Hybrid Threats 101 - Conceptual and Historical Context
Hybrid threats collectively constitute a relatively new concept, their practice, however, is not so recent. At the same time, their definition, categorisation, and historical context remain relatively elusive, even as their use, and therefore the necessity of countering them effectively, increases. In this introductory article to the series ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’, we aim to set the foundation by tackling these exact questions.
The Concept of Hybrid Threats
Hybrid warfare was defined by Hoffman for the first time as a method of conflict that combines both traditional and non-traditional tactics, including irregular formations, terrorism, and criminal activity, used by both state and non-state actors to achieve political goals. The primary objective is to disrupt the target nation through a blend of tactics, rather than to progress through traditional phases of warfare. Hybrid warfare presents a complex challenge for defence planning in the modern era, as it challenges conventional notions of warfighting, by erasing the boundaries between what is war and what is not. Ambiguous and unpredictable in nature, it securitizes every aspect of politics and society as everything is susceptible to becoming a threat to states.
Definitions by different international organisations
NATO defines hybrid threats as a combination of “military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups, and use of regular forces.” According to the Alliance, “hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations.” The EU recognises the diversity of definitions of hybrid threats as well as the evolving nature of these threats and defines the concept in a similar fashion as NATO, as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.”
As encompassing as the concept of hybrid threats is, the UN does not have a formal definition of the concept due to the differing views of all Member States, which poses a problem in building consensus around the term and the steps that need to be taken to combat these threats. Similarly, the OSCE does not have a formal definition as such, but its Member States have discussed the issue in several meetings with the Secretariat, showing a common concern to counter them.
Types and categories
Hybrid threats take many forms, and the types and categories delineated below form a list that is by no means exhaustive. Their irregular and blurry nature, in fact, may contribute to the notion that even categorisation as such can remain elusive. Nevertheless, we attempt to describe and briefly evaluate some of the more common ones below.
Grey zones
Grey zones are operations between war and peace; in some circles, “military operations other than war”. These may range from election interference to the use of ambiguous forces. The broad scope of action that can be considered as a part of grey zone operations poses a two-fold problem: (1) there is difficulty in determining which operations are taking place in the grey zone, i.e. the definition problem; and (2) another difficulty lies in establishing criteria of prioritisation for countering threats in the grey zone.
Due to their shadow nature, the principal use of grey zone operations tends to be attributed to non-democratic states such as China and Russia, although, with the diffusion of digital technology, these tactics are available to any state and non-state actor. Nevertheless, democratic states are generally considered at greater risk due to their open and transparent system of governance. This furthermore extends to businesses based in democratic states, who may be the direct target through economic pressure, or be indirectly affected by quasi-military activities or fluctuating and polarised public opinion. At the same time, freedom of speech and cooperation can be leveraged as key tools for exposing threats from grey zone activities.
Economic pressure
Economic coercion and pressure are threats targeting the economic and business activities of a state, including tactics such as debt dependency, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and punitive trade disruption. As a result of unfair trade practices by China, for example, and the narrowing of the global free trade space, countries like the United States have increasingly resorted to retaliation measures in the form of sanctions and tariff imposition.
Although it is unclear to what extent economic coercion helps states achieve their geopolitical goals or greater influence, it is clear that economic issues are increasingly understood as political and security issues as well. The implications for states and businesses alike need to be taken seriously. For all the dismissal of sanctions as ineffective, economic coercive measures and counter-measures are evolving towards more specific targeting, putting the pressure directly on businesses, their representatives, and individuals connected to the state rather than states as a whole. Furthermore, with a globalised and interconnected economy, the potential for secondary and tertiary impact remains high.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is the practice of safeguarding computer systems, networks, and sensitive information from unauthorised access, theft, damage, or disruption. Governing cybersecurity is challenging due to the constantly evolving nature of cyber threats, the difficulty in attributing attacks to specific actors, and the absence of international norms and agreements on cyber warfare.
Cyberspace operates differently from the physical world due to the lack of physical boundaries. In cyberspace, information can be copied and disseminated instantly, and digital assets can be accessed and transferred without the need for physical presence or travel. This opens the door to attacks from anywhere in the world, with a lack of transparency and accountability. Cyberspace is also a relatively new domain of governance, and the existing legal frameworks, such as the Tallinn Manual, need to be updated accordingly. This legal uncertainty creates gaps and inconsistencies in the regulation of cyberspace and its treatment as a security issue.
