Behind the Conflict: Support for Prigozhin and Public Reaction
A certain level of support from Prigozhin’s network, including various influential regional and federal actors, partly explains the rapid movement of Wagner’s troops towards Moscow on 24 June. Given the quality and quantity of weapons used in the “coup” attempt, it seems that Prigozhin had planned it in advance but was waiting for the right moment. In an interview Prigozhin did with Russian military correspondent Semyon Pegov in April 2023, the latter mentioned a perceived threat in Moscow to give Prigozhin more weapons due to Wagner’s autonomy and, indeed, “the possibility of attacking Moscow.” Therefore, if this warning was circulating in Moscow, no one in the Kremlin took it seriously, and Wagner’s capabilities were misjudged.
The Russian Army’s Support for Prigozhin
Firstly, without assured backing, Prigozhin would have unlikely started his “March of Justice” due to the very high risk of Putin’s reprisal. It is likely that he received support from influential Russian oligarchs. However, it is hard to estimate who it could be. In the upcoming months, potential internal destabilisation in Russia could shed more light on the growing splits among the Russian elite.
Secondly, Prigozhin has privileged contacts with the military elite. One of them is General Surovikin, former commander of the Russian forces in the Russian-Ukrainian war until January 2023. According to Prigozhin, General Surovikin commanded Wagner’s operation in the Donetsk region after being replaced by Valery Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Troops of Russia. Meanwhile, General Mikhail Mizintsev, known for leading the siege of the city of Mariupol, became Wagner’s deputy commander in May 2023. Several media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, reported the detention of General Surovikin in the wake of the attempted coup. As stated, the general was aware of an upcoming uprising against Russia's military leadership but did not participate in it.
Thirdly, both Surovikin and Mizintsev still enjoy great prestige among middle-ranking Russian officers. This could have positively influenced the perception of Wagner’s leader in the officers’ eyes, which was beneficial for Prigozhin. Months before the rebellion, Prigozhin changed his rhetoric into a more comprehensive critique of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s management of the war, shared by a growing number of low-ranking Russian soldiers. In sum, some soldiers' sympathy for Prigozhin and Wagner may have ensured a neutral stance towards Wagner's actions and the non-intervention of a large part of the regular Russian army and law enforcement agencies.
Prigozhin’s mercenaries did not face any resistance from the border officers at the entry points of Rostov-on-Don oblast or from the Russian army and police in Rostov and Voronezh. It indicates either the unpreparedness and inability to manage the crisis of Russian security and law enforcement agencies or their support for Wagner’s actions. Indeed, both of these factors were instrumental in enabling the movement of Wagner’s troops within Russia. Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, mentioned that neither the Rosgvardia nor the Capital Police could match Wagner’s capabilities, equipment and arms. Moreover, the fact that senior and middle-ranking officers could stand aside and not react to direct military rebellion highlights the divisions within the Russian army and underlines the possible disloyalty of the military command to Putin.
The Public’s Reaction to the Rebellion
The reaction of Russian society to the attempted “coup” remains uncertain. Unsurprisingly, people were disoriented when Wagner’s forces entered Rostov-on-Don, took over the administrative buildings and managed to move further on. Prigozhin insisted that Wagner had received strong support from citizens, who were allegedly disappointed when the “march” stopped, as they had hoped that the fight against bureaucracy and the resolution of other problems in the country would be pursued after the rebellion. Contrary to Prigozhin’s statements, Wagner mercenaries dispersed demonstrations against their “march” in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Therefore, on 24 June, the population of Rostov was divided with a big share of those ready to resist Wagner not to let them overthrow the legitimate government.
Russian non-governmental research organisation Levada Analytical Center conducted a comprehensive social poll on the Russian public’s perception of the Wagner rebellion. Anxiety was the most common reaction on 24 June, but its level was not comparable to that of February and September 2022, when a partial mobilisation was announced. The report concluded that because it all happened so rapidly, people did not have time to be truly terrified. Moreover, most respondents (44%) followed the events on television, thus consuming the information as interpreted by the authorities.
