Why the West will not stop India from buying Russian oil (and why it might not want to)
With the valuable assistance of Nicholas Ferrara and Blake Majerczak
Overview
Amid the global oil unrest, India is the largest buyer of Russian oil products. The population giant makes up 51% of purchases for Russian oil; significantly more than China, one of Russia’s strongest supporters in the war in Ukraine. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, India only made up a small percentage of the purchases because it mainly imported oil from the Middle East, but post-invasion seized upon the now significantly cheaper Russian alternative. Subrahmanyan Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, explained India’s reasoning for deciding to buy more Russian oil after the invasion by stating: “It is a sensible policy to go where we get the best deal in the interest of the Indian people.” For the West, this is problematic as it undermines its elaborate and sustained sanctions against Russia over the war in Ukraine. In this piece of writing, we assess what (and if) the West can do by exploring different scenarios for the future of Indian consumption of Russian oil.
Sanctions on India?
The most straightforward action by the West would be to pressure India into discontinuing or lessening its consumption of Russian oil, possibly through sanctions. However, the current appetite for this approach is low among Western policymakers.
In a meeting between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India, Biden allegedly told Modi that the U.S. could help India diversify its energy sources. This highlights that the U.S. is willing to help India lessen Russian oil consumption through incentivisation, but no further actions have been taken thus far. Subsequently, when asked about India-US relations, Karen Donfried, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, said that the Biden administration accepts India’s purchases of Russian oil and is not going to sanction India. Sanctions then, are clearly not on the table.
Part of why the US will not impose sanctions is that the Indian elite are already very closely invested with Russian oil. The Jamnagar Refinery in India is the biggest oil refinery in the world. It clears over 1.2 million barrels of oil a day and is owned by Reliance Industries, CEO Mukesh Ambani’s multi-billion-dollar oil company. Over half of the refinery's crude oil input comes from Russia now. Mukesh Ambani, the wealthiest man in India, is a strong supporter and ally of Prime Minister Modi and his government. It is alleged that he helped the BJP, Modi’s party, win the parliamentary election in 2019, by spreading disinformation in the BJP’s favour. The Vadinar complex, the second-largest oil refinery in India, is less than 10 miles away from Jamnagar. Both refineries are owned by Nayara Energy, which in turn is owned by Rosneft, a Russian company.
If the West imposes sanctions on Reliance Industries and Rosneft for trading Russian oil, it will likely lead to counter-sanctions. Such counter-sanctions could range from Indian medications for the U.S. market, or, ironically enough, less India refined petroleum for the American market (explored later in the article). In addition, India will likely halt its current deals with the West. For instance, India has recently diversified its weapon purchases by buying Western-made
Ongoing Business (as usual)
It is thus highly unlikely that India will stop consuming Russian oil, at least in the short term. Simple math shows us why India is so keen on purchasing Russian oil. Crude oil from Russia is 60 dollars a barrel compared to the global benchmark of 75 dollars. India buys 2.09 million barrels of oil a day, after one day they can save 30 million dollars when buying Russian oil. This means that there is little to no incentive for India to lessen its consumption. In addition, India is adamant about stressing its neutral stance in the war. The only other incentive would be that another country offers cheaper oil than Russia. It is however very unlikely that any country will dive underneath the bottom prices of Russia for the foreseeable future. It is most likely then, that India continues to purchase Russian oil, either to the same amount or in even larger quantities. Furthermore, India benefits from having Russia as an ally in a geopolitical sense too, specifically as it could leverage Russia’s role as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
Western complacency?
What is more, India is profiting from the resale of Russian oil to Western countries at a higher price. Western countries are actually buying relatively cheap oil from India, which is very likely from Russian origin. The United States buys 15% of its oil and refined petroleum products from India, according to the Wilson Center. This trade virtually ensures that some of the gasoline and diesel that the US buys from India contain Russian molecules, according to Global Witness.
One way that the United States could make sure that they are not buying Russian oil is to make a law to ban the import of oil or petroleum products from refineries that have bought crude oil from Russia within a certain date. This would signal to refineries that the United States will not buy oil that originates from Russia. Through coordination with partners like the EU, the US could ensure that the banning of imports from other oil laundering operations that successfully go around their sanctions on Russia are also implemented and shored up.
For now, intentionally, or not, the West is profiting from Russia’s bottom prices. On top of this, India’s shifting oil consumption has freed up parts of the market for the Western countries that do boycott Russian oil and needed alternatives. Had India not shifted its oil policy, other suppliers would not have been able to meet the demand, with prices soaring even higher and oil shortages in many parts of the world. In addition, many of the crude oil India has imported from Russia left the country as refined petroleum products, including to Western countries. This has prevented a major economic crash.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that India will stop buying oil from Russia for anything other than a change in its financial considerations. It remains unclear how desirable such a stop would even be for Western countries as the market would see a significant contraction in available supply, causing potential shortages, because India’s consumption of Russian oil frees up the oil market. Given that the market is stabilizing again and prices are broadly dropping, India is considering slightly lessening its importation of Russian oil. Such a move would be ideal for India as it retains access to cheap prices while politically pleasing the US and its partners.
Developing coherent counter-hybrid threat strategies
Introduction
What do effective counter-hybrid threat strategies look like? In Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman’s Conflict in the 21st Century thesis – the paper which first coupled the term ‘hybrid’ with warfare (and similarly, threats) – he emphasises that the West can “no longer overlook our own vulnerabilities as societies, focus on preferred capability sets, or underestimate the imaginations of our antagonists”. Since then, spurred on by the significant hybrid threats of the 21st century, counter-hybrid threat strategies have been sought. These are often (though not always) reactionary, meaning a hybrid threat needs to be realised, before a coherent counter strategy can be implemented. This can be especially true when a hybrid threat is coupled with new technologies, such as the Russian cyber-attack against US election infrastructure in 2016.
The scope of hybrid threats is enormous, shown comprehensively below. As with other doctrines therefore, counter-hybrid strategy must be guided by principles before bespoke solutions can be put in place. This article explores how some of these principles have been used successfully, allowing actors within states and across societies to develop resilience.
Figure 1: The Hybrid Threat Toolbox (Giannopoulos, Smith & Theocharidou, The Landscape of Hybrid Threats).
Identify adversaries and their intentions
Identifying an adversary, and further still identifying their modus operandi is no easy undertaking. Whilst not exhaustive, the desired effect of an adversary will usually fall into one of five categories: extort (for money); provoke (to trigger a reaction which damages reputation or justifies a counter-reaction); intimidate (individual or group coercion); exhaust (to break an opponent's will and stop them pursuing an objective); or protract (to drain an opponent’s resources whilst preserving your own). Knowing the single or combination of desired effects is useful in developing a counter-hybrid strategy.
In 2016, following the mass migration of refugees from the MENA region a year earlier, the EU struck a well reported deal with Turkey to stem migration flow into Europe, known as theEU-Turkey deal. Part of the contract saw the EU give €6 billion to improve the humanitarian situation within its borders. In June 2021, a further €5 billion for Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon wasbeing debated to bolster the initial sum. Coincidentally, over the same period, RyanAir Flight 4978 was diverted to Minsk on its journey from Athens to Vilnius, and a dissident Belarusian journalist onboard arrested by the Belarusian authorities. This sparked a string of economic sanctions from the EU (adding to an already extensive list of sanctions imposed following the 2020 Belarusian elections). Following both events, Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko began trafficking refugees (predominantly from Iraq) into neighbouring EU states, specifically Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, using a series of trafficking routes operated by commercial third parties, and actively encouraging – even forcing – illegal migration across borders into the EU. European leaders were quick to identify this as a hybrid threat aimed to intimidate the EU in to renouncing sanctions, with some commentators suggesting Lukashenko also intended to use‘migrants as bargaining chips’, in order to extort the EU for financial humanitarian aid, citing the aforementioned EU-Turkey deal (and subsequent anticipated remunerations for Jordan and Lebanon) as a precedent.
Figure 2: Monthly data for 2021 showing number of illegal migrants coming from Belarus to Lithuania, July 21.
The EU response was swift and bold. EU leaders moved quickly to reform policy and legislation on migration, allowing the quick construction of physical barriers on Baltic State borders with Belarus. EU leaders agreed they “won’t accept any attempt by third countries to instrumentalise migrants for political purposes”, and condemned “such hybrid attacks on EU’s borders”. An article by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development theorises how Lukashenko assumed the EU would respond ineffectually, banking on significant border collapses from which the dropping of sanctions and inevitable humanitarian aid from the bloc could be negotiated (on top of his already lucrative smuggling fees, estimated by DGAP to have run to €40 million). The EU did commit €700 million for humanitarian aid within Belarus, though this was carefully distributed; €200 million directly to the ICRC and the remainder implemented by EU partner organisations on the ground. The Commission made available an additional €3.5 million to support voluntary returns from Belarus to countries of origin, effectively undermining Lukashenko’s forced diasporas.
Furthermore, additional legislative action was proposed and actioned, blacklisting the airline providers which facilitated Lukashenko’s migrant smuggling operation. The new legal framework allowed the EU to adopt targeted measures against transport operators. Subsequently, direct flights from Baghdad to Belarus were suspended, and flights from Erbil transiting through third countries to Belarus were also stopped. Ultimately, Lukanshenko’s scheme was too transparent. The EU recognised the threat and the intentions behind it quickly, allowing a timely, collective response.
Diversify imports
Diversification is a vital tool in the arsenal of any counter-hybrid threat strategy. The war in Ukraine is showing all too clearly how dependencies on Russian liquified natural gas and Russian and Ukrainian wheat can cause catastrophic economic and humanitarian consequences. By controlling the sole production, logistic chain, or geopolitical choke-point, adversaries are able to leverage significant influence and exact an extort, intimidate, provoke, exhaust or protract agenda.
Figure 3: Percentage of total wheat imports from Russian and Ukraine and top ten wheat producers worldwide, November 22.
An interesting, contemporary case study to examine is Chinese and Taiwanese semiconductors. In 2011, Taiwan alone accounted for ~20% of the overall semiconductor industry worldwide and ~50% of the 20 leading semiconductor foundries, chief among them being the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). The requirement for semiconductors since then has grown steadily, with chip demand soaring as the demand for smart devices increases. Annual semiconductor revenue increased exponentially; by 9% in 2020 and by 23% in 2021 – far above the 5% reported in 2019, with demand accelerating through the Covid-19 pandemic, as significant portions of the globe started working more remotely.
China’s increasingly threatening behaviour towards Taiwan has brought the reliance of Taiwanese semiconductor foundries into sharp focus. The process had already begun to naturally spread as the benefits of semiconductor production became clear, but the geopolitical implications of a potential conflict between China and Taiwan have accelerated the urgency for the West in particular to diversify their suppliers. US Commerce Secretary, Gina Raimondo,stated this year at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado “our dependence on Taiwan for chips is untenable and unsafe”. In the last year, the US have recognised their over-reliance on Chinese and Taiwanese semiconductor imports and have significantly diversified their sources. As of 2023, the US produced 17% of its semiconductor demand, with 83% coming from Asia. China and Taiwan both show relative negative trend, with Thailand, Vietnam, India and Cambodia showing significant positive trend.
Figure 4: Comparison between 2022 and 2023 for the top 10 sources of US semiconductor imports.
Private companies too have recognised the consequences of overreliance on a small number of sources. Samsung, one of the world's leading users of semiconductors, has been ramping up their diversification strategy since 2019, aiming to invest $116 billion by 2030 to boost its foundry operations. Similarly, the management consultancy firm Deloitte has offered four useful, transferable actions which help private companies create diversified, safer semiconductor sourcing, and mitigate the risk of adversaries taking advantage of a monopolised semiconductor market. Deloitte suggest, 1) bringing manufacturing closer to home – nearshoring or friendshoring – by building new foundries or expanding old facilities; 2) managing the risks and challenges that come with this localisation, 3) digitally transforming and digitising elements of the process such as financial planning, operations, order and supply chain management (this helps create more resilient processes as they can be achieved remotely); and 4) addressing and balancing the semiconductor talent equation to ensure a balance of homegrown experts at all stages of production. Similar models can be applied to other industries at risk of hybrid attack.
Control the narrative
Societies writ large are a very important element of hybrid threats, and often the target of such attacks. NATO describes the information, cognitive and social domains as the cornerstone of hybrid warfare. Influence operations such as those employed by Russia in 2016 during the US presidential elections and UK Brexit referendum epitomise this. Access to information is readily available to societies. Open source intelligence (OSINT) makes up between 80-90% of all intelligence activities carried out by Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Due to the expediency of information proliferation, staying ahead in the battle to control the narrative is a critical element of countering a hybrid threat.
Russia’s hybrid operation to seize the geopolitically strategic Crimean Peninsula in 2014 was successful in part to a well-constructed narrative, plausible deniability, and a weak Western counter-narrative. Through carefully designed lines of moral and legal pretext – including the citing of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to create a Kosovan protectorate as precedent – followed by a veiled democratic election, Russia was able to seize the initiative and justify a land-grab which technically broke numerous treaties and charters, including the UN non-intervention charter, Helsinki Final Act of 1975, 1990 Paris charter, 1997 Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Ukraine, and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances.
Figure 5: Crimea’s illegal annexation - key pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea was condemned by many in the international community, and a series of moderate sanctions were implemented. However, the West’s reaction to the event has been described as weak for the most part. Russia’s pretext and subsequent justification narrative raised political and policy challenges for the West, and the West’s quiet voice gave impetus for Russia to increase nationalist rhetoric. Russia’s campaign in Crimea was ultimately unchallenged internationally, and some would argue their latter actions in Syria and the Donbas were more brazen as a result.
By contrast – and clearly the differences between 2014 and 2022 are evident in that 2022 was a full scale military invasion – the West’s unified voice and competitive narrative around the war in Ukraine have proven far more effective at galvanising international response. An important part of the Western narrative strategy in 2022 (led by the US and the UK) has been their use of intelligence. Early on in the campaign, when Russia was suffering from a string of tactical defeats including the roadblock en route to Kyiv, Western intelligence agencies began to rapidly declassify intelligence and release it to the public, a communication strategy which hitherto had not been seen in the 21st century. Russia’s withdrawal from Kyiv, an evident failure, was explained by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strategic pivot. Western intelligence made it clear that it was military misjudgement, and distributed this globally. Eugene Rumer, a former US Intelligence Official at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained how this strategy “underscores to the world the futility, the foolishness, the insanity of Putin’s approach to Ukraine [and] hopefully this will also reach the Russian public and will feed into the domestic Russian narrative”. The UK intelligence services too have adopted this strategy. UK officials cited the failure in not aggressively sharing intelligence prior to and during Russia’s annexation of Crimea, with one official saying, “It needs to be done because it makes it harder for Russia to deny what it is doing, which was a problem back in 2008 (Georgia), in 2014 (Crimea) and in Syria”.
