The recent coup in Niger led by the head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, was met with extensive condemnation, both regionally and internationally. Principally, the Nigeria-led ECOWAS bloc imposed various economic and travel sanctions against Niger to pressure the coup leaders to reinstate democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum. The West African organisation also issued a one-week ultimatum to the putschists, which if ignored, would entail a military intervention. ECOWAS claimed the use of force would be a “last resort”.  The bloc aimed to develop a detailed plan for the use of force, including the resources needed and the timing of a possible intervention. Meanwhile, the Nigerian president and head of ECOWAS, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, expressed his support for Bazoum. He declared that “[w]e will stand with our people in our commitment to the rule of law” and signalled Abuja’s “readiness to intervene” in Niger as soon as ECOWAS gave the order. Additionally, Nigeria stopped supplying electricity to Niger - Niger depends on Nigeria for around 70% of its electricity.

Despite these measures, Niger’s coup leader has repeatedly claimed he will not give into pressure to restore President Bazoum. Instead, General Tchiani has proceeded to form his government, naming a 21-member cabinet and appointing a new prime minister, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, to replace Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou. Given the putschists’ steadfastness and Nigeria’s stern response to the coup, calls for a Nigerian-led ECOWAS military intervention were to be expected. Yet, on 6 August, Nigeria’s senate rejected Tinubu’s plan to send forces to Niger. It instead encouraged ECOWAS to pursue “political and diplomatic options” to resolve the crisis in Niger. This will undoubtedly give the military junta a respite.

Why Oppose an ECOWAS Military Intervention in Niger?

Although an ECOWAS-led intervention in Niger may have helped Nigeria boost its regional geopolitical standing and restore political stability in its neighbourhood, the senate’s decision to oppose this measure was not senseless. Several factors may have informed its ruling on 6 August.

Within Nigeria many believe that President Tinubu’s assertiveness abroad constitutes an attempt to distract from domestic problems, and shore up much-needed popularity. Tinubu has been accused of electoral misconduct and has been criticised for his slow response to the country’s economic and security challenges, including the continued Boko Haram attacks across North Eastern Nigeria. Accordingly, the public has been vocal in denouncing Tinubu’s ‘unnecessary’ external interference. The Nigerian senate may have similarly recognised a need to refocus the regime’s attention to domestic issues. Nigeria’s participation in ECOWAS’s planned intervention may have further risked jeopardising relations with Niger, which remains an important partner in the Nigeria-led joint force fighting armed groups in the Lake Chad region.

While the coup leaders cement their hold on power in Niger, the resistance to a potential ECOWAS intervention is growing. Within Niger, the public has widely shown its support for General Tchiani while President Bazoum has found little support on the ground. Although a former Nigerien rebel and politician has recently launched a movement to oppose Tchiani’s coup, this merely constitutes an incipient campaign that will likely be quashed by the military junta. Public rallies have also evidenced Nigerien citizens’ disapproval of the continued French presence in the country, in which many demonstrators openly displayed support for Russia. Although Niger is one of the world’s poorest countries, its military has been trained to fight jihadists by France and the United States, and may thus have the capability to successfully oppose forces deployed by ECOWAS. Importantly, Niger’s troops would not be fighting alone; Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, as well as Algeria, Mauritania, and Benin have expressed their support for Niger’s new leaders in the midst of a possible ECOWAS intervention. Mali and Burkina Faso have gone further, exclaiming that any attempt to restore Bazoum would be treated as a “declaration of war” against them all. Additional support from private actors like the Wagner Group may also have bolstered Tchiani’s ability to defend against an ECOWAS invasion. ECOWAS’s internal challenges would likely have undermined its prospects for success in Niger, and may have thus pushed the Nigerian Senate to reject ECOWAS’ plans for intervention. 

Analysts have claimed that ECOWAS doesn’t possess the military capacity to launch an operation in Niger. Although the West African bloc intervened in The Gambia in 2017, when former President Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after his electoral loss, the intervention was largely possible because ECOWAS was “invited in by the Banjul government.” ECOWAS also suffers from a lack of coordination in providing security regionally and often fails to align its policies with those of other regional organisations. For example, ECOWAS gave the Niger junta a one-week deadline to reinstate President Bazoum while the African Union issued a 15-day ultimatum. Insufficient trust among ECOWAS members would have further compromised any attempt to mount a strong front against General Tchiani. Lastly, western support may have been necessary to address ECOWAS’ financial and logistical difficulties. The Nigerian Senate’s approval of a western-backed ECOWAS intervention would likely have sparked more protests and resistance in Niger, as well as more divisions within the West African bloc.