As a result, the “coup” had relatively little effect on the Russian public’s perception of their government. Only the popularity rating of Sergei Shoigu, the main target of the rebellion, has been affected, while Putin’s indicators “as a whole” have remained the same as in the previous poll (no specific figure was mentioned; however, the last poll (22-28 June) concluded with a positive perception of 81%). The Levada Center has concluded that the failed rebellion has had no impact on the power of the Russian government. According to a third of respondents, society will continue to consolidate, and the state will become stronger. Conversely, the Russian youth, traditionally more opposed to the government, is more inclined not to believe that the Kremlin's authority has not been affected.
Slightly different conclusions were presented by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, which is considered to be pro-government. Although sociologists claim that Putin is still trusted by 77.2% of Russian citizens, according to a poll published on 14 July, this is the lowest value since 27 February 2022. Notably, the indicators for trust decreased after Wagner’s rebellion (on 23 June, the indicator was 78,9%).
The Russian government-backed media play a crucial role in keeping Putin's confidence indicators high, emphasising the Russian government’s success in preventing the Wagner troops from entering Moscow. They also downplayed Wagner's activities in Ukraine and tried to create an information vacuum about subsequent events concerning Wagner and the circumstances of 24 June in order to avoid raising the subject as a point of discussion among Russian citizens. Notably, Putin recently denied the very existence of Wagner, claiming that private military companies are forbidden in Russia and, therefore, cannot exist.
Conclusion
Prigozhin's rebellion ended the Russian government’s total control over critical viewpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian war and allowed these discussions to reach a larger section of the Russian public. The “March of Justice” has become a clear signal of Putin’s vulnerabilities and the uncertainties surrounding his inner circle and Russia’s senior military leadership. Moreover, the rebellion revealed the internal divisions between the Russian militaries and the growing discontent within the Russian army, specifically among senior and middle-ranking officers. However, now that Prigozhin has announced Wagner’s definite withdrawal from Ukraine, his instigations against the current Russian military leadership are likely to cease which will avoid fuelling conflicts within the Russian army and society. Moreover, it will be easier for the Russian Ministry of Defence to manage its war in Ukraine without an independent Wagner-style military force. At the same time, it would be wrong to believe that the rebellion has had a significant impact on Putin’s regime. Although the attempted “coup” has demonstrated the internal instability that Russia is currently experiencing, it had little impact on the way the Russian people perceive their government and the current course of domestic politics. Consequently, it is likely that Putin will retain public support even after the events of 24 June, reducing the possibility of a civil uprising.
Behind the conflict : Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defence
The events on the 24th of June in Russia left many unanswered questions and signalled more to come. This article focuses on why the Chief of PWC Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, announced his “March for Justice” and discusses his relations with the main target of the rebellion - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. While Prigozhin attempted to adjust his deteriorating position and gain more attention from the Russian military and political decision-makers, his failed "coup" greatly reduced its influence in Russia through the physical relocation of Prigozhin and most of the ‘Wagnerians’ to Belarus, consequently cutting off access to the Russian media field. Putin is currently seeking to preserve “Wagner” as a cohesive fighting force; however, he is striving to separate it from Prigozhin. Thus, aiming to prevent the destruction of Wagner, Prigozhin ultimately brought this process closer to reality.
What Is Special About Wagner in The Russian-Ukrainian War
PWC “Wagner” gradually gained its reputation in Russia amid the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine (2014-2022), the war in Syria and the resultant presence in Africa. Their influence was augmented following the failure of the initial plans of the Russian leadership to defeat Ukraine in February 2022. During the summer of 2022, Wagner’s Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, launched a successful recruitment campaign, and the number of Wagner mercenaries on the Ukrainian battlefield increased to approximately 50,000.
Exploiting its unique position outside the Russian law and military hierarchy, with independent access to the Russian information space, Prigozhin established a military system parallel to the Russian Armed Forces, evading the usual levels of accountability expected from conventional military units. This indicates that Prigozhin was unrestricted when making military decisions and planning Wagner operations, as stated in a former London Politica article by Olivia Gibson. Such a lack of coordination between Wagner and the Russian MOD could explain inconsistencies and mistakes on the frontline, thus further deteriorating the Russian war effort against Ukraine. Demonstrating a major issue for the MOD, as they are principally accountable for Russian war developments.