Tim Weiner, journalist and author of The Folly and the Glory: America, Russia, and Political Warfare, 1945–2020, explained that this rapid percolation of intelligence isn’t new, but simply a reimagination of a strand political warfare, stating “the rapid declassification and publication of secret intelligence exposed and effectively blunted Putin’s plans to use disinformation and lies as instruments of war. Ultimately, this is a battle for the truth, and shaping people’s views of authoritarian regimes is part of the way political warfare is waged”.
Become resilient
Resilience, a buzzword often associated with counter-hybrid strategy, and a pillar of the EU’s approach to countering hybrid threats, is an encompassing term. Notably, a state’s critical infrastructure (civilian and military and across all domains including cyber) must have built-in resilience to withstand hybrid threats, with effective crisis response. NATO too acknowledges that resilience in infrastructure is a prerequisite for military effectiveness.
In April 2007, following a catalytic event in which the Estonian authorities moved a controversial communist statue called The Bronze Soldier from the centre of Tallinn to the outskirts of the city, Estonia became the victim of a wave of cyber-attacks from Russian IP addresses, likely designed to ferment disruption across the city in an act of retribution. Online services such as banks, media stations and government infrastructure were swamped with unprecedented amounts of botnet activity, bringing the city to a stand-still. Cash transactions, online broadcasts and government emails were all affected. The event was a harsh reality-check for Estonia. NATO is ambiguous as to whether a cyber-attack would trigger an Article 5 response. At the same time, Estonia realised this would likely be a recurring 21st century threat. Interestingly, about a decade earlier, Estonia had already initiated a workforce e-revolution, beginning with its Tiger Leap Foundation, which was rolled out across Estonian schools during the 1990’s, followed by the Look@World Foundation, a public-private partnership which has raised digital awareness and popularised the internet, supported by the telecom and banking sectors. Between 2000 and 2016, the percentage of Estonia’s population using the internet jumped from 28.6% to 91.4%. Both projects have been instrumental in creating a baseline of cyber-attack resilience, and an internet-savvy workforce to draw from. Moreover, it has also energised computing across the Estonian population on a huge scale. So, when the 2007 cyber-attack hit, Estonia was able to mobilise at a remarkable pace, immediately setting up a voluntary Cyber Defence Unit aimed at protecting Estonian cyberspace, drawn from the country’s leading IT experts, who are security vetted and remain anonymous. Since then, they frequently run cyber-based scenarios exercises, jointly with other agencies, such as an attack on a vital service provider or utility.
Estonians also vote and pay tax online, have access to their health records online and use online banking. They use a ‘personal access key’ (sometimes referred to as an online ID card) to access these services. Crucially, to ensure transparency, Estonians are able to monitor their own privacy digitally. As President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the innovator behind Estonia’s digital revolution explains, the public can trace anyone who has tried to access their data by logging on to the state portal. There have been few cases where people have been sentenced for unethically accessing databases, such as medical professionals and the police. In effect, Estonia has its entire adult population frequently checking for abnormal behaviour within their own online realm, a hugely powerful reporting tool for any potential cyber-attacks. In 2021, Estonia ranked third in the Media Literacy Index, compiled by the European Policies Initiative of the Open Society Institute (OSI), behind Finland and Denmark, meaning that Estonia has one of the highest potentials for withstanding disinformation. The Estonian Digital Research Center and State Chancellery in partnership with an Estonian cyber-security company has also launched an online test which assesses disinformation detection skills. Estonia also houses ‘data embassies’ abroad, remoting their servers to allied countries further away from their adversaries, mitigating physical espionage. In 2008, they became the first country to use KSI Blockchain, allowing near-instantaneous threat detection.
Estonia has become a model for e-governance and a leader on digitisation. Since its digital reformation (and prompted by the 2007 cyber-attack), Estonia has shown how capable it is at countering cyber-attacks, to the point that it is able to withstand significant attacks with relative ease, such as the 2020 Killnet cyber-attack, thought to be in retaliation for Estonia removing a similarly controversial Soviet tank from a World War II memorial.
Target hybrid threat financing
Daniel L. Glaser, the Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes in the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office, stated during his tenure, “there can be no comprehensive response to a national security threat that does not include a strong financial component”. A feature of this financial component with respect to hybrid threats is to target adversarial finances, sometimes called counter-threat finance. Counter-threat finance is explained as “the activities and actions taken to deny, disrupt, destroy or defeat an actor’s ability to raise, move, use or store value”. Targeting threat financing is a strategy which has already been well refined in relation to terrorism, but is less developed and far less simple with more globalised threats, as the law of unintended consequences is amplified. Russia’s current stranglehold on Ukrainian grain exports (which in 2021 generated 41% of the country's total exports, amounting to $27 billion in revenue) is a clear example of how damaging it can be to restrict a state's income, with many African states suffering at the hands of the Russian blockade.
The application of sanctions, or the establishment of embargoes, is measured by NATO in terms of its practical value and its signalling value. Following Russia’s hybrid attack into Crimea, the West resolved to target the Russia economy, focusing on three practical areas: restricting access to Western financial markets for specific enterprises such as banking, energy and defence; an embargo on high-technology oil exploration and production exports to Russia; and an embargo on military exports to Russia (including dual use goods). These practical elements were in concert with the signalling value which can be interpreted as a measure of subjective effectiveness for a specific population. In this case, the signalling was hoping to achieve the following:
Coordinated action (by the EU and NATO, signalling unity to domestic and adversarial audiences).
Specific agencies targeted within the Russian state (signalling responsibility and distinction to domestic and adversarial audiences).
Designed to cause tangible economic damage (signalling credibility to domestic and adversarial audiences).
Accepting a limited risk of economic pain domestically (signalling resolve to domestic and adversarial audiences).
The economic and financial assault on Russia following the annexation, specifically their energy sector, likely contributed to Russia’s faltering economy over that period. In 2019, Bloomberg compared Russia’s 5-year GDP forecast with its actual GDP, showing financial targeting had almost certainly had a degree of impact.
Figure 6: Russian economy 2013-19.
Integrate and cooperate
Perhaps most importantly, a developed counter-hybrid strategy must be integrated and in cooperation with allies, organisations and societies. Notwithstanding the primary responsibility to respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted country, NATO recognises (as does the EU and individual nation-states) that a joint, integrated approach, built on activities including coherent, strategic messaging, shared intelligence, joint exercises and closer military-civilian cooperation is fundamental. Cooperative societies are also recognised as key to challenging hybrid threats. Threat-aware societies are able to recognise disinformation, absorb economic pressures, and shape sensible policy decisions, which can augment counter-hybrid threat strategies. This has been seen to work for Estonia with their media literacy index score.
An example of European integration against hybrid threats is the Hybrid Centre of Excellence (Hybrid CoE), an autonomous, network-based international organisation sponsored by Finland, which allows NATO and the EU to work more closely against hybrid threats. A ‘do-tank’ with a budget of €1.5 million, the centre helps NATO and the EU design the counter-hybrid threat playbook. The Hybrid CoE has facilitated learning through a series of regional seminars, and identified the need to develop a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, which includes engagement with the private sector, academia, and civil society.
Figure 7: Comprehensive approach to counter hybrid threats.
Additionally, the Hybrid CoE has coordinated a number of joint exercises with EU and NATO audiences to stress-test hybrid threat responses, for example the “Harbour Protection under Hybrid Threat Conditions” exercise, which was run in 2018. The European Defence Agency Chief Executive, Jorge Domecq, noted the relevance and usefulness of these types of exercises, and the Director of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Matti Saarelainen, emphasised how exercises such as this are crucial, stating “as international interdependency increases, it is necessary to assess and develop security more comprehensively than in the past. Hence, all stakeholders should be equally aware of the nature of hybrid threats and share the level of awareness among them”.
The European External Action Service, including the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre, works closely with NATO, upholding the Joint Declarations of Warsaw and Brussels (2016 and 2018), which identifies fourteen agreements aimed at jointly tackling hybrid threats. It is equally important to recognise how EU-NATO cooperation is moving from agreements to actions. Two actions which deserve mention are the Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defence, which provides a framework for sharing best practices between NATO’s Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU), and Military Mobility 2.0, a system which allows NATO armed forces to quickly respond at scale to crises erupting at EU external borders. Additionally, since 2019, NATO has been trialling concept forces known as Counter Hybrid Support Teams, which give ad-hoc assistance to member state Armed Forces in the event of a hybrid crisis. These teams have been fielded and exercised since 2019. All of these actions are in their early developmental stages, but certainly serve as evidence of how a cooperative approach assists with developing coherent counter-hybrid strategies at scale across the European continent.
Conclusion
Principles pertaining to counter-hybrid strategies are clearly non-exhaustive. This article has identified some of the most important. The European Commission’s joint framework on countering hybrid threats helps to consolidate and direct future lines of operation for countering hybrid threats. Critical to positive outcomes is improving awareness using the aforementioned whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, and establishing mechanisms to exchange information (including intelligence) and examples of good practice at various scales. Teija Tiilikainen, the Director of Hybrid CoE has written perceptively about the 10 steps for a resilient Europe which complement counter-hybrid strategies, the last of which is to ‘be imaginative’. This language is important, echoing Hoffman’s adage to ‘not underestimate the imaginations of our antagonists’. Tiilikainen is clear that hostile adversaries can and will transform anything they can into a tool of influence, and use that tool in multiple domains with the help of advances in techniques and technology. Therefore, the preparedness and response to these threats must be equally imaginative, novel and influential.
Covert Naval Activities - Covert, Low Profile Military Vessels in the Littoral
This article aims to explore the ways in which state naval forces are employing various forms of non-traditional vessels in order to conduct hybrid warfare in the naval domain. Traditionally, naval power has been the essential tool in power projection and interstate military dominance with this power measured by the number of principal surface combatants (major military ships) possessed by one's navy. The nature of the increasingly surveilled and interconnected naval domain and world in general has created opportunities for irregular activities within it.
A particular area of interest is the littoral. The littoral refers to the area close to a state’s coastline encompassing amphibious operations in a military rather than geographical context. The UK Ministry of Defence defines the littoral zone as ‘those land areas (and their adjacent areas and associated air space) that are susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea’ adding a land component to the definition. Its significance is owed to the tendency of significant population centres, nodes of trade and communication, maritime traffic, and sea-based infrastructure to exist in this zone.
This article explores some of the methods and vessels used by a variety of states to conduct hybrid, grey zone activities in this area as well as further developments going forward and what this could mean for warfare in the 21st century. It furthermore explores vessels from a full spectrum of global navies namely; the US, UK, Iran and the PRC.
US Covert Special Operations Vessels
The US employs low-profile civilian appearance vessels for special operations activities. While the US has never denied their usage in a military role, they do not appear within the list of US navy vessels and have clearly been styled to maintain a non-militaristic appearance in order to avoid attention. The two vessels used, the MV Ocean Trader and MV Carolyn Chouest are both converted civilian vessels that sail without AIS (automatic identification system - publicly accessible ship trackers that all civilian vessels have installed) turned on in order to avoid tracking through open sources. These vessels have been retrofitted to conduct special forces activities through the installation of a flight deck and hangar for helicopters, launch bays for small military craft such as the Combatant Craft Assault (CCA), new signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communication equipment and berthing for special forces personnel.
There is very limited information available on the vessels or their activities, nor are there many official documents where these vessels are mentioned beyond their initial procurement requests. More interestingly, there are also very few photos available of the ships, with the MV Ocean Trader last photographed in Oman in 2018, and the MV Carolyn Chouest last seen in a photo released by the US Department of Defence in the Philippines in 2022. The near total lack of photos suggests that the discrete and uninteresting appearance of these vessels is successful at avoiding public attention and thus photography, assisted by the fact that the absence of AIS tracks prevents a concerted effort to track them through satellite imagery.
MV Ocean Trader, a BAE conversion of the formerly Maersk operated MV Cragside, was highly likely procured by US Special Operations Command to fulfil the role of a forward deployed base from which special forces activities in Africa and the Middle East could be conducted. This is evidenced by the temporary lease of a civilian ship from Edison Chouest Offshore to be statically based off the coast of Somalia until a converted ship could be acquired with the purpose of supporting special operations missions and conducting signals intelligence. The purpose of the MV Ocean Trader seems to be identical to the ship it replaced with facilities to land a number of special forces helicopters, carry special forces craft and launch drones. These operations could include, raids to strike high value targets (HVTs), diving operations, counter piracy and counter hijacking or boarding operations. The vessel has also been observed in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas suggesting it has a special operations role to play here as well.
The advantage of the civilian appearance here is two-fold. Firstly, the vessel can move without drawing attention to itself as it transits the globe thus preventing any suspicion from adversaries as to its intended target or destination. More importantly, and more useful to its likely mission, it can provide basing for special forces in politically sensitive areas without attracting attention or driving political repercussions. For a hypothetical example, the MV Ocean Trader could remain anchored off the coast of Yemen collecting signals intelligence without suggesting it poses a direct military threat, and thus avoiding protest from groups in Yemen like a military-flagged warship would. It could then launch an unexpected raid into Yemen territory to remove an HVT before disappearing again into the clutter of civilian sea traffic. There is no indication that it has been used in this way, however, it certainly has the capabilities to be employed as such, and would be an invaluable asset in the 21st century environment where deniable operations are key.
Image 1: MV Ocean Trader in 2016 with a good view of the subtle military modifications while still retaining the overall appearance of a civilian cargo ship or ferry.
Image 2: MV Carolyn Chouest after conversion demonstrating very similar retrofitted equipment with the notable absence of a flight deck suggesting that the ship was likely converted for its availability and convenience rather than it being a perfect platform to operate from.
The MV Carolyn Chouest is a chartered vessel that originally supported the experimental research submarine NR-1 however was converted and repainted into a low-profile special operations support vessel. It seems to have a Pacific focus to its operations unlike the MV Ocean Trader and was involved in raiding exercises alongside partner nations as part of the Balikatan 22 exercise in the Philippines, suggesting that it’s primary purpose, similar to the MV Ocean Trader, is to support small scale special forces operations in the Pacific rather than the Middle East and Africa.
The Royal Navy has also expressed interest in a ‘littoral strike ship’, initial proposals of which are clearly based on the MV Ocean Trader. Important to note that this vessel is more overtly military and therefore not befitting the title of a covert vessel. It would, however, have similar capabilities as these US ships, demonstrating a view in the Royal Navy that these ships are incredibly useful even without the advantages offered by their covert nature in US service.