Cybersecurity is an essential and cross-cutting component of hybrid warfare, as cyber-attacks can disrupt communications, steal sensitive information, and cause physical damage to infrastructure. This is directly linked to other hybrid threats such as critical infrastructure protection, management of dual-use technologies for Artificial Intelligence (AI) or strategies against disinformation: they require an adequate cybersecurity framework.
Disinformation and election interference
Disinformation, which can be defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information to deceive people, is a major security threat because it can manipulate public opinion, destabilise governments, undermine trust in international norms, and institutions, and incite violence. It can be used to interfere in elections and justify acts of aggression and even war crimes. Disinformation can achieve strategic objectives without resorting to direct military action, making it a cost-effective and low-risk tool for state and non-state actors.
The subjective nature of information and perception, along with the horizontal and democratised nature of social media makes disinformation a risky matter to address. While censorship may appear to some as the easiest way to counter disinformation, it highly undermines the legitimacy of a state, as it raises complex ethical questions and debates, such as the lack of freedom of expression or media plurality, and the respect for civil rights and freedoms.
Psychological warfare
Psychological warfare is by no means a new tactic, however, its use as a hybrid threat has greatly evolved since its employment in historical conflicts such as WWII. In theory, psychological warfare constitutes operations targeting morale, exploiting the fears, dispositions and emotions of enemy troops and the wider population. In practice, however, the lines are blurred between what constitutes psychological warfare, information operations, or foreign influence operations more broadly. The uniqueness of psychological warfare is that it is designed to target deeper feelings and processes outside of perception, many of which are difficult, if not impossible to control. Its use is not restricted to a time of war, however, and psychological operations can be used to intimidate adversaries and delay or deter military action. Modern-day use of technology, and especially the psychological impact of social media algorithms, has also expanded its potential reach beyond its traditional boundaries.
Energy
Using energy as a coercive measure is often construed as a subset practice of economic coercion, however, as recent events in Europe have demonstrated, the manipulation of energy resources has the potential to cause damage in more than one way. The reliance of a number of basic human needs on energy is only increasing, making energy a potent instrument of war and peace. Furthermore, the scarcity of resources has been discussed as a security issue long before energy specifically emerged as their frontrunner. Another challenge facing the reality of scarce energy resources is the exacerbation of such needs by climate change.
At the same time, energy as a hybrid threat faces serious shortcomings, namely traditional supply and demand calculations, sourcing of secondary material, and crucially, the availability of energy transport infrastructure. Confronting these aspects is thus a key stepping stone for states, businesses, and other non-state actors to guard against energy exploitation. In other words, with the right tools and policies, the cause of mitigating this hybrid threat remains at least partially hopeful.
Transport and supply chains
Supply chains are key to the functioning of economies and national security, as the US-China trade war currently demonstrates. Governments can leverage their control over supply chains to achieve objectives such as promoting domestic industries, protecting national security or exerting political influence through tactics such as export controls, investment restrictions or favouring domestic companies.
Supply chains are vulnerable to hybrid threats because they rely on the fragmentation of production and manufacturing processes across different states. The comparative gains from diversification and fragmentation of supply chains also open the door to dependency and vulnerability, as states and non-state actors often use supply chains and their facilities to disrupt other states, organisations and private entities.
Supply chain disruptions often target critical infrastructures, such as maritime trade routes, airports, air traffic, power plants, energy transmitters, and cyber infrastructures. Sustained supply shortages can have a significant impact on the economy and stability of states, leading to major disruptions in public security and a lack of long-term access to commodities, as seen in the crisis that erupted following the loss of agricultural exports since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Critical infrastructure
The term “critical infrastructure” refers to those assets, systems, and networks, physical or virtual, whose disruption or destruction would have an effect on security, economic security, public health or safety due to their vital contribution to peace, security and safety. Critical infrastructure enables the normal course of daily life. The term is all-encompassing and subjective in nature, as what is critical and what is not is left to the discretion of states. The US government has so far considered 16 sectors that could meet this definition: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing assets, dams, defence industrial base, emergency services, energy and power plants, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology (ICTs), transportation systems, water and wastewater systems, nuclear reactors, materials and waste.