Additionally, Prigozhin’s enhanced popularity on social media (with his Telegram channel “Prigozhin's hat” or other Wagner-related channels) and publications belonging to his Patriot media holding have allowed him to promote himself freely and Wagner, whilst publicly criticising Russian military officials and their decisions/failures on the frontline. Indeed, there were registered cases when Prigozhin’s public activity contradicted the Kremlin’s official narratives about the course of the war, such as the security of the Russian Belgorod Oblast. Which substantially undermined the domestic trust in Russian political and military officials, especially among the more patriotic citizens of the country.
At the same time, PMC “Wagner” was not a fully independent military actor on the Ukrainian battlefield nor in its operation in Africa or Syria. Prigozhin and Wagner’s commanders were largely accountable to Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, Wagner’s mercenaries had been receiving exclusive provisions from the MOD. But when the Ministry could not keep supplying Wagner with the previous volumes and quality of arms and ammunition, Prigozhin started to manipulate the narrative.
Consequently, Wagner turned out to be a double-edged sword for Putin. On the one hand, the Russian president heavily relied on Wagner’s mercenaries on the front line in Ukraine, specifically Bakhmyt. On the other hand, as the practice showed, Prigozhin harmed Putin’s regime in the midst of war intensification.
A Brief History of Prigozhin-MOD Tensions
The conflict between Yevgeniy Prigozhin and the Russian MOD, namely Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, resulted in Prigozhin’s “March of Justice”. Prigozhin's clash with the Defence Ministry escalated in January 2023, particularly because of the change of the commander of the joint grouping in Ukraine when Valery Gerasimov replaced Sergey Surovikin. In addition, Prigozhin has been accusing the MOD of downplaying Wagner's role in Russian military achievements in Donbas.
For a while, a central point of confrontation was a lack of arms supply for PMC “Wagner”. In February 2023, Wagner complained about a shortage of arms and ammunition at the front, causing "hundreds" of soldiers to die daily. In early May, Prigozhin resorted to a radical approach on this ground and announced Wagner’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. The Ukrainian city of Bakhmut has played a strategic and more symbolic role for Ukrainian and Russian armies, as fierce fights have continued since August 2022.
The split between Prigozhin and Shoigu became more evident when in early June 2023, the Defence Minister issued an order requiring all formations that carry out combat missions to conclude a contract with the military by 1 July. This would have meant the end of Wagner’s autonomy on the Ukrainian battlefield and its overall weakening. Prigozhin announced that none of his soldiers would sign the contract and that Wagner would keep fulfilling the tasks assigned by Army General Surovikin (Gerasimov’s predecessor). Later, Prigozhin reported the shelling of Wagner's positions from the rear, suggesting that the command of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff were behind or knew about these events.
23-24 June: Prigozhin Against Putin? Or Against Shoigu?
On the afternoon of 23 June, Prigozhin's press service published his half-hour speech in which he lashed out with personal criticism of Shoigu and dispelled the core narrative of Russian war propaganda towards Ukraine. Prigozhin’s rhetoric complied with his long-lasting tensions with the Russian MOD, particularly Sergei Shoigu. At the same time, Prigozhin tried to justify and indeed defend Putin, who, according to Wagner’s Chief, received reports that "did not correspond to reality in any way" because the MOD "thoroughly deceived him".
Later, Prigozhin revealed the purpose of the "march", which was to prevent the destruction of the PMC “Wagner” and to bring to justice those who "with their unprofessional actions committed a huge number of mistakes in the course of the SMO (ed. - special military operation)". Overall, Prigozhin claimed that the “march” aimed at demonstrating their protest, not to overthrow the country's government. Although the rebellion was not explicitly against Putin, the vast majority of foreign observers agree that Wagner’s “coup” publicly exposed the weakness of the Putin regime and even the start of its gradual ending.
Did Prigozhin achieve any of his goals?