Iranian Covert Motherships
Iran, similarly, has become somewhat of a specialist in the usage of these disguised military ships. They employ both discrete civilian-styled vessels with military usage, and civilian vessels that have been overtly converted into military usage as floating ‘motherships’ for Iranian naval activities in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. There is an important distinction to make between the two entities that conduct naval operations for Iran; the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) that conducts overt conventional naval activity and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Navy (IRGCN), which is largely focussed on covert, asymmetric, and hybrid naval operations in the region. The IRIN is largely analogous with other conventional navies, and is considered ‘green water’ rather than ‘blue water’, meaning it has the capabilities to operate regionally but does not have the assets or experience to claim global naval reach.
The IRGCN on the other hand is at the heart of regional asymmetric and unconventional operations and has been traditionally associated with activities such as swarm boat attacks, harassment of civilian and foreign military vessels, hijackings, smuggling of weapons to Yemen, and special forces operations. While the IRGCN does operate a fleet of overtly armed fast attack craft, the more important vessels are the two visually civilian cargo ships MV Saviz and Behshad.
Image 3: Behshad.
These two vessels, while appearing as civilian cargo vessels, are known to be operated by the IRGCN. Although the nature of their exact roles is unknown, open source intelligence and limited statements by the Iranian Government have been pieced together by intelligence analysts to give an idea of what they are involved in. These vessels seem to fulfil the same role with the Behshad taking over the role from the MV Saviz after it was damaged by an alleged Israeli sabotage attempt and forced to return to port. These vessels appear to fill the role of intelligence and observation ships that can sit in strategically significant areas, such as the Bab Al-Mandab strait on the Red Sea, and observe, document, and potentially interdict vessels travelling through the narrow sea lane.
The advantages that these vessels give Iran are enormous because the civilian nature of the ship means that it can remain in the strait indefinitely, while drawing little attention to itself and its activities. More specifically, the critical nature of this sea lane means that this vessel can act as a floating observation post where reports on Western, and more importantly, Saudi-UAE naval movements can be made to keep track of vessel locations and potentially facilitate windows of opportunity for deliveries of military aid to Houthi rebels, as well as observing Saudi-UAE aid to the Yemeni government. The ship’s radar system and possible signals intelligence (SIGINT) equipment would make it very effective at this task, as it could survey the entire width of the strait. In addition, this makes the vessel ideally placed to find potential targets for the IRGCN to seize, with numerous cases of Western vessels being boarded and moved to Iranian ports, or attacked. The presence of fast-attack craft seen on the deck of the MV Saviz seems to suggest that it would be capable of conducting these operations if a good target was located. The sabotage conducted on MV Saviz, whether conducted by Israel or not, suggests that these vessels are deemed enough of a security threat in the region that they warrant a military response. Further, the fact that Iran replaced the damaged MV Saviz with the Beshad within nine days signals that Iran sees these covert vessels as critical to their activities in the region as well, showing how effective and useful a covert naval asset can be.
While an overt naval mothership could also conduct these operations, the strength of the disguised vessels is in the plausible deniability they offer. With the ship seemingly unarmed and non-military in nature, it is able to provide the Iranian government with the ability to deny it is engaged in military activity in the area. This deniability is clearly useful in the event of a vessel seizure or weapon shipment seizure where Iran can claim that it had no military assets in the area and therefore, to a general audience, seemingly convincingly deny involvement and thus not elicit a major military response.
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia
Another geographically distinct example of this kind of vessel use is seen with the Chinese People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). The PAFMM is a paramilitary organisation that consists of a mixture of purpose built militia ships and modified fishing trawlers that is designed to augment People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities, especially in the South China Sea. The fleet likely numbers in the thousands, with the vast majority consisting of unarmed fishing trawlers. The role of this organisation appears to be to intimidate foreign naval vessels in order to project Chinese naval power without the need for the higher profile of involvement from PLAN vessels. They achieve this through swarming, harassing, ramming and blocking other states’ naval vessels in the South China Sea. Similar to the previous examples, these vessels give the Chinese government the ability to conduct effective grey zone warfare by having naval assets that are plausibly not under direct government control therefore not drawing as large a military response as a PLAN vessel would.
Image 5: PAFMM Vessel harassing the USNS Impeccable in 2009.
A classic example of the work of this fleet is the Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012. In this particular case, Chinese fishing vessels, which were deemed by the Philippines to be fishing illegally, were searched by Philippine Navy personnel. However, when the Philippine Navy attempted to arrest the fisherman, PAFMM vessels physically blocked the ships and used water cannon to force the Philippine vessel away. Following this, consistent disruption efforts by PAFMM vessels have led to the shoal coming under de facto control of China where Philippine fishing vessels are unable to fish the area, while an estimated fleet of 287 Chinese fishing vessels fished the area in 2021. This demonstrates the effect such strategy can have, as harassment tactics rather than direct military confrontation elicit a lesser international response, and therefore allow China to achieve its maritime aims without serious diplomatic or military consequences.
Anti Access Area Denial
To fully understand the effectiveness of these US, Chinese, British and Iranian vessels, it’s essential to introduce the concept of anti-access and area denial (A2AD). A2AD is, in its simplest form, the controlling of access to an area by a military force. This is often thought of in terms of weapons systems that could be employed asymmetrically by a weaker force to prevent a stronger force accessing a certain area to conduct operations. A good example of this would be the use of anti-ship missiles (ASMs) where the threat of missiles fired from land could deny a naval force the ability to operate within the missile’s range of the coast. This can be seen in Ukraine, where the efficacy of Ukrainian naval A2AD systems in allegedly sinking the Moskva have limited the vastly superior Russian naval forces to long range strikes, and have denied them access to conduct amphibious operations against the Southern Ukrainian coastline. Whether the Moskva was indeed sunk by Ukrainian ASMs or otherwise, the relegation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to a series of platforms for launching cruise missiles rather than engaging in littoral operations suggests that Ukraine has successfully leveraged its A2AD assets to deny the Russian forces a domain in which they command complete supremacy.
Image 6 displaying the different layers of the Chinese A2AD bubble in Pacific Asia. These assets could be used to deny Japanese, Taiwanese, South Korean and US navies access to the region and render operations within the bubble impossible due to the threat of casualties from these systems.
In the context of these covert vessels, the advantage they offer is that they can operate within, and threaten an adversary A2AD bubble. This is explored in depth in a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) publication where the concept of a low profile, lightly armed, covert vessel (titled the littoral operation vessel (LOV)) could enter a contested region without eliciting a major military response from an adversary and then conduct low-intensity, grey zone operations to set the conditions for future large-scale military activity or contest opposing grey zone operations. Applying this idea to the examples above gives a set of possible scenarios which can illustrate the importance of these vessels. The MV Ocean Trader could forward deploy to the Middle East and sit without indicating a major US military deployment. On the vessel could sit a task force of US special forces personnel, helicopters and small boat assets that would enable counter piracy, interdiction and sabotage operations. This is particularly significant in the context of the recent US announcement of their intent to deploy small protection teams on civilian vessels transiting the Persian Gulf. The MV Ocean Trader would be perfectly positioned to blend into the mess of civilian traffic and deploy these small teams, as well as directly countering Iranian efforts to threaten shipping by engaging in activities that would be politically damaging to attribute to conventional US naval assets, such as engaging in sabotage or reconnaissance of Iranian fast-attack craft bases. Further, the persistent deployment of this vessel would set a pattern of life that would potentially allow it to operate within the Iranian A2AD bubble, as directly challenging a non-threatening US vessel with ambiguity and deniability in its activities would set Iran on an escalatory path and justify further US actions. If direct confrontation between Iran and the US became necessary, this would allow the US to deploy small special forces teams to destroy Iranian A2AD and shape the battlefield for a future conventional naval task force. The concept follows the same logic for the British Littoral Strike Ship/LOV concept, with three worked concepts found within the RUSI article.
The PAFMM is similar in its ambiguity. Deniability from the central government combined with confusion on ownership, identity of vessels, justification as a military target and autonomy from the PLAN means a PAFMM vessel or fleet isn’t going to cause a direct military response or justify the employment of A2AD assets from a neighbouring navy. Instead one gets below-the-threshold-of-conflict engagements between these vessels and their opponents, consisting of water cannon, ramming, shining of laser, physical blocking and attempts to foul the propulsion systems with nets. In other words, exercising naval power without firing a shot. Overall, these vessels, and those mentioned previously, rely on a perceived lack of threat, operational ambiguity, disguise, deniability and persistent deployment to create enough confusion and uncertainty to prevent an adversary from engaging in military or political response by utilising their A2AD systems, without seeming to be the escalatory power themselves. Thus, they create a dilemma where they either don’t respond and allow the grey zone activities to continue, or escalate, which, in turn, paints them as the aggressor and/or justifies further escalation from the original operator of the covert vessel. A third option is to deploy an opposing asset to conduct countering grey zone activities such as the fate that befell the MV Saviz where, likely Israel, countered Iranian deniable activities with their own deniable attack on the vessel, leading to no escalation from either side and no claiming of responsibility for these actions.
Modularity
A relatively recent naval development that lends even greater significance to these vessels in the roll out of a number of containerised modular systems designed to fit within a 20 or 40 foot standard shipping container space and offer a full spectrum suite of naval sensors, weapons, unmanned systems and countermeasures. The following briefly explores the capabilities offered by the SH Defence CUBE system as this seems to have the greatest integration from other defence manufacturers as well as being the most mature system.
Two images demonstrating the capabilities of the CUBE. Image 7: Sea mine deployment. Image 8 (below): Anti-ship missiles.
With sufficient power generation to run, this system effectively allows any vessel to fit military systems at short notice, or an existing military vessel to enhance its capabilities. A covert vessel would raise very little suspicion with a cargo of a few containers placed on its deck, and it would not detract from the low-profile appearance of the vessel. Yet, these containers could give these vessels full spectrum naval capabilities with air defence, anti-ship or land attack missiles, armed unmanned vehicles, extra attack craft to carry extra special forces, naval mines or sensor systems such as an electronic warfare suite or radar. All of this would be possible within an adversary A2AD bubble. It is important to note that part of the low-profile nature of these ships comes from their lack of overt weapons systems. Therefore, while these modular containerised systems would provide a potent asset, their usage would be one-off before justifying the covert vessel as a legitimate, overt military target. In an amphibious warfare context, however, this brief surprise may be all that is required to achieve an operational objective.
One key issue with this system is target identification. While a navy’s armed surface combatant fitting two containerised air defence missile systems is not problematic regarding military identification, setting the precedent of deploying such a system to a civilian appearance vessel allows the leap to be made justifying any civilian ship with a container as a potential military target. This is clearly an unacceptable situation in the eyes of Western navies, hence the lack of weapon systems on the US and UK vessels presented in this article. The Russian Navy has however, indicated their willingness, or at least consideration, of fitting these systems to a civilian vessel as demonstrated by this graphic.
Image 9: Graphic demonstrating how this system could be fitted to a civilian vessel and blend in with other shipping containers and deliver four anti-ship missiles.
This highlights the important point of the balance these vessels must strike between appearing civilian enough to maintain a low profile and yet still be somewhat attributed to a military entity in order to avoid justifying actions against civilian shipping.
Conclusion
Overall, these vessels, while differing in their intended tasks, their capabilities, and their level of militarisation, have been developed to operate within the same domain. They are designed to operate below the threshold of conflict and provide a capability to operate in the grey zone through deniability, secrecy and ambiguity. They provide an ability to project soft power as well as low-intensity hard power to further a state’s objectives without provoking a significant military or political response. This ability allows them to operate within an A2AD bubble in a peacetime environment, or threaten the destruction of the bubble in a warfighting environment.
With the ongoing increase in multipolar, low intensity, competition across the globe, and the decline of the US as definitive principle naval power, the importance of possessing assets able to achieve political and military goals without sparking major conflict in the littoral zone will continue to increase in relevance. We may be expected to see, or not see, an increase in the number and scope of operators of these vessels in the coming decade.
From Early Warning to Early Response in Conflict Prevention
The last decades have been marked by instability of the international scene due to the increasing number of inter- and intra-state conflicts. These conflicts are caused by violent extremism, climate change, the deterioration of a state's socio-economic situation, a shortage of resources and, last but not least, civilians' growing distrust of its institutions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 56 States suffered armed conflict in 2022 in the Americas, Asia and Oceania, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, 10 more than in 2021.
The concept of conflict prevention was coined in the 1960s. It refers to diplomatic approaches through multiple activities and strategies aimed at anticipating conflict or neutralising violence before it escalates into conflict. It is a broad term that includes early warning and early response systems. The concept has grown in popularity to become a strategy within international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and within national governments. Early warning and response systems are subject to specific regulations and commitments by countries depending on the context and the circumstances. With multiple definitions depending on the type of crisis to be managed, this article focuses on the conceptualisation of systems aimed at avoiding armed conflict and on the observation that, despite this, conflicts continue to break out between different state and non-state actors, particularly in Africa.
The concept of early warning
Early warning consists of identifying factors that predict the onset of violence. It comprises five main mechanisms: data collection, data analysis, assessment of different scenarios, formulation of possible actions, and the transmission of recommendations to decision-makers. This comprehensive monitoring is carried out by internal and external analysts in the region concerned, who focus on political leaders, political groups, armed groups, and other relevant stakeholders likely to jeopardise order. The spectrum assessment areas is broad and can focus on economic, political, demographical, social, ethnic, environmental, health, or safety factors. In practical terms, intelligence gathering and analysis provide an in-depth understanding of the social dynamics of the area threatened by conflict and the interests of the involved actors involved. By identifying potential scenarios and presenting them to decision-makers, they can anticipate the deterioration of a situation and develop a coherent strategy and effective intervention.
To make the early warning system more effective, four considerations need to be taken into account in addition to the overall monitoring. Firstly, the political analysis should identify the parties involved in the conflict who are in favour of peace. This targeting would make it possible to establish a relationship of trust with actors who have the potential to promote non-violent solutions to the crisis. Secondly, analysts should keep observing the situation to foresee unexpected developments during and after the warning. In addition, analysing the behaviours of the stakeholders involved could help to understand the actions taken and the causes of the instability. Finally, when elaborating the strategy, it should be essential for analysts to determine the actors best qualified to lead the resolution of the conflict. These considerations would make early warning credible and help to understand if and how political actors can exacerbate a crisis, what actions can accelerate tensions, and what form a crisis might take if left unchecked.
As the early warning system only serves to alert and advise on a possible crisis, it is often combined with an early response system to make conflict prevention comprehensive and effective.
The concept of early response
Early response consists of proposing timely and appropriate initiatives to ease tensions or put an end to the outbreak of violence. It brings together available tools and instruments from government, regional, and international organisations. This system is classified into three levels of action:
Facilitative - high-level diplomacy, mediation, and confidence-building measures;
Coercive - diplomatic penalties, sanctions, threats of international justice, and the use of force in extreme cases; and
Incentive - financial aid, security guarantees, and institutional support.