Identifying and understanding the interdependencies between infrastructure elements and sectors is important for assessing risks and vulnerabilities and for determining measures to increase security and resilience. Damage, disruption or destruction of one infrastructure element can have cascading effects, affecting the continued operation of another. Depending on the degree of interconnection between infrastructures, the effects of disruption may be different. Therefore, if the exposure to risk is different from one infrastructure to another, the response must also be addressed in a distinct manner, complicating the management, governance and security of critical infrastructure.
Technology
States, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded terrorist groups, exploit many military technologies such as encrypted command systems, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and other modern lethal systems. Nevertheless, technologies that had no original military use or purpose are now being transferred into the military domain: these are known as dual-use technologies and are key to understanding hybrid warfare and how traditional conflicts have changed.
Dual-use technologies have both civilian and military applications, blurring the line between the military and the non-military. They can be used for peaceful purposes such as transportation and communication or for military purposes such as weapon systems and intelligence gathering. Adversaries can misuse dual-use technologies in hybrid warfare. GPS technology, for instance, can guide missiles or drones to different targets, whether involved in a conflict or not, while social media platforms can spread propaganda or coordinate hybrid operations.
While the export of some dual-use technologies is not prohibited a priori, it is subject to restrictive controls, usually in the form of a licensing requirement. However, some countries are subject to import or export restrictions. For example, since 2018, the United States has imposed semiconductor export controls on China, targeting those that can be used for AI and military capabilities.
Migration
Migration is a constant reality of an interconnected world, and despite inflaming rhetoric has been pretty much stable over the past fifty years. Nevertheless, states are slowly coming to the realisation that the movement of large numbers of displaced people, forcibly or otherwise, can be used to pursue nefarious political and security objectives. The talk of ‘weaponising’ migration has entered geopolitical discourse very recently, yet states have been using migration policy in this way for much longer. The chief threat of weaponised migration lies in its socio-economic implications, but also increasingly in public polarisation and political destabilisation, especially when coupled with securitising rhetoric. The latter is often the primary goal, but other objectives may include punishment for what an adversary perceives to be a previous offence, or use as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table, whether in bilateral or multilateral relations.
However, one must also be careful of the use of terms such as ‘weaponising’ migrants, as it comes at the expense of their individual humanity. Not only can migration be used as a hybrid threat, but it can also incite discourses of dehumanisation, polarisation, and political violence, which themselves threaten stability in the long run.
Historical Context and Perspectives - Continuity and Change
Hybrid threats or hybrid warfare might appear relatively recent, decidedly twenty-first-century concepts, and the terminology is certainly quite new. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics and tactics of hybrid warfare are completely without precedent. In fact, warfare has been a complex phenomenon throughout history, whether labelled ‘hybrid’ or not. A number of tactics and events in history have thus retrospectively been likened to instances of hybrid warfare. These range from the Soviet partisan movement in the early 1940s, to the whole of the Cold War, to developments in Chinese military strategy at the end of the 1990s. Certain hybrid threat theorists posit that it is possible to go even further into history with examples such as the Peloponnesian War (431-405 BC) or the American Revolution (1875-1883), where tactics of psychological warfare, economic pressure, and the deployment of irregular forces were used.
Historically speaking, the purpose of hybrid threats as tactics of warfare has been to exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries, or, where possible, even turn a formerly perceived advantage into a vulnerability by the employment of irregular means. They have thus been used principally by parties that would normally be perceived as being at a disadvantage in traditional settings. However, without the systematic and doctrinal foundations that present-day hybrid threats possess, the manners of addressing them varied greatly depending on the tactics used, and the circumstances adversarial parties found themselves in. The extent to which lines become blurred with the introduction of hybrid threats into traditional methods and tactics of warfare has certainly increased. A partial reason for this is the perceived hegemony of the United States that emerged at the end of the Cold War, which led challengers to the new status quo to pursue new and irregular approaches, incorporating them to fit their strategic, historical, geographical, and economic circumstances, while maintaining the corresponding difficulty of attribution characteristic of hybrid threats. These must therefore each be explored accordingly, in order to form a full and detailed picture of the use, impact and possible countering of hybrid threats in modern conflicts, by states and businesses alike.
