From Floods to Acquittals: Examining Electoral Risks in the DRC and Zimbabwe

As the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe prepare for their upcoming elections, a myriad of challenges and events present significant electoral risks. From devastating floods, protests, insecurity and escalating ethnic violence to the exoneration of prominent novelists and court denials of postponement of elections, both countries navigate uncertain political landscapes. We examine the convergence of these factors and their potential impact on the electoral processes in the DRC and Zimbabwe.

DRC

Ethnic Violence Threatens DRC's Electoral Integrity

On April 24th,  the DRC's electoral commission concluded a nationwide initiative to update voter lists for the upcoming general elections in December 2023, as per a Human Rights Watch report released on May 9th. However, during the registration process, certain regions such as Goma, Bukavu, Nyagenzi, and Uvira in Eastern Congo saw violence and discrimination towards Banyamulenge, a Congolese Tutsi ethnic group from the South Kivu province. The incidents involved groups of youths who threatened, beat, and prevented the Banyamulenge from accessing registration centres. Human Rights Watch confirmed this information by speaking to the victims, witnesses, and community leaders, some of whom had experienced attacks by youth groups mobilised to defend their South Kivu localities against armed groups, including M23 rebels.

The increasing ethnic discrimination against Banyamulenge and Tutsi communities in Congo, particularly in the lead up to the December general elections, poses a significant threat to the country's stability and democratic process. The violence and discrimination towards these groups may lead to an uneven distribution of votes and hinder other national processes such as the population census and identification process. The continued appeal to ethnic prejudices by the parties to the conflict also suggests that this issue may persist even after the elections. Therefore, it is imperative that Congolese authorities take decisive action to prevent ethnic-based discrimination, including conducting comprehensive voter education campaigns and prosecuting individuals who commit ethnically motivated harassment and attacks. Failure to address these issues could lead to further instability and violence in the DRC.

Deadly Flooding Casts Shadow on Upcoming Elections

As of May 7th, the governor of South Kivu province, Theo Ngwabidje Kasi, announced that the death toll from flooding and landslides in the DRC has increased to at least 401. This figure marks a significant rise from the previous reports, which stated that the fatalities had reached 176, and many people were missing as rescue workers searched for victims. The flooding occurred when heavy rainfall caused rivers to overflow, resulting in 205 individuals sustaining severe injuries. Unfortunately, 167 individuals remain unaccounted for, adding to the gravity of the situation. These events could have potential implications for the political landscape of the country, especially with the general elections scheduled for December 2023. The current situation may hinder the government's ability to conduct voter registration and other necessary activities, as the authorities may be more preoccupied with disaster response efforts. Additionally, the flooding could lead to displacement and relocation of people, which could affect the allocation of voting resources and could potentially lead to accusations of voter fraud or suppression. The government must prioritise disaster response efforts and ensure that they do not impede the electoral process, as an effective response to the crisis is crucial in maintaining public trust and credibility in the upcoming election.

Protest Postponement Raises Concerns for Elections

On May 13, political activists associated with the Commitment for Citizenship and Development (ECIDE), Together for the Republic, Leadership and Governance for Development (LGD), and the All Volunteers for the Recovery of the DRC (ENVOL) planned a protest march in Kinshasa to condemn the insecurity in the eastern regions, high cost of living, and an alleged disorderly electoral process. However, due to concerns expressed by authorities regarding the demonstration's security, the organisers decided to postpone it until May 20. The postponement may indicate the organisers' willingness to cooperate with authorities to ensure public safety. However,  it could also have implications for the upcoming general elections, particularly if the march leads to significant demonstrations and violence, further destabilising the political landscape. This could have lasting consequences for the democratic process. It is therefore crucial to monitor the situation carefully and ensure that the protest remains peaceful and does not escalate into a full-blown political crisis.

President Accuses East African Forces of Colluding with M23 Rebels

On his visit to Botswana on May 9th, President Felix Tshisekedi accused the East African forces currently deployed in the DRC of colluding with rebels. The President expressed concerns about the East African Community (EAC) regional force's capability to fight M23 rebels in the eastern part of the DRC and alleged that the forces have cohabited with terrorists, which was not part of the original plan. Although Tshisekedi did not provide details of the collusion, he stated that his administration had to reevaluate its approach to the situation in the east. The President  also expressed his reservations about Kenya's decision to replace the commander of the regional forces without consulting the DRC's authorities. These allegations may have implications for the region's security and potentially destabilise the upcoming general elections in December. The accusations could further exacerbate existing tensions and divisions, potentially leading to violence and impeding the electoral process. Furthermore, these allegations could heighten mistrust between the DRC and its East African neighbours, which could have wider implications for regional cooperation and stability. As such, it is crucial to closely monitor the situation and take steps to mitigate any potential risks to the electoral process and regional security.

ZIMBABWE

Constitutional Court Denies Request to Postpone Elections

The Constitutional Court (CC) denied the request made by the former Zimbabwean main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), to postpone the elections on May 8th. The MDC had challenged the delimitation report of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in February, alleging that it was biassed towards the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Delimitation involves dividing a country into constituencies and wards for election purposes, and when it is unfairly drawn to favour a political party, it is referred to as "gerrymandering". However, the Constitutional Court ruled against the MDC, stating that they had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the violation of fundamental rights or demonstrate how the demarcation of constituencies had affected those rights. The court also asserted that the case was outside its jurisdiction. The objective of the MDC's case was to postpone the upcoming presidential and legislative elections until new voting boundaries were reviewed. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court ultimately decided to proceed with the elections as scheduled between July and August, disregarding the opposition party's efforts.

The ruling in favour of the ZEC has the potential to trigger allegations of a biassed electoral process, which, in turn, may escalate political tensions and destabilise the country. The MDC is expected to appeal the ruling and take the case to a lower court. This could lead to prolonged legal proceedings, exacerbating uncertainty surrounding the electoral process. Furthermore, ZEC's credibility to conduct free and fair elections will be called into question, further undermining confidence in the electoral system. It is crucial to closely monitor the situation and ensure that the elections are conducted with transparency, fairness, and peace to avert any adverse repercussions.

Acquittal of Renowned Novelists Places Zimbabwe's Political Activism Under the Spotlight

Renowned Zimbabwean filmmaker and novelist Tsitsi Dangarembga has been exonerated by the country's High Court of orchestrating an anti-government one man protest, which occurred in the year 2020 as per 8 May reports. Initially, Dangarembga had been handed a six-month suspended jail sentence and a fine after being found guilty of intent to incite public violence. However, following her acquittal on Monday, her lawyer, Harrison Nkomo, confirmed that she was absolved of the charge. Nkomo expressed gratitude to the court for acknowledging that Dangarembga had not committed any offence. 

The lower court had earlier found Dangarembga guilty of participating in a public gathering with the intent to incite public violence, while simultaneously breaking COVID-19 protocols. However, the High Court judges did not provide any immediate reasons for the acquittal. Dangarembga, who is known for her vocal stance against corruption in Zimbabwe, has been fighting for reforms and advocating for the right to demonstrate for years. Notwithstanding, Zimbabwean courts have been handing down strict sentences to political activists leading up to the general elections this year. Opponents and activists have also accused the police of quelling dissent. For instance, Jacob Ngarivhume, an opposition leader who was apprehended alongside Dangarembga for organising protests, was recently sentenced to four years in jail on charges of inciting violence.

Based on the information provided, the exoneration of Tsitsi Dangarembga from charges of inciting public violence could embolden other political activists to engage in protests or other forms of dissent, which could lead to increased political unrest and instability in the country. However, given the harsh sentences handed down by Zimbabwean courts in recent times, it is more likely that activists may be deterred from engaging in protests or other forms of dissent. Moreover, the police's reported suppression of dissent may further contribute to activists' hesitation to engage in protests or other forms of dissent. Ultimately, the impact of Dangarembga's exoneration on the electoral processes in Zimbabwe remains to be seen, and it is essential to keep an eye on the situation in the country in the lead-up to the general elections.

Conclusion

The DRC faces significant challenges with protests, ethnic violence, and natural disasters that could impact the electoral landscape. The discriminatory incidents against the Banyamulenge community and the government's response to flooding highlight the potential disruption to voter registration and resource allocation. Furthermore, allegations of collusion between East African forces and rebels add another layer of complexity to the political stability of the country. In Zimbabwe, the exoneration of Tsitsi Dangarembga may inspire other activists, but the harsh sentencing of political dissidents and reports of suppression by the police could discourage widespread protests. It is crucial to closely monitor these developments and their repercussions to ensure fair and peaceful elections while mitigating potential risks to stability and democratic practices in both countries. 

Drones and the Future of African Warfare

Drones have taken centre stage in international security conversations. The nature of violence, its accessibility, its purpose, and its meaning for the balance of power are being reshaped by the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). In Africa, however, drones are viewed through the frame of development, meaning their military significance often goes under the radar. Whilst drones have a great potential to bring about positive change on the continent, they carry the dangerous risk of misappropriation. Therefore, understanding the security implications of drones in Africa is crucial.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are “aircraft that do not require the presence of a human pilot on board.” They have permeated African geopolitics since 2011, gaining increasing importance in North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. The Libyan Civil War, during which drones were used in more than 900 missions by both sides, has put the spotlight on their strategic importance. More recently, the Libyan conflict also made headlines as the first lethal autonomous drone without human oversight was used to track and attack a military convoy in March 2020. Between 2011 and 2021, “drone operations have been carried out in at least 20 [African] states.”

Terrorist Use of UAVs

Military air power has traditionally been only enjoyed by state militaries due to the high material, financial, and technical resources required. However, drones have recently become a relatively cheap and accessible appliance for the general public, which disrupts the established power balance between state and non-state actors. The proliferation of commercial and hobbyist drones has enabled armed groups to acquire aircraft relatively easily, which they equip with weapons, cameras, and sensor systems. As an example of accessibility, Audrey Kurth Cronin, distinguished professor of international security, found that the most common type of drone used by the Islamic State was the DJI Phantom, priced between $450 and $800 on Amazon. Equipped with the ability to remain fully autonomous for up to 30 minutes, and a high-definition video function that can capture images up to 2 miles away, this inexpensive drone became a great military tool for ISIS in leading surveillance and identification missions. 

The extensive availability of unregulated explosives, in addition to the transfer of technical know-how from terrorists and their affiliates, makes the militarisation of drones achievable for terrorists in Africa. Moreover, the development of 3D printing technology opens the possibility of extremists producing spare parts autonomously in the near future. Military drones, such as “miniature loitering munitions,” namely specialised kamikaze drones, are available on the dark web for a couple of thousands of dollars. As Major Thomas G. Pledger explains, “The massive increase in the number of form factors, capabilities, ease of access and ease of operation of drones at low cost will make them the weapon of choice for future terrorists.” Don Rassler of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point confirmed that it is “only a matter of time before drones get deployed more actively across Africa.”

Cases of non-state armed groups’ use of UAVs have been recorded in Africa in recent years. IS affiliated terrorist group Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna, fighting in Mozambique since 2017, has reportedly used drones to identify targets in the Cabo Delgado province, according to Mozambique’s Interior Minister Amade Miquidade. Drones have also been deployed for intelligence, surveillance, or propaganda operations by armed factions in Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. They are especially useful in gathering data about infrastructure and potential weak spots which may not be visible from the ground. Terrorists have also used drones to record their attacks and release shocking images which increase the effectiveness of their propaganda. As of yet, armed organisations in Africa have not led “active-offensive” attacks with unmanned systems, but this dangerous scenario is likely to happen in the next few years. According to Abebe Muluneh, director of the Security Sector Program of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa and head of mission to Ethiopia, terrorist organisations operating in Eastern Africa are already attempting to transform commercial drones into attack drones. 

Recent developments in the Middle East provide insight into the dramatic strategic advantage drones can bring to terrorist groups. In Syria and Iraq, ISIS carried between 60 and 100 aerial drone strikes every month during 2017. These new weapons, acquired through an always-changing network of providers and local manufacturing sites, became a critical weapon for ISIS. Drones enabled the armed group to conduct synchronous attacks, not only increasing their military impact but also the psychological effect on the local population. ISIS also developed drone strategies to improve the effectiveness of other operations and weapons, such as guiding vehicle-borne suicide bombers and enhancing mortar and rocket fire accuracy. African armed groups have already started to incorporate unmanned systems into their weaponry and are progressively increasing their use, which could pose dramatic challenges to the security balance in Africa. 

The asymmetrical nature of unmanned vehicles - representing a relatively cheap investment for great strategic and military capabilities - has the potential to change both the balance of power between state forces and terrorist organisations and the nature of the conflict. Drones give secluded terrorist groups the capacity to project beyond their borders as never seen before. If they acquire militarised drones, terrorist organisations would be capable of destroying heavy artillery from a distance without risking the lives of insurgents. This could threaten civil and military infrastructures located in geographical areas that were not vulnerable to terrorist attacks before and destabilise states’ forces. An additional consequence would also likely be a dramatic increase in civilian casualties, which African states already have trouble preventing and responding to.

The solutions available to governments appear insufficient to face the spread of unmanned weapons amongst armed non-state organisations. One of the measures available to states is to identify and disrupt terrorist supply routes. To be effective, this endeavour would require a careful mapping of the supply chain networks, systematic investigation of the equipment used in past attacks, and more efforts to restrict the distribution of dual-use equipment in conflict-ridden regions. Some initiatives focusing on drone supply have emerged in Syria and Iraq could be developed more extensively in the context of African conflicts. Former BBC Foreign Correspondent and visiting fellow at King’s University Karen Allen explains that “there is scope for exploring early warning systems to flag the large consignments of drones procured and delivered to areas of known conflict [...] a registration scheme similar to that used for mobile phones may be considered for smaller shop-bought drones that are not mandated to apply for a license.” 