The classification of responses allows decision-makers to react in the short and long term, which would define the outcome of the conflict. Short-term measures cover interventions during an election, within civil society groups or representative authorities, joint peace missions, military deployment, or the conduct of mediation and negotiation between conflicting parties. Long-term measures cover the management of interactive peace dialogues, the organisation of problem-solving workshops, or the sensitisation of policy-makers and civil parties to a potential danger. It is therefore the type of crisis that will determine the form of the response.
This system is complementary to the early warning system, which enables conflicts to be predicted and prevented. Following the early warning assessment, researchers, academics, and external organisations submit a range of responses that could be implemented by national government, local, regional and international organisations. This allows decision-makers to tackle the real sources of conflict and prevent them not only on the surface but also in depth. Responses elaborated tend to be more structural over time by targeting the key socio-economic, political, and institutional factors that can lead to a crisis such as addressing marginalisation and inequality, strengthening social cohesion and social capacities, promoting local development, ensuring legitimate and equitable justice, and building security institutions. Therefore, early response helps to persuade and encourage decision-makers to pursue actions aimed at avoiding or minimising violence and to propose solutions to contain it.
The effectiveness of these systems: a case study of the African Union’s early warning and response system and the Sudan conflict
As mentioned above, an early warning and early response system can also be implemented at regional level. This section focuses on these systems within the African Union and their effectiveness. The organisation establishes policies and provides political and financial instruments to prevent conflicts within the continent.
Africa has always been confronted with cycles of conflict, the origins and degree of violence of which vary from one region to another. In 2012, the African Union set up the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to gather information, monitor situations and formulate responses for decision-makers. In 2017, institutional reforms were undertaken to make the system more effective and address financial dependence on international donors. The reform resulted in the creation of a new department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, and a Situation Room supervising early warning and early response in Africa. It has strengthened cooperation and coordination between economic communities and Member States at regional level. However, despite the implementation of the CEWS, Africa recorded its highest number of conflicts on the continent in 2019. The Peace Research Institute Oslo counted 25 state conflicts including ethnic, religious, environmental, or societal issues. Consequently, it can be said that the new departments created do not fulfil their mandates. Instead of focusing on early warning and response, they are concentrating more on crisis management of ongoing conflicts, thus losing sight of their purpose.
Despite the existence of the CEWS, Sudan has been facing a violent conflict since April 2023. This conflict opposes General Dagalo, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, and General al-Burhan, commander of the Sudan national military force, due to institutional disagreements, economic and security instability, humanitarian needs, and poverty following their military coup in October 2021. Nevertheless, Sudan is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which operates the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), an early warning system implemented in 2022. As part of this regional community, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda have promoted a system that seeks to collect information from religious and civil society leaders, youth, and women to avoid crises. This strategy allows a greater number of factors to be gathered and used, enabling analysts to decipher potential tensions. However, this mechanism operates under a strict mandate, including the prevention of pastoralist conflicts in which governments are not involved, and the non-management of civil conflict between government and rebel groups supported by neighbouring governments. Furthermore, within this mandate, CEWARN can only provide accurate and verified information to the states concerned in order to enable them to take appropriate measures to prevent conflict. Consequently, the most competent body that could have prevented the conflict in Sudan was limited in terms of action, geographical scope and conflicting interests.
Since the coup in October 2021, the international community has been striving to restore civil democracy. At that time, UN Special Envoy Volker Perthes warned of the possibility of a further fragmentation of Sudan if no inclusive dialogue was initiated. He also advised rebuilding trust with the Sudanese people and regaining economic, financial and political support from the international arena. A return to the path of democratic transition in Sudan would have reduced tensions and the risk of escalating violence, and enabled international donors to restore their financial support for development, which had a major impact on early warning and response monitoring. After alerting to the situation, Volker Perthes proposed short- and medium-term actions such as stopping arbitrary arrests, releasing political detainees, and guaranteeing civilians’ rights to protest and assemble. Despite these proposals for rapid intervention to prevent the escalation of violence, the conflict that broke out in April 2023 is still ongoing, with no end in sight. Regional early warning and response systems did not prevent the conflict from breaking out, despite the existence of obvious factors such as institutional instability following a coup d'état, the country's poor economic situation, deplorable health, climatic and living conditions, and security instability in various parts of the country.
What is making these systems uncertain?
Several factors can make early warning and response systems uncertain. Having or benefiting from such systems does not guarantee that the tensions observed will not turn into conflict. Three factors can be taken into consideration when a conflict emerges despite the presence of an early warning and response system:
human unpredictability,
the country’s socio-economic situation, and
the strengthening of the country's institutional capacities.
Firstly, the stress faced by decision-makers is an important factor that needs to be taken into consideration in conflict prevention. Stress can be seen as a response resulting in positive or negative outcomes, based on a cognitive interpretation of a situation. Lazarus and Folkmans introduced a strategy called “stress coping”, which can be associated with a possible outbreak of conflict. Depending on the situation, this involves adopting a problem-focused response, an emotion-focused response or a self-esteem-focused approach. Thanks to this analysis, in the case of a possible crisis and a stressful challenge, it is possible to identify three types of responses.
Acknowledgement of a lack of control over the situation, which may lead to a lack of appropriate decisions.
Emotional outburst, which can lead to subjective decisions.
Confidence that tensions can be managed using available means, which can lead to unmeasured decisions.
As a result, human and psychological factors in times of crisis make the early warning and response system unpredictable. The decisions of decision-makers are indirectly influenced by their beliefs, convictions, emotions, and their advisors, which can compromise the effectiveness and certainty of the early warning and response system.
Second, violent conflicts frequently erupt in states with fragile economies and social structures. National budgets are distributed differently across countries and, since the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015, the level of national budget execution is an indicator of the government's ability to deliver public services and achieve development goals. With the overriding objective of ending poverty, promoting prosperity for people, and supporting sustainable development, decision-makers are seeking to strengthen institutional and organisational capacities. Therefore, conflict prevention is becoming a secondary concern, particularly for developing countries. Even if conflict prevention is less costly than conflict management, decision-makers may remain reluctant to intervene before violence escalates, undermining the effectiveness of the early warning and response systems.
Last but not least, early warning and response systems can be uncertain due to a lack of efficient institutional capacity building. Institutions are key actors in conflict prevention because they collect and analyse relevant information, identify threats, and assess warnings and appropriate responses for decision-makers. The escalation of violence is mainly due to a lack of substantial information or the inability to deploy the necessary resources to prevent conflict from breaking out. Consequently, early warning and response systems are difficult to implement, both for the country concerned and for external actors involved in conflict prevention.
How to make early warning and early response systems more efficient?
The current operation of early warning and response systems has shortcomings and therefore needs to be adjusted and reinforced on an ad-hoc basis. Four recommendations can be made to make these systems more effective.
The first recommendation concerns strengthening cooperation between national governments and external stakeholders to promote conflict prevention. To be more effective, it is important to focus on the exchange of information, strategies and materials. This will help to create coordinated and rapid responses in the field of conflict prevention. In this way, early warning and response systems will be more comprehensive, targeted, and responsive.
The second recommendation is about the effectiveness of actions taken under the rapid reaction system. National governments are on the front line when domestic tensions escalate into violent conflict. Therefore, governments must have available and flexible emergency funds that can be deployed in the event of an imminent crisis. The availability of the fund allows the decision-maker to react quickly, without worrying about prioritising socio-economic issues. The flexibility of the fund means that responses can be tailored to specific situations. In this way, less developed countries will reduce their dependence on international partners.
The third recommendation concerns the inclusion of civil society in conflict prevention, particularly women and youth. Women have an important voice due to their involvement at community level, since they are involved at all levels of the local population, organising the community. Young people are seen as the future of the community because they are at the heart of public policy and the first to be sensitised to enable long-term action. Together, they have a strong voice, could be agents of change in conflict prevention, be a valuable source of information, make early warning analysis more accurate, and enable appropriate responses. Moreover, by increasing their visibility and influence in the decision-making process, national government and external actors could seize the opportunity to raise awareness and prevent tensions from flaring up again.
Combined with the previous point, the fourth and final recommendation highlights the importance of reintegrating communities into society. As institutions in fragile countries struggle to provide adequate services and maintain a growing economy, civilians tend to gravitate towards organisations capable of performing government functions. These organisations are sometimes illegal armed groups. This is a practical relationship in which communities give their loyalty to illegal groups in exchange for the provision of necessary resources and security. The challenge is to reintegrate civilians into society by re-establishing a relationship of trust with the government. This requires effective institutions, strong democratic governance and economic growth for civil society.
Georgia Walking a Fine Line between Russia and the West
On 20 May 2023, news broke out that the daughter of Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, had arrived in Georgia and was attending a wedding; just as protests were being held across the country over the resumption of direct flights between Georgia and Russia following a four-year hiatus. Both of these events increased the frustrations of the majority of the Georgian population who strive for their country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Since the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, which resulted in the military occupation of 20% of Georgian land by Russia, the government of Georgia has walked a thin line trying to maintain strong relations with the West, all the while appeasing Russia in more recent years. Direct flights between the two countries were banned by Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, in 2019 following violent clashes between the police and protesters in Georgia after a Russian lawmaker visited the country. After the 4-year break, the decision of President Putin on 10 May to lift visa requirements for Georgian citizens and to resume direct flights between the two countries was announced by the Russian Transport Ministry, also triggering large protests across the country, most significantly at Tbilisi International Airport. Importantly, even though this decision was unilateral, it is suggested that an agreement from the Georgian government would have been necessary for its implementation. The Georgian government’s involvement in this is even more evident through the Georgian ruling party’s, Georgian Dream’s, claims of ‘xenophobic’ protests. The latter statement was criticised by the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, claiming that “This is an insult to the Georgian people” and that it is unacceptable to accuse Georgians of xenophobia, given that the public has accepted hundreds of thousands of migrants from Russia in the last 18 months.
The arrival of the daughter of Sergey Lavrov to Georgia, reportedly by land, added fuel to the fire and brought further condemnations from President Zourabichvili who expressed disbelief that the Georgian government was unaware of the presence of “the daughter of the highest-ranking official, from Putin’s immediate circle, who is under sanctions”, urging the government to protect Georgia from Russian individuals on the sanctioned list. Furthermore, politically, this decision was met with strong discontent by EU diplomats in Georgia, arguing that if Georgia is set on EU integration in the future, they should follow the decisions made by the 27 EU Member States with regards to sanctions. However, Georgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic and Sustainable Development, Levan Davitashvili, pointed out that Georgia is not yet an EU member State and therefore the country’s actions and decisions, be it political or economic, cannot be equated to that of EU members. The Minister further noted that the EU position with regards to trade with Russia is not clearly defined, pointing to the supposed EU-Russia trade increase of over $5 billion in 2022, and therefore called for an open dialogue with the EU to discuss any issues within this context. However, it must be noted that conflicting reports exist with regards to the amount of trade between Russia and the EU following the invasion of Ukraine and the establishment of sanctions; this is mostly due to the varying trade relations between Russia and the individual 27 EU Member States.
With regards to the resumption of direct flights, several interests exist in increased relations between the two countries. For the Russian government it is clear; they seek to promote their efforts in improving relations with Georgia, simultaneously strengthening transit opportunities, and establishing shipment prospects of prohibited and sanctioned items. Whereas for Georgia, the direct flights provide benefits with regards to increased trade and tourism as well as diffusion of tensions following the 2008 war. However, these benefits are not met with as much enthusiasm by the general public as by the Georgian government. Although taken in isolation, the resumption of flights and the lift of visa requirements may not be alarming, it is however when they are coupled with the recent more pro-Russian approaches of the Georgian Dream party that the government is put under heavy scrutiny.
Recent Pro-Russian Movements
Although the Georgian government has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expressed solidarity, and has provided humanitarian aid and shelter for Ukrainian refugees, following the invasion, Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, announced, and has stuck by his announcement, that “considering [Georgia’s] national interests and interests of the people, Georgia does not plan to participate in the financial and economic sanctions [on Russia], as this would only damage our country and populace more.” Furthermore, other politicians such as Irakli Kobakhidze, head of the Georgian Dream party, can also be seen to have a pro-Russian sentiment through his public statements. Between February and July 2022, he has criticised Russia nine times mainly on its invasion of Ukraine, whereas his criticisms towards Ukraine equated to 26, mainly focusing on Ukraine’s condemning comments of Georgian officials, and 57 towards the West, including criticisms towards the EU Ambassador in Georgia, as well as accusing the US Ambassador in Georgia, Kelly Degnan, of pushing the country to go to war with Russia.
More pro-Russian acts within Georgia can be traced back to the Foreign Agent Bill that was announced by the Georgian Parliament on 9 March 2023, which included the requirement for any organisation within the country receiving more than 20% of its annual funding from overseas to be declared as "agents of foreign influence". Criticism stemmed from the similarity of the aforementioned legislation to one introduced by President Putin aimed at silencing his opponents. The draft legislation was coined as the “Russian law” in Georgia and resulted in mass protests in Tbilisi denouncing the bill. The Georgian Dream party subsequently withdrew it. Russia claimed that these mass protests were an attempted coup orchestrated from abroad. What the protests in fact demonstrated is the growing distrust in the government, as identified by President Zourabichvili, and demonstrated the Georgian public’s desire for the country to remain on a pro-Western path and to be part of the European family. In light of this, the Georgian government has been receiving criticisms over the state of its democracy, and has somewhat damaged its ties with the EU.
Hence the resumption of direct flights and the case of Lavrov’s daughter in Georgia are not isolated instances and have evidently further exacerbated the criticisms and raised concerns over “Georgia's EU path and Georgia's commitment to align with the EU decisions in foreign policy”, as stated by EU Spokesman Peter Sano. The Georgian government, for the most part, has downplayed the political implications of the most recent events and has focused more on the economic benefits of the $400 million a year that Russian tourism would bring to the country. Hence Russia’s attempts of harming Georgia’s European integration through the normalisation of relations between the two countries, as identified by the US Ambassador to Georgia, Kelly Degnan, have been arguably ignored by the government and are more of a concern for the Georgian public and President Zourabichvili.
Georgia’s Western Path
Following Georgia’s Independence in 1991, the European path was enshrined in the country’s constitution, emphasising the country’s pro-Western aspiration. This is precisely why as a response to the recent actions by the government that during her speech on Georgia’s Independence Day on 26 May 20203, President Zourabichvili called on the government to meet the Georgian public's “will to strengthen the country's independence, establish democracy, and join the European family”. This call is vital for Georgia’s application for EU candidacy and its “perspective” position (rather than the candidacy status that was granted to Ukraine and Moldova) which includes following and implementing the reforms suggested by the EU; among them judicial reform, de-oligarchisation, addressing organised crime, improving the media sources, addressing political polarisation, and considering independent individuals in the appointment of a new Public Defender. However, reports have identified that only two of the twelve suggested reforms have been addressed. In this vein, it is important to note that for Georgia and its population, Euro-Atlantic integration, or EU and NATO membership, is not just a desire but a need for Georgia’s national security, even more in light of the war in Ukraine. The recent decision undertaken by the ruling party, Georgian Dream, can be seen to be drastically different from that of the population's wishes. This can be seen through the protests held in Georgia over the past couple of years as well as through recent studies that identified that 89% of the Georgia population supports EU membership, and 80% wish to join NATO in the near future. This is precisely why the recent protests have seen as many as 160,000 participants chanting the slogan “Home to Europe'' and carrying EU flags.