Right after the termination of the rebellion, Russian President’s Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that any cadre reshuffles in the Russian Defence Ministry were not the subject of negotiations, and Sergei Shoigu remained in his position as of July 15. Considering the failure of the “coup”, it was doubtful Putin would agree to these changes. Moreover, after circulating gossip around Gerasimov’s resignation, he publicly appeared during one of the meetings, refuting those speculations.
Days after the “coup”, Vladimir Putin confirmed that Wagner received RUB 86 billion (around USD 954 million) from May 2022 to May 2023. Now budget expenditures might be directed to the needs of MOD. Besides, over 2,000 pieces of Wagner’s equipment have already been passed to the Russian Armed Forces, including hundreds of tanks, Grad and Uragan MLRSs, Pantsir SAMs, self-propelled artillery systems, armoured personnel carriers and other items. Russian Army also received over two and a half thousand tonnes of ammunition and about 20 thousand small arms. All equipment and weapons are being delivered to the rear areas for repair and combat preparation.
While Prigozhin intended to correct his shaken position, the failed “coup” provided a suitable opportunity for Putin and MOD to undermine a main internal competitor, the PWC “Wagner” in the hands of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Earlier, Prigozhin had enough capabilities and possibilities to harm MOD plans on the battlefield in Ukraine and inside Russia. As a result of the June 23-24 events, Wagner lost its reputation and support from Putin, and now the country is directing its power to eliminate Wagner’s autonomy and include it in the Russian military structure as a typical military unit.
Wagner Intel Brief- 24/06 at 13:04 BST
Yevgeny Prigozhin called for a rebellion against the army on June 23rd, and urged the army not to resist, calling it a "march of justice”. This came after Prigozhin claimed that Wagner military sites in Ukraine were attacked by Russian artillery on Chief of General Staff Gerasimov's orders after a meeting with Defence Minister Shoigu, where they decided to eliminate Wagner.
Wagner forces have been vital in Russia's Ukrainian war, capturing the city of Bakhmut. However, Prigozhin has repeatedly criticised Russia's military leaders for incompetence and neglecting his troops' needs.
Yevgeny Prigozhin speaking inside the headquarters of the Russian southern military district in the city of Rostov-on-Don
Russian government response
Immediately after, security services called for the arrest of Prigozhin. Security was heightened in Moscow and in Rostov-on-Don (“Fortress operation”).
Putin denounced a “treason” and “mutiny” but denies calling it a military coup.
A counter-terrorism regime was introduced in Moscow, the Moscow region and Voronezh region (9AM BTS).
Governors of Sverdlovsk and Bryansk regions introduce high alert regime - Russian media (12PM BTS)
Military developments
Rostov-on-Don
Evening of 23rd: Wagner surrounded military HQ and the city of Rostov-on-Don, “no resistance from Russian military” and in spite of alleged roadblocks put in the place by the military (tweet)
Announcement of Prigozhin from the HQ of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don which Wagner PMC now fully control (video). He states that he has full control of the military installations to ensure that the Russian air force are attacking Ukrainians, and not Wagner troops. He calls for Shoigu and Gerasimov to be given up by the Russian authorities.
A Wagner convoy near Voronezh controls the Don highway (video).
Wagner installs mine barriers made of TM-62 anti-tank guns in Rostov-on-Don.
Wagners are mining the streets of Rostov-on-Don, setting up roadblocks and firing positions, Russian public media reports, citing eyewitnesses at the scene (video).
Voronezh
Wagner column seen 2 km from Buturlinovka, Voronezh region (video).Voronezh is located between the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and Moscow. So as Wagner forces are expected to head towards Moscow, Russian Air Forces are allegedly attacking Wagner convoys along the M4 highway (other source).
At the Bugaivka border crossing in the Voronezh region, another 180 Russian soldiers and law enforcement officers agreed not to interfere with the Wagner action and laid down their arms. It is not the only report made by Progozhin about the support from the Russian border control officers’ side.
The battle was filmed in the Voronezh region. Judging by the sounds in the video, there was an active firefight between the Russian army and Wagner (around 9am BST). https://t.me/lachentyt/30933.