Aims of ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’
Such exploration is, in a broad sense, the overall aim of this project. Due to the uncertain and broad nature of hybrid threats, and the fact that they can be difficult to define properly, it is also challenging to counter them effectively. A series of articles is to follow, which thus aims to highlight a variety of hybrid threats, as presented above, ranging from disinformation, disruption and attacks on critical infrastructure, to impacts on supply chains, energy security, economic pressures and cyber attacks, among others. Furthermore, we endeavour to highlight the current and likely impacts on business, non-profit organisations, and conflict more generally. Based on such analysis, tools and frameworks for countering hybrid threats will also be presented and evaluated.
Navigating the Eastern Flank: The Role of Poland and the Baltic Countries in EU-NATO Security Strategy
Introducing the Eastern Flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia
When Russia extended its military support to the secessionist paramilitary republics of the Donbas on 21 February 2022, preluding the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech denouncing the allegedly historically unjust borders established during and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From the Russian perspective, this is considered the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, as the “Western liberal order” has deprived Russia of its perceived “historic homeland”. Putin also claimed responsibility for protecting Russians who have been “deprived of their homeland” and Russian-speaking citizens who live far from their nation.
At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin gave one of his most famous speeches, which can now be understood very differently after the start of the war in Ukraine. He notably said: “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force, military force, in international relations, a force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts, [...] this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe.”
Putin’s sense of “injustice” and “insecurity” is the rationale behind the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation strategy to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric tends to suggest that he may have wider aspirations to re-establish control over other former parts of the Russian Empire, not only Ukraine. This is why Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are existentially worried. This region, often referred to as “the eastern flank” by NATO, shares a common history and a geographical space, as well as a common existential threat from Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. However, they also share a common deterrence strategy, which will be explained below.
The eastern flank countries are unique in that they all share borders with Russia, either with the mainland or with the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Lithuania and Poland are geographically vulnerable to Russian attempts to assert control across the narrow Suwalki Corridor linking Kaliningrad to Belarus, where Russia has a military presence. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the sense of threat depends not only on geographical proximity but also on a common identity and cultural struggle within the post-Soviet space. Returning to Putin’s speech, Russia's self-proclaimed right to protect Russian speakers and citizens abroad raises suspicions about Moscow's long-term ambitions toward the Baltic states and Poland. Estonia and Latvia are particularly concerned, as approximately a quarter of their respective populations are native Russian speakers. In this sense, Russia is perceived as a common threat, but with specificities for each country.
Context and chronology of the events
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Baltic states and Poland began to develop a strategy to deter Russia and strengthen their ties with the West. This strategy was based on NATO enlargement and the Article 5 collective security umbrella. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the Baltic countries in 2004. Despite enlargement, Russia was still seen by many Western European countries as a potential partner in international security efforts, especially on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism in the framework of the OSCE.
However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a game-changer, with Polish and Baltic concerns becoming more prominent than before. In particular, Poland and the Baltic States have pushed the EU and NATO to adopt a more confrontational approach towards Russia. The first significant change came at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, with NATO countries agreeing to increase their defence spending by 2% of GDP by 2024 in the Summit. This is what the US called a “credible commitment” against declining defence spending and free rider attitudes within the alliance. After the Summit, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was created in 2003, was upgraded with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a renewed force comprising land, air, and sea, with a focus on improving readiness and responsiveness to Russia.
The requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence is gaining importance with the war in Ukraine. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already complying with the requirement, with the objective to raise it to 3% in 2024. Along with the US, Poland, and the Baltic countries are pushing other NATO member states to invest more in defence, beyond the 2% threshold, as they consider this to be the minimum requirement for NATO and EU members after the invasion of Ukraine. Yet, many of them remain behind the 2% GDP defence spending target.