An ECOWAS-led intervention would have also carried the risk of further escalation; a mere attempt to restore President Bazoum could have ushered in a war transcending multiple African countries. Even in the best-case scenario, an intervention would have likely compelled ECOWAS troops to remain in the country for a lengthy period. This would strain countries’ military budgets and make “Bazoum look like he is only a president because of foreign armies, and that [would] destroy his legitimacy.”

Lastly, civilians would have likely borne the greatest costs of an ECOWAS military intervention. ECOWAS troops have a suboptimal record when it comes to avoiding collateral damage. Before parliamentary talks on 6 August, Nigerian senators issued a joint statement claiming they would not accept military action in Niger because it could worsen the humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Refugee flows from Niger, which shares a 1,600 kilometre border with Nigeria, would have strained the central government’s capacities.

Looking Ahead: A Multi-Level Strategic Predicament

The Nigerian Senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans for a military intervention presents an important question: What’s next? As the West African bloc struggles to find an alternative solution to the coup in Niger, the implications of the abortive ultimatum and intervention are becoming increasingly evident. ECOWAS’s credibility will undoubtedly take a hit. The West African bloc had been criticised for its poor response to the coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali in recent years. The lack of firm retaliation against the Nigerien military junta reiterates this pattern and will further harm ECOWAS’s perceived relevance and effectiveness. ECOWAS’s failure to respond militarily also reveals important cracks in the alliance, as countries scrambled to pick a side between the wealthier pro-democracy states and their military-led counterparts.

The senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans will have grave implications for West African geopolitical stability. First, ECOWAS’s weak response will have a significant impact on how politics will be conducted in the region; it may provide leaders across the region with a ‘green light’ to stage coups or ignore constitutional limits. As such, the use of force may increasingly supersede the rule of law. As a result, democracy in West Africa remains very fragile. Additionally, the lack of military retaliation will open up space for greater Russian presence in Niger and in the wider West African region, at the expense of western influence. In particular, the Wagner group may capitalise on its existing ties in Mali and Burkina Faso to expand its reach into Niger. 

The coup will also likely undermine the efficiency of the western-backed anti-terrorism campaign across the Sahel. Niger has been a key ally and security buffer for western states against al-Qaeda and Islamic State insurgent groups, but the recent coup will likely affect collaboration on counter-terrorism. The new Nigerien leadership will unlikely view the west as a valued partner, but rather as a colonial power. Thousands of French troops were forced to withdraw from Mali and Burkina Faso after their respective coups. As foreign armies retreat, terrorist and armed groups will be able to exploit political instability and uncertainty throughout political transition periods to expand their operations. Islamic extremists may intensify their recruitment exercises and violent campaigns. This occurred in Burkina Faso after its coup last September.

As the putschists continue to strengthen their political authority and support base in Niger, the West African bloc is at a crossroads. Realistically, ECOWAS’s alternatives to resolve the crisis are now largely limited to diplomatic avenues and/or continued sanctions. Both should not be discounted as pathways towards stability. Yet both unfortunately seem to have bleak prospects. On one hand, repeated attempts at negotiations over the past week have yielded little progress. Nigeria may be able to utilise the existing commercial and diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Niger to pressure the military junta into backing down, but this outcome does not seem probable. Niger’s new leaders retain key leverage, as Bazoum constitutes a valuable bargaining tool. Tchiani is therefore unlikely to surrender. Further, ECOWAS sanctions have thus far had little impact on decisions made by the Nigerien military junta. 

On Tuesday, ECOWAS imposed more sanctions on Niger after General Tchiani denied a joint delegation from West African states, the African Union, and the United Nations permission to enter the country. Yet, the sanctions will unlikely be effective. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, sanctions were lifted soon after they were imposed. Instead, sanctions will likely harm civilians already facing acute poverty and hunger. Sanctions may also prove politically counterproductive; in Mali, the military junta was able to use the “international campaign against Malian sovereignty” to rally people behind it and gain legitimacy.

Niger’s neighbours and the international community are now faced with a critical strategic predicament. Irrespective of ECOWAS’s next strategic move, there is a need for extreme caution. If not properly managed, the coup in Niger may set the stage for similar political disruptions elsewhere, produce deep rifts among African countries, and may eventually be overlooked.