Bigger Picture
When looking at the most recent developments with direct flight resumption, it is important to question why these efforts from Russia to increase relations with Georgia are being made now, and what this means for Georgia. Essentially, experts have claimed that Russia is employing a carrot-and-stick approach, the carrot being economic benefits for Georgia, and the stick being the spread of fear of the same situation as what Ukraine has found itself in. Ultimately, there is no denying that Russia is employing a long-term strategy for Georgia, part of which relies on the maintenance of power and the loyalty of the current government and the ruling party, Georgian Dream, who is also in turn benefiting from increasing relations with Russia and branding itself as a party looking for a resolution to the Russo-Georgian conflict. The start of the flights between the two countries have even been followed by bilateral talks on the resumption of railway traffic through the occupied region of Abkhazia. There are probably one-sided hopes that this may even lead to the recognition of Abkhazia’s sovereignty by Georgia, which will further deepen the country’s ties to Russia and will also deepen the divide between Georgia and the West. Furthermore, there is a likelihood that these decisions may be implemented by the Georgian government against the population’s will, labelling the actions as restorations of relations with the occupied regions.
Overall, with the increasing relations between Georgia and Russia, it may be questioned what these decisions, which may be coined as confidence building measures or conflict resolution, would mean for Georgia’s overall security. Evidently, if Georgia strives for EU candidacy status and eventual EU and NATO membership, and hence the security that this guarantees, one would expect the government to comply with the existing sanctions against Russia, implement the reforms suggested by the EU and not be distracted by Russian influence. However, the resumption of flights may only be the start of the increasing distance away from Georgia’s Western path and towards closer ties to Moscow.
The European Defence Fund: Political Impact and Challenges
The European Defence Fund
The European Defence Fund (EDF) is an initiative launched by the European Commission in 2017 under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). For the 2021-2027 MFF, the main objective is to promote defence cooperation between EU Member States through the coordination, complementarity and amplification of national defence investments, to encourage an innovative and competitive defence industry, to enhance cooperation between companies and stakeholder states, and to support research and development in defence technology. The EDF is divided into two windows. One part of the fund is allocated to collaborative defence research projects. The other part is to provide capability levels and incentives for companies and EU Member States to cooperate on joint defence projects. This fund enables multi-level cooperation in the security and defence sector and increases competitiveness with other military powers in a global dynamic where all nations are seeking to remilitarise their territory and strengthen their defence industry. As a matter of fact, since the end of the Cold War, global military spending has risen considerably due to the volatility of the international scene. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditures for 2018 reached $1,82 billion or 2,6% more in real terms compared to the $1,73 billion spent in 2017. In the context of this fast-changing development, the European Union attempts to assert itself through the European Defence Fund and the biggest military spenders, namely the United States (US), China, and Russia.
A changing security landscape
In response to the international arms race, the EDF was initially allocated a budget of €13 billion for the period 2021-2027. In the meantime, European priorities and challenges have shifted towards public health, research, and on the fight against climate change. The budget allocated to the EDF was subsequently revised downwards. The EDF budget was fixed at €8 billion, including €2,7 billion for collaborative defence research and €5,3 billion to fund capability development projects.
However, since its adoption, threats have evolved, as have the challenges to European security. The use of conventional and unconventional means to jeopardise security stability has increased on the international scene, as have the actors who use them. In addition to existing threats in its neighbourhood, such as armed conflict sor civil wars, Europe faces a wide range of hybrid threats, including terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber-attacks, propaganda, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attacks, and disinformation. Given the volatility of the international scene and the danger facing European territory, the mid-term review of the MFF on 20 June 2023 was an opportunity for the European Commission to propose a revision of the MFF. The strengthening of EU defence research and development through an increase in the budget was accepted following the review. An additional €1.5 billion will be allocated to the EDF, bringing the total to €9.5 billion. In a long-term financial plan, the review is an opportunity to reassess European needs regarding new and current security and defence issues and provide common responses to them. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine having an immediate impact on European countries' decisions on military spending, the European Union should allocate more defence funds to Member State industries to enable the pooling and harmonisation of the European defence industry, particularly in the field of research and technological innovation. This will enable Europe's small military powers to overcome their gap with the major military powers and give the strongest defence industries the means to go further in innovation and capability design. This would simultaneously strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy.
Reinforcing the status of the European Union on the international stage
The implementation of the EDF is closely linked to the strengthening of Europe's strategic autonomy, and consequently to the consolidation of the EU's position on the international stage. Adopted in June 2016, the EU’s Global Strategy introduces the concept of an EU autonomy strategy. It is rooted in the idea of making the EU capable of conducting operations and crisis management missions within the EU, in its neighbourhood and in other regions of the world, of being well equipped militarily and of operating independently of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The fund, combined with the strategy, would enable the EU to assert itself politically on the international stage, where the preservation of stability and security is increasingly under threat. As the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, has said, strategic autonomy is also a “process of political survival” for the EU. This process could have consequences at three levels.
It would allow the EU to protect itself from its volatile neighbourhood environment. Indeed, all the crises happening in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods of Europe are having a strong impact on the EU’s internal security due to ripple effects. This is the case of the security situation in Sahel, which has led the EU to notice terrorist threats growing on its territory and to set up training missions -such as EUCAP Sahel Niger or EUCAP Sahel Mali- to prevent the spread of terrorist groups within and outside the region.
It would enhance EU action for international crisis management, and give a new dynamic to the Schuman Declaration which stated that “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.” The economic interdependence that used to be enough to guarantee peace is no longer sufficient. To avoid conflict, the EU must have the means to ensure its own protection, defend its territory, and deter the enemy from destabilising international security by adjusting its strategies.
Progressively, the European Union could become more competitive with powers such as the US, China, and Russia, which are constantly increasing their defence investment in terms of research, innovation and technology. Indeed, the US ranks first in the world in terms of military spending. Its defence expenditures reached $877 billion in 2022. This was an increase of 0,7% in real terms on the 2021 budget of $801 billion. As the world's second largest military spender, China has been increasing its defence budget for 28 consecutive years, allocating $292 billion in 2022 to its military budget. This is 4,2% more than in 2021, with an estimated budget of $279,74 billion. Russia is the world's third largest military power, with a budget of $86,4 billion in 2022. It is 9,2% more than the 2021 budget (estimated at $78,45 billion).
The increasing complexity of the world, the changing nature of internal and external threats, the emergence of transnationalism in international relations and growing interconnectivity have altered the international balance of power and had an impact on international stability. This adaptation has had an impact on the EU's internal policy. These impacts have challenged the unity of European Member States before bringing them together.
What the EDF has triggered in the EU
A two-speed Europe
The cut in the EDF budget by the European Commission has relegated the reinforcement of European security and defence capabilities to a secondary position, due to the remote idea of war reappearing on the European continent and the need to consolidate the different defence and security policy perspectives of the Member States of the European Union. This has also led to a diversification of opinion on the desire to strengthen European defence and security capacities independent of NATO and the US, and in the political project of developing a strategic autonomy for the European Union. This was demonstrated through the negotiation of the MFF during the Finnish presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019 and the French presidency in 2021. Finland proposed to cut the EDF budget in half for 2021-2027 and allocate it an amount of €6 million. On the contrary, France proposed a budget of €924 million. As a result, the notion of a two-speed Europe in terms of security objectives and means was reinforced. On one hand, some Member States were reluctant to have a stronger military role for the EU in order to avoid the duplication of NATO’s role. They were confident about NATO and the US ensuring security over their countries. This was the case of the Baltic States constantly warning that they were under threat from Russia due to the sharing of borders and the Russian military district in the enclave of Kaliningrad. On the other hand, some EU governments, mainly the major military powers such as France or Germany, were pressing for increased national spending to guarantee Europe’s security and defence. There was a clear divergence of vision between European countries with fewer security and defence capabilities, relying on others to protect them, and those capable of securing their own territory and defending themselves.
The EU Battle Groups have demonstrated this lack of common vision within the EU. Created in 2007, the EU Battle Groups consist of troops made available by European Member States and deployable within 10 days. These groups are not controlled by a centralised authority and generate unequal expenditure between countries with the means to deploy equipped troops. The gap between military strategies and threats assessment have discouraged European countries from getting involved in deploying the Battle Groups. As a result, they have never been used but are still active with the aim of overcoming obstacles and being deployed. However, due to the increase in common threats, national foreign, security and defence policy strategies, which previously differed, are tending to coincide between European Member States and within the institutions of the European Union.
Improved interoperability
Two instruments have been created to reduce the aforementioned divergences and extend the scope of European foreign security and defence actions. In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched, allowing EU Member States to integrate their defence capabilities on a voluntary basis, and with legally binding commitment. While this means can accentuate the division between Member States, it can also enable integration and cooperation, and serves to demonstrate the benefits and effectiveness of European defence capabilities. PESCO is a crucial mechanism for achieving strategic autonomy through closer cooperation between EU Member States and political preparedness. To complement this momentum, the European Peace Facility (EPF) was launched in 2021. This new financing instrument has a budget of €5 billion for the periods 2021-2027. The EPF guarantees the supply of military equipment and humanitarian aid, increases EU military mobility, and supports increased defence spending by EU countries. In this way, the European Union gives its Member States the financial resources they need to strengthen security and defence cooperation and increase the EU's influence on the international stage. In the context of recent security events and the reassessment of threats facing the EU, a consensus has emerged on cooperation and coordination of actions. The European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and the European Peace Facility are part of a package of defence measures offering Member States complementarity in maintaining security.
A “de facto solidarity” - Robert Schuman
From Robert Schuman to Ursula Von der Leyen, the European project has always been synonymous with solidarity, cooperation and interoperability. Initially to consolidate peace, today to manage crises and maintain European and international stability, the European project is adjusted and consolidated through European unity. The new and multiple security challenges are too great for individual Member States to tackle alone. Over time, European Member States have increased their national security capabilities and strengthened their cooperation and coordination. The Baltic States' willingness to devote 3% of their GDP to defence spending and the EU's provision of arms and assistance to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility are just two examples. This demonstrates the willingness of EU Member States to work together to maintain safety and security. The EDF, initially relegated to the background due to the multiple crises the EU has gone through, is regaining its importance. The initial project of a united Europe is present. The project of an interoperable Europe is progressing. The implementation of the EDF has consolidated the idea of the European concept described by Robert Schuman: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”
Four challenges facing the EDF
These concrete achievements linked to the EDF have raised a number of challenges that the European institutions and the EU Member States must address. Four of them, among many others, are highlighted here:
The first concern relates to the traceability of weapons manufactured as part of a common defence industry and their delivery in support of partners affected by conflict. In order to develop the European defence industry and prevent such a situation from recurring, a European body should develop a system of checks and balances, as well as a means of tracing weapons so that they can be easily found and tracked.
The second concern is the development of new technologies and critical weapons. Given that the fund will be allocated to defence industry stakeholders on a project basis, the innovation of new technological weapons should be monitored. The European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU have agreed in an inter-institutional agreement not to fund Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) to ensure that new technologies remain human-centred. This is why the European Commission must set up a control authority capable of supervising the projects it funds through a system of monitoring, control, and audit. This will also enable the money invested to be tracked and will emphasise transparency between the European institutions, private players and European citizens.
The aforementioned challenge is closely linked to the direct arms financing in EU legislation. As the Lisbon Treaty forbids “expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications”, the EU provides money to Member States through public funds such as the EDF, the Cohesion Fund or the Recovery Fund to finance their military and defence industries. By authorising the use of these funds for defence spending, the EU is indirectly helping to finance weapons and bring them into line with Community law. This subtlety caused concern among EU diplomats, who stated that “the treaty explicitly excludes funding for weaponry” and wondered whether this strategy would work. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for Internal Market, insisted on the “drastically, dramatically changed” European security context to justify using EU money to finance arms directly or indirectly. As the Cohesion Fund and the Recovery Fund were set up to help EU countries recover from the avian flu pandemic, the European Union should clarify the use of these funds and consider a strict plan on how they can be spent.
Finally, the mid-term review of the EDF could potentially lead to a significant reduction in other areas of the EU's public fund, but this has yet to be confirmed as decisions on the increase in the fund have not yet been made public. Europe is facing an economic and environmental crisis and is trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. If Russia's aggression against Ukraine has convinced European public opinion to strengthen the practical and financial means of European defence and security, the EU must be able to justify the origin of the funds injected and the priority given to this area over others. There is common agreement on the war on European citizens, but the fears and interests of different nationalities are not the same.
Conclusion
As the international security landscape continues to evolve and transform, governments must adapt to meet new threats and ensure their defence. Within the European Union, the creation of the European Defence Fund has helped to address these crucial new security issues. This has had an impact on the European Union by highlighting its potential. Weaknesses that suggested the EU would not work have now become a strength, bringing together ideas and actions to address the common interests of European security. Although these objectives have exacerbated the divergent visions of EU Member States, the threats at Europe's borders and the instability of the international scene have made it essential to find a consensus. Today, there is a political will, which exceeds the financial capacities of the Member States, to move forward and cooperate to maintain security and assert Europe's place in the international system. European institutions, the private sector and public opinion in Europe are currently facing a number of challenges. They concern priorities, vision and action in the field of security and defence. However, these challenges do not seem impossible to meet, since they are based on a common objective: to have a European Union that is secure and capable of protecting itself in a world where security is increasingly fragile.
Warfighting and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century
The nature of warfare has been perpetually altered by continuous innovation in technology and strategy throughout history, never remaining static for long periods of time. This rate of change, however, vastly accelerated during the 20th century seeing a change from cavalry and bayonet charges through nuclear weapons to stand-off precision weapons and cyber warfare. This article will explore some of the key foundational concepts of 21st-century warfare and provide a concrete set of definitions on which this series will base its analysis. It will then explore the scope and range of topics that will be covered in the series going forward and provide a brief overview of Ukraine in order to ground these topics in a conflict currently taking place.
Some definitions
To set the conditions for a comprehensive analysis of these changes, it is first necessary to provide some concrete definitions for often misunderstood or misused terms relating to the topics of irregular warfare and warfighting.