However, many obstacles could hinder the development of appropriate tools to target drone supply routes in Africa. Such initiatives would require extensive financial and technical efforts from African governments, which may not consider the restriction of drones a priority in their allocation of public funding. Civil society actors could attempt to carry out such efforts, but they are likely to face financial and legal constraints. As many West African countries are breaking ties with larger military allies which could have provided support on such initiatives, international institutions will likely act as a necessary partner in garnering the required resources to address this threat. However, their involvement might be restricted by the lack of political will of African governments and/or member states. 

Another option for governments to counter the use of drones by terrorist organisations is the development of “active defence measures.” For instance, manufacturers can implement geofencing control during the construction phase, which prohibits the usage of drones in certain delimited geographical locations, such as military bases or airports. Easy hacking of the geofencing and restricted geographical delineations, however, limit the potential effectiveness of this tool to counter terrorist groups and protect civilians. Geofencing can be easily overcome, but not all terrorist organisations using drones are aware of this, or have the knowledge necessary to identify what drones are equipped with geographical restrictions. Therefore, forms of drone tracking can be used by law enforcement to surveil and gather intelligence about terrorists and their affiliates. Finally, other active defence measures, such as nets, physical impactors, or birdshots, would be limited to narrowing pre-defined geographical areas, and cannot protect large swaths of the population. 

The development of efficient countermeasures will require strong cooperation between the private and public sectors, in addition to strict regulatory and legislative frameworks on the production and supply of commercial drones. The military approach to counterterrorism should not supersede human rights considerations and the protection of civilians should be prioritised in future conversations. If African governments want to counter terrorism, they should uphold  international legal regulations in their use of UAVs. If African governments act in a neglectful or corrupt manner while implementing the usage of armed drones in their militaries, these technologies are likely to be misappropriated and more civilians are likely to end up dead. Considering the past records of some African countries’ on weapons governance, this is not unnecessarily an unlikely scenario.  

African States’ Use of UAVs

Drones have also become an attractive investment for African governments, who view them as an effective counterterrorism weapon. UAVs have already demonstrated their efficiency in military applications in Ethiopia and Mozambique, where they were deployed by government forces to counter non-state armed groups. After 2021, Ethiopia’s fleet of drones, composed of Iranian, Chinese, and Turkish devices, were used to strike the Tigray People's Liberation Front’s (TPLF) remote garrisons. Unmanned vehicles were crucial in disrupting the TPFL’s logistical supply and played a decisive role in the battle of Gashena, according to the Africa Report. Although the government has not officially confirmed the use of drones, evidence from satellite images and social media investigations has proven that they were utilised. Ethiopia is considered “the heaviest user of drones on the continent,” according to Wim Zwijnenburg, drone specialist for the peace organisation PAX. 

Since 2020, a growing number of African states have acquired UAVs. Ethiopia, Morocco, Niger, Togo, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia have added new drones to their counterterrorist repetoire. South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya are anticipated to be the main African participants in the worldwide commercial drone industry, which is anticipated to reach $43 billion by 2024. Whilst growing African interest in UAVs does not represent a  continental arms race, it seems to play into regional power politics. Morocco is gaining a strategic lead in this race after the signing of an agreement in October 2022 with Israeli defence companies, agreeing on the construction of two drone manufacturing facilities in Morocco. In the two years preceding the agreement, Morocco had already started to acquire important stocks of foreign UAVs, in the context of hostilities with Algeria over Western Sahara. This Israeli-Moroccan cooperation will enable the government to produce drones at a lower cost, and to become the first African drone manufacturer, affecting the balance of power on the continent.  

African governments’ growing acquisition of drones is also influencing global dynamics. While the majority of western powers are limited in their ability to export drones due to legal restrictions, authoritarian states, particularly Turkey, China, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have emerged as the continent's primary suppliers of UAVs. Africa represents an important market for UAVs, and demand on the continent is steadily rising, which could lend great financial and diplomatic influence to drone-exporting countries. Turkish defence and aerospace exports alone have risen from $83 million in 2020 to $288 million in 2021 in Africa, and is likely to continue to grow in years to come. Ankara’s development of “drone diplomacy” clearly reflects the geopolitical significance of drone trade, as military partnerships have become a tool of rapprochement with African countries. The tightening of diplomatic ties as a result of the drone trade can then be leveraged for varying aims, such as the acquisition of business deals or voting support in international institutions.  

In addition, this trend reflects a wider shift in geopolitical influence in Africa, as countries diversify military partnerships and begin to engage more directly with non-western powers. As Paul Melly, consulting fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House, argues “for both Togo and Niger the supply partnership with Turkey is also politically useful, reducing their public reliance on close security partnerships with France.” This pivot to the East also comes in a context of growing tension between former colonial powers and African states, with increasing domestic criticism and challenges posed by the recent wave of military coups. 

Consequences for Civilians 

Whilst the power gained through the drone trade by authoritarian powers poses a risk to the future of international security and the upholding of the rule of law, the growth of unmanned weapons in Africa is already threatening civilian lives across conflicts. In July 2022, the Togolese military confirmed the killing of seven civilians who had been mistakenly assumed to be militants during a drone strike. Over the course of the Ethiopian conflict, drones have been reported to be the cause of 300 civilian deaths, according to aid workers on the ground. This dramatic death toll has two main explanations. First, drones employed militarily in Africa are often not very precise, meaning many civilians become collateral damage. Second, offensive decisions are mad on inferred cues about local conditions, which might confound civilian and military activities. Whilst civilian casualties caused by drone strikes remain relatively low compared to other weapons, the narrative that drones are exceedingly precise can contribute to excessive use of UAVs and a lack of accountability surrounding that usage. 

The threat posed by drones to civilians is also compounded by the blurriness of African states’ legal position on unmanned weapons, the secrecy of their arms trade deals with foreign powers, and the lack of mechanisms to ensure accountability. As a PAX review summarises, “this ongoing secrecy by states about drone deployments in Africa and censorship of the press limits the space for civil society to engage meaningfully in a debate about drone warfare in Africa.” In addition, drones could provide repressive African states with an incredibly efficient tool to track and surveil civilians with relative secrecy. Members of civil society and political parties already struggling to organise and voice their concerns under the coercive environment of authoritarian states, such as in Equatorial Guinea or Chad, would have to avoid the “live-feed video cameras, infrared cameras, heat sensors, and radars” of state-acquired drones.

Global conversations have already taken place around the implications of drone adoption on civilian lives, but no international regulation has followed, notably due to the resistance of major powers, such as the United States and China. It is highly unlikely that we will see any international ban on drones in the short to medium term, considering their strategic importance and relative precision. Regulations limiting their use in populated areas, similar to the recent political declaration adopted by 82 states to prevent the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), appear more realistic but remain unlikely in the near future. Even if such a treaty was agreed upon, many African states would probably not sign it, as only 11 African states were signatories of the political declaration on EWIPA.

A first step towards a more ethical use of drones is to recognise their physical and psychological impact oncivilians by offering accountability and justice to victims. This initiative has been fostered by NGOs for many years, such asAirwars or theRed Cross, who have already initiated projects to map and limit the use of drones whilst promoting accountability and transparency. Investigations on drone strikes that leave civilian casualties are crucial to raise awareness needed to push for political solutions. The work done by NGOs is crucial, but should be complemented by governmental regulations and private-public partnerships to advance technological restrictions on the nefarious misuse of drones.

Africa's Electoral Rollercoaster: Top Highlights and Challenges of the Last Two Weeks

Over the last two weeks, Africa's electoral landscape has witnessed a flurry of developments, ranging from humanitarian crises to political instability. The chance of any fair election in Sudan is at a standstill amid a growing humanitarian crisis, while South Sudan's fragile peace process could be threatened by potential spillover violence from Sudan. In Libya, a positive step forward was taken with the pledge by security and military factions to secure the electoral process, but concerns remain regarding weapon smuggling and the presence of mercenaries. 

In Zimbabwe, the conviction and incarceration of an opposition party leader has raised concerns about the country's political climate. Meanwhile, Sierra Leone's upcoming presidential elections are shaping up to be highly competitive, with the defections of prominent opposition politicians to the ruling party and the adjournment of main opposition leader Dr. Samura Kamara's corruption trial until after the elections. As we continue our Election Watch series, these developments will be crucial in assessing the political risk and business implications for investors and other stakeholders.

April 17 - May 1

SUDAN

Worsening risks for displaced Sudanese civilians as fighting persists

As per 28 April reports, millions of Sudanese are currently facing severe food shortages, heightened health hazards, and preventable fatalities as the United Nations (UN) agencies have been compelled to halt their "life-saving" operations in Sudan. The ongoing violence has created an extremely hazardous environment, making it impossible for them to operate.

Sudan and its neighboring countries have endured decades of scarcity, suffering, and unrest. Even before the conflict between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Response Forces (RRF) erupted on 15 April, Sudan had already been hosting over 4 million displaced persons.

The escalating humanitarian crisis in Sudan, exacerbated by the recent suspension of UN agencies' "life-saving activities", may have significant implications for the upcoming elections. With millions of Sudanese facing severe hunger and heightened health risks, it is unlikely that the government can ensure a safe and fair election process. Moreover, the displacement of over 4 million people, even before the current conflict, raises concerns about the integrity of the electoral rolls and the potential exclusion of vulnerable communities.

The ongoing violence and the inability of UN agencies to operate further complicate the election process, as the government must ensure that all eligible voters can participate safely and freely. If the situation worsens, it will not be feasible to hold an election. Additionally, the lack of access to healthcare and other basic needs for displaced individuals may fuel further unrest and instability in the country, making it challenging for the government to guarantee a peaceful and democratic transition of power.

SOUTH SUDAN

Authorities express concern over continued violence in Sudan

According to 29 April reports, the South Sudanese government has voiced significant apprehension regarding the ongoing hostilities in Sudan. Major General Charles Machieng Kuol, a high-ranking military officer in South Sudan, expressed concern about the possible repercussions of an extended conflict and stressed the importance of stability in the area. He stated that his country has already deployed troops along the borders in order to safeguard them. Kuol underscored the country's preparedness to prevent the war from spilling over and escalating within South Sudan.

The ongoing fighting in Sudan poses a significant political and business risk for South Sudan, particularly as the country prepares for upcoming elections. Given the historical conflict and interdependent relationship between the two nations, any instability or escalation of violence in Sudan could "easily spill over" into South Sudan, jeopardising the country's fragile peace process and potentially derailing the election. This situation requires urgent attention and strategic planning to mitigate potential negative impacts on businesses and political stability in the region. 

Businesses operating in South Sudan must implement comprehensive risk management strategies and contingency plans to manage the potential disruptions caused by the conflict. Similarly, the government of South Sudan must continue to implement the necessary measures to protect its citizens and safeguard the pending election process from external influence. Failure to address this issue proactively and strategically could have severe consequences for the stability of South Sudan and its future prospects.

LIBYA

Libyan security and military  factions pledge to secure elections

The UN Envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, announced on 18 April that he had successfully negotiated with the security and military factions in Libya to ensure the safety and security of the forthcoming electoral process during a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) briefing. Bathily affirmed that all factions in the country expressed their commitment to meet the necessary criteria for holding elections. He secured a pledge from security and military factions to renounce violence, release detainees, and ensure an all-encompassing national reconciliation. 

The early success of Abdoulaye Bathily's negotiations and the full commitment of the security and military factions in Libya has the potential to significantly contribute to a peaceful and democratic electoral process. The pledge to reject the use of violence, release prisoners, and promote national reconciliation is a crucial step towards the creation of a stable and inclusive political environment. If the parties continue to follow through on their commitments, the elections would be held under favourable circumstances that could increase public trust and participation in the democratic process.

However, if the security and military factions fail to fulfil their commitments, the electoral process could be marred by violence, insecurity, and intimidation. Failure to release more prisoners and promote national reconciliation could further deepen political divisions and create a hostile environment that undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the electoral process. The failure to provide a secure environment for the polls could lead to low voter turnout and further undermine the already fragile political stability in the country.

Weapon smuggling in Libya threatens stability

In April 18 reports, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Representative to the Security Council, voiced her worries about the resurgence of conflict in Libya caused by unhindered arms trafficking. She called upon the 6+6 committee to assist the United Nations' initiatives and stressed the urgency of promptly tackling any obstacles that could hinder the forthcoming elections. Among these obstacles, Thomas-Greenfield highlighted the security threat posed by the presence of Wagner Group mercenaries in Libya.

If arms trafficking in Libya is not effectively addressed, it could have a significant impact on the security of the electoral process. The proliferation of weapons would create an environment of insecurity and potentially increase the likelihood of violence during the election. This could further impede the electoral process and undermine the legitimacy of the elected government. Additionally, if armed groups are able to continue acquiring weapons, they could potentially use them to challenge the authority of the government and destabilise the country. It is crucial that steps are taken to prevent arms trafficking and ensure the safety and security of the Libyan people during the upcoming elections.

