Olivia Gibson London Politica Olivia Gibson London Politica

The Lukashenko Factor: Decoding Belarus' Strategic Role in Resolving the Wagner Rebellion

Event Overview

On June 23rd, a 24-hour coup attempt involving the Wagner Group took place in Russia. The crisis was resolved swiftly as President Alexander Lukashenko played a prominent role in negotiating peace between the Wagner Group's Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin. Lukashenko's efforts led to an agreement in which Prighozin's Private Military Company - the Wagner Group, agreed to withdraw its personnel from Russia in exchange for amnesty in Belarus.

Lukashenko's Interest in Peace Negotiation Role

Lukashenko's interest in being a peace negotiator can be attributed to various factors. Following the contested 2020 election, which tarnished his legitimacy, Lukashenko's authority and image of power was significantly diminished. To navigate the ensuing political turmoil and widespread protests, he relied heavily on Moscow's intervention. However, this reliance also reduced Belarus’s autonomy and further alignment with Russian interests.

During this period, through frequent joint operations and cooperation, Belarus strengthened ties with Russia's Federal Security Bureau (FSB) and the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB). This growing convergence signalled the erosion of Belarus's sovereignty and its closer integration with Russia.

In the context of the coup attempt, Lukashenko saw an opportunity to regain prominence and solidify his position in the eyes of Russian authorities. By successfully brokering a deal with the Wagner Group, he aimed to demonstrate his utility to Russian President Vladimir Putin and, in return, potentially gain access to resources and training for his troops from the PMC.

In summary, Lukashenko's involvement in the peace negotiations reflects his strategic bid to restore his standing and strengthen ties with Russia amid the challenges to his authority and Belarus's sovereignty.

Implications of Accepting Wagner Troops in Minsk

Accepting Wagner Group troops in Minsk could have significant implications for Belarus both domestically and in its relations with other countries. The Wagner Group is a Russian private military company known for its involvement in conflicts around the world, and its presence in Minsk could create various consequences:

Heightened Tensions with the West and Baltic States

Accepting Wagner troops may further strain Belarus's relations with Western countries. The Wagner Group's reputation for engaging in questionable activities and its connection to the Russian government could raise concerns about Belarus's alignment with Russia's aggressive foreign policy. This may increase diplomatic pressure and sanctions from Western nations and neighbouring countries. Ukraine and the Baltic states may perceive the presence of Wagner troops in Minsk as a potential threat. Given Wagner's involvement in conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere, this move could trigger regional security concerns and heighten tensions in a delicate geopolitical environment.

Challenges to Sovereignty

Hosting Wagner troops could be seen as compromising Belarus's sovereignty and independence. It may raise questions about the extent of Russia's influence over Belarusian affairs and its ability to deploy forces on Belarusian territory without facing resistance from the government. If such arrangements continue or escalate, it could deepen Belarus's dependence on Russia for security matters and military support, potentially undermining its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Domestic Concerns and Popular Perception:

Belarus’s decision to welcome Wagner troops could fuel heightened resistance from citizens and political factions. This action might be construed as jeopardizing national interests and security, potentially triggering protests and demonstrations. This unrest amplifies the risk of regime instability and challenges the state's authoritative control. Furthermore, Lukashenko's credibility could suffer as the move might be seen as deepening his alignment with Russia, rather than pursuing authentic diplomatic resolutions.

Economic Ramifications

Depending on the response from the international community, accepting Wagner troops could lead to economic repercussions, such as trade restrictions and reduced foreign investments. These consequences could further strain Belarus's already struggling economy.

Suwalki Gap

Amidst these unfolding dynamics, the Suwalki Gap emerges as a strategic flashpoint. Positioned between Belarus and Kaliningrad, fears are taking root that Wagner troops, masquerading as either Belarusian border officers or asylum-seekers, could exploit this choke-point to facilitate migrant movement and further destabilize the border region. Consequently, Poland has begun erecting a formidable barrier along its border, while Lithuania contemplates a potential border closure. The Suwalki Gap's weight in this developing scenario is a stark reminder of the intricate game of influence and instability.

Overall, the coup attempt revealed Lukashenko's pivotal role in Belarus' strategy. Accepting Wagner troops holds intricate implications, from straining relations with the West and neighbouring states to risking sovereignty and triggering internal unrest. Amidst this, the Suwalki Gap's shadow underscores the high-stakes game of power. Belarus faces a critical crossroads, balancing its choices against the intricate web of global dynamics that shape its future.