The road towards Voronezh is heavily damaged (Telegram post with video). It is reported that the Russian Armed Forces were shooting. The video shows that a civilian car was damaged.
Images of Russian soldiers surrending in Voronezh.
Heavy convoy in Voronezh, at 9:30 BST, the convoy is about 445km from Moscow.
Another video showing column moving towards Moscow
In Rostov, explosions ripped through the headquarters of the Southern Military District (around 12 BST).
Explosion 1672544456929693696 - geolocated
Moscow
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation take up positions near the bridge over the Oka River near Serpukhov, where the M2 "Crimea" highway runs towards Moscow (around 10:00 BST).
Checkpoints with APCs have been set up at the entrance to Moscow, local media reports say.
The movement of the Wagner military column towards Moscow (11:30 BST)
Video confirmation of Counter-Terrorism Committee (branch of the FSB) buildup in Moscow
Translation: “I have a dream in which Moscow is burning. Good luck, not a step back” (Sheik Mansur Battalion)
Unconfirmed (mainly happening in the Voronezh region)
A warplane, likely a transport aircraft, was shot down over Voronezh. So far, it looks like Wagner was responsible. Allegations that the plane was carrying hundreds of Kadyrov soldiers.
Oil depot in Voronezh was bombed by a helicopter (video, video). The attacker responsible for the fire in unknown.
The Wagner PMC destroyed 4 helicopters of the Russian Armed Forces and one AN-26/Su-25 (other video, video, video)
A military convoy wan noticed moving towards Krasnodar.
Medvedev and his family have allegedly escaped from Moscow?
Situation updates
Map of Wagner progress
Other actors:
Ramzan Kadyrov - Head of the Chechen Republic - supports Putin and calls Wagner’s operation a military coup.
Fighters from the Storm-Z group endorsed Prigozhin & are willing to join Wagner if they require their assistance. On June 19th, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced it was replacing the Wagner Group convict troops with its own Storm-Z battalions and Chechen special forces. This initiative sparked allegations of the “Russian army 'on verge of civil war'.
Kalinowski's Regiment prepares an address to the Belarusian people at 17:00 Minsk time. (The Kastusia Kalinouski Regiment (Polk Kastusia Kalinouski) is a volunteer regiment (formerly a battalion) formed in February 2022 to defend Ukraine against Russian invasion)
Russian Volunteer Corps is interested in the developments and asks Russian people share the footage with the location of checkpoints, equipment to their Telegram bot.
Translation:
Friends, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps are very interested in what is happening in their hometowns today.
Sheik Mansur Battalion - Reports of increased tension in the Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia as orders restricting movement outside of the regions are put into effect - Source
Translation - “Collaborators of the occupied Checnya and Ingushetia start to fuss. Orders are being received not to move outside the republics, even if neigboring regions ask for it. Fear…tremble enemies of the freedom-lovers
You can send photos/video information showing roadblocks, equipment and other attempts of the regime to defend itself to the bot of our channel.
We are most interested in Moscow, Rostov and Voronezh.
Reaction:
- Дума statement:
“The history of Russia has shown that external challenges and threats have united our society. Together we are able to overcome any difficulties.
The problems and troubles of the country have always occurred only because of betrayal, internal division and betrayal of the elites.
The deputies of the State Duma, representing the interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation, advocate for the consolidation of forces, support President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin — our Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
The Wagner fighters must make the only right choice: to be with their people, on the side of the law, to protect the security and future of the Motherland, to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.
Anything else is a betrayal!
We are confronted by a common external enemy that promotes the ideology of Nazism — destroys Russian citizens, threatens the security of our country.
In this situation, it is necessary to unite even more and do everything to win”
Ukrainian reaction and comments:
Moscow is preparing for a siege. The city is virtually isolated by police and military units. All military equipment that has remained in reserve and border regions is being moved to Moscow - the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine
Security forces have received permission to:
Listen to any conversations and checking correspondence
Conduct detentions and searches without additional approvals
Forceful access to private and official premises
Use motor vehicles of citizens and organisations
Disconnect all types of communication
"Removal of individuals from areas and objects".
Published: around 12:15 BTS.