ZIMBABWE

Opposition leader convicted for organising anti-corruption protests

The leader of the opposition party Transform Zimbabwe, Jacob Ngarivhume, was convicted on 28 April for organising and leading anti-corruption protests that took place in July 2020. He has been sentenced to a four-year prison term, with one year suspended and no option for bail. Amnesty International's Interim Deputy Regional Director, Vongai Chikwanda, has called upon the Zimbabwean authorities to overturn Jacob Ngarivhume's conviction and sentence, arguing that the organisation of the protests was based on his right to free expression and peaceful assembly.

Amnesty International's (AI) request for the reversal of the conviction highlights a high political and business risk environment for Zimbabwe. The conviction may be perceived as an attempt to suppress opposition voices and dissent, thereby creating a hostile environment for political and social activism. Such an action could also undermine the credibility and integrity of the upcoming elections. It is therefore imperative for the authorities to reconsider their decision (as per AI recommendations) in order to prevent further escalation of political tensions in the country. This arrest and subsequent conviction may intimidate opposition parties and supporters, thus limiting their ability to campaign freely and impacting the overall fairness of the electoral process. Additionally, the sentencing of Jacob Ngarivhume further raises concerns about the rule of law and the potential weaponization of the judiciary system to settle political scores.

SIERRE LEONE

Opposition Leaders Join Forces with Ruling Party Ahead of Presidential Polls

According to 26 April reports,  several opposition politicians, including Dr. Kandeh Yumkella, the parliamentary leader of the National Grand Coalition (NGC) party, and Saa Emerson Lamina, the parliamentary leader of the Coalition for Change (C4C), along with two of his eight C4C parliamentarians, defected and declared their support for President Julius Maada Bio's Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) before the presidential polls. Dr. Kandeh Yumkella's support for President Julius Maada Bio is of significant importance as it potentially brings 170,000 votes that the NGC party won in the 2018 election, thereby boosting SLPP's votes.

These defections resemble Charles Margai's political breakaway in 2007, where he left the SLPP to form the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC). However, despite Margai's 2007 success in helping President Ernest Bai Koroma rise to power, PMDC's sudden rise came at the expense of a disunited and fragmented SLPP, with most PMDC supporters returning to the SLPP or joining the All People's Congress (APC) party by 2012. The current defections raise questions about whether history is repeating itself, and if so, what lessons can be learned for Yumkella and his NGC, as well as Sahr Lamina and his C4C. 

While it may be difficult to predict the exact outcome of the presidential polls in Sierra Leone due to the current political climate, the defections of prominent opposition politicians to the ruling party could give the SLPP a significant advantage in the elections, resulting in their political irrelevance in the long run. However, this move may also lead to the creation of new opposition parties or alliances, which may ramp up electoral competition in the next electoral cycle. The defection of Yumkella and Lamina to the ruling party has undoubtedly increased President Julius Maada Bio's chances of winning the election. Nevertheless, other smaller parties' roles cannot be ignored as they could also influence the election's outcome. The opposition parties may create new alliances or coalitions to counterbalance the SLPP's advantage, resulting in a more intense and competitive election. The weeks ahead are critical and require close monitoring to identify any further political negotiations leading up to the June 24th presidential elections.

Opposition Leader's Corruption Trial Suspended Until After Presidential Election
The hearing against Dr. Samura Kamara, the presidential candidate and leader of the main opposition party the All People's Congress (APC), and five others by Sierra Leone's Anti-Corruption Commission was scheduled for 29 April but has been suspended until 14 July. This is nearly three weeks after the presidential and general elections scheduled for June 24th. The APC's National Publicity Secretary, Sidi Yahya Tunis, expressed relief at the decision and stated that the party would utilise the extra time to communicate more effectively with the electorate.

Many observers and analysts following the case believe that the trial is politically motivated and intended to derail Dr. Samura Kamara's candidacy against the incumbent President Julius Maada Bio. Senior lawyer and former Ombudsman Francis Gabbidon is among those who have publicly expressed the opinion that the case is unjustified and politically motivated, a sentiment shared by other legal practitioners and public servants. Dr. Samura Kamara's perceived chances of winning the presidency make the impact of the suspended trial on the upcoming election significant. With the trial postponed until after the election, it may become a referendum on Kamara's innocence. The more than two-years case and the allegations of political motivation may raise concerns of a compromised judicial system, potentially affecting public confidence in the government's ability to uphold the rule of law. It remains to be seen how voters will view the trial's postponement and whether it will positively or negatively affect the APC's chances of winning the presidency.

Conclusion

As Africa prepares for a series of elections, it is evident that several challenges and opportunities lie ahead. It is essential that proactive measures are taken to address the challenges facing the region's electoral processes and safeguard the integrity and legitimacy of the electoral outcomes. By doing so, African nations can set the pace for peaceful, inclusive, and democratic governance, setting the foundation for sustainable development and progress. 

Sudan Could Become the Site of International War

The recent spur in conflict in Sudan has caused concern regarding the country turning to civil war. Without a doubt, this would be a disastrous development for the Sudanese, a people already struggling with a food insecurity crisis and mass displacement; 3.7 million Sudanese are already internally displaced. According to Save the Children, a third of the population (15.8 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Gunfire and explosions have proliferated across the capital of Khartoum, where the majority of the city's 5 million people are sheltering at home without electricity or access to food or water. In less than a week, as many as 20,000 people have fled from the region of Darfur and crossed the border into Chad, a country that already hosts 400,000 refugees and has limited resources. As of the publication of this article, 420 people have been killed and at least 3,551 injured. 

External Competition

In addition to the concern over casualties, there needs to be consideration regarding the involvement of external actors that could exacerbate the conflict. A plethora of foreign countries have already become involved, some of which are trying to invoke diplomacy and foster stability. However, there are others who are exacerbating the conflict, such as the Egyptian military and a Libyan militia, by supplying arms to opposite sides. “Khalifa Haftar, the commander of a faction that controls eastern Libya, dispatched at least one plane to fly military supplies to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces [... while] Egypt sent warplanes and pilots to back the Sudanese military”. 

While the US State Department is preparing to impose sanctions on the two parties, it is doubtful that they will be adhered to or serve as a warning to others. This has become evident as Russia and the UAE team up to evade sanctions; “on the Emirati-Russian front, everything seems to be going smoothly: for a year now, hundreds of Russian companies have been created to circumvent Western sanctions, while banned oligarchs continue to do business and maintain their fortunes.” Both countries are supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti; there is little doubt that this partnership would not extend to military action in Sudan. Russian and Emirati involvement is alarming given the Wagner Group’s track record of “alleged torture, mass killings and looting in several war-torn countries”, alongside the allegation circulating that the UAE was behind an attempted coup by the RSF, a major cause of the conflict. 

The regional powers (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) and the international powers (China, the EU, Russia, and the US) involved will play a critical role in how the conflict develops. “Sudan’s strategic position on the Red Sea, its access to the Nile River and vast gold reserves have long been coveted by outside powers.” Russia has already played a role in plundering Sudan’s gold reserves through collusion with the Sudanese military; they were given access to gold reserves in exchange for political and military support. This has enabled “billions of dollars in gold to bypass the Sudanese state and to deprive the poverty-stricken country of hundreds of millions in state revenue.” US officials confirmed that Russia was behind the 2021 coup that placed General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in power as the de facto head of state. Russia has evaded sanctions by using Sudan’s gold to fund their war efforts in Ukraine while backing military rule in Sudan and expanding Wagner activities. It is exceptionally doubtful that Russia is concerned with the stability of the nation or the realities faced by civilians. One has only to look at Russia’s nefarious activities throughout the continent regarding disinformation, human rights violations, and their inability to effectivey abate terrorism in several nations across the continent.

Risk of Terrorism

The conflict also opens the door to terrorist groups, who are likely to take advantage of the instability and make their own attempts in acquiring access to crucial resources and infrastructure, such as oil fields and ports. “The Sahel is the region of the world most affected by terrorism, recording a noticeable deterioration in 2022 [...]”. The proliferation of terrorist groups in Sudan would also exacerbate the battle for influence among foreign nations. Suspected Wagner ties with General Hemedti, though denied, set the stage for Western nations to possibly become involved in more than just diplomacy. A greater dependency on Wagner in Sudan would, without a doubt, impact Sudan’s relations with other African nations and impact western counter-terrorism efforts. A Wagner expansion into Sudan would be very damaging; not only when concerned with foreign relations and security sector reform, but also with human rights. Regarding Wagner, the State Department stated that “The interference of such entities in Sudan’s internal conflict will only lead to more human suffering and delay the country’s transition to democracy.”

Additionally, resources could be pulled from other vulnerable nations and causes to apply focus on Sudan, creating further discord in Africa. As the Sahel becomes the epicentre of terrorism, the conflict in Sudan could have a disastrous effect on counter-terrorism efforts on the continent, furthering the decline in democracy, encouraging greater migration crises, and creating new conflicts in the region. As Sudan plummets further into insecurity, it is ever more likely that groups associated with al-Qaeda or the Islamic State will become intertwined in the conflict.

Power Struggles

The conflict in Sudan is at a critical precipice. As of now, the impression is that the generals will fight to the end. “This conflict intends to name the next president,” says Bashir El-Shariff, a professor of political science at the Islamic University of Omdurman. A diplomat added, “There is a Gordian knot to be cut between them.” It is clear that both generals are disregarding the impacts on the Sudanese people as the country is driven into further turmoil; evidenced by the repeated dismissal of previous agreements. As is shown through the worry of Sudan’s neighbours, instability rarely stays localised. Alan Boswell of the International Crisis Group poignantly stated, “What happens in Sudan will not stay in Sudan. [...] The longer (the fighting) drags on the more likely it is we see major external intervention.” 

Norway’s ambassador to Sudan, Endre Stiansen, echoed his sentiments; “one of the worst things that can happen is that this becomes a regional conflict where countries in the neighbourhood intervene on behalf of either of the parties.” While mediation is critically needed, governments that provide military supplies will generate an environment of bedlam that will be difficult to recover from. Unless foreign powers are able to quickly and successfully mediate the conflict, Sudan will be thrown into a civil war with international backing. Should the conflict continue on its current trajectory, the impacts will be felt across the continent while governments and militias fight each other for influence.

Election Risks in the Shadow of Conflict and Legal Weaponisation

Introduction

In this week's Election Watch series, we will analyse the potential impacts of armed conflicts, states of emergency, and the weaponisation of the legal system on the upcoming presidential elections. Recent developments indicate a resurgence of military attacks in Sudan, ongoing armed rebel attacks in the DRC, and the extension of a state of emergency in Togo due to persistent armed rebel attacks. In Zimbabwe, reports indicate that there is a high probability of the Electoral Bill being finalised. If passed, this bill may result in the disqualification of numerous opposition leaders from running in the upcoming election, highlighting the continued weaponisation of the legal system. As we closely monitor these events, it is crucial to assess their potential effects on the democratic process

Sudan

Army and Paramilitary clash in Khartoum.

Intense fighting broke out on April 15th in Khartoum between Sudan's national army and paramilitary forces, resulting in the death of almost 100 people and injuries to hundreds of others. The fighting has spread to nearby cities, including Omdurman and Bahri, and has persisted for two days, with no signs of either side backing down. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have called for an immediate end to hostilities, but their calls have been ignored.

The conflict stems from a power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the national military, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), over how the paramilitary forces should be incorporated into the military and who should oversee the process. This disagreement has persisted since the 2021 "failed coup attempt" and has further delayed Sudan's transition to a democratically elected government.

Despite the army's declaration that "the hour of victory is near," the situation remains uncertain, and the possibility of a civil war cannot be ruled out. The military's stance of not negotiating with the RSF until they are dismantled indicates a winner-takes-all approach that is not conducive to a peaceful resolution. International and regional intervention may be necessary to halt the fighting and resume negotiations. However, the international community's willingness to provide such intervention may be limited due to potential resource constraints and the recent killing of international workers in the ongoing fight.

As the conflict continues, the level of violence against civilians is likely to increase, and the goal of holding democratic elections this year seems unattainable. The situation is currently uncertain and expected to remain so as both sides are anticipated to release statements that support their respective positions, contributing to the fluidity of the situation.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Ethnic rebel attacks surge in the Eastern Congo

Dieudonne Lossa, the president of a civil society group in Banyari Kilo, reported that on April 15th, the CODECO ethnic Lendu armed group killed more than 42 individuals in Ituri Province. Ethnic-related attacks between the Lendu militia groups and Hema ethnic self-defence groups have been ongoing since 2017, but recent reports show a sudden surge in such attacks. The increase in ethnic-related violence in Eastern Congo worsens the displacement of communities, depriving them of meaningful participation in electoral processes.

Security concerns in the DRC persist, despite the withdrawal of the March Movement (M23) rebel group from some parts of the North Kivu province, with countless local disputes arising from clashes over natural resources. As long as these disputes remain unresolved, ethnic-related armed attacks will persist, resulting in increased personal insecurity. The pending election is likely to attract communities that have some level of peace and security, while those in areas mostly affected by rebel attacks will have restricted participation due to displacement. The conduct of democratic processes, such as voting, will remain exclusionary as long as armed attacks continue in certain regions, limiting the participation of displaced communities.