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Olivia Gibson London Politica Olivia Gibson London Politica

Unleashing the Semistate: Russia’s dance with PMCs and the Geopolitical Game

 Russia’s increased employment of semistate forces raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic concerns, particularly regarding the state’s deliberate lack of accountability, transparency, and regard for international and humanitarian law. Given the successful operations of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria as well as their perceived effectiveness in achieving geopolitical objectives, it is highly probable that Putin's regime will continue to rely on Private Military Companies (PMCs) as a means to further its interests. Thus it is imperative to gain a more nuanced understanding of the risks and weaknesses associated with the dynamic relationship between Russia and PMCs.

Although Russian PMCs are officially designated as private entities, they are often owned by the Russian oligarchy and operated by former members of the Russian military or intelligence services who maintain close working relationships with the Kremlin. Consequently, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have adopted the phrase “semistate” to more accurately describe Russia’s PMCs. These semistate forces work outside of the conventional military and legal structures and can be employed to further state interests through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Russia's synergistic relationship with these semistate forces is marked by a complex interplay of power dynamics; an intricate web of connections upheld by the country's inherently vague legal structure.


Russia’s ambiguous legal framework is a key component for the facilitation of the state’s interconnected relationship with semistate forces. While PMCs remain illegal, Private Security Companies on the other hand are officially registered entities that have been legally operating since 1992. In essence, this provides a legal loophole for Russia’s private commodity powerhouses, such as Gazprom and Transneft, to employ security units authorized to engage in predominately law enforcement-like activities at the facilities and, increasingly, engage in war activities. Although PMCs remain illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, perversely it is the illegal status that has facilitated the growth of the PMC industry, as the vague legal framework is used as a leveraging tool to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin. Given that Russia operates under a patronage system, the ambiguous laws ensure Putin’s cronies, like Prighozin, remain loyal to the Kremlin’s power vertical while also guaranteeing a portion of the PMC’s accumulated wealth will be shared with the state, or more specifically its officials. 


 Under this ambiguous legal system, state power and influence are undoubtedly augmented, as the capricious application of law generates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within the industry. Not to mention, evidence has revealed the oligarchy’s personal involvement in the funding and leadership of PMCs, with the most prominent example being the infamous Wagner Group reportedly funded by close Putin ally Yevgeny Prighozin. 

The Wagner Group is believed to have been established in 2014 to provide offensive capabilities during the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent combat support to separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner would then go on to continue cutting its teeth by gaining notoriety for their involvement in Syria, where it acted as a force multiplier for President Bashar al-Assad’s army and safeguarded valuable infrastructure such as oil and gas plants. By fighting alongside Syrian forces and propping up Assad’s regime, Wagner enabled Russia to extend its influence in the region and project power beyond its traditional sphere of influence while remaining below the threshold of direct military involvement. Moreover, the Wagner Group’s relative success in Syria empowered the Kremlin to further cultivate lucrative relationships with client states, particularly in Africa, as Russia’s semistate forces had presented themselves to be reliable partners in the sectors of counterterrorism, regime control, and either a formidable source of stability or instability depending on the client’s specific needs. 

Indeed Wagner’s status as a PMC has sanctioned operations that would be difficult for official actors to undertake, as the organization can deploy of militarily trained fighters to do the bidding of the Kremlin under the guise of ostensibly commercial PMCs to conflict zones that would normally require the approval of the Russian parliament. The group’s participation in conflicts also provides the Russian military with an invaluable testing ground for new weapon systems and tactics, which has serious implications for future disputes. The relationship between the state and its semistate forces is further complicated by the presence of a symbiotic relationship with military special forces operators. For instance, Dmitry Utkin, the former commander of Russia’s special forces foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU’s Spetsnaz, was found to be the true operator of the Wagner Group in 2014. Consequently, PMCs are an appealing marketplace for former military and intelligence professionals seeking to leverage their expertise for financial revenue. In this way, Russian military and intelligence agencies can amplify the state’s exertion of influence and control. Showcasing this dynamic relationship, reports have revealed the subordination of the Wagner Group, as it shares a military base with the GRU’s Spetsnaz near Mol’kino and has conducted training exercises in at least two camps affiliated with the elite unit. Overall, an ambiguous legal system and multifaceted relationship between state apparatuses, the oligarchy, and PMCs enable the Kremlin to employ expeditionary semistate forces with relative ease. This arrangement allows the state to operate outside the bounds of conventional legal frameworks and enjoy multiple benefits.

