The Somali-Led Offensive Against Al-Shabaab

In August 2022, Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared an ‘all-out war’ against Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group seeking to topple the central, western-backed government and establish a political rule based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. This move has constituted an attempt to deepen and reinvigorate previous, largely unsuccessful efforts to eradicate the group’s influence across the country and in the wider region.

Over the past 10 months, Somalia’s offensive has gained significant traction, yielding the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s. It has dislodged the militant group from swathes of Central Somalia, including major cities and key strategic locations such as the port of Harardhere. The government has forced the Islamist insurgency to retreat towards the south of the country, which has become the focus of the offensive’s emergent second phase. The Somali government has been utilising growing popular discontent with the non-state group, largely resulting from heavy taxation and coerced recruitment, to encourage participation in the war against Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, the security forces have increased their defensive measures in the capital, with checkpoints established on the city’s outskirts. 

The offensive’s progress has evidenced the Somali government’s ability to shoulder increased security responsibilities, particularly at a time when regional and international partners are looking to gradually withdraw. The United States, Turkey, and the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) have thus far crucially supported the operation both militarily and financially. Yet, ATMIS troop reductions are planned for the end of the month and in September 2023. Nonetheless, other actors have recently stepped up as possible allies in the fight against Al-Shabaab. After having exited 16 years ago, Eritrea rejoined the East African bloc, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in an effort to rebuild ties with its neighbours and assist in the promotion of peace and stability in the region; however, its potential contribution to the Somali-led offensive should not be overstated. Political strains between Eritrea and its neighbouring countries could compromise the coalition’s cohesion and the offensive’s success. Similarly, tensions with the US over alleged human rights abuses both domestically and in the Ethiopian Tigray region may instigate discord. Further, as part of Russia’s broader efforts to extend its influence in the African continent, Moscow has also signalled its willingness to supply Somalia’s army with military equipment in its war against Al-Shabaab. However, existing political strains between Russia and members of the Somali-led coalition may once again fragment the anti-Al-Shabaab front.

The role of state-led initiatives must not obscure clan militias’ key contribution to the offensive’s success. Clans are refusing to comply with Al-Shabaab’s doctrines and are jointly mobilising to push back against the group. Communities are providing the government with fighters who know local terrain and can offer a crucial link to the local population. Cooperation between the central regime and clans is simultaneously allowing for greater government penetration of rural areas, often targeted by Al-Shabaab for recruitment and financing. As such, clans are importantly undercutting Al-Shabaab’s material and ideological support.

Despite critical successes in Central Somalia, the second phase of the offensive concentrated in the states of Jubaland and South West has gotten off to a slow start, and will likely face a unique set of challenges. First, the Somali government will need to simultaneously retain control of its recent territorial gains in Central Somalia. Neglecting this imperative and risking overreach will allow Al-Shabaab to exploit the security vacuums left behind, rendering previous efforts futile. An additional challenge for the considerably weak and perennially under-resourced government is not defeating Al-Shabaab itself, but rather what comes after; who will be tasked with holding onto and governing recently reconquered areas? This remains an open question. Soldiers and security forces have been trained for offensive operations. They are therefore not well-suited to ensure the effective and equitable provision of goods and services, nor to nurture popular support for the Somali government in communities that have been under Al-Shabaab’s control for over a decade. Central regions will continue to be major theatres of operation as Mogadishu will need to devise a long-term governance strategy as Al-Shabaab strives to reverse the Somali coalition’s gains. This may impair efforts to move southward.

The offensive will face another major challenge. To resist and subvert Mogadishu’s advances, Al-Shabaab will increasingly rely on guerrilla tactics and its ability to stage attacks on civlians, even in regions beyond its formal control. On 9 June, Al-Shabaab staged a large attack on the Pearl Beach hotel in the Somali capital, killing 6 civilians, 3 security personnel, and leaving at least 10 injured. The location was popular among government and foreign officials. This event came only days after Al-Shabaab attacked an African Union peacekeeper base in the southern town of Bulo Marer, killing 54 Ugandan soldiers deployed as part of the ATMIS mission. Since then, the Uganda People’s Defense Force has reconquered the base. These latest attacks highlight Al-Shabaab’s resiliency, flexibility, and its likely strategy in response to coalition gains.

Clans in the south will likely play a lesser role in the second phase of the offensive, as levels of discontent with Al-Shabaab and clan military capabilities appear to be lower than in Central Somalia. Many communities have not taken up arms against Al-Shabaab, nor revealed the group’s hideouts despite government prodding and consistent attempts to delegitimise the group’s claims of religious authority. Other clans have instead cut deals with the group to forge a form of coexistence as they find the costs of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. This will likely deprive the government of the community-level assistance and impetus that was central to its success in Central Somalia. The government will need to secure support from local communities before making further advances in its southward offensive. Southern provinces also evidence greater inter-clan diversity, which diminishes the prospect of a unified and coherent offensive. Political fissures at the state and federal level, as well as within foreign partner states, may undermine the mission’s effectiveness. After Al-Shabaab’s recent attack on the ATMIS base, there have been pressures from within Uganda to end its involvement in Somalia, a development that would deprive the coalition of vital logistical and military support.

Even if such difficulties are tackled and the campaign proves largely successful in dislodging the group from its stronghold in southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab and its ideology will likely survive. The group will remain a significant security threat for years to come, both within Somalia and across the wider region. The group already appears to be adapting to the government’s offensive, dropping its coercive tactics and emphasising the need to promulgate Islamist values. The Somali government should therefore consider the option of negotiations as a means of de-escalating the war. It could use the bargaining power it has recently gained from its military victories to extract concessions. A diplomatic resolution may be particularly helpful given the ever-increasing resources dedicated to the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, which are diverted away from the humanitarian exigencies across Somalia. Nonetheless, reaching an agreement with Al-Shabaab would be exceedingly difficult.

Ultimately, recent advances give reason to believe that Mogadishu’s offensive will continue to sustain gradual, but important gains in the near future. Yet, while it is tempting to claim that this campaign marks the end of Al-Shabaab, this assessment is overly optimistic and premature. It risks encouraging a dangerous overconfidence in an offensive fraught with challenges and resisted by a still very influential and resilient Al-Shabaab.