Togo

State of emergency extended in Togo

On April 6th, the Togo parliament voted to extend the state of security emergency in the Savanes region for an additional 12 months due to an increase in terrorist attacks near the Northern border. President Faure Gnassingbé's initial state of emergency, approved in June 2022, ended on March 13th, 2023, but is now further extended. Since November 2021, the Northern region of Togo has been prone to rebel group attacks, with jihadist groups having control over substantial areas in the region. However, the prolonged state of emergency may jeopardize civil liberties, especially during the forthcoming elections, and the risk of violence against voters, election observers, and workers is high. In some cases, governments may misuse their emergency powers to aim at political rivals, control the press, or reduce access to information, resulting in a reduction of people's freedoms. This endangers the democratic process and may lead to lower electoral participation. Additionally, rebel groups may intimidate voters to influence the election outcome. Despite the state of emergency being extended to counter rebel groups' incursions and restore security, it reduces comprehensive electoral participation. The re-establishment of the state of emergency in the Northern region after a brief lapse between March 13th and the first week of April 2023 highlights a likely persistence of insecurity in the medium to long term, as jihadist groups occupy vast areas in the Northern region. Unless this control is weakened or eliminated, the electoral process carried out will likely be symbolic and exclusionary, with fewer people participating due to the higher personal security risk.

Zimbabwe

Electoral Amendment Bill a Priority in Parliament

On April 14th, the Minister of Justice, Ziyambi Ziyambi, announced the government's intention to prioritise the passing and implementation of the Electoral Amendment Bill for the upcoming elections. If passed, the bill would disqualify individuals with recent convictions for crimes of dishonesty or those with pending criminal cases from running for office. However, critics argue that the bill may be unconstitutional and biased against opposition members, such as Job Sikhala, who has been held without trial for over 275 days, as the state maintains that he is accused of “inciting public violence.” If the Electoral Amendment Bill passes without revisions, it may exclude approximately 14 other opposition leaders with pending criminal cases, which could have negative implications for the democratic process and exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of the ruling party. The recent increase in arrests of leaders and members of the Citizens for Coalition Change (CCC) has been criticized as a legal weaponisation strategy aimed at intimidating political opponents and further restricting the democratic space for opposition voices.

Conclusion

The upcoming presidential elections in various African countries are at risk of being undermined by armed conflicts, states of emergency, and the weaponisation of the legal system. In Sudan, the ongoing fighting between the national army and paramilitary forces may escalate into a civil war, making it impossible to hold democratic elections in the short to medium term. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, ethnic-related attacks continue to worsen the displacement of communities, depriving them of meaningful participation in electoral processes. In Togo, the prolonged state of emergency reduces comprehensive electoral participation, and the risk of violence against voters, election observers, and workers is high. In Zimbabwe, if passed, the Electoral Amendment Bill may disqualify several opposition leaders from participating in the election, further highlighting the continued weaponisation of the legal system.

African Elections 2023-2024 Series

As we commence the second quarter of 2023, it is evident that the African continent is set for a significant election year as 29 countries are scheduled to hold national elections. Among them are Zimbabwe, Sudan, Somaliland, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Libya, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Given the political and security implications of such an election cycle, it is imperative to keep a close watch on the evolving situation in each country. The recent Nigerian election has brought to light the potential for electoral disputes in countries lacking electoral reforms and an environment not conducive to conducting free and fair elections. Therefore, it is crucial to monitor political and security developments that may affect businesses, individuals, and international organisations operating in these regions.

Reports from 1st of April to the 9th of April

DRC

Protesters challenge discriminatory 'Congoleseness' bill

On 4 April, members of the Association of Mestizos in the Congo (Asmeco) protested against a discriminatory bill, named the "Tshiani law", outside of the Parliament building. This bill seeks to prevent those with mixed nationality parentage from holding top senior political office. If passed, opposition presidential candidates, such as Moïse Katumbi, would be disqualified from the December presidential race because his father was Greek. If implemented, the law would delegitimize the election and lead to unrest in the coming months, as it would exclude political leaders who do not pass the Congolese purity test. This development presents a significant political risk as it could lead to social and political tensions, undermining the country's democratic stability.

Militant attacks kill dozens in Ituri Province

At least 30 people were killed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebel group between 2 and 3 April, in the Ituri province in the Northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 

The region is suffering from continuous militant attacks by various rebel groups, including the foreign ADF, which has been active in the eastern DRC for decades. These attacks exacerbate the already high level of displacement and security risks in the region, where attacks on civilians are commonplace. With the state of siege in place and restrictions on movement, armed attacks are expected to impede electoral participation ahead of the December presidential elections. This situation poses a serious political risk as it raises concerns about the government's ability to maintain security and ensure fair elections.

Gabon

New presidential term limits enacted

The Gabonese National Assembly and Senate reportedly amended the country's constitution on 6 April by decreasing the presidential term limits from seven years to five and adopting a one round ballot system. Some within the opposition ranks have condemned the adoption of the one round ballot system as a ploy to keep the incumbent President Ali Mbongo Ondimba in power, although he is yet to declare his candidacy for the upcoming election. With the reduction in presidential term limits and the adoption of a one round ballot system, the upcoming election in Gabon could lead to further political instability if the opposition is dissatisfied with the outcome.The lack of unity among opposition parties may also lead to a weaker opposition movement, further strengthening the incumbent's position, and potentially increasing tensions between opposing factions.

Libya

Human Rights Watch urges anti-cybercrime law repeal

On April 3rd, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged for the nullification of the anti-cybercrime legislation and the release of those incarcerated for violating the law. The anti-cybercrime act, which was enacted in September 2022, has been abused to carry out targeted arrests. In February 2023, security forces apprehended a singer in eastern Libya for allegedly violating the anti-cybercrime act by "subverting public order and morals".  The law's second article aims to protect "public order and morals", but it lacks a specific meaning of these terms, making it simple to exploit the legislation to silence government critics. Without freedom of expression, it will be impossible to hold free and fair elections. Thus, in the next few months there will likely be an increase in the arrest of government dissenters if the anti-cybercrime act is not repealed.

Madagascar

Public protest ban ahead of presidential elections

Madagascar's government has prohibited "public protests" ahead of the November presidential elections, as reported by Radio France International (RFI) on 3 April. The ban extends to all political parties and government officials, with the exception of the executive branch, which may still hold public political gatherings. President Andry Rajoelina is expected to seek reelection. The government's blanket ban on all public protests is a direct assault on freedom of expression and a blatant disregard for democracy, which will likely fuel opposition and provoke protests across the country in the near to medium term.

Sierra Leone

Regulatory commission bans political parades

On 3 April, the Political Parties Regulatory Commission in Sierra Leone announced a ban on political parties before the June presidential election. The decision aims to encourage informed electoral choices by discouraging "street" festivities. Both the ruling Sierra Leone People's  Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People's Congress (APC) traditionally hold public, political parades in the lead-up to elections, but the Commission's spokesperson Lucien Momoh notes that this ban seeks to promote peace, in contrast to previous cycles marked by violence and intolerance. By prohibiting  political parades, the electoral cycle is expected to be less violent than previous elections.

Somaliland

President pledges to end armed-conflict

On 3 April, reports indicated that President Muse Bihi pledged to resolve the LasAnod conflict via peaceful dialogue. For the past three months, armed conflict has raged in LasAnod due to its aspiration to reunite with Somalia. Failure to resolve this conflict could impede the electoral process by restricting freedom of movement in the region, preventing effective participation in the election. This may raise questions regarding legitimacy, particularly from a region that seeks to reunite with Somalia rather than remain part of Somaliland.

Sudan

Protests erupt over delayed civilian government deal

On 7 April, hundreds of protestors in Khartoum demonstrated their frustration over the military authority's continued delay in implementing a long-awaited civilian government agreement. Despite security personnel's swift use of stun grenades and tear gas to disperse the protests, more demonstrations and confrontations are anticipated in the following weeks if a transitional civilian government is not established to facilitate a free and fair election. Unless a negotiated settlement is reached that satisfies the demands for a fully-fledged civilian government, the country will likely remain in a state of turmoil.

Zimbabwe

Opposition spokesperson's conviction increases crackdown fears

According to Amnesty International Deputy Director Flavia Mwangovya, Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) spokesperson Fadzai Mahere was convicted on 5 April for "communicating falsehoods" under a devoid legal provision as declared by the Constitutional Court in 2014. This conviction has exacerbated concerns regarding the growing crackdown on freedom of expression in Zimbabwe. As a result of her conviction and in accordance with the Electoral Act Amendment Bill, 2022, Fadzai Mahere may be ineligible to run for public office in the upcoming elections, as legislators and councilors who are convicted of "crimes of dishonesty" within 12 months prior to the date of candidate nomination are disqualified. Despite avoiding a 20-year prison sentence, the $500 fine levied against her has sparked alarms and a conversation around the application of Zimbabwean laws. By using a non-existent law to secure the conviction of an opposition spokesperson, the authorities appear to be weaponizing the legal system to silence political adversaries. As a result, it is likely that the run-up to the election will be fraught with numerous instances of crackdowns on critics and intimidation tactics.

A “New Era” in Ouagadougou: the Consequences of French Withdrawal for Burkina Faso & Western Africa

On February 20th, the French finalised their military mission in Burkina Faso during a ceremony with Burkinabe officials at the Kamboinisin base, north of the capital Ouagadougou. This follows the decision by the Burkinabe government to terminate its military cooperation agreement with France earlier this January, demanding that the 400 troops stationed in the country depart within a month. The end of the French mission demonstrates the deteriorating relations between France and Burkina Faso since President of the Transition Ibrahim Traoré ousted Paul Henri Sandaogo Damibia last September. The presence of troops had been empowered by a military cooperation agreement signed in 2018 to fight jihadist insurgency groups present in Burkina Faso, such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (IS-GS). The departure of French troops raises several questions regarding the origins and significance of the damaged relationship between Burkina Faso and France, spotlighting the transformation of French presence in West Africa. 

Developments in Relations 

Burkina Faso’s relationship with France has been defined by the latter’s economic and political influence since the independence of the country in 1960. The two have encountered a relatively stable relationship in recent decades, especially when considering trade relations. In 2020, France was Burkina Faso’s third most important trading partner in terms of imports. France was also Burkina Faso’s most important foreign aid donor, providing €91 million in 2020. 

French influence has also materialised by a military presence in Burkina Faso - unofficially since 2010, then officially since 2018, resulting from the signature of the cooperation agreement. France was perceived by the Burkinabe government as a reliable partner in the fight against jihadist insurgency groups which gained traction in the north of the country in the late 2000s. This enabled France to deploy its task force “Sabre” (created in 2009) to defend French interests in West Africa during the Blaise Compaoré presidency. The presence of these troops was formalised and strengthened during Roch Marc Christian Kaboré’s presidency (2015-2022) following the 2018 attack on the French embassy in Ouagadougou, claimed by JNIM. France presented its troops as an effective instrument to solve the escalating security crisis in the country considering the limited capacities and resources of the Burkinabe government. However, French support did not solve the security crisis as hoped, challenging French presence in the country. Declining confidence in Burkinabe-French relations was further diminished by President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who removed Kaboré in a coup in January 2022 criticising his approach to jihadist insurgency groups. This discourse was used by Damiba’s opponents to remove him from power and subsequently gained ground. 

Following a second coup in less than a year in September, the rise to power of Ibrahim Traoré has seen a clear deterioration of the relationship between Burkina Faso and France. In the aftermath of the coup, Traoré accused French troops of protecting Damiba on Burkinabe television, resulting in an attack on the French embassy by Traoré supporters in October. Two months later, the regime ordered the suspension of Radio France Internationale (RFI) in the country. All of these actions complement the regime’s discourse that argues France has acted as a meddler rather than a partner in Burkina Faso and Western Africa. 

Grievances against the former colonial power have spread across the country. In early January 2023, French deputy foreign minister Chrysoula Zacharopoulou visited Ouagadougou to try and appease tensions with the Traoré regime. She denied accusations that France was a meddler, asserting it was “imposing nothing” on Burkina Faso. However, this visit seems to have had little impact on altering the trajectory of the relationship, considering Burkinabe authorities demanded the departure of French troops two weeks later. Whilst the last Burkinabe request for French military support dated back to only July 2022, the request of departure indicates that relations with France are in a critical phase. The spokesperson of the Burkinabe government, Jean-Emmanuel Ouédrago, stated that the termination of the 2018 agreement was not the end of Burkina Faso-France relations. Considering the current authoritarian regime has designated French military intervention as the root of the worsening security crisis, it is likely that these relations will be more limited for the foreseeable future as long as Traoré stays in power. 

New Partnerships

Burkina Faso, along with Mali, has become the epicentre of the security crisis in Western Africa. Two million people are internally displaced and 40 per cent of territory is controlled by JNIM and IS-GS insurgency groups. Traoré has devised a strategy different from his predecessors to reconquer territory from jihadist insurgency groups. He has argued that the solution to the security crisis is the militarisation of Burkinabe society rather than relying on external forces, such as France. Since November 2022, 90,000 civilians have been recruited to be part of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), a paramilitary group established in 2020. Traoré has also announced he wants civil servants, such as those from the Forest and Water agency, to participate in this fight. 

This policy of the Burkinabe forces has also been reinforced by the arrival of new military equipment ordered by Damiba, such as Bayraktar drones. Traoré’s strategy has had some success as Burkinabe forces were able to take back some significant towns in northern Burkina Faso in late 2022 and early 2023. However, the frequency of attacks by jihadist insurgency groups has also increased. In recent weeks, more than 70 Burkinabe soldiers have died in Oudalan province bordering Mali, demonstrating the limits of domestic capacity building. In consequence, other external actors, such as Russia and Turkey, have stepped in to try to project their influence in the hope of filling the gap left by the departure of France. 