At the heart of the defence spending imbalance is the difference in approach to the EU strategic autonomy as a political project and its role in European security. The EU Strategic Autonomy was the centrepiece of HRVP Mogherini’s 2016 EU Global Strategy, which was welcomed by all EU member states, but without a clear understanding of what it meant. In reality, not all EU countries are on the same page. This difference is mainly divided between the Western countries, which welcomed the term, and post-Soviet countries, which are more sceptical, as they lean more towards Atlanticism and the US as the guarantor of Europe’s defence. In Poland and the Baltic States, the idea of EU strategic autonomy also relies on a stronger European defence, especially in support of Ukraine. For instance, at the Special European Council in Brussels on 9 February 2023, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas spoke of the need to use an approach comparable to that used for the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines for defence contracts to support Ukraine's military capabilities.
Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 US elections also fuelled mistrust and tensions between NATO and Russia. That same year, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland pushed for NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which approved the rotation of four multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This strategy was aimed at deterring potential Russian aggression on NATO's eastern flank.
The Eastern Flank and NATO’s response after February 2022
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies adopted a new NATO Force Model (NFM) as well as a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022. The NFM is a high-readiness force of more than 300,000 troops, a significant increase from the 40,000 high-readiness troops of the existing NATO Response Force. The NFM, which is expected to be fully operational this year, comprises 100,000 soldiers deployable within 10 days, and a further 200,000 within 10 to 30 days, to have a rapid and reactive military force. The new model calls for an additional 500,000 troops to be deployed between 30 and 180 days, bringing the total number to at least 800,000 troops. In addition, the allies have indicated their intention to increase the number of troops on the ground from battalion-size (between 1,000 and 1,500) to brigade-size (around 4,000) “where and when required”. Once fully operational, the NFM will significantly enhance NATO’s responsiveness to possible threats, especially from Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the NFM is expected to protect NATO’s eastern flank and its borders with Russia.
Poland and the Baltic states have been key partners in achieving such a defence effort within NATO, as evidenced by the VJTF and the NFM. Nevertheless, military mobility remains a topic on which the four countries and NATO disagree. Efforts to deter Russia in the eastern flank rely mainly on rotating multinational battalions. This has been an issue for Poland and the Baltics since the annexation of Crimea. They have been requesting NATO to establish a more substantial and sustained presence on their soil, and on a permanent basis instead of multinational battalions. The White House has been supporting this request since last year and has recently opened its first military garrison in Poland, in line with their demands. This is the first US permanent base on NATO’s eastern flank and can influence the future of the eastern flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia.
The eastern flank is claiming agency and organising itself, both inside and outside NATO. On 31 January 2023, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland signed a collective statement in Riga, Latvia, to enhance their cooperation on security matters in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Specifically, the ministers agreed on common positions to be defended within the EU and NATO to ensure sustained assistance to Ukraine and additional sanctions against Russia.
Since joining the European Union in 2004, the eastern flank leaders have warned Europe of the growing danger posed by Russia. Specifically, Poland has taken a leading position in strengthening Europe's response to Putin's ambitions, due to the country's long-standing trauma of Russian expansionism in its tsarist and Soviet forms. Poland also possesses a stronger military than the Baltic States, which explains its central role in deterring Russia and the fact that it has been the EU country that has supplied the most military equipment to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.
Poland and the Baltic states have raised the bar, set standards, and pushed other European countries to strengthen their humanitarian response to Ukrainian refugees and victims of forced displacement. Since the beginning of the invasion, Poland has hosted the largest number of refugees within its borders, with almost 1.6 million refugees benefiting from the Temporary Protection scheme or other forms of national protection. In this sense, we find a causal link in the response: the countries that provide the most military aid to Ukraine in terms of share of GDP are also those most involved in refugee protection. These countries are Poland, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and the United States, which demonstrates an integrated and comprehensive response, both military and humanitarian.
Risk assessment and outlooks for European security
Given its strategy to strengthen its defence capabilities, the eastern flank also faces an important cost in terms of the region's economic stability. The European Commission has stated that Poland’s GDP growth will fall from 0.7 to 0.4%, as high inflation rates and low consumer confidence will continue to impact Polish economic cycles. Nevertheless, we should expect to see a GDP growth of 2.4% for the Polish economy in 2024, which gives a good outlook for Poland’s long-term economic performance. The situation is quite different for the Baltic states. They are expected to suffer more severe and greater economic and social repercussions due to their involvement in Ukraine. From military aid to Ukraine to enforcing sanctions against Russia, and even against China in the case of Lithuania, this will come at a cost to the Baltic countries. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facing declining GDP growth rates due to mounting inflation. There is a substantial reduction in the average GDP growth rate from 5.0% in 2021 to 1.6% in 2022, and a growth rate of 0.4% is forecast for 2023 in the Baltic countries.