Warfighting
Warfighting, as the name would suggest, refers to the action of fighting a war, specifically and crucially this conflict is through kinetic means with physical military engagement between belligerents. The UK Ministry of Defence states “while the character of warfare is changing, the nature of war does not change, it is always about the violent interaction between people.” This highlights the key point in this term that warfighting is not conflict or contest between groups but rather, actual direct military action. The term ‘conventional warfighting’ will also be used throughout this series to refer to so-called “peer” and “near-peer” warfighting, i.e. warfighting against an adversary considered to be militarily equal or near-equal in terms of capability. A traditional example of this would be, from a US perspective, China as a peer adversary or Iran as a near-peer adversary.
Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is not a doctrinally defined term within a Western military context, rather it is a concept developed by Frank Hoffman to describe the emerging threat of multifaceted military entities in 21st-century conflict. He talks specifically about the blend between conventional warfighting, irregular warfare, and terrorism or organised crime. Specifically, he describes hybrid warfare as being conducted by state or non-state actors and involving an ambiguous mix of combatants and tactics to exploit military vulnerabilities in a force. While he uses the example of Hezbollah in 2006, a more current example would be the Russian forces deployed in Ukraine where a large conventional Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) element is augmented by militia forces from the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LPR and DPR as well as mercenaries from the Wagner Group amongst others). The term hybrid warfare is often deployed in a context of national competition below the threshold of conflict such as economic warfare, energy warfare or political interference. This is beyond the scope of both Hoffman’s definition as well as the range of this article series and as such we will focus on the, primarily, military nature of Hoffman’s definition.
This form of conflict is becoming increasingly common as states seek to conduct military operations without the domestic and political risk of their state military involvement. These militias offer a level of deniability along with leveraging existing local disputes, power structures and sentiments to increase the chance of military success. Another current example would be that of the ongoing conflict in Syria where various militia factions are supported to varying degrees by the West, Turkey, Iran and the Syrian government itself with international state involvement including the US, Russia and the UK supporting these factions with air-strikes and troops on the ground. It is difficult today to find or imagine an active conflict that does not correspond to this definition. On the contrary, it has become an essential element in conduct of warfare, as irregular forces are often capable combatants and can cause difficulties for conventional military forces.
Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare has traditionally been used, incorrectly, to describe all military activity that does not fit within the traditional view of conventional warfighting. The Modern War Institute defines it as “a coercive struggle that erodes or builds legitimacy for the purpose of political power. It blends disparate lines of effort to create an integrated attack on societies and their political institutions. It weaponizes frames and narratives to affect credibility and resolve, and it exploits societal vulnerabilities to fuel political change. As such, states engaged in or confronted with, irregular warfare must bring all elements of power to bear under their national political leadership.” The key point is that this form of warfare involves various techniques and groups that are not considered conventional and can, but does not necessarily have to, involve violent conflict. Examples of techniques that could be considered irregular warfare would be the spreading of disinformation to reduce legitimacy of a military group. An example could be the Russian focus on and inflation of the far-right elements of the Ukrainian military to portray the entirety of Ukraine as a far-right state despite that not being the case overall.
Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric warfare has a simple definition but two completely different military situations in which this definition can be applied. Kenneth McKenzie Jr defines it as “leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior opponent to achieve disproportionate effect.” While this in itself is a fairly tangible definition, the nuances of this term are in what is being considered asymmetric. For example, a war between a nuclear and non-nuclear state could be considered asymmetric even if the belligerents were equal in conventional military power. Similarly, any war involving the US could be considered asymmetric given the unmatched scale of the US Air Force (USAF).
For this series, asymmetry will be used in three ways. Firstly, strategic asymmetry. This concept can be used to describe warfare between two fundamentally unequal military groups where one side is totally outmatched in every metric. An example of this would be the conflict between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban within Afghanistan where ISAF outmatched the Taliban in technology, funding, manpower, training and equipment. It is important to note here that strategic asymmetry does not guarantee defeat for the weaker side as this example illustrates.
A second use of the term asymmetric warfare is that of operational or tactical asymmetry. This can be broken down into asymmetry in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and asymmetry in physical metrics such as equipment or manpower figures. Asymmetric TTPs can be used to describe the situation in which belligerents with a level of conventional military equity seek gains by changing tactics to exploit a perceived weakness. For example, the Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive exploited a perceived stretching of weakened Russian defensive lines by massing lightly armed vehicles with high operational mobility to penetrate and exploit the Russian lines achieving rapid victories. This tactic would not be found in any Soviet, Russian or Ukrainian doctrine handbook and instead capitalised on the available equipment and condition of the battlefield to defeat an opponent expecting a conventional attack.
Further, asymmetry can be used to refer to a disadvantage or difference in a specific physical measurement of military power. This could include a disadvantage in the numbers of troops, equipment or ammunition such as the artillery barrel and ammunition deficit that left Ukraine facing a 10:1 disadvantage around Bakhmut or a specific capability gap such as Ukraine’s lack of a blue water navy or any navy at all. These asymmetric disadvantages leave room for asymmetric innovations and technologies to fill, many of which will be explored in this series.
Unconventional Warfare
Unconventional warfare refers specifically to activities designed to support an insurgency or resistance group in order to achieve political and military goals. It is an element of irregular warfare.
Grey Zone Warfare
Another poorly doctrinally defined yet widely used term. Grey zone warfare has been explained by the Australian government as “activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict... paramilitary forces, militarisation of disputed features, exploiting influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers.” This essentially overlaps with the definition of irregular warfare but refers more to the non-physical domain in which this activity occurs; the ‘grey zone’. A key point here being that this definition is self-contradictory, stating that grey zone warfare seeks to avoid military conflict but advocates militarisation and interference operations as acceptable tactics. The point this definition is trying to get at is that grey zone warfare seeks to avoid conventional military conflict. The Nord Stream bombings were almost certainly a military operation of some kind regardless of speculation of actors involved, however this activity was designed to add a layer of deniability in order to get a state-on-state advantage without escalating to conventional war.
There is significant overlap between these definitions, some of which are based on existing military doctrine and others which have been created as theoretical tools to group together certain types of military activity.
The diagram below is intended to visually illustrate the overlap of some of these terms and theories and to show how various military actions can be categorised into a certain form of warfare.
Matrix of Conflict. Source: Australian Army Research Centre
Scope of this series
This series will explore a variety of TTPs, technological innovations, and changes in military force design that have occurred or may occur in the near term at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It will illustrate how the changing nature of conflict has influenced and will continue to influence military development in technology, equipment and TTP in the future. The focus will be on the military aspect of these changes rather than the political aspects covered in the Hybrid Warfare series. The series will largely explore topics relating to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as it is the most recent crucible in which these changes can be observed and from which these innovations have, are and will emerge. These lessons and observations can then be applied to other regions of the world to examine their impact on warfighting in the 21st century more generally.
Ukraine as a case study for irregular warfare
The Ukrainian conflict is an ideal case study for examining the various forms of warfare defined above and the physical manifestations of these forms of conflict.
The Ukrainian conflict encompasses all the forms of warfare that this series seeks to cover, from targeted assassinations in Moscow to the destruction of critical national infrastructure and the development of improvised or homemade naval and unmanned aerial systems. While it is not the intention of this series to focus entirely on Ukraine, the conflict provides the most recent evidence base from which lessons can be learned and developments in technology and TTP can be observed. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has provided perhaps the first example of real warfare in the 21st century and has proved to be a theoretical watershed moment as traditional post-Global War on Terror Western thinking sought to distance itself from conventional warfare in Europe and focus on irregular warfare in the Indo-Pacific, as the Integrated Review illustrates. The Russian invasion brought an interesting change to this view, forcing Western states, while not discounting the rising threat posed by China, to accept that the idea of interstate conflict in Europe is not as distant as once thought.
At an operational level, the war in Ukraine has proved another assertion about 21st-century conflict wrong. The idea that conventional warfare is still relevant was relegated to the background in favour of expeditionary, asymmetric, and interventionist warfare as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and South Sudan among others. What Ukraine has shown is that while conventional warfare is still of crucial importance, its nature has entirely changed, as we will see in other articles. 2,000 destroyed, damaged or abandoned Russian tanks would seem to suggest that the TTPs, technology or equipment that the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) have employed so far are fundamentally challenged in the conventional warfighting environment of the 21st century and that there are many lessons to be drawn from their actions, failures, and successes.
The conflict has also provided numerous opportunities to observe asymmetric warfare in action, with examples such as the use of custom-built unmanned surface vessels (USVs) by the Ukrainian army to challenge the Russian Black Sea Fleet or the procurement and employment of Western air defence systems to counter the threat posed by the Russian Air Force and Russian long-range precision guided munitions (LR-PGMs) such as Kalibr, Kinzhal or Iskander-M missiles. This asymmetric tool employed by Ukraine has denied Russian forces air superiority, a key tool that facilitated the allied success in Desert Storm.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this brief introduction to the terms and primary case studies to be used throughout this series aims to have provided a basic conceptual understanding of the spheres of conflict that sit below and alongside the conventional understanding of warfighting. Going forward the series will explore a variety of domains and specific examples of technologies and strategies that exist within these spheres and the impact that these will have on warfighting and conflict in general going forward. These examples will be explored at a variety of scales with innovations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels as well as exploring entirely new domains of conflict such as deep sea warfare.
As the conflict in Ukraine is currently demonstrating, irregular and unconventional warfare is likely to become more prevalent in the coming decades even as conventional interstate conflict continues as a major security threat. As the conflict continues, new material and tactical developments continue to appear driven by the combination of limited economic and military resources on both sides as well as the push to achieve a military advantage and improve the situation on the battlefield.
These developments in Ukraine are being watched globally by various militaries to form the basis for new policy, procurement decisions, and military innovations to move from the traditional Cold War model of interstate warfare to the hybrid forms seen today. The successes and failures of these developments, and their applicability to other potential and current theatres of conflict, will pave the way and shape the nature of 21st-century warfare.
Cocaine and Canals: The Risk of Drug Trafficking for Businesses Operating in Belgian and Dutch Ports
Over the last decade, the centre of European drug trafficking has shifted from southern Italy to Northern Europe. This is largely due to the FBI's crackdown on Mexican drug lords and their Italian affiliates. Since then, southern American suppliers, like Peru and Colombia, have sought other partners, which they have found in the criminal networks of northern Europe, particularly the Benelux countries. Antwerp and Rotterdam are the ports of choice for drug trafficking.
A new generation of criminals seized this opportunity and took the drug market by storm, cooperating with the Italian ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra clans, the Irish Kinahan group, and Balkan clans in what has been dubbed a “super cartel”. Because of its markedly multicultural make-up, the Dutch chapter of this super cartel has been called the “Mocro Maffia”. It is in fact a collection of different drug trafficking groups that emerged at the same time in the Netherlands and Belgium, giving these two countries the status of Europe’s leading drug hub. As a result, the Benelux has reached new levels of violence, threats and criminal influence, with some commentators referring to “narco states”. Although many high-ranking members have been arrested and are currently before the courts, their operations remain uninterrupted. The organisation is even held responsible for the assassination of lawyers and journalists from prison. This Spotlight assesses the influence of this situation on Benelux societies and economies, focusing on firms working with and in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam.
Scope
The strength of Northern Europe’s trade infrastructure is a double-edged sword. While it enables large-scale trade, it also makes it vulnerable to exploitation by criminals. This is the case for the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, respectively the largest and second largest in Europe. Rotterdam processes about 9 million containers a year, while Antwerp processes nearly 7.5 million. This is where Europe gets its supplies of raw materials, high-tech products and, above all, foodstuffs. This legal economy is exploited by its illegal counterpart, helped by the high-quality infrastructure, good connections with the rest of Europe and impressive processing speed of these ports. Cocaine in particular, with its high profit margins, is placed illegally in containers at the originating destination, to be picked up by traffickers in the port. The ever-increasing demand for cocaine in the European party scene is driving up profits. Currently, only about 1% of all the containers, or 10 per-cent of the fruit containers from Latin America, are scanned. As these are perishable goods and controls take time, it is challenging to check more containers. Additionally, drug traffickers are creative in finding new goods and new ways of transporting their drugs, for example by concealing them inside pineapples. Simultaneously, corruption and extortion among customs officers and port officials are commonplace. Due to the very nature of corruption, exact figures are unknown, but examples of corrupt customs officers in ports abound.
Threat to businesses
This endemic drug trade represents a growing risk for businesses. The first risk is that businesses are used as cover for drug trafficking, which can have devastating effects on them. When cocaine is placed in a company's container and the authorities suspect attempted trafficking, the cargo will inevitably be delayed due to extended searches of the goods and background checks on staff. This has a negative impact on commercial relations. In the case of perishable goods, the delay is even more detrimental. Customers can invoke a breach of contract if they have not received their goods on time. Claims and additional costs are therefore to be expected.
Another consequence is the possibility of a fine. Take the example of MSC, the world's largest shipping company. Over the years, large quantities of cocaine have been found in its cargo. In one major operation, 20 tonnes of cocaine with a street value of $1 billion were seized from the MSC Gayane, one of the largest ships sailing the oceans today. It was found that many crew members were complicit in the trafficking, including the chief mate. Most of them had been recruited by the Balkan Cartel. These shipments usually make a stopover in the United States before continuing on to Rotterdam and Antwerp. This time, the stop was made in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where the American authorities seized the drugs. To set an example and out of frustration at what the American authorities considered to be insufficient efforts on the part of MSC to prevent drug trafficking, the company was fined $600 million. In addition, the Gayane was temporarily seized. Companies face a permanent risk of confiscation.
Businesses can also be subject to threats, extortion, and even violence from drug gangs if their trafficking activities are hindered by the companies affected by the trafficking. The case of fruit importer De Groot in May 2019 is a case in point. their smuggling of 400kg of cocaine. Employees found the drugs and called the police to report it. What should have been the end of the matter was the beginning of two disastrous years for the company. Shortly after the police found the drugs, the director began receiving threatening text messages demanding compensation. In a year-long campaign, (former) employees were threatened, their homes were set on fire, shots were fired and, on one occasion, a grenade was left at an apartment complex.
Finally, companies can also suffer reputational damage. In the case of De Groot, the media and the perpetrators themselves raised the suspicion that the company director was complicit in the trafficking. But even when rumours are not actively spread, companies can still suffer reputational damage. It is not always a question of a normative judgement on the association with drugs. Even the practical consequences of delays due to drug checks and seizures can deter companies from doing business with the company concerned, such as MSC, which was simply unable to handle its normal quantities of cargo because one of its largest ships was confiscated.
Outlook
The growing drug trade in Northern European ports is creating major risks for companies operating with or through these ports. The increasingly reckless behaviour of drug traffickers is putting businesses at risk. Companies need to be aware of this, and prepare accordingly. Measures that can be taken to mitigate the risks range from hiring security guards to minimise the risk of drug gangs placing drugs in containers, to working closely together with authorities and customs officials. Perhaps the most important thing is to exercise caution when recruiting staff. Thorough security checks must become company standards to minimise the effect of corruption. The reasons for engaging in corruption should also be considered. If they are financial, companies could consider increasing their employees' salaries to make them less vulnerable to offers from drug gangs. Investments in legal teams in case of a drug seizure will also prove beneficial.