Anti-French sentiment has escalated due to France’s failure in successfully mitigating the security crisis, which has been fuelled by campaigns on social media. Russia has been particularly active in trying to expand its influence in Burkina Faso as part of its broader strategy in Africa. It has been credited with significantly contributing to disinformation campaigns and fuelling anti-French sentiment across the region, which has been particularly effective in Burkina. Reports of Russian flags and photos of Russian President Vladimir Putin during protests in Ouagadougou this January reflect the reality of growing Russian influence in the country under the Traoré regime. Both countries have embraced expanded cooperation as demonstrated by Burkinabe Prime Minister Kyélem de Tambèla’s visit to Moscow in December 2022 and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Ouagadougou in January. 

In December 2022, Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo made allegations against Burkina Faso, stating that they made an arrangement where Wagner mercenaries would support Burkinabe forces in exchange for operating a gold mine. However, Burkinabe authorities have rejected the claim that there are Wagner troops in the country. Burkina’s ties with Russia risks relations with some neighbours sceptical of Russian influence, like Ghana. This could compromise regional security collaboration, such as the Accra initiative which coordinates counterterrorism operations since 2017. Burkina Faso’s receptiveness to Russia reflects a desire for new partnerships ensuing the rise of tensions with France. There is potential for the presence of Wagner troops in the near future in the country which would likely further the divide with France, as seen in Mali. Moreover, it is unlikely that the presence of Wagner troops would be effective in improving the security situation, as has been demonstrated in Mali. Exchanging French military presence with another presence, such as Russia, will not resolve issues of inappropriate strategy and rampant corruption within the Burkinabe army, which has hindered the response to jihadist insurgency groups. 

Consequences of Withdrawal

In the days following the termination of the agreement, French authorities announced that the 400 troops stationed in Kamboinsin would be redeployed to neighbouring Niger where there are already 2,000 troops stationed. Since then, French President Emmanuel Macron outlined a new strategy for Africa during a speech on February 27, preceding his four-nation tour in the region. During this speech, he announced a gradual decrease of French military presence in Western Africa whilst increasing cooperation and training of African military forces, which does not encompass Burkina Faso. French departure from Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali has highlighted the need to rethink operations in the region. Part of this rethink is increased cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Sénegal. However, the French have yet to detail what they will do with troops stationed in Chad and Niger. 

Presently, Chad and Niger are the strongest partners of French security operations in the region. Niamey, the capital of Niger, is already becoming the hub of French security operations in West Africa. This has been enabled by the eagerness for French presence by Nigerien President Mohammed Bazoum, despite opposition by some. French strategy will have to ensure Nigerien authorities and the public remain supportive if they wish to make Niger the hub of their counter-insurgency operations. France should also consider furthering cooperation with countries in the Gulf of Guinea, such as Benin and Togo, who are increasingly subject to attacks of jihadist insurgency groups on their territory. If France chooses to diversify cooperation, it should also take into account the regimes in place and their stability to prevent a reiteration of the situation in Burkina Faso and Mali. 

Developments in the security sphere also raise questions regarding France’s future economic and political presence in Western Africa. Anti-French sentiment is gaining ground in countries as some argue that the Burkina Faso and Mali expulsion is the “tip of the iceberg”. Negative perceptions could materialise in countries traditionally favourable towards the French, such as Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Hostility towards France is also impacting its economic and political presence in the region. Since the early 2000s, French economic presence has declined drastically through trade and technical cooperations in favour of other powers, such as China, Russia, and Turkey. In his speech, Macron challenged this decline, calling for a “new era” to develop a new partnership with African actors. It remains to be seen whether this new era will materialise as it is not the first time that Macron has promised reform. Revelations in future months and years might also show that France may have done lasting damage to its relationship with some African partners, such as Burkina Faso, particularly if the regime stays in place in Ouagadougou. 

Rebuilding Relations

France’s issues in the region are rooted in negative public perception towards the former colonial power. In Burkina Faso, civil society played a crucial role in the government’s decision to sever ties with France. Any future French strategy must take the role of civil society seriously in order to mitigate public reception. Redefining military cooperation may not be enough to challenge perceptions that it is a neo-colonialist power sustaining an asymmetric relationship. This could materialise by expanding exchanges and a more robust development policy which demonstrates France can be a beneficial and reliable partner. Thus, the French government should also pursue policies which engage with civil societies in the region to prevent the pattern of events which developed in Mali and Burkina Faso.

The success of France’s new strategy in the region remains to be seen. It is crucial to focus on a relationship driven by mutual interest, particularly in the field of security. However, the transformation of this relationship is not solely dependent on France. As asserted by Macron, France cannot fix all of the problems in Africa. Some regimes have chosen to blame France entirely for the escalation of the security crisis in order to divert attention from problems of corruption and strategy. Therefore, the relationship can only transform if these regimes choose to engage with France or if these regimes change. Therefore, the relationship can only transform if these regimes do not remain in power. In Ouagadougou, it is unlikely that the attitude towards France will evolve as Traoré’s discourse is focused on blaming France and developing a relationship with Moscow. This situation is not necessarily the same for other countries in the region where there is potential for a new era.

While Burkinabes and France wait to see how Burkina Faso’s governance will be handled, France should focus on establishing and reforming relations in West Africa. Preventing Russian influence and mitigating errors in counter-terrorism operations are key in order for France to gain favour in the region and hopefully repair its relationship with Burkina Faso in the future. French presence in Africa is in a critically fragile state and must be handled methodically. The coming months will show whether France adapts a more analytical strategy and how the new era of French-African relations materialises. 

Food Insecurity in Africa

Examining contributors & consequences across sectors

The problem of food insecurity in Africa is becoming increasingly severe, exacerbated by its intersection with other crises. In this report by Africa Watch, we investigate some of the most prevalent factors that contribute to this problem and their consequences, both in Africa and globally. By analysing the agriculture, economics, politics, and human security sectors, we identify the complexity of the issue and conclude that regional action alone is not sufficient to solve the problem. International cooperation is also necessary to tackle the issue of food insecurity in Africa.

Read the report HERE

The Conflict in Tigray: A Consequence of an Unequal Political System

The outbreak of the Tigray war is to be understood as a simple national opposition. Although the conflict officially started with the events of November 2020, the tensions between its belligerents go back much earlier. Until the appointment of current Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, Ethiopia was governed by the coalition of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), composed of four independent, ethno-regional parties: the Oromos, the Amharas, the Tigrayans led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, (TPLF), and the southern peoples. 

The TPLF, a historic opponent of the Derg military junta (1974-1991), emerged from Ethiopia's civil wars as the country's main political force despite Tigrayans representing only six percent of the population. Their objective is to reinvent a multinational state where sovereignty would rest with the different nationalities that make up Ethiopian society. Their idea was endorsed by the vote on a new constitution in 1994, giving rise to the present federal state of Ethiopia. The text is the direct result of a policy of "ethnic democracy," inspired by Joseph Stalin's theory of nationalities, which was widely shared at the time by EPRDF leaders. However, in the practice of power, it quickly became clear that most decisions were taken by the TPLF, which transformed the coalition into an autocratic power in which it was in a hegemonic position. 

Between 1994 and 2018, Ethiopia was a federal state in name only, ruled by a hegemonic coalition representing a minority population. After 30 years on the basis of this model, violent protests finally erupted in Ethiopia in 2016. The form of the state as well as its practice of power is questioned, which leads to a deep crisis for the coalition at the head of the country. It is in this context that the figure of Abiy Ahmed asserts himself. Appointed Prime Minister thanks to his arrival at the head of the central party, the Oromo leader quickly presented himself as the antithesis of the Tigrayan ideology. 

Ahmed advocated a unified Ethiopia and compared ethnic federalism to the colonial period. He saw the constitutional recognition of ethnicity in the 1994 constitution and ethnonationalism as a risk to the unity and stability of the country. However, according to Mehdi Labzae, a sociologist and political scientist specializing in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed goes further by quickly presenting himself as a multi-positional. This group supports a pan-Ethiopian ideology based on the principle of the people's right to self-determination, excluding any ethnic dimension in the distribution of power, which contrasts with the federalist ideology of the Tigrean elites. Other ethnic groups, such as the Oromos, never had a representative in power before Ahmed and the people of Afar, which borders Tigray, joined the protest. 

Abiy Ahmed will thus play on these oppositions and secure the support of the aggrieved Amhara elites in power by promising to pursue a warmongering policy against the Tigrayans. As of 2019, the TPLF complains that it is being pushed out of power and marginalized, especially since the central government accuses it of participating in the destabilization of the north. A few months after his appointment, Ahmed also announced his intention to carry out major reforms to change the existing federal system. He proposed, for example, centralization and nationalization of the central party, as well as the merger of all ethno-regional parties into a new party: the Prosperity Party. All of the parties accepted this proposal, with the exception of the TPLF. 

The events of 2020 are therefore the result of these national and historical tensions. The simple issue of elections set the stage for the conflict. When Abiy Ahmed came to power, he was appointed Prime Minister following the resignation of Haile Mariam Dessalegn in April 2018. This sudden change brought an unelected figure to power, allowing the opposition to challenge his legitimacy. Although the central government announced elections in 2019 for the spring of 2020, the deadline was postponed because of the Coronavirus pandemic. 

The situation escalated when the TPLF leaders decided to hold their own elections in Tigray in September 2020. The central government's postponements are seen as an affront by Tigrayans, who see these delays as a means of extending the terms of office of newcomers to power. The TPLF won elections in Tigray, but the election was deemed illegal by the federal government, which subsequently announced the suspension of general funds for the region. The conflict officially erupted in November 2020 when the federal Ethiopian government launched a military operation in response to the TPLF attack on a military base housing the federal army's Northern Command. Tigrayans justified the attack by claiming it was a preemptive strike against a military intervention that the government had been planning for weeks. From then on, dialogue broke down and a deadly conflict began that would last almost two years.

Pretoria Agreements

The talks that began in Pretoria in October 2022 were agreed to by the TPLF leadership and the Ethiopian army, following an invitation from the African Union. The two sides committed to an  end of hostilities on November 2, under the leadership of several key African political figures (Chairperson of the African Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat Faki, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, and former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka). Two commitments were made with immediate effect at the end of the initial discussions: the restoration of humanitarian services and supplies in northern Tigray, as well as basic services - telecommunications, electricity, fuel, and banking - which the region had been deprived of since the beginning of the war - and the restoration of law and order, including the protection of civilians, especially women. A roadmap has been put in place reaffirming the commitment of the various parties to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia while respecting the constitution. Transitional justice mechanisms are also provided to settle wartime disputes, although these have not yet been detailed.  

Entitled the "Agreement on Durable Peace and Permanent Cessation of Hostilities," the talks now focus on the gradual disarmament of Tigrayan forces, as well as the return of humanitarian aid to the devastated region of Tigray. With the latter being the most sensitive issue, Tigray representatives have asked for security guarantees. Additionally, the treaty emphasizes that "the disarmament of heavy weapons must be undertaken concomitantly with the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region."

Apart from the cessation of fighting, work on concrete modalities for the effective signing of a peace agreement between the two parties remains outstanding as of yet. After almost a month of deliberation, the latest commitment was the opening of a humanitarian corridor to Tigray on November 12. Signed by Field Marshal Berhanu Jula, Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces (ENDF), and General Tadesse Werede of the TPLF, the resolution comes amidst ongoing discussions in Nairobi on the implementation of the peace agreement reached in South Africa. 

Although this decision provides some temporary relief for the people of Tigray, the UN says the region is experiencing one of the worst humanitarian crises Ethiopia has seen in the past 30 years. At the time of the ceasefire decision, 5.2 million required humanitarian assistance in Tigray, including 3.8 million who needed healthcare, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The region has remained cut off from the world for more than two years, leaving people so vulnerable that this assistance seems minimal compared to the needs that could be expected locally. Moreover, the Tigray region currently remains closed to journalists, by the decision of the Ethiopian central government, which makes it impossible to verify information about the allocation of aid on the ground. 

Root Causes

At the opening of the talks this October, UN Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Hanna Tetteh emphasized that "the agreement is only the beginning of the peace process.” This is not the first time that peace agreements have been reached between representatives of the Ethiopian government and the Tigrayan forces in this conflict. In March 2021, a humanitarian truce was agreed upon between the two sides, which stopped the fighting for five months. After that, between last August and this January, fights re-emerged in Tigray causing thousands of more victims. Even if the new discussions give rise to general hope, the situation remains fluid and unstable in northern Ethiopia, with an upsurge in fighting that could occur at any time. In addition to these recent events, the contributing factors that are at the heart of the war continue. These include the persistence of ethnic federalism as a system of government and the important role played by Eritrea in the conflict. 

Regarding ethnic federalism, researchers Medhi Labzaé and Sonia Le Gourillec argue how the unequal foundations of the system have resulted in the current war. Using the linguistic and ethnic criteria as the main tool for institutional division, in a country like Ethiopia whose populations are very heterogeneous and numerous, has led to several dysfunctions in the Ethiopian political organization. For example, as regions are divided along ethnic lines, land allocation within them is also based on this criterion which has created conflicts over land distribution, as in 2010. At that time, the Ethiopian government granted nearly 3 million hectares (which corresponds to 30000 meters) of land under lease agreements to multinational companies, to the detriment of local pastoralists and farmers already hard hit by severe and recurrent droughts. Their protests were violently repressed by sending the army, demonstrating the dysfunctional nature of the ethnic system. Those events have raised awareness of how this system was leading to the exacerbation of political tensions surrounding resources of the country between the average Ethiopian communities and how it always benefits the ones in power first (since 1990 the Tigrayans).

Another concern with ethnic federalism is that over the three decades that it has been in place as a model of government, the federal state has become confused with the apparatus of the hegemonic TPLF party. Since the coalition is entirely dominated by the Tigray minority, its power has given rise to a certain authoritarianism. According to Le Gourillec, an ethnically based state where each group can hope to be represented and have access to power and resources can only function in a democratic space. This is due to the high risk of creating frustration and anger on the part of communities that feel they have been deprived of power or are insufficiently represented. It is exactly for this reason that the Amharas and Arfars joined Abiy Ahmed in his strategy of creating post-ethnic politics through the Prosperity Party and then participated in the war effort against the Tigrayan forces. Taking into consideration the various problems with ethnic federalism, it can be deduced that the political system and its organization are one of the main reasons for the internal conflict. 

The talks that began last October have so far made no mention of restructuring or even amending articles 39 and 47 in the constitution that provide the basis for ethnic federalism. Thus, if the talks do not address the root causes of the tensions that have plagued the country for decades, there is little chance that the talks will lead to lasting solutions at this stage.

The second structural problem is the involvement of the Eritrean army in the conflict. Although it was not involved in the talks, Eritrea is a major player in the Ethiopian civil war. However, the extent and importance of its role has never been revealed publicly in detail, as can be seen from the statements of some mediators during the talks such as Uhuru Kenyatta said: "We are not here to discuss any particular foreign country, we are here only to talk about peace in Ethiopia" when asked about the departure of Eritreans in northern Tigray. Since November 2020, Abiy Ahmed has stated that the armed forces receive military assistance from Eritrea to support the government’s fight against the TPLF. Eritrea has been a long-standing enemy of the Tigrayan leadership, an element that Abiy Ahmed has used to destabilize them since 2018.

The violence and resentment between Eritrea and Tigray have significantly contributed to the current conflict. As soon as he came to power, Abiy Ahmed initiated a rapprochement with Eritrea, which earned him the Nobel Peace Prize following the signing of the peace agreements in July 2018. Although this reconciliation is intended to bring stability to the Horn of Africa, this diplomatic opening allowed Ahmed to destabilize the former ruling elites by getting closer to the TPLF's biggest regional enemy. As evidence of this, when the conflict broke out in 2020, the Eritrean army supported the official Ethiopian forces and took part in crimes against humanity in northern Tigray, such as the Aksum massacre. In November 2020, Eritrea’s army arbitrarily massacred more than 100 civilians in this town, randomly executing people in the street. According to Amnesty International, "the Eritrean army engaged in widespread looting and extrajudicial killings.” 

Securing Peace

So far, progress in resolving and easing inter-ethnic tensions at the initiative of the Ethiopian government has been slow. Some provisions of the first version of the peace agreement have been passed since late December. Although Internet and telecommunication services have not yet been allowed throughout the region, the town of Mekele is now connected to the national power grid on December 6. Besides, the country's main bank, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, announced on December 19 that it was resuming financial operations in some towns in Tigray. In addition, an Ethiopian government delegation made its first official visit to the capital of Tigray on December 26th, to "oversee the implementation of the main points of the peace agreement.” However, the situation remains worrying. Emergency measures such as the provision of humanitarian aid remain insufficient and suffer from poor logistics, mainly due to the fragile functioning of basic services and the cutting of telecommunications networks. No official date has been announced for their restoration throughout the region. However, their resumption is essential for the effective administration of international humanitarian aid and to report on the reality of needs on the ground.

Most alarming is the continued presence of the Eritrean army and security forces, as well as militias from the Ethiopian region of Amhara. The two groups, which have supported the federal army in the conflict, have still not been invited to the ongoing talks in Pretoria. In recent testimonies, Tigrayans authorities and aid workers have accused the latter of looting, executions, and abductions of civilians. Such cases include two aid workers informing the AFP (Agence France Presse) that "Amhara forces are looting homes and government offices [...]" and that "Eritrean soldiers are also continuing to abduct youth”.

To find an effective solution to the current conflict, a tripartite agreement must be concluded between the Ethiopian government, the TPLF, and the Eritrean armed forces. The stakes are high. If the Tigray forces finalize a peace agreement with the central Ethiopian government, the alliance between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki can be expected to be jeopardized, as such an agreement would call into question the basis of their rapprochement in 2018. A consequence of this could be further destabilization of the region with potential conflict between the two states, solidifying historical resentments. Among the Amhara, tensions with the Tigrayans date back decades resulting in the misallocation of fertile land inherited from the ethnic federal system since the TPLF came to power in 1991. The resolution of the historical resentment between these two ethnic groups is thus necessary to ensure internal stability in Ethiopia. If a peace agreement is not reached, fighting could resume in the Tigray region, increasing violence against the Tigrayan population and worsening the humanitarian crisis. 

Who is at the Helm of Zanu-PF & the Future of Zimbabwe?

Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe’s former Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987 and President from 1987 to 2017, collectively ruled the country for a period of nearly four decades since independence. Under his rule, which has been described as governing with an iron fist, Zimbabwe underwent tremendous changes. Mugabe was forced out of power in November 2017 with current Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa at the helm of Zanu-PF leadership and Zimbabwe. 

The events that led up to Mnangagwa gaining leadership of the country were preceded by what may be described as a coup, although the military that placed Mugabe under house arrest stated that it was not a military takeover of the government, Mugabe was still the country’s commander in chief. Their main aim was to target “criminals” that surrounded Mugabe and who were deemed responsible for the country’s economic decline. These accused criminals included members of Mugabe’s cabinet, prominent G40 leaders, and supporters of his wife Grace, who had started infiltrating Zimbabwean politics, seeking to gain power and leadership and oust the opposition.

The military also opposed Grace Mugabe’s underhanded tactics to gain a quick ascension to political power. Such tactics included becoming head of Zanu-PF’s Women’s League after she sought to enter politics more actively in 2014 and become Mugabe’s successor, whilst gaining support from the G40 and the Youth League. Despite receiving the nomination to head the Women’s League, she does not come from a background of independence struggle and has also not gone through grassroots levels, as stipulated by the party’s constitution.

Prior to these events, Mnangagwa was fired as Vice President in 2017 after Mugabe accused him of plotting to take power from him. However, on 24 November 2017, Mugabe submitted his resignation as President just as impeachment proceedings would be held against him. As such, Mnangagwa succeeded Mugabe and took on the role of President of Zimbabwe. 

In the general elections that followed in 2018, Mnangagwa maintained his position as Zimbabwe’s president. Nicknamed the “crocodile,” Mnangagwa’s leadership does not appear to diverge much from Mugabe’s reign. His promises have included job creation (Zimbabwe’s current unemployment rate is estimated to range from around 5% to figures that go in the upper tens of the percentile, depending on whether one includes informal employment as well) and compensation for those who had their land seized by the government in the past. Other promises have included fair, democratic elections, as well as financial stability. 

However, the results on the ground paint a different picture. Since Mnangagwa came to power in 2018, over one million Zimbabweans have fled the country owing to a plethora of reasons, among which include rising inflation and unemployment. 

Other Mugabe-era challenges that prevail to this day include corruption, nepotism, and intimidation. This is despite the fact that when he came to power he promised that he would seek to open up to economic reforms and rekindle ties with foreign investors and the international community. Prior to this, the international community had largely shunned Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s leadership. 

Given the fact that Mugabe and Mnangagwa served so closely together for decades, and their credentials as independence heroes in the country, it does not appear that Mnangagwa will keep his promises. Old, underhanded tactics to destabilise the opposition, such as limiting their right to assemble and hold peaceful meetings, arresting and detaining opposition members, and the police using force against them, continue to be used to this day. 

Mnangagwa’s history is a chequered one. He was arrested for his role in blowing up a Rhodesian train in the pre-independence struggle and was sentenced to death. However, his young age then prevented him from getting the death penalty and he instead served out a 10-year prison sentence. 

After his release, he entered politics and served in the Central Intelligence Office in various ministries and ministerial roles, culminating in the role as Vice President just before Mugabe resigned. He has also been accused of being a part of orchestrating a genocide in which over 20,000 people were killed in the 1980s, although he has denied any involvement and wrongdoing. The genocide or massacre, also referred to as Gukurahundi, took place from 1983 to 1987 and targeted Ndebele civilians by the Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe National Army. At that time, Mnangagwa was the Minister of State for National Security. The wounds of the past remain with many Zimbabweans to this day and they are a cause of deep resentment and frustration.

Regarding the upcoming 2023 elections, Mnangagwa is highly unlikely to release his grip on power and old tactics used during the Mugabe regime of stifling the opposition are likely to remain. He is highly likely to mobilise all the instruments he has at his disposal, including the army and police, to break up and prevent opposition rallies. Further challenges include the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission’s (ZEC’s) close ties with the ruling party and its unwillingness to share voters’ rolls in time for open inspection, amongst multiple other grievances the opposition has raised against the ZEC. As such, the electoral process is likely to feel unfair to many in the opposition and the people on the ground. Human rights violations are also expected to continue as opposition parties attempt to garner support. Therefore, despite being a democracy on paper, Zimbabwe is not expected to experience fair and democratic elections. 

However, in the first post-Mugabe elections in 2018, many Zimbabweans were hopeful and optimistic about change in the country. Unfortunately, political, social, and economic change appears unlikely if Mnangagwa remains at the helm of Zimbabwe. With a focus on cementing his power and retaining the status quo, it will be difficult for the opposition to break through the long-established institutions that appear to favour Mnanagagwa and Zanu-PF. 

Mnangagwa was recently endorsed as Zanu-PF’s presidential candidate and despite talking left, and walking right, his rhetoric for reform is unlikely to come to fruition. The opposition will have a long road ahead and many challenges to overcome in trying to secure seats in the National Assembly. At the very least, once they gain even a small foothold in Parliament they need to remain vigilant and act as watchdogs over Zanu-PF’s actions in an attempt to keep the party and its leadership accountable, in terms of the broadly outlined roles and duties of an opposition party in the National Assembly. However, with the deep entrenchment of Zanu-PF’s power, acting as a watchdog will not be enough. This is especially the case if the opposition does not secure a sufficient number of seats. Working together with civil society could help the opposition strengthen its voice and impact. However, due to the numerous limitations placed on civil society in Zimbabwe and Zanu-PF’s “unfriendly” and sceptical attitude toward NGOs that are foreign funded, this role is likely to have limited impact. 

Despite much talk about democracy and following democratic processes by Zanu-PF, the 2023 elections are likely to be a democratically superficial act. The opposition will face significant resistance from Zanu-PF and its deeply entrenched organs of state in terms of being able to campaign and canvass to gain voter support. As such, the opposition, while it has the potential to play a crucial role in Zimbabwean politics, is expected to face an uphill battle through continued arrests of its members, possible protests, and basic rights abuses carried out by police and security forces. Although the 2023 elections might ensure procedural accuracy, there are unlikely to be any significant developments in the substance of the political fabric of Zimbabwe in that no meaningful change is expected to take place.   

The Luanda Agreements: A Path to Ease Relations Between Kigali & Kinshasa in the Kivusian Conflict?

This July, Rwandan president Paul Kagame and Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi met in Luanda, under the supervision of Joao Lourenço, Angolan president appointed by the members of the East African Community (EAC), to mediate the talks regarding the conflict in eastern Congo. The initial conclusions of the meeting were the immediate withdrawal of positions occupied by the March 23 Movement (M23), the establishment of an ad hoc observation body under Angolan auspices, and a section on the exploitation of the DRC's natural resources while respecting state sovereignty. 

All of these summer meetings were aimed at finding solutions to the thorny conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda regarding the situation in Kivu. They also took place in the context of the resumption of fighting following the capture of Bunagana by the rebels of M23 last June. 

Composed of former Tutsi fighters from Laurent Nkunda's National Congress for the Defense of the People, M23 was reintegrated into the Congolese army following the March 2009 agreements. After its reinstatement, it was quickly pointed out for its abuses of power within the newly reformed Congolese army and its dissident practices. Its members were accused by the United Nations of supporting mineral trafficking and by international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, of perpetrating numerous acts of violence against the civilians. From 2012 onwards, these accusations quickly led to an increase in tensions between M23 and the Congolese government. Additionally, there were suspicions about Rwanda's support for the rebel faction. This information was reported in an official letter from the UN Security Council in June 2012. In this tenuous context, the capture of Bunagana was a victory and a resurgence of M23 against the Congolese government. The town served "as a base" for M23 in November 2012, as had the town of Goma, before M23 lost the war to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and the international coalition, before taking refuge in Uganda. This past summer, photos of overturned armored vehicles believed to belong to the FARDC have been posted on social networks and, according to the UN, more than 30,000 people have been displaced by the fighting. The DRC government continued to accuse Rwanda of supporting these abuses, which Kigali has fiercely always denied. 

In the wake of these events, the tripartite meeting in Luanda was aimed at finding new avenues for appeasement between the two powers. A "roadmap" aimed at achieving this objective stipulated a willingness to normalize diplomatic relations between Kinshasa and Kigali. It also provided for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of M23 from its positions in the DRC as the Congolese presidency had specified on Twitter. The meeting was also intended to define the modalities of this roadmap. While this announcement seemed like a good start with the “de-escalation agreement" between the DRC and Rwanda and the re-launch of a permanent DRC-Rwanda joint commission, no official peace agreement has been reached since these meetings. The terms of the various commitments made have not been specified.

Seeking to Ease Tensions

Located on the border with Uganda, Bunagana is the capital of North Kivu province and a strategic city for the DRC's border trade with the Great Lakes region. According to Congolese economist Kamala Kaghoma, a lecturer at the Université Officielle de Bukavu, "Bunagana is an important town economically because it facilitates access to Uganda, which has more access to the sea than the DRC, and also allows the country to have a passageway to the sea. So Uganda, through Kenya, has more access to the sea than the DRC”. Therefore, the recapture of the city by M23 is a destabilizing factor for the region and also a symbolic failure for the Tshisekedi government. 

With the resumption of its activities in November 2021, M23 is now, more than ever, the epicenter of tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa. According to a recent United Nations report, the armed group is still supported by the regime of Paul Kagame in spite of the agreements. This report highlighted the participation of Rwandan soldiers in several attacks against Congolese soldiers in North Kivu province between November 2021 and this July. Prior to the release of this confidential information, EAC leaders had previously discussed the issue at a meeting in Nairobi, proposing a regional solution to the crisis including the creation of an inter-state military force. However, the release of the report and recent events have shown that the diplomatic agreements discussed during the summer have not been able to override the realities on the ground or ease tensions between the two states. Somes examples are the capture of Rumangabo, Kiwanja, and Rutshuru. 

The Luanda agreements also raised another important point. In addition to the deployment of the regional force decided in Nairobi and the updating of the tripartite agreement of Kigali, dating back to 2010, several agreements were passed between the two belligerents. First, Rwanda should not participate in the regional force. Second, it should support the fight against M23, the Rwandan rebels of the DFLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), as well as their dissidents. At the beginning, officials were rather confident following these meetings. For the Rwanda Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Biruta, the recommendations agreed upon were a "new step in the right direction.” However, the  involvement  of regional organizations in the crisis, such as the EAC, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), indicated the possibility of regional and even international solutions to the crisis.

However, recent events in the conflict have dashed the hopes and commitments made last July. From the beginning of the meetings, organizations were opposed to these agreements. For example, LUCHA, a Congolese civil organization of defense of the rights of Congolese civilians advocating non-violence, denounced the Luanda agreements due to the normalization of diplomatic relations with an “aggressor state,” pointing out Rwanda.

Moreover on the battlefield, things do not seem to have changed since the passage of these agreements. Recent reports show that the commitments made in Luanda have not found a significant resonance among the main parties involved. Last October, M23 expanded its influence in eastern Congo with the capture of two new towns in North Kivu. Faced with this development in the conflict, President Tshisekedi reacted by once again accusing Kigali of encouraging the destabilization of the region by supporting M23. Tshisekedi then called for the removal of the Rwandan ambassador  from the DRC and on "youth to mobilize" against the M23 threat in a televised address in November. Paul Kagame reacted by deploring his counterpart's attitude and Rwandan security forces have been on alert at the Congolese-Rwandan border. Joao Lourenco has sent a special envoy to Kinshasa to try to convince the DRC and Rwanda to participate in a third peace dialogue this month. Despite the current effort, the evolution of events between July and November attests to the difficulties in establishing a lasting solution and concrete commitments to resolve the crisis.

Competition in Kivu

If we look at the history of relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo on the Kivu issue, the Luanda agreements show the persistence of a fluctuating relationship between the two states. Despite the announcement of several commitments, the two states always return to their initial positions. On the one hand, Rwanda continues to support the actions of M23 through its nationals, which allows it to have an indirect presence in the territory and thus access to mineral resources. On the other hand, the DRC continues to allow the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) to circulate on its territory, carrying out operations against the FARDC. This group has become one of the most important armed groups in the region and poses a direct threat to Rwanda's internal security, as it is made up of former Hutu soldiers who participated in the genocide against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994.

The apparent insolvency of the conflict also underscores the difficulties of response by regional and international organizations, particularly in their ability to coerce the two states. Regional organizations, such as the EAC, lack the coercive tools to force the two states to respect their commitments. Initially endorsed as an economic institution, the EAC is a recent political organization and its activity was only accelerated in 2017 as the East African Federation. Although it is attempting to increasingly unite through various stages of integration, it remains little known and most nationals of the organization's member countries remain uninformed and unconvinced of the effectiveness of the organization's political action. 

Additionally, reaching out to dissident armed groups is complex. Before the capture of Bunagana last June, the EAC had organized talks in May, inviting the presidents of the states of the sub-region but also Congolese and foreign armed groups to try to find agreements on the Kivusian question. However, most of the rebel groups did not show up, resulting in incomplete negotiations.

Foreign Influence

Adding to the complexities, traditional international mediators, such as UN peacekeeping operations and Western countries who have greater diplomatic and military resources, do not seem to have found the keys to resolving the crisis. For example, at this year’s UN General Assembly Emmanuel Macron, Félix Tshisekedi, and Paul Kagame agreed on the need to find common solutions to the crisis, stressing a "common will." Despite these encouraging statements, the annexation of new towns in eastern Congo barely a month after these declarations show the lack of implementation of concrete measures with Western mediators. These difficulties of the international mediators are crystallized by the continued exacerbation of tensions between the Congolese population and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Present in the country since 2010 with the mission to protect civilians but also to participate in the promotion of peacekeeping in the DRC, MONUSCO is regularly the object of attacks and  numerous demonstrations in the provinces of South and North Kivu. Demands against the mission include its departure, which has already taken place in Butembo, the third largest city in North Kivu province.

Moreover, the growing interest of foreign actors in the region, such as Russia, raises questions about the potential choice of a new mediation model on the part of the belligerents. Last August, a meeting took place between Russian and Congolese officials. Russian diplomat Viktor Tokmakov, known for his links with Wagner, attempted to position Russia as an arms supplier for the DRC. Russia's appearance in the conflict comes at a time when the lack of Western support in the conflict with M23 is being denounced by those close to President Tshisekedi. According to Congolese political analyst Dady Saleh, meetings have increased over the summer between Moscow, Kinshasa, and some leaders of the paramilitary group. Although the group has not been mentioned since the current upsurge in tension, involving private armed groups in the resolution of the conflict would be an infringement on the sovereignty of the Congolese state, but even more so a threat to the rights of its population.

In the face of these blockages, a relevant solution should come first and foremost from the interdependent will of the two states to take strong measures to contain the conflict. On the one hand, it would be interesting to see the regional institutions equip themselves with legally, politically, and financially binding tools in order to force the states to revise their personal judgments in favor of the stabilization of the region. On the other hand, both presidents are far from ignorant of the realities on the ground. In various ways, they have been actively involved in the political and military life of their countries since the crisis began in the 1990’s. Their respective inactions can therefore only be explained by the primacy of their desire for personal enrichment via national resources rather than the security of their populations. Thus, the corruption of the rulers as well as their use of the belligerents involved contributes to a conflict that seems to have no end. 

Hope for Change or Much of the Same?

The by-elections that were held in Zimbabwe earlier this year were a signal that change is on the horizon. With the CCC led by Nelson Chamisa scooping up many of the seats formerly being held by Zanu-PF members, hope for change in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) country has been expressed. But how much of this hope is well-grounded? Not much, if one looks at the history of Zanu-PF’s tactics of intimidation and violence during election periods, particularly when it comes to opposition parties attempting to gather, let alone express opposition to Zanu-PF.

Since 1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence, Zanu-PF has been the ruling party of the country; retaining leadership over politics for the past 32 years. Some maintain optimism that change will come. However, this is an unlikely scenario due to the deeply entrenched power structure.

What appears to be on the horizon is not peaceful electioneering or voter education but a gloomy outlook that many monitoring the run-up elections foresee.

The causes for this are manifold. Zanu-PF, for example, often addresses supporters freely countrywide, whereas opposition parties’ rallies have been banned. This makes it very difficult for any opposition party to gather, discuss the way forward with their supporters and constituents, and many, including female leaders, fear for their lives. This is despite the fact that there is a gender quota for women to enter the political space (31% or 81 seats in the National Assembly are reserved for women) and be placed on voters’ rolls in an effort for more gender representation.

Apart from the gender inequality and intimidation many opposition female politicians face, the police, as an extended arm and tool of the ruling party, frequently use assault at opposition gatherings and invite their anti-riot squad to break up proceedings, such as the recent arrest of several dozens of CCC supporters earlier this year. In fact, as an extension of the ruling party, Zanu-PF tanks with “poisoned water and batons” are at times used to intimidate residents. 

The disbalance in terms of freedom-to-gather is not new. Some CCC officials have cited the disbandment, interruption, or outright refusal of opposition gatherings as being done for “frivolous reasons.” The CCC has also cited violence and intimidation as a major tactic by the ruling party to prevent it from gathering and meeting its members freely. 

Other tactics that are used include the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) often failing to disclose the voter’s roll for inspection to the opposition on time; violating electoral rules of the country. Despite the involvement of human rights lawyers and NGOs who have continually raised these issues and brought some to court, little is expected to change in terms of the ruling party’s machinations in the run-up to the 2023 general elections.

In the run-up to the by-elections earlier this year, some CCC rallies were banned by the police with meetings being disrupted. This is further exacerbated by the fact that at least 37 of its supporters were arrested. Many view this as a “test-run for the general elections next year”. Moreover, Zimbabwean human rights NGO Forum has recorded nearly 2,000 cases of political violence in the country between this January and October alone. According to NGO Forum, the situations range from “arbitrary arrests, malicious damage to property, arson, threats/harassment/intimidation as well as assault and torture.”

Violence and election rigging is not new in Zimbabwe’s political landscape, particularly by the ruling Zanu-PF. The reasons for this are simple: the retention of power. Yet, by intimidating voters and the opposition, their attempt to stifle local voices, and inability to meet their needs could backfire. Zanu-PF is again expected to bring out water cannons, police, and other intimidation tactics to ensure it remains at the helm of the country’s leadership in 2023. 

Any results of the elections that can be perceived to be against Zanu-PF’s interests are expected to be contested, such has occurred in the past with former opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. In sum, while the CCC may have garnered multiple seats in the by-elections, the 2023 elections are going to be a true test as to whether Zimbabwe is on the road to reform or will the country repeat the same tumultuous corruption practices that has been seen in its political landscape?

The Impact of African Coups on Chinese Economic Interests

Chinese engagement in Africa has significantly increased in recent years as China has become an important economic and political actor on the continent. As Africa is receiving loans and infrastructure development funding, China is taking advantage of a resource-rich continent and a large market to export its manufactured goods. However, the deepening of Chinese interests in the African continent have led to increased security considerations. As Africa has recently witnessed an “epidemic of coup d’états,” with six military overthrows during the year 2021 alone, the question of the protection of Chinese interests is coming back to the forefront. 

Impact on Chinese Interests 

At first sight, African coups do not seem to affect Chinese interests significantly. The new military governments have never taken an anti-Chinese stance and most have reaffirmed their commitment to Sino-African cooperation. In some cases, China has benefitted from the coups’ instability by gaining bargaining power and new opportunities for Chinese companies. Beijing also seems to have accepted the continent’s insecurity into its foreign policy. Although Beijing has not been completely disengaged from African security, actively using propaganda and information control, the idea prevails amongst Chinese officials that instability is inevitable with Africa’s current state of development and that “in the meantime, China has to be flexible and create new opportunities for both political leaders and African societies,” commented a Chinese representative. 

However, presenting the impact of African coups as negligible would be overlooking the indirect consequences of uncertainty and instability which constrain Chinese benefits and foreign policy’s efficiency. Firstly, a change in government always questions the future of existing agreements - if there is a risk that the new administration will renege completely on the deal, it might also want to renegotiate the terms for a bigger share, more local overview, or higher taxes. This change is likely to stretch the period of delay before the deal is agreed on and implemented, which can sometimes take decades in the African case. Moreover, the insecurity flowing from a military overthrow leads to a slowdown of the economy, reducing trade for a temporary period or longer if international sanctions against the new military government are imposed. For instance, the stark sanctions implemented by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali this January significantly impacted the country’s trade, with liquidities drying up and the government accusing the banking restrictions for its $31 billion default default in bond payments. Finally, military overthrows pose the risk of increased violence and turmoil. Whilst domestic unrest risks slowing down trade and services, it can also directly threaten the Chinese workers involved in the country. For instance, during the Malagasy uprising in 2009, numerous Chinese businesses were the target of looting and required Chinese officials to demand greater protection of the citizens. 

The risks of coups for Chinese interests have been more visible after the 2021 Guinean coup, which has sparked a more assertive response from Beijing. Guinea is an essential partner for China, as its great iron ore and bauxite resources are crucial for its industry. China imports around 50 per cent of its bauxite from Guinea, which is used for the automotive, technological, and manufacturing sectors. The two countries also cooperated on the Simandou deal, a $19 billion mining project for iron ore in the West African state. 

Col. Mamady Doumbouya’s military overthrow in September 2021 highlighted Guinea’s importance for Chinese interests and therefore Chinese vulnerability to instability in Guinea. The coup raised uncertainty around the Samandon project, threatening to cancel the deal which had been signed a year before after more than two decades of negotiation. Prospecting on the effects of the Guinean coup a week after the event, Natalie Sambhi, analyst for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, declared “it’s not clear that the coup leaders and interim administration will honour agreements signed with Chinese companies under the previous government.” 

