Unleashing the Semistate: Russia’s dance with PMCs and the Geopolitical Game
Russia’s increased employment of semistate forces raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic concerns, particularly regarding the state’s deliberate lack of accountability, transparency, and regard for international and humanitarian law. Given the successful operations of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria as well as their perceived effectiveness in achieving geopolitical objectives, it is highly probable that Putin's regime will continue to rely on Private Military Companies (PMCs) as a means to further its interests. Thus it is imperative to gain a more nuanced understanding of the risks and weaknesses associated with the dynamic relationship between Russia and PMCs.
Although Russian PMCs are officially designated as private entities, they are often owned by the Russian oligarchy and operated by former members of the Russian military or intelligence services who maintain close working relationships with the Kremlin. Consequently, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have adopted the phrase “semistate” to more accurately describe Russia’s PMCs. These semistate forces work outside of the conventional military and legal structures and can be employed to further state interests through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Russia's synergistic relationship with these semistate forces is marked by a complex interplay of power dynamics; an intricate web of connections upheld by the country's inherently vague legal structure.
Russia’s ambiguous legal framework is a key component for the facilitation of the state’s interconnected relationship with semistate forces. While PMCs remain illegal, Private Security Companies on the other hand are officially registered entities that have been legally operating since 1992. In essence, this provides a legal loophole for Russia’s private commodity powerhouses, such as Gazprom and Transneft, to employ security units authorized to engage in predominately law enforcement-like activities at the facilities and, increasingly, engage in war activities. Although PMCs remain illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, perversely it is the illegal status that has facilitated the growth of the PMC industry, as the vague legal framework is used as a leveraging tool to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin. Given that Russia operates under a patronage system, the ambiguous laws ensure Putin’s cronies, like Prighozin, remain loyal to the Kremlin’s power vertical while also guaranteeing a portion of the PMC’s accumulated wealth will be shared with the state, or more specifically its officials.
Under this ambiguous legal system, state power and influence are undoubtedly augmented, as the capricious application of law generates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within the industry. Not to mention, evidence has revealed the oligarchy’s personal involvement in the funding and leadership of PMCs, with the most prominent example being the infamous Wagner Group reportedly funded by close Putin ally Yevgeny Prighozin.
The Wagner Group is believed to have been established in 2014 to provide offensive capabilities during the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent combat support to separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner would then go on to continue cutting its teeth by gaining notoriety for their involvement in Syria, where it acted as a force multiplier for President Bashar al-Assad’s army and safeguarded valuable infrastructure such as oil and gas plants. By fighting alongside Syrian forces and propping up Assad’s regime, Wagner enabled Russia to extend its influence in the region and project power beyond its traditional sphere of influence while remaining below the threshold of direct military involvement. Moreover, the Wagner Group’s relative success in Syria empowered the Kremlin to further cultivate lucrative relationships with client states, particularly in Africa, as Russia’s semistate forces had presented themselves to be reliable partners in the sectors of counterterrorism, regime control, and either a formidable source of stability or instability depending on the client’s specific needs.
Indeed Wagner’s status as a PMC has sanctioned operations that would be difficult for official actors to undertake, as the organization can deploy of militarily trained fighters to do the bidding of the Kremlin under the guise of ostensibly commercial PMCs to conflict zones that would normally require the approval of the Russian parliament. The group’s participation in conflicts also provides the Russian military with an invaluable testing ground for new weapon systems and tactics, which has serious implications for future disputes. The relationship between the state and its semistate forces is further complicated by the presence of a symbiotic relationship with military special forces operators. For instance, Dmitry Utkin, the former commander of Russia’s special forces foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU’s Spetsnaz, was found to be the true operator of the Wagner Group in 2014. Consequently, PMCs are an appealing marketplace for former military and intelligence professionals seeking to leverage their expertise for financial revenue. In this way, Russian military and intelligence agencies can amplify the state’s exertion of influence and control. Showcasing this dynamic relationship, reports have revealed the subordination of the Wagner Group, as it shares a military base with the GRU’s Spetsnaz near Mol’kino and has conducted training exercises in at least two camps affiliated with the elite unit. Overall, an ambiguous legal system and multifaceted relationship between state apparatuses, the oligarchy, and PMCs enable the Kremlin to employ expeditionary semistate forces with relative ease. This arrangement allows the state to operate outside the bounds of conventional legal frameworks and enjoy multiple benefits.
The employment of semistate forces offers Russia such benefits as plausible deniability; casualty avoidance, (as PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny as military losses); increased manoeuvrability associated with rapid deployment and withdrawal capacities; and cost efficiency, as PMCs often receive substantive funding through private channels. Moreover, the relatively inconspicuous, deniable operations undertaken by these security companies allow the state to conduct low-risk foreign policy experiments where new modes of international influence can be tried without much cost to the Russian state if they go wrong. For instance, the Wagner Group's unsuccessful attempt in 2018 to seize the Conoco gas plant in Deir al-Zhour was an effort to gain control of a valuable economic asset while gauging the United States' determination. Although the Wagner Group suffered substantial casualties, the Kremlin maintained political distance while gaining a better understanding of the political and military environment. Considering this litany of advantages, it comes as no surprise that a seven-fold increase from 2015- 2021 was found in the number of countries where Russian PMCs are conducting operations, most notably within Africa and the Middle East.
After the recent attempted Wagner military coup, which was supposedly led by Prighozin, Putin made a surprising announcement. He openly admitted that the Kremlin fully finances Wagner and has provided the PMC with nearly $1 billion in the past year. This marks a significant departure from the previous stance of the state, which always maintained that PMCs and the government were separate entities. This change in narrative seems to be a strategic move by Moscow to bolster Putin's authority while discrediting Prighozin. The Kremlin now claims that Wagner's leader has been lying about the company's independence from the state, launching an information campaign to that effect. The question arises whether the Wagner Group will be considered a state organ. Despite Putin's assertion that the group is "fully" funded by the state, Wagner also receives funds from various sources, including other states. As for the command relationship between the PMC and the state, it remains unclear and varies from operation to operation, even when the state appears to exert control. The recent rebellion further underscores Wagner's distinct identity and ability to act in its own interests, exemplifying the unreliability of PMCs self-serving opportunist nature. Moreover, the recent attempted Wagner coup serves as a poignant reminder that PMCs consistently retain the capability to act as regime usurpers, underscoring their potential to challenge and undermine the authority of established governments.