The employment of semistate forces offers Russia such benefits as plausible deniability; casualty avoidance, (as PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny as military losses); increased manoeuvrability associated with rapid deployment and withdrawal capacities; and cost efficiency, as PMCs often receive substantive funding through private channels. Moreover, the relatively inconspicuous, deniable operations undertaken by these security companies allow the state to conduct low-risk foreign policy experiments where new modes of international influence can be tried without much cost to the Russian state if they go wrong. For instance, the Wagner Group's unsuccessful attempt in 2018 to seize the Conoco gas plant in Deir al-Zhour was an effort to gain control of a valuable economic asset while gauging the United States' determination. Although the Wagner Group suffered substantial casualties, the Kremlin maintained political distance while gaining a better understanding of the political and military environment. Considering this litany of advantages, it comes as no surprise that a seven-fold increase from 2015- 2021 was found in the number of countries where Russian PMCs are conducting operations, most notably within Africa and the Middle East.

After the recent attempted Wagner military coup, which was supposedly led by Prighozin, Putin made a surprising announcement. He openly admitted that the Kremlin fully finances Wagner and has provided the PMC with nearly $1 billion in the past year. This marks a significant departure from the previous stance of the state, which always maintained that PMCs and the government were separate entities. This change in narrative seems to be a strategic move by Moscow to bolster Putin's authority while discrediting Prighozin. The Kremlin now claims that Wagner's leader has been lying about the company's independence from the state, launching an information campaign to that effect. The question arises whether the Wagner Group will be considered a state organ. Despite Putin's assertion that the group is "fully" funded by the state, Wagner also receives funds from various sources, including other states. As for the command relationship between the PMC and the state, it remains unclear and varies from operation to operation, even when the state appears to exert control. The recent rebellion further underscores Wagner's distinct identity and ability to act in its own interests, exemplifying the unreliability of PMCs self-serving opportunist nature. Moreover, the recent attempted Wagner coup serves as a poignant reminder that PMCs consistently retain the capability to act as regime usurpers, underscoring their potential to challenge and undermine the authority of established governments.


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Wagner Intel Brief- 24/06 at 13:04 BST


Yevgeny Prigozhin called for a rebellion against the army on June 23rd, and urged the army not to resist, calling it a "march of justice”. This came after Prigozhin claimed that Wagner military sites in Ukraine were attacked by Russian artillery on Chief of General Staff Gerasimov's orders after a meeting with Defence Minister Shoigu, where they decided to eliminate Wagner. 

Wagner forces have been vital in Russia's Ukrainian war, capturing the city of Bakhmut. However, Prigozhin has repeatedly criticised Russia's military leaders for incompetence and neglecting his troops' needs.

Yevgeny Prigozhin speaking inside the headquarters of the Russian southern military district in the city of Rostov-on-Don

Russian government response

  • Immediately after, security services called for the arrest of Prigozhin. Security was heightened in Moscow and in Rostov-on-Don (“Fortress operation”).

  • Putin denounced a “treason” and “mutiny” but denies calling it a military coup.

  • A counter-terrorism regime was introduced in Moscow, the Moscow region and Voronezh region (9AM BTS).

  • Governors of Sverdlovsk and Bryansk regions introduce high alert regime - Russian media (12PM BTS)

Military developments

Rostov-on-Don

  • Evening of 23rd: Wagner surrounded military HQ and the city of Rostov-on-Don, “no resistance from Russian military” and in spite of alleged roadblocks put in the place by the military (tweet)

  • Announcement of Prigozhin from the HQ of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don which Wagner PMC now fully control (video). He states that he has full control of the military installations to ensure that the Russian air force are attacking Ukrainians, and not Wagner troops. He calls for Shoigu and Gerasimov to be given up by the Russian authorities.

  • A Wagner convoy near Voronezh controls the Don highway (video).

  • Wagner installs mine barriers made of TM-62 anti-tank guns in Rostov-on-Don.

  • Wagners are mining the streets of Rostov-on-Don, setting up roadblocks and firing positions, Russian public media reports, citing eyewitnesses at the scene (video).

Voronezh

  • Wagner column seen 2 km from Buturlinovka, Voronezh region (video).Voronezh is located between the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and Moscow. So as  Wagner forces are expected to head towards Moscow, Russian Air Forces are allegedly attacking Wagner convoys along the M4 highway (other source).

  • At the Bugaivka border crossing in the Voronezh region, another 180 Russian soldiers and law enforcement officers agreed not to interfere with the Wagner action and laid down their arms. It is not the only report made by Progozhin about the support from the Russian border control officers’ side.