Given how the eastern flank is central to the security of the European continent, it is concerning to see the difference between the eastern flank and the western countries in the management of the Ukrainian crisis. This has a cost for the domestic economies of these countries, but also for the traditional powers, the UK, France, and Germany, whose central role in transatlantic relations is changing. The leadership of Poland and the Baltic states in deterring Russia sets an interesting precedent for the future of European security, which will be based in the East for some time to come.
Barcelona Summit: A New Era for France and Spain's Energy and Defence Cooperation
On 23 January, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic within the framework of the 27th Spanish-French Summit held in Barcelona.
The summit aimed to strengthen the relationship between Spain and France and to address the common challenges facing the European Union. The treaty contains two important points - the development of renewable energy channels and grids, and defence cooperation. The signing of the treaty also means that France now considers Spain as its most important ally after Italy and Germany. This suggests a shift in France's foreign policy priorities towards the southern and western regions of Europe. France acknowledges the growing importance of Spain, especially as a key player in energy governance in Europe and as a strategic location for potential gas pipelines or liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, mostly coming from the US.
One of the main developments at the summit was the signing of an agreement to strengthen cooperation on energy. Spain is connected to the rest of Europe by two gas pipelines that cross the Pyrenees and reach France, making Spain an important energy provider to France. The first of these, Larrau-Calahorra, was commissioned in 1993. In 2013, the Spanish company Eneagás began the construction and management of the Irún gas pipeline, bringing the number of pipelines between Spain and France to two. Both pipelines are mainly managed by Enagás. French companies are also regularly involved in the Spanish electricity, natural gas and renewable energy markets. In 2021, Spain initiated negotiations with France over the construction of a new pipeline across the Pyrenees, the Midcat, as they considered the current pipeline infrastructures outdated and insufficient to meet the energy needs of both countries. The project was initially proposed as a way to improve energy security and reduce dependence on imported natural gas. France, however, did not actively support it, mostly due to the environmental impacts of such a project and its well-developed natural gas infrastructure.
The recent H2MED project has revived the energy governance relationship between France and Spain. H2MED is a corridor that also connects Portugal and unites the Iberian peninsula with France. The initial plan to build the H2MED corridor included the term "renewable hydrogen", which left the door open to interpretation, as it did not mention green hydrogen per se. France, which relies heavily on nuclear energy, pushed for pink and yellow hydrogen produced by their nuclear plants and generators to be included, as it regards hydrogen produced from low-carbon energy sources, such as nuclear, as green hydrogen. Paris considers low-carbon hydrogen essential for the EU to meet its emission reduction targets and create a competitive industry, but its lack of distinction between pink/yellow hydrogen and green hydrogen from renewable energy sources has led Spain to oppose the idea, as Madrid views green hydrogen as the only sustainable energy source.
Tensions over the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries to export energy to the rest of Europe eased when Paris and Madrid committed to transporting green hydrogen and other renewable gases between Barcelona and Marseille through the H2MED. Both countries pledged not only to energy governance and cooperation with the H2MED, but also to work together to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Paris and Madrid bridged their differences in energy governance and committed to working together to increase the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, and to promote the use of electric vehicles.
It is necessary to contextualise this cooperation by taking into account the energy governance group between Portugal and Spain. Both countries have been less dependent on Russia for gas and fossil fuels, and now pay lower prices for gas and electricity thanks to the Iberian exception approved in June 2022 by the European Commission and technically due to expire in May 2023. The Iberian exception temporarily introduces a cap on the price of electricity produced by combined cycle power plants in the daily energy auctions of the Iberian Peninsula. As a result, electricity prices in the Iberian pool have fallen from €332/MWh to €149/MWh. Taking into account the levy paid to gas power plants, the net benefit of lower prices overall is €54.25/MWh. Under these circumstances, Spain’s role in geopolitics and energy security is important, given its energy independence from Russia and its geographical position. This may partly explain France's decision to strengthen its ties with Spain.
