambiguous legal system, state power and influence are undoubtedly augmented, as the capricious application of law generates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within the industry. Not to mention, evidence has revealed the oligarchy’s personal involvement in the funding and leadership of PMCs, with the most prominent example being the infamous Wagner Group reportedly funded by close Putin ally Yevgeny Prighozin.
The Wagner Group is believed to have been established in 2014 to provide offensive capabilities during the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent combat support to separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner would then go on to continue cutting its teeth by gaining notoriety for their involvement in Syria, where it acted as a force multiplier for President Bashar al-Assad’s army and safeguarded valuable infrastructure such as oil and gas plants. By fighting alongside Syrian forces and propping up Assad’s regime, Wagner enabled Russia to extend its influence in the region and project power beyond its traditional sphere of influence while remaining below the threshold of direct military involvement. Moreover, the Wagner Group’s relative success in Syria empowered the Kremlin to further cultivate lucrative relationships with client states, particularly in Africa, as Russia’s semistate forces had presented themselves to be reliable partners in the sectors of counterterrorism, regime control, and either a formidable source of stability or instability depending on the client’s specific needs.
Indeed Wagner’s status as a PMC has sanctioned operations that would be difficult for official actors to undertake, as the organization can deploy of militarily trained fighters to do the bidding of the Kremlin under the guise of ostensibly commercial PMCs to conflict zones that would normally require the approval of the Russian parliament. The group’s participation in conflicts also provides the Russian military with an invaluable testing ground for new weapon systems and tactics, which has serious implications for future disputes. The relationship between the state and its semistate forces is further complicated by the presence of a symbiotic relationship with military special forces operators. For instance, Dmitry Utkin, the former commander of Russia’s special forces foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU’s Spetsnaz, was found to be the true operator of the Wagner Group in 2014. Consequently, PMCs are an appealing marketplace for former military and intelligence professionals seeking to leverage their expertise for financial revenue. In this way, Russian military and intelligence agencies can amplify the state’s exertion of influence and control. Showcasing this dynamic relationship, reports have revealed the subordination of the Wagner Group, as it shares a military base with the GRU’s Spetsnaz near Mol’kino and has conducted training exercises in at least two camps affiliated with the elite unit. Overall, an ambiguous legal system and multifaceted relationship between state apparatuses, the oligarchy, and PMCs enable the Kremlin to employ expeditionary semistate forces with relative ease. This arrangement allows the state to operate outside the bounds of conventional legal frameworks and enjoy multiple benefits.
The employment of semistate forces offers Russia such benefits as plausible deniability; casualty avoidance, (as PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny as military losses); increased manoeuvrability associated with rapid deployment and withdrawal capacities; and cost efficiency, as PMCs often receive substantive funding through private channels. Moreover, the relatively inconspicuous, deniable operations undertaken by these security companies allow the state to conduct low-risk foreign policy experiments where new modes of international influence can be tried without much cost to the Russian state if they go wrong. For instance, the Wagner Group's unsuccessful attempt in 2018 to seize the Conoco gas plant in Deir al-Zhour was an effort to gain control of a valuable economic asset while gauging the United States' determination. Although the Wagner Group suffered substantial casualties, the Kremlin maintained political distance while gaining a better understanding of the political and military environment. Considering this litany of advantages, it comes as no surprise that a seven-fold increase from 2015- 2021 was found in the number of countries where Russian PMCs are conducting operations, most notably within Africa and the Middle East.
After the recent attempted Wagner military coup, which was supposedly led by Prighozin, Putin made a surprising announcement. He openly admitted that the Kremlin fully finances Wagner and has provided the PMC with nearly $1 billion in the past year. This marks a significant departure from the previous stance of the state, which always maintained that PMCs and the government were separate entities. This change in narrative seems to be a strategic move by Moscow to bolster Putin's authority while discrediting Prighozin. The Kremlin now claims that Wagner's leader has been lying about the company's independence from the state, launching an information campaign to that effect. The question arises whether the Wagner Group will be considered a state organ. Despite Putin's assertion that the group is "fully" funded by the state, Wagner also receives funds from various sources, including other states. As for the command relationship between the PMC and the state, it remains unclear and varies from operation to operation, even when the state appears to exert control. The recent rebellion further underscores Wagner's distinct identity and ability to act in its own interests, exemplifying the unreliability of PMCs self-serving opportunist nature. Moreover, the recent attempted Wagner coup serves as a poignant reminder that PMCs consistently retain the capability to act as regime usurpers, underscoring their potential to challenge and undermine the authority of established governments.