  • The battle was filmed in the Voronezh region. Judging by the sounds in the video, there was an active firefight between the Russian army and Wagner (around 9am BST). https://t.me/lachentyt/30933.

  • The road towards Voronezh is heavily damaged (Telegram post with video). It is reported that the Russian Armed Forces were shooting. The video shows that a civilian car was damaged.

  • Images of Russian soldiers surrending in Voronezh.

  • Heavy convoy in Voronezh, at 9:30 BST, the convoy is about 445km from Moscow.

  • Another video showing column moving towards Moscow

  • In Rostov, explosions ripped through the headquarters of the Southern Military District (around 12 BST).

  • Explosion 1672544456929693696 - geolocated

Moscow

  • The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation take up positions near the bridge over the Oka River near Serpukhov, where the M2 "Crimea" highway runs towards Moscow (around 10:00 BST).

  • Checkpoints with APCs have been set up at the entrance to Moscow, local media reports say.

  • The movement of the Wagner military column towards Moscow (11:30 BST)

  • Video confirmation of Counter-Terrorism Committee (branch of the FSB) buildup in Moscow

    • Translation: “I have a dream in which Moscow is burning. Good luck, not a step back” (Sheik Mansur Battalion)

Unconfirmed (mainly happening in the Voronezh region)

  • A warplane, likely a transport aircraft, was shot down over Voronezh. So far, it looks like Wagner was responsible. Allegations that the plane was carrying hundreds of Kadyrov soldiers.

  • Oil depot in Voronezh was bombed by a helicopter (video, video). The attacker responsible for the fire in unknown.

  • The Wagner PMC destroyed 4 helicopters of the Russian Armed Forces and one AN-26/Su-25 (other video, video, video)

  • A military convoy wan noticed moving towards Krasnodar.

  • Medvedev and his family have allegedly escaped from Moscow?

  • Situation updates

  • Map of Wagner progress

Other actors:

  • Ramzan Kadyrov - Head of the Chechen Republic - supports Putin and calls Wagner’s operation a military coup.

  • Fighters from the Storm-Z group endorsed Prigozhin & are willing to join Wagner if they require their assistance. On June 19th, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced it was replacing the Wagner Group convict troops with its own Storm-Z battalions and Chechen special forces. This initiative sparked allegations of the “Russian army 'on verge of civil war'.

  • Kalinowski's Regiment prepares an address to the Belarusian people at 17:00 Minsk time. (The Kastusia Kalinouski Regiment (Polk Kastusia Kalinouski) is a volunteer regiment (formerly a battalion) formed in February 2022 to defend Ukraine against Russian invasion)

  • Russian Volunteer Corps is interested in the developments and asks Russian people share the footage with the location of checkpoints, equipment to their Telegram bot.

Translation:

Friends, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps are very interested in what is happening in their hometowns today.

  • Sheik Mansur Battalion - Reports of increased tension in the Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia as orders restricting movement outside of the regions are put into effect - Source

Translation - “Collaborators of the occupied Checnya and Ingushetia start to fuss. Orders are being received not to move outside the republics, even if neigboring regions ask for it. Fear…tremble enemies of the freedom-lovers

You can send photos/video information showing roadblocks, equipment and other attempts of the regime to defend itself to the bot of our channel.

We are most interested in Moscow, Rostov and Voronezh.

Reaction:

- Дума statement:

 “The history of Russia has shown that external challenges and threats have united our society. Together we are able to overcome any difficulties.

The problems and troubles of the country have always occurred only because of betrayal, internal division and betrayal of the elites.

The deputies of the State Duma, representing the interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation, advocate for the consolidation of forces, support President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin — our Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The Wagner fighters must make the only right choice: to be with their people, on the side of the law, to protect the security and future of the Motherland, to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.

Anything else is a betrayal!

We are confronted by a common external enemy that promotes the ideology of Nazism — destroys Russian citizens, threatens the security of our country.

In this situation, it is necessary to unite even more and do everything to win”

Ukrainian reaction and comments:

  • Moscow is preparing for a siege. The city is virtually isolated by police and military units. All military equipment that has remained in reserve and border regions is being moved to Moscow - the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine

  • Security forces have received permission to:

  • Listen to any conversations and checking correspondence

  • Conduct detentions and searches without additional approvals

  • Forceful access to private and official premises

  • Use motor vehicles of citizens and organisations

  • Disconnect all types of communication

  • "Removal of individuals from areas and objects".

    • Published: around 12:15 BTS.

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