Another objective of the summit was to reach a consensus on a comprehensive defence and foreign policy agenda. Notably, Macron and Sánchez discussed the need to strengthen defence cooperation between Spain and France. They pledged to cooperate, coordinate, and establish defence standards by increasing the number of joint military exercises and possibly creating a joint military unit for crisis management. They also discussed the need for better coordination of defence procurement in order to use resources in the most efficient way.
Several defence-related issues require further integration between the two countries. First of all, military spending and capabilities have always been major issues between Paris and Madrid. France has traditionally had a higher level of defence spending and a more advanced military than Spain. In 2021, French military spending amounted to 1.95% of GDP. Under a new budget proposal, France's defence budget in 2023 would increase by €3 billion, or 7.4%. This shift in defence spending began in 2017 to meet the NATO requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence. From the French perspective, the aim is clearly to position Europe as a defence actor through an increase in the defence budget. Macron has pushed to re-energize Europe’s defence policy by insisting on the need for “a common intervention force, a common defence budget and common doctrine to act.”
In contrast, Spanish military spending was 1.37 % in 2021. At the NATO summit in June 2022, Spain agreed to increase its defence spending from 1% to 2% of GDP by 2029, using part of this increase to modernise military equipment, giving priority to Spanish companies for contracts. As we can see, France and Spain still have a significant divergence in defence spending and capabilities. This will hamper cooperation between Spain and France, not only bilaterally, but also in the framework of NATO-EU cooperation and security. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland and Baltic countries have been pushing for European countries to raise their defence spending criteria to 2% of GDP criteria, which Spain is far from meeting.
France and Spain have also faced some difficulties coordinating joint military operations. For example, the two countries had different approaches to the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, with France taking a more active role in the conflict, while Spain took a more cautious stance. France's permanent seat at the UN Security Council also plays into the fact that the bilateral relation between Spain and France might appear unbalanced. Despite these challenges and differences, France and Spain continue to cooperate closely on security and defence industry matters, both bilaterally and within the EU and NATO framework.
Since coming to office in 2019, Sánchez has attempted to promote a more ambitious foreign policy than his predecessors. The energy and defence developments discussed at the Barcelona summit should be contextualised in the context of Spain’s fifth Council Presidency, from July to December 2023. A strengthened relationship with France will further establish Spain among the club of Europe's most important member states due to France's influence and presence on the international stage, which Spain may not enjoy as much. Given the economic size and political involvement of both countries in the European Union, this commitment to bilateral cooperation should benefit not only the two countries, but also the European Union as a whole.
Western Sahara Conflict: Geopolitics of Natural Resources, Foreign Actors and Humanitarian Impact
This report, a collaboration between the Middle East Watch and Conflict & Security Watch Programmes, undertakes an intensive examination of the conflict in Western Sahara. Covering the conflict’s historical, economic and humanitarian dimensions, the report explains the decades-long Moroccan sovereign claims over Western Sahara and highlights the critical humanitarian and economic risks emerging from the conflict.
Read the report HERE
United in Hybridity - EU-NATO create a task force on resilience and critical infrastructure to face potential hybrid threats from Russia
As the proliferation of non-state actors, critical technologies, and energy markets have gained crucial leverage in international affairs, security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic have been multiplied and redefined. Hyper-connectivity between states has increased vulnerability worldwide. New emerging domains such as cyberspace have revisited fundamental ideas and concepts of security, conflict, and war. As a result, hybrid threats have become central to political agendas, particularly in the context of EU-NATO cooperation. According to Frank Hoffman, hybrid warfare mixes and blends conventional warfare with other sources of irregular warfare, such as cyber warfare, energy and financial markets, as well as disinformation, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral intervention. Unpredictability and transversality are fundamental characteristics of hybrid threats.
Hybrid threats have recently been recalled in the recent NATO and EU discourses. In fact, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept specifically mentions them 7 times as a priority for the Atlantic Alliance. That is why, on 10 January, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed on a joint task force on resilience and critical infrastructure protection as part of their third joint declaration. “Resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure are a key part of our joint efforts, as we have seen both with President Putin’s weaponizing of energy and […] the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines,” Stoltenberg announced.