In conclusion, the global trade that passes through the ports of the Benelux contains a dark side that threatens the economic structures it exploits. There is no straightforward solution to this problem, as the highly profitable drug trade has proved to be adaptable and creative. However, precautionary measures can be taken to minimise the impact on businesses operating legally. This might not dry up European ports of cocaine, but it can keep businesses and drug traffickers on separate lanes.
Psychological Dimensions of the Indo-Pakistani Hybrid Warfare
In the dynamic and evolving landscape of international politics, the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan has held political and cultural significance for decades. These neighbouring South Asian nations have been locked in a battle for supremacy through various strategies over the years. While overt confrontations have periodically occurred between the two nations, a subtler strategy that appears to have been employed is hybrid warfare, a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare tactics. This article delves into the psychological underpinnings of the hybrid nature of the conflict between India and Pakistan, and analyses the motivations and actions of the actors involved. It also aims to provide insights into the affective consequences of these actions on the warring parties and the population in these regions.
Foundations of distrust
Following a tumultuous partition of centuries of shared history, the Indo-Pakistan relation was built on mass migration and immense bloodshed. The trauma and communal violence endured by both nations have created deep-rooted narratives of victimhood, perceived injustices, and a desire for retribution, fuelling the misperceptions that lay the ground for hybrid warfare and pervade present-day conflicts between the nations.
The conflict between India and Pakistan extends beyond power and military strategy, involving individual perceptions, collective identity, and societal attitudes. Some of the theoretical frameworks relevant to understanding the dynamics between India and Pakistan are explained below.
Social Identity
Individuals define their identities in relation to their membership in social groups. This leads to ingroup and outgroup categorization, resulting in ingroup favouritism and outgroup hostility. In the case of India and Pakistan, individuals identify themselves as part of their respective nations, viewing their own country as the ingroup while considering the other as the outgroup. This sense of national identity becomes a powerful force, influencing how individuals perceive themselves and others, and driving their actions during conflict. The continuous cycle of hostility and conflict shapes the minds of citizens, creating a fertile ground for mistrust. As a result, a narrative of “the dangerous Other” is created. Such conditioning amplifies and perpetuates animosity, hampering meaningful dialogue and diplomatic resolutions. Under extreme circumstances, cognitive and affective biases emerging from societally reinforced stereotypes, or political propaganda can result in devaluing and dehumanizing members of the other group, which has been characteristic of India and Pakistan’s relations with each other.
Collective Identity
Collective identity encompasses the shared beliefs, values, narratives, and experiences that bind individuals within a particular group. It represents the entire group’s identity and is different from social identity, which is part of a person’s self-concept. Collective identity plays a significant role in shaping individual and group behaviour, by instilling a sense of solidarity, purpose and commitment towards one’s group. In India and Pakistan, collective identities are closely connected to history, religion, and nationalism. It substantially contributes to the complex intergroup relations in the dynamics between the two countries.
For instance, one of the central points of magnified mistrust between the countries is the territorial dispute over the region of Kashmir. Combined with its strategic and symbolic importance, authority over Kashmir has led to competing ideologies and has become a catalyst for psychological warfare (PsyWar). To India, the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir represents the collective identity of a secular nation where diversity can co-exist, and for Pakistan, it represents the essence of its nationhood and its objective to protect the Islamic way of life, aside from geostrategic factors. This paves the way for identity politics as a strategy of manipulation used by both parties to tamper with their rival’s national narratives.
The Security Dilemma
The security dilemma is a situation in international politics when one state takes action to increase its security, which causes a rival state to perceive a potential threat and react to the action. Therefore, the net effect is a decrease in security. Several experts agree that the issue of Kashmir and border violence are merely symptoms of adeep-rooted issue between India and Pakistan. The real problem is the lack of trust that the security and foreign policy establishments of both countries have about the other’s intentions and motives. For instance, real and perceived hegemonic ambitions in the region, as well as potential insecurity caused by restricting access to shared resources such as the Indus River, have been vulnerable points of contention for both parties, in their attempts to secure their own nation, leading to various points of a non-conventional security dilemma. Thus foreign policy rooted in distrust serves as a tool of political calibration between India and Pakistan.
Strategies of Hybrid Warfare
Information Operations
One of the crucial components of this psychological battlefield is Information Operations, which resorts to influencing perceptions and manipulating opinions with the aim of sowing discord within the adversary state. Both India and Pakistan have been accused of engaging in information operations carefully curated to exploit religious and ethnic fault lines and shape public opinion around historical as well as territorial disputes.
Citing a report by EU Disinfo Lab in December 2020, Pakistan’s foreign minister and media have accused India of being involved in attempts to discredit Pakistan on the international stage through fake news outlets. The report by the European NGO exposed a 15-year operation by Shrivastava Group, a New Delhi-based entity, targeting the United Nations and the European Union with fake news to serve Indian interests against Pakistan. Although the report did not attribute the campaign to the Indian government or its intelligence agencies, and there was no evidence of the government’s involvement, this cyber disinformation campaign was instrumental in shaping international opinion, leading to Pakistan’s addition on the FATF grey list, with charges of financing violent extremism.
India has also been accused of being involved with Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB), based on propaganda trends on Twitter, including the use of hashtags such as #CivilWarInPak through fake as well as verified Twitter accounts and media outlets, during Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan’s protests in Lahore, in April 2021. This cyber meddling intensified Pakistan’s distrust of its neighbour. Pakistani media was quick to challenge the claims through fact-checks. It also raised allegations of attempts by India at inciting sectarian violence in an already volatile Pakistan, resulting in doubts and questions about the credibility of Indian media. It also reopened discussions about Indian media previously having “manufactured” a non-existent civil war in Karachi in October 2020 to portray Pakistan as a country torn by war and to diplomatically isolate the country from the international community by conveying an image of terror, violence, and human rights violations.
India retaliated to these allegations by claiming that Pakistan is the “best example” of disinformation campaigns by referring to records of sheltering international terrorists and unsuccessfully trying to cover the tracks of the alleged mastermind behind the 26/11 Mumbai attack. Social media jihad by Pakistan has been discussed in academia and media on several occasions as aimed at appealing to religious ideologies by portraying insurgency as pious through misleading information. A report backed by the UK Government published in February 2023 as a part of its scheme to prevent terrorism highlighted how rhetoric from Pakistan was instigating extremism and stirring anti-India sentiments among the Muslim community in the UK. The report evinces how rhetoric can be a potent tool in manipulating emotions and swaying beliefs, attitudes, and actions of individuals or larger groups. By strategically employing such persuasive linguistic devices, actors in the political landscape instill a sense of fear and doubt towards the adversary while bolstering confidence, loyalty, and support for one’s own side.
Efforts by Pakistan to cultivate false narratives through digital propaganda had also been observed after the abrogation of Article 370 from the Indian constitution. The article granted the region of Jammu and Kashmir a certain amount of autonomy as a “temporary clause” following its accession to India in 1947, which included a separate constitution and differential laws on permanent residence. By abrogating the article in 2019, the government of India sought to repeal Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and integrate it with the Indian constitution. The move was received by the opposition as a “calculated insult” and a humiliation for the citizens of the region, because the stakeholders were not consulted. It also evoked frustration in Pakistan surrounding the exposure of its proxy forces, which is discussed in the next section. Attempts by Pakistan to re-ignite hybrid war with India through separatists provoking violence within the region and conventional fire at the Line of Control (LoC) were unsuccessful due to deployment of Indian security forces and restrictions on electronic communication. Other hybrid threats initiated by Pakistan such as lowering of diplomatic and economic relations with India, stopping rail communication, and blocking air routes also turned out to be a disadvantage to Pakistan. The resulting resentment and exasperation led to the launch of an information warfare against India. Social media campaigns from Pakistan stigmatized Indian security agencies and accused counter-terror measures of violating the rights of Kashmiri civilians, further fuelling bitterness within the region of Kashmir towards the government and security agencies.
The information operations between India and Pakistan have gone beyond mere propaganda, exploiting the cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities of the target audience. Emotional appeals, selective framing, and strategic communal politics have heightened tensions by undermining the adversary’s credibility. For instance, even the nomenclature surrounding the territorial dispute, such as India referring to Azad Kashmir as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan identifying the rest of Kashmir as Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK) highlights how perceptions can be shaped and emotions can be evoked through the use of language. A scrutiny of the media and literature disseminated by the countries reveals that both parties have attempted to reinforce nationalistic sentiments and strengthen support for their respective governments’ policies and actions, while polarizing public opinion about the adversary, through a blurring of lines between fact and fiction. As doubts, ambiguity, and mistrust fester, the rival nation becomes a caricature of malevolence in the eyes of the general public.
Proxy Warfare
Proxy warfare refers to the use of non-state actors, armed groups, or insurgent organizations to carry out operations on behalf of their benefactors. When rival countries attempt to destabilize each other by operating through intermediaries, proxy warfare becomes a hybrid threat. By employing proxies, India and Pakistan have been exploiting existing fault lines and stoking ethno-religious tensions within rival territory, shielding themselves from direct confrontation and maintaining elements of ambiguity as well as deniability. From a psychoanalytic perspective, proxy warfare can be seen as a means for externalizing aggression and preserving a sense of moral superiority by distancing oneself from the direct consequences of one’s actions. Feelings of insecurity and fear are perpetuated among the target population, fostering support for the proxy forces, and undermining the legitimacy of the rival government.
The first instance of Indian engagement with proxy warfare against Pakistan can be traced back to its support toward the Bangladesh Liberation Force, known as the Mukti Bahini, during the fight for independence of East Pakistan in 1971. Presently, allegations of India’s involvement in the long-standing Baloch separatist movement in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, through financial, political, and logistical support exemplify proxy relations. The arrest of a former Indian naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav, by Pakistani authorities in 2016, on charges of espionage and terrorism intensified friction surrounding the Balochistan issue. With India arguing that Jadhav was innocent and no longer in service, and against Pakistan’s death sentence, the case sparked a diplomatic dispute between the countries.
In the same year, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, responded to Pakistan’s continued intrusion in India-administered Kashmir through a speech that expressed gratitude towards the people of trouble-prone areas in Pakistan such as Gilgit, Balochistan, and PoK for thanking him for his support in their struggle. This remark about the country’s indigenous conflict was driven by the objective of sending a message to Pakistan that any sort of conventional or nonconventional intervention in Indian domestic affairs would be met with retribution. The remark placed Pakistan on high alert, confirming its suspicions of India’s medical and possibly logistical aid to Baloch insurgents. Later in 2020, a comment by Indian-army veteran Major Gaurav Arya claiming that he has connections with Baloch freedom fighters aggravated doubts about India’s role in Baloch insurgency.
Pakistan has long been accused of supporting various militant groups operating in Indian-administered Kashmir. These groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), have been involved in acts of insurgency in the region, carrying out attacks against Indian security forces and civilians, striking the population with terror and insecurity. Pakistan’s support for these proxies is viewed as a method to destabilize Kashmir and keep the region’s agitation dynamics active, by creating an ethnic and sectarian divide and triggering a communal backlash. The move is also an attempt to portray the issue as an international flashpoint and exert pressure on India. The series of coordinated terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and several attacks across the LoC also heightened tensions between the two countries, with India accusing Pakistan of supporting and sponsoring terrorists involved in the attacks, despite the latter denying involvement. Records of Pakistani sleeper cells in India further point to terrorism as a possible means of proxy warfare in the India-Pakistan conflict.
The psychological consequences of this form of warfare are significant for both countries. The target population in the affected regions experiences trauma, fear, and a constant sense of insecurity due to acts of terrorism carried out by proxy forces. The presence of terrorism can lead to heightened levels of anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a breakdown of social trust within communities. Attempts at weakening the adversary by destabilizing them from within have proven effective several times in the case of India and Pakistan. Furthermore, individuals may develop cognitive biases and prejudices, as well as harbour resentment and animosity towards the opposing country, which can hinder prospects of peacebuilding and reconciliation. The reinforcing of deep-rooted divisions keeps the cycle of violence going and makes it challenging to establish cooperation between the two nations.
Escalation and Retaliation
One of the recurring themes in the conflict between India and Pakistan is escalation and retaliation. A crucial factor perpetuating the conflict is that acts of aggression or hostility by one side lead to retaliatory measures by the other. Such a cycle fosters a sense of urgency, and a desire to maintain a position of strength among decision makers and security institutions of both nations. This creates a dynamic where each action provokes a response, fuelling a continuous cycle of escalation. The constant threat of escalation and anticipation of retaliatory actions intensify the anxieties experienced by individuals living in these regions. It leads to a climate of tension, fear, and insecurity among the populations of India and Pakistan.
The occurrence of standoffs, border skirmishes, and surgical strikes such as the events of 2019 adds another layer to the psychological dimensions of the conflict. These military actions can evoke feelings of anger, and revenge among the populations, aggravating hostility. The affective consequences of such events are often utilized as a tool to rally public support, strengthen nationalistic sentiments, and justify further military action. Through low-level and non-military provocations, the cycle also leaves room for manipulating the narrative and portraying the adversary as the aggressor by claiming that the retaliation was uncalled for.
Another factor to be taken into consideration in this context is public opinion. The voice of the public often shapes the response of political leaders of these democracies directly or indirectly, as they must navigate the expectations and demands of their respective populations, who are often emotionally invested in the conflict and desire retribution. This exerts a pressure on leaders to respond forcefully, escalating the tensions between the two nations.
Perceptions and misperceptions further contribute to the cycle of escalation and retaliation. Each side’s interpretation of the other’s actions, intentions, and capabilities can be influenced by biases, preconceived notions, and historical narratives. This becomes an important driver of the cycle, considering the history of distrust that India and Pakistan share. Perceptions, whether accurate or distorted, can lead to misjudgements, and have a profound impact on decision-making processes, as they shape the strategies, responses, and justifications adopted by both nations.
Calibration, which refers to the careful management and adjustment of actions, responses, and strategies to maintain a delicate balance and avoid unintended escalation in interactions, is a significant element in the India-Pakistan dynamics. It involves the continuous assessment of the situation, understanding each other’s thresholds, and the fine-tuning of policies to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. It requires a nuanced understanding of the psychological, political, and strategic factors at play to navigate the complex relation to minimize the risk of miscalculation. Calibration constitutes various components, including the management of rhetoric, military deployments, and responses to incidents and provocations. Decision makers in both countries must carefully calibrate their statements and actions to avoid inflammatory rhetoric or provocative gestures. Establishing direct lines of communication and confidence-building measures can help prevent misunderstandings and provide an avenue for de-escalation in times of heightened tensions. Between India and Pakistan, calibration is particularly important due to the presence of nuclear weapons and scope for misinterpretation.