Moreover, the prices of aluminum rose up to their highest levels since 2008 as a result of the coup; directly impacting the Chinese industrial sector. If the country had been exposed to repeated coups and a high price of aluminum or bauxite for a prolonged time, China would have been required to diversify its imports or rely more on Australia, from which it currently imports 30 per cent of its bauxite. However, this would have required an adjustment of China’s foreign policy, as Beijing was trying to gain more independence from the island which had supported an international inquiry into China’s role in the Covid outbreak. If the new Guinean government reasserted its commitment to China, keeping the impact of the coup on Chinese interests to a low, the 2021 overthrow showed that China is not completely unconcerned by the security situation in Africa, as its interests can be quickly threatened in case of prolonged instability. Therefore, if the African coups’ direct impact on Chinese interests is not evident, they do seem to have diffuse effects which require adaptability from China. 

Chinese Response to the Coups 

Chinese foreign policy rests on the principle of non-interference; it considers that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure security in its own internal affairs. Whilst the European Union (EU) and ECOWAS are vocal in their condemnation of the coups, often imposing stark sanctions against the military governments deemed anti-democratic, China does not usually make an official condemnation or support sanctions against African military governments. China expressed no criticism of the five African coups between 2003 and 2010. In response to the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe, China declared, “We hope that Zimbabwe could properly handle its internal affairs,” whilst stating that Sudan is “capable of managing its own internal affairs and ensuring its national peace and stability” after the 2019 coup. Chinese condemnations are rare but increasingly more common and are usually voiced when Chinese stakes are higher in the concerned countries. Representatives have officially condemned the 2012 coup in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the 2013 coup in the Central African Republic, and most recently the military overthrow of Guinea’s former president Alpha Condé. However, they have never supported or implemented sanctions against the new military governments.

Although the Chinese response may appear neutral or nonpartisan, China’s non-interference doctrine has many political implications. For one, this policy represents indirect - if not direct - support for the new governments. Increasing its aid to Madagascar in return for more security for its citizens and infrastructures after 2009, Chinese support was represented in local media as an achievement of the new Madagascar government and important international recognition, helping to root the new government’s legitimacy. 

Being associated as an ally and supporter of military governments can turn detrimental to Chinese interests, notably for its image in African civil society. When the military overthrows are criticized by the population, the Chinese reputation, already low due to perceptions of economic aggressiveness, risks to decrease even more. As Chris Alden and Christopher R. Hughes, experts on Chinese foreign policy argued, “the Chinese presence then becomes a potential target for dissent from any segment of society that is discontented with the prevailing circumstances under the government of the day, whether trade unions concerned about safety standards or businesses that are unable to compete against Chinese imports, superior access to supply chains or low-cost bidding.” They use the example of Chinese cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was decried in Parliament by Jean-Lucien Mbusa, an important member of the opposition party, to rally civil society. 

Secondly, its policy of “non-interference” leads China to actively oppose sanctions in international institutions. Refusing to vote for UN-backed sanctions against the coups, China positions itself closer to Russia, which is more actively engaged in its support of the military regimes. As Richard Gowan explains, UN director for the International Crisis Group, “Russia has backed the coup-plotters in Sudan and Mali even more strongly than China. Beijing and Moscow tend to coordinate their positions over these crises.” This position has tended to deteriorate China’s relations with African members of the UN Security Council, as their historical Chinese ally in the UN went against their decision to sanction the coups. This policy also goes against ECOWAS’ position, which has become more assertive in its condemnations of the African military overthrows. ECOWAS’ policy used to be based on the principle of non-interference, but in recent years the regional organization has taken a more intervening stance, therefore breaking away from its accordance with China. David Shinn, former US ambassador to Burkina Faso and professor at George Washington University summarized: “Military coups in Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso complicate both China’s economic interests and foreign policy in the region, especially when Beijing’s policy is contrary to the prevailing African view.” 

The recent wave of coup d’états in Africa, therefore, impacts Chinese foreign policy, by forcing Beijing to position itself and protect its interests whilst not worrying local opinion. As China is expanding its investment on the continent, its security engagement will become increasingly significant. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that China will shift from its non-interference approach as it represents the backbone of its foreign policy. China will be more inclined to increase its presence through the outsourcing of its security to private companies or through UN peacekeeping missions, as it has started to do in recent years. For instance, following the Darfur crisis, the Chinese government pressured Sudanese authorities to accept UN peacekeeping forces in order to protect its interests in the region. Besides, it is likely that Beijing will develop its diplomatic presence in unstable countries. In recent years, there has been an important augmentation of Chinese staff, both in political and economic cabinets, whilst the first special envoy in charge of the eastern region of Africa, Xue Bing, was appointed this February. Finally, experts have noted that China should improve its reputation in African civil society as it has started to do in recent years through its “charm offensive.” 

Coups d’état in Africa are therefore not as negligible on Chinese interests as it may appear prima facie. The recent wave of military overthrows, exemplified by Guinea, has highlighted the vulnerability of Chinese engagements in the continent. Whilst China is unlikely to undertake a drastic shift in its approach to African security, it will have to adapt its policy to protect its interests in the future. Beijing’s choices in Africa will be determinant for the security of the continent and for Chinese foreign policy globally. 

Can the CCC Overtake Zanu-PF?

The Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) was formed this January as a splinter group of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC Alliance), the former main opposition party of Zimbabwe. Despite being such a young party on the Zimbabwean political front, it managed to win 19 out of 28 by-elections in March this year. This has made it a strong force to look out for in Zimbabwe’s political landscape as the MDC Alliance has been accused of having links to the ruling party Zanu-PF and has therefore lost significant credibility among voters. The CCC can be considered Zimbabwe’s largest political opposition at the moment and is worth following closely in the run-up to the 2023 elections. 

Structures, Constitution, & Election Manifesto

In May of this year, leader of the CCC, Nelson Chamisa, was criticised for not yet developing an election manifesto. Chamisa had also not created proper structures for the election nor selected party members. This has led some prominent Zimbabweans, such as exiled Professor Jonathan Moyo, who previously lectured in Political Science at various African universities, to call him “a one-man show.” 

Despite these criticisms, Chamisa stated in February that the party was working towards building a new government that will begin with Councillors, MPs, and followed by Ministers. These leaders, he claimed, would be “incorruptible” and “come from the communities, stay in the communities, and represent the citizens.” The practice of vote buying would also be abolished with a strong focus being placed on who Zimbabweans want to lead them and not who is imposed on them. 

Chamisa has also stated that the CCC would target rural areas as that is where true transformation will come from. According to the World Bank, around two-thirds of Zimbabweans live in rural areas and these have been a central focus for the ruling Zanu-PF in past election campaigns. In fact, Zanu-PF members have often been involved in hindering the CCC’s gatherings and one person was killed this year when “thugs” attacked a Chamisa gathering in Kwekwe, which is President Mnangagwa’s home town. 

The ultimate aim, however, as indicated on the party’s website is to have leadership that is “committed to seeing […] Zimbabwe rise up out of poverty and hardship in a new glory.” 

Challenges Going Forward

Zimbabwean police have banned the CCC from holding campaign rallies in some parts of the country. Chamisa, however, riding the wave of success of the recent by-elections stated that he was “encouraging supporters to register as national voters to ensure a landslide victory for the presidency and a two-thirds parliamentary majority”. 

Chamisa has called on every Zimbabwean to register to vote so that the country can experience true change in 2023. However, this should be done in face of the need for key electoral reforms prior to the elections. One such challenge is ensuring that Zimbabweans in the diaspora are allowed to vote, even though this has been a practice that Zanu-PF and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) have not permitted. A potential reason for this is the absence of the right infrastructure to ensure voter authenticity and prevent voter fraud. However, with technological advances in terms of electoral equipment, these do not appear to be sound arguments by the ZEC and are rather perceived to be construed as seeking to limit the opposition from gaining a stronger foothold in Zimbabwean politics. According to recent records, there are over two million Zimbabweans living in South Africa. This alone could swing the vote in the CCC’s favour, but Zanu-PF is unlikely to support such changes. In fact, Zanu-PF has used violence, intimidation tactics, and food as weapons against the CCC and these machinations are not expected to subside in the mid-2023 elections. 

Chamisa, therefore, has an uphill battle against the deeply ingrained political status quo, which has strong structures and far reach. Consequently, and despite limitations such as being banned from holding rallies in some parts of the country, Chamisa will need to ensure that he stays committed to the cause, single handedly focusing on the task at hand, and braves the storms that are expected to head his way in truly turbulent times. He has acknowledged that much remains to be done and that “it’s not going to be easy,” particularly in the face of government-sponsored violence and intimidation.

Zimbabwe Heads to the Polls Mid-2023

Zimabweans are heading to the polls for their general elections in the third quarter of 2023, with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announcing a suspension of by-elections. These, according to the country’s Constitution, cannot be held nine months before a national election is due. 

The country’s last elections were held on 31 July 2018, with Zanu-PF emerging as the victorious political party under the helm of President and party leader Emmerson Mnangawa. Zanu-PF has ruled Zimbabwe since the country’s independence in 1980. The 42-year reign of the party is likely to continue, despite new players emerging in the role of the opposition while old ones attempt to consolidate their positions. 

A Brief Snapshot of the Main Contenders

The ruling Zanu-PF is expected to hold a congress in the next three weeks in which it is highly anticipated that Mnangagwa will be endorsed as the party’s 2023 presidential candidate. 

Nelson Chamisa is the current leader of the main opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC). He was formerly a part of the MDC-Alliance. Chamisa has promised to improve social protection and reform. Criticisms levelled at Chamisa and his party include that the CCC does not have “the political structures, ideological grounding, or a strategy to resolve the Zimbabwean socio political crisis”.

There is also the MDC-T, which is led by Douglas Mwonzora.

Criticisms Levelled

Chamisa has criticised the ZEC, citing lack of independence amidst contested election results. Further accusations were levelled at President Mnangagwa, who is accused of nepotism and manipulating past election results by appointing electoral commissioners who were relatives of some of his colleagues. Despite Zanu-PF vehemently opposing and ruling out any possibilities of the United Nations (UN) observing the elections, Chamisa has called on the intergovernmental body to attend as an observer. The ZEC has responded by dismissing as false “reports of any form or rigging in Zimbabwean elections”. This is despite the fact that the ZEC has a complete mandate to monitor the printing of ballot papers, which ultimately denies any opposition the chance to test the ballot paper’s “encrypted technological capabilities and security features”. 

The ZEC has been criticised for failing to revise its nomination fees under Statutory Instrument 144 of 2022. This has the potential of excluding multiple parties from the elections as presidential candidates are expected to pay $20,000, while aspiring Members of Parliament (MPs) are required to pay $1,000. Senate and local authority candidates will be required to pay $200. Some have referred to this as pricing democracy “out of reach for many”.

The President of the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe Obert Masaraure has also criticised Zanu-PF of using teachers as a political tool. This followed after the launch of the recent Teachers for Economic Development (Teachers for ED) with over 5,000 educators attending and praising Mnangagwa. Masaraure called the move  a propaganda exercise, adding that Zanu-PF planned to use the teachers as polling officials in the elections as a way to “manipulate votes” in those constituencies where the opposition failed to field election agents.

A fourth challenge that is expected to arise in the upcoming elections is the issue of the youth vote. According to an Afrobarometer survey, just over half of youths aged 18 to 35, approximately 70% of Zimbabwe’s population, are planning to vote. This could potentially mean that the results of the elections will be under-representative of the overall population and that results could be quite skewed. This is partially attributed to political apathy among the youth.

The President Issues a Strong Warning

During this October, President Mnangagwa threatened politically focused NGOs, describing them as “trojan horses” with an intent on causing electoral instability. He also called for no violence during the upcoming elections. While reiterating that the elections must be peaceful, Mnangagwa stated that they are for Zimbabweans only; implying that no unfriendly foreign influences to Zimbabwe would be tolerated. 

The State of the Nation

A report conducted by the World Bank last year estimated that the number of Zimbabweans living in abject poverty, nearly half of the population, was nearly 7.9 million. The persistent challenges of inflation, unemployment, and poor service delivery continue to weigh heavily on the nation’s citizens. Some of the key developmental issues of concern include economic mismanagement and unemployment, which is expected to reach 5.9% by the end of 2022.

What’s Next?

The head of the European Union’s (EU’s) electoral mission for Zimbabwe Elmar Brok recently recommended that the country amends some of its laws prior to the elections to give all parties a fair chance of winning. Electoral reforms should ideally include levelling the playing field, ensuring the impartiality of state media, treating all parties equally, ensuring a proper voters’ registration, amongst multiple other factors and areas for reforms. If loopholes in current legislation are addressed, this is one of the ways of ensuring peace in the country, according to Brok.

Despite such recommendations, it is unlikely that Zanu-PF will let go of any of the power it has consolidated over the past three decades or change any of the laws that could favour the opposition. The upcoming elections are expected to see much of the same in the Zimbabwean political landscape with the current ruling party continuing to hold the reins tightly and steering the country in a direction which it views as the best for Zimbabweans. This is despite the economic state of the country, high levels of inflation, high unemployment figures, widespread poverty, and others. 

Opposition parties, which are sorely missed in Parliament due to their slim presence there, must continue to apply pressure on Zanu-PF in peaceful and consistent ways to give Zimbabweans hope for change. Many citizens live in fear during election periods and this is a time when violence can erupt. It is not uncommon for the ruling party to rely on its armed forces to quell protests. Voter intimidation is another factor that could be a stumbling block to free and fair elections. The façade of free and fair elections is expected to take years to break with the ultimate aim of having a more meaningful and democratic party landscape that Zimbabwe could benefit from.