Both Stoltenberg and von der Leyen put this decision in the context of the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022, which was the result of the EU’s position in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Hybrid warfare has fundamentally changed how war is waged - it now includes cyberattacks, export controls, economic sanctions, and disinformation, among other means. Nevertheless, the most concerning aspect of hybrid warfare is that Russia and China have increased their assertiveness through it. And NATO and the EU are aware of this.
As a direct response, both the Alliance and the EU have taken the initiative to ensure the energy security of the European continent. In 2021, the EU greatly depended on external energy markets, importing 83% of its natural gas. Since then, imports from Russia to the EU have been significantly reduced, and the EU has redefined and diversified its relations with other energy partners, such as Norway or Algeria. In order to support this decision, Washington has strategically increased its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU by more than 137% in almost a year. The White House and the Commission also announced last year the creation of a joint Task Force to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is important to note that countries like Portugal or Spain are not as dependent on the Russian energy market as Germany, which has led to differences in how to find a common response to the energy crisis. Solutions like the ‘Iberian exception’ to cap energy prices have been fundamental in addressing these differences.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO developed a new Strategic Concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit. It identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to the Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, which is the strongest concept used to describe Russia since 1991. It is also not the first time the EU has acted on hybrid threats: in November 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats to foster the resilience of the EU. The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure may differ from one Member State to another. Nevertheless, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, the EU Joint Framework, and the new EU-NATO task force have all agreed that energy security, space infrastructure, maritime security, public health, transport, cyber security, communications, and financial systems are the “critical infrastructures” vulnerable to hybrid threats.
The term hybrid is expected to be reinterpreted and revised over time. It should be perceived as an all-encompassing and evolving term aimed at addressing current security challenges, as opposed to conventional means. Hybrid threats break these well-defined guidelines of what is and what is not war. In 2010, when NATO introduced the term, there was no initial common understanding of what "hybrid warfare" meant within the Alliance.
This common understanding of hybrid threats is reflected in the document that the EU and NATO presented. The mutual understanding represents a political and diplomatic achievement, as it also integrates the EU’s strategic autonomy in the framework of Euro-Atlantic security and protection. Nevertheless, opinions within EU-NATO coordination have been diverse and often contradictory. Over the years, France has intended to boost the EU's defence industry with the clear aim of making the EU more strategically autonomous. Conversely, some Central and Eastern European countries, like Poland, do not agree with this. These Member States still see the US as the main guarantor of security on the European continent.
EU and NATO members (and allies) should expect to live with the uncertainty surrounding hybrid threats for some time, as there is now a risk of not measuring conflict and instability properly. Hybrid threats allow us to rethink some of the most pressing issues in international security under a different lens, such as the causes of terrorism and violent extremism around the world, as well as civil wars and social unrest in unstable political regimes.
If anything can be considered a threat, then what makes a threat significant? This question should be addressed in a transatlantic and comprehensive approach that can integrate deterrence and the military as well as the social and economic perspectives of states. What makes hybrid threats so unpredictable is that their causes are not short-term based, or solved by increased defence spending. They very often stem from structural causes: climate migration, economic inequality, unequal access to technologies, and lack of digital skills, as well as populism and far-right extremism, among others. In this sense, increasing national GDP in defence spending should not be the only solution to the development of European defence, as resilience in the face of hybrid threats requires a more integrated and transversal security perspective.
As a final assessment, the EU-NATO task force still needs to be properly developed, but a first step has been taken. As Madeleine Albright once stated, the debate on NATO's future has too often reduced the alliance's raison d'être to a one-dimensional international military organisation. Nevertheless, the political aspect cannot be forgotten. It is not only the EU that has served as a force for integration and reconciliation across the European continent. Not only did NATO contain the Soviet threat, but it also helped the EU deal with most of the internal conflicts within the Union: between France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, and Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet space. Now, at the beginning of 2023, while the war in Ukraine is still going on, the EU and NATO have come together again with their third joint declaration. With a specific and dedicated space to harmonise all these differences, hybrid threats have become fundamental to political agendas, including creating a resilient European energy market and cyberspace. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fostered the transatlantic partnership in an unprecedented way, making it clear that NATO remains the backbone of the collective defence of the European continent and the Euro-Atlantic area.