Nuclear Deterrence
The psychological implications of the presence of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have created a unique security environment that poses challenges to traditional deterrence theories. The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which assumes that the threat of nuclear devastation prevents major conflicts, may not be applicable to the India-Pakistan dynamic. The lack of clear red lines to prevent the accidental tipping of nuclear thresholds, the involvement of non-state actors or proxy forces, the history of deep-rooted distrust, and a lack of mutual understanding increase the risk of miscommunication and misperception.
Ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding deterrence are further compounded by the long-standing Kashmir conflict. The disputed territory is closely tied to the political legitimacy of both countries, making it a highly sensitive issue. The Pakistani military establishment, which has control over the country’s nuclear strategy, uses the ‘India threat’ rhetoric to maintain domestic legitimacy and justify unwarranted military action. This perpetuates tensions and raises the stakes in any crisis or conflict between the two nations.
The presence of nuclear weapons can also create a paradoxical situation where both countries may engage inlow-level military provocations. Brinkmanship, for instance, involves the use of psychological tactics to push the adversary to the edge of conflict while stopping short of direct confrontation. The strategy relies on psychological factors such as intimidation and the manipulation of risk perceptions to gain leverage and maintain a strategic advantage. Because India and Pakistan trust that the opponent’s fear of nuclear escalation will constrain retaliation to such provocations, the likelihood of dangerous escalation increases if both sides misjudge the risks of crossing nuclear thresholds. Furthermore, India’s consideration ofpreemptive strike capabilities against Pakistan’s weapons adds an alarming dimension to the scenario. In 2003, India’s External Affairs Minister Yashwarnt Sinharemarked that “India has a much better case for preemptive action” against Pakistan, which was taken seriously byinternational actors to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. The fact remains that India could try to strike first if it believed that it was the only way to permanently stop infiltration. Meanwhile, if Pakistan sensed India’s real or perceived motive to strike first, Pakistan would have the incentive to initiate an attack. Either way, the nuclear-armed atmosphere in the already volatile South Asian subcontinent has much scope for misinterpretation, potentially heightening the risk of a catastrophic escalation.
Implications for Global Security
The hybrid warfare between India and Pakistan extends beyond national and regional boundaries, and the countries’ attempts to balance relations with South Asian neighbours and other state actors results in implications for South Asian politics and international security. Positioned at a geostrategic location, in the midst of rising Chinese activities and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), elements of the Indo-Pakistan dynamics, including the cycle of escalation and retaliation, nuclear deterrence, and brinkmanship, are prominent in the larger security landscape. India and Pakistan’s strategic interaction with each other and their South Asian neighbours posits a case for how hybrid threats can influence the threat perception of other nations as well. Similarly, the adoption of strategic neutrality by both countries following Russia’s war on Ukraine, aiming to sustain relations with major global powers and safeguarding their own interests while balancing each other’s influence, holds significance for understanding their role in global geopolitics.
The protracted conflict between India and Pakistan involves a complex interplay of psychological factors that perpetuate a cycle of problematic interactions. Driven by national pride, the desire for revenge, mistrust, and a hostility for the outgroup, various individual and institutional actors of both countries contribute to the propagation of insecurities and terror among the affected populations. Additionally, the presence of nuclear arsenal compounds the complexity of the conflict. Nuclear deterrence creates a psychological barrier that prevents direct confrontation, but at the same time increases anxieties, misperceptions, and tensions between India and Pakistan. Brinkmanship tactics, proxy war, and disinformation campaigns make it challenging to establish trust between the countries and engage in meaningful diplomacy.
Despite the recent calls for peace, the absence of serious diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, and the age-old mistrust make reconciliation appear unlikely in the near future. The public pressure on decision-makers to prioritize the ‘Kashmir cause’ creates additional obstacles for peace negotiations, especially in light of the upcoming national election in Pakistan and the Indian general elections scheduled for 2024. In Pakistan, public sentiment regarding Kashmir often plays a significant role. Candidates who emphasize a hardline approach or nationalist and communal rhetoric regarding Kashmir may attract support from segments of the population who value assertive action on the issue. Conversely, candidates advocating for dialogue, diplomacy, and conflict resolution may resonate with those seeking a peaceful resolution. In the Indian context, however, the weight of the Kashmir issue on the outcomes of elections varies significantly between constituencies. While it remains an important topic, other factors such as economic development, national security, and political ideologies may have a more substantial influence on electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, a candidate’s stance on Kashmir can still impact their popularity and electoral prospects, and the perceived handling of the Kashmir issue by political leaders can sway public opinion as voters tend to align themselves with candidates who prioritize their collective national interests.
Understanding the motivations, decision-making processes, and potential consequences of the cycle of hybrid war between India and Pakistan plays a major role in informing potential solutions. Recognizing the psychological dimensions at play in the issue highlights the need for effective communication and conflict resolution mechanisms. This could include establishing sustained and meaningful dialogue by engaging in diplomatic discussions at various levels, including government officials and civil society representatives, to foster understanding. Implementing confidence-building measures is vital in reducing tensions and enhancing trust. Encouraging cultural exchanges, people-to-people interactions, trade cooperation and joint projects in areas of mutual interest can bridge the communal divide and lead to positive engagement. Engaging neutral mediators such as international and regional actors can possibly create an environment conducive to negotiations. Furthermore, promoting media literacy, fact-checking initiatives, and responsible reporting can counter false narratives and combat disinformation campaigns that perpetuate hostile sentiments between the countries. Finally, efforts to address underlying grievances and prejudices to break the cycle of conflict by providing platforms for genuine representation, respecting human rights, and addressing social disparities, particularly in Kashmir, could perhaps pave the way for a more stable and peaceful relationship between the nations, and instill hope for stability in South Asia.
The Instrumentalization of Migrants - An Hybrid Threat Used as a Foreign Policy Tool
The growing role of state actors in influencing, artificially creating and facilitating irregular immigration in order to achieve political objectives, such as destabilising the European Union (EU), is an urgent issue on the European legislative agenda. A watershed event that drew particular attention to the matter was actions taken by the Belorussian government with regard to migration: in May 2021 President Lukashenko stated that he would allow migrants to enter Western Europe unhindered. According to reports by the EU, these migrants were being sourced by the regime and flown to Belarus from the Middle East, since Belarus is not a country under migratory pressure and is also not on any known migration route. The growing migratory pressure on European borders has caused growing tensions with Belarus’s neighbouring states, including Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. This has resulted in not only the deployment of troops to the border, but also Poland constructing fortified barriers along large sections of land. A third victim of the crisis is the migrants themselves: they are being pushed into European territory by the Belarusian government and consequently expelled by European authorities, resulting in them spending prolonged periods of time without shelter or access to basic humanitarian services.
The instrumentalization of migrants has been generically referred to by the EU as a political power game, and further sources suggest that the scope of the allegedly orchestrated migratory crisis is to destabilise the union, and in general the target state. The precise motivations of governments such as Belarus are unclear, but it is apparent that the instrumentalization of migrants is a strategy that is gaining in popularity and deserves to be examined.
What is migrant instrumentalization?
The instrumentalization of migrants specifically refers to activities in which a perpetrator will exploit and strategically influence migration flows in order to achieve a specific goal, or even to destabilise another state. This practice generally involves the manipulation and exploitation of vulnerable migrants and refugees without regard for their well-being or human rights and is often carried out for the benefit of specific individuals, institutions or groups. Migrants often lack formal rights while they are in transit, and therefore are forced to remain and work in both transitory and destination countries, facing “institutional exclusions that violate human dignity.” There are a variety of ways that migrants can be exploited and used for specific gains but two predominant distinctions can be made between migration manipulation with a “coercive intention”, where migrants are used as a foreign policy tool to apply pressure to other states, or economic motivations with financial gain as the final goal.
The instrumentalization of migrants is not a new practice and, over the last decade, it has been the subject of a growing number of reports, particularly in the European context. Episodes such as the Turkish government sending over 13,000 people over the border to Greece in 2020, or in May 2021 when Morocco permitted the entry of 10,000 irregular migrants into Ceuta, a Spanish territory bordering Morocco, are prime examples of how migration can be politically weaponized. In these specific examples, the ultimate goal was to achieve concessions from the EU, which can be considered a form of political blackmail. This strategy is particularly attractive to perpetrators due to its low-cost nature: migrants are easily exploitable due to their vulnerable nature and hence they can be redirected or exploited in order to “destabilise or coerce a target state.”
Paradoxically, the migrants can be instrumentalized also by the receiving country: radical parties within Europe have been quick to harness the migration crisis to perpetuate pre-existing stigmas, inequalities, xenophobia and racism towards certain migrant groups. In this case, migrants can be used to advance specific national agendas, and by presenting them as a threat to national identity and stability, support can be raised for certain parties or ideologies. The 2016 migration crisis that occurred in Italy, which saw a distinct rise in populism correlated with an increased influx of migration, indicates that migrants can be instrumentalized both by external states to push their policy agendas, but also by domestic groups.
Another aspect to consider is the instrumentalization of migrants for economic gain. Migrants often do not have the right of free choice when it comes to employment, making them dependent on their employers and thus vulnerable to abuse. Human trafficking can be a by-product of migrant instrumentalization, and it is an incredibly lucrative business, generating more than $150 billion in profits across the globe yearly. Hence, it is convenient to exploit crises globally in order to gain access to the cheap, flexible workforce that migrants represent. The imbalance in relations gives employers the power to exploit migrants and therefore use them as economic tools.
Migrant instrumentalization for both political and economic gain results in increased marginalisation and poor treatment of migrant workers. Migrants and refugees begin being viewed as commodities and a means to an end, which is a problem in the grand scheme of the often severe humanitarian crises that produce large quantities of migrants. The handling of the instrumentalization of migrants in the previously mentioned case of Belarus is a prime example of this, as the EU and NATO only collectively acted once the crisis was out of hand and thousands of migrants were already freezing to death. The EU failed to act due to a lack of agreement on a common migration policy, and although the EU imposed sanctions on the individuals responsible for the crisis, Polish border guards continued using tear gas and water cannons to deter people from entering. Effectively, the instrumentalization of migrants, in this case, created a scenario where, as noted by members of Human Rights Watch, the EU acted in solidarity with its Member States, but also allowed a humanitarian crisis to unfold. The provision of humanitarian aid and respect for human rights can be hampered by uncertainty about the nature of migration or even the motive of foreign actors. This means that the instrumentalization of migrants can ultimately result in the exacerbation of humanitarian crises. Therefore, the cycle becomes perpetuating, in that there are more migrants available to exploit.
Migrant instrumentalization: the case of the Middle East
The phenomenon of migrant instrumentalization is not a singularly European one, but most discourse at the academic, social and political levels occurs in the European sphere. Nevertheless, another region of interest is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as increased evidence is arising regarding the phenomenon of migrant instrumentalization there. For instance, Turkey has been recorded as a provocateur, manipulating the Syrian refugee crisis to obtain leverage in bargaining with the EU. More specifically, in February 2020 President Erdogan unilaterally suspended the EU-Turkey statement, sending approximately 20,000 migrants to the border with Greece, along with demands for additional EU funding. In fact, the weaponization of refugees has been reported as a “fundamental feature in the definition of the interactions between Turkey and Europe.” The weaponisation of refugees by Ankara has enabled Turkey to occupy an important place on the European political agenda. The use of migrants as a geopolitical tool puts the receiving countries in a position where they either respond with force or play into the hands of the countries responsible for instrumentalising migrants. In both cases, insufficient safeguards to uphold the fundamental rights of the migrants are being established.
These examples still assess the instrumentalization of migrants in a political sense, but migrants can be instrumentalized in ways beyond the political and economic. There has been a studied pattern of the militarization of migrants within the Middle East. The vulnerable nature of migrants means there are increased chances of refugee radicalization. Factors such as overcrowding, poverty, local crime, and hunger increase the risk of refugee alienation as well as radicalization. Studies have proven that refugees displaying more extremist beliefs are less willing to emigrate to the West. For instance, in the case of Lebanon, the more extremist Syrian migrants studied in a report by the US Department of Homeland Security are approximately 50% less likely to want to move to the West compared to wanting to move back to Syria, due to negative perceptions of the West. This indicates that the dangers of migrant radicalization and instrumentalization for extremist purposes are more likely to be felt within the MENA region itself, posing a substantial security risk to nations within the region.
The success of radicalization attempts does depend on the receiving nation’s capacity and willingness to combat the influence of external actors. In the context of the MENA region, the receiving nations often do not have the resources to properly deal with this issue, allowing for the increased spread and danger of radical ideologies. Even when international organisations and foreign entities do become involved with deradicalization and disengagement efforts, it is difficult to determine the appropriate measures necessary to not only protect refugees, but also build community resilience to migrant instrumentalization as well as targeting the root source of refugee vulnerabilities. The main approach of many states is to control borders in order to deter irregular migration, but it is acknowledged that the focus should instead be on building resilience, stability and development in nations that produce large numbers of refugees, in order to reduce mass migration altogether. Providing aid specifically in the MENA region can be challenging, as the security climate is constantly changing and it can be difficult for policymakers to determine where and how to provide aid for long-term development purposes. This matter is complex and would require policymakers to re-evaluate how they assess systemic issues and, consequently, how they respond to them.
Migrants within the MENA region are also facing the risk of militarization. The most common perpetrator is Iran, and the example of the Liwa Fatemiyoun proxy group is indicative of the scale of the problem. This specific group is formed primarily of migrants of the Shiite ethnic group from Afghanistan, and these migrants were recruited by the Iranian army during their transit away from the civil wars in Afghanistan. This recruitment was not always voluntary, although in some cases they were offered money. The Iranian regime’s guards were able to exploit the migrants’ vulnerability to militarise them and include them in Tehran’s military conflicts. Cases like these demonstrate that the instrumentalization of migrants can constitute not only a threat in terms of political bargaining, but also a more traditional form of threat to physical security.
Additionally, there is the phenomenon of host community fatigue, which further destabilises host countries. In Jordan, for instance, this means that not only is the quality of life of migrants and refugees diminishing, but opportunities for the national community are also being compromised. Jordan is one of the countries that hosts the most refugees per capita in the world. In 2020, Jordan was hosting about 760,000 refugees, accounting for about 7% of its population. Since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, Jordan’s economic situation has gradually deteriorated, and according to the IMF, it has lost 1% of its GDP each year of the crisis. This data indicates how heavy the refugee burden can be on the Jordanian economy and society. An example of the strain can be felt in the health sector, where the increased population places a strain on the quality and availability of care. At the same time, receiving countries can instrumentalize migrants by exaggerating the quantity of refugees they receive, in order to receive increased quantities of foreign aid. Examples from countries in the MENA region, but also from the rest of Africa, indicate that officials inflate the number of refugees under their protection, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in aid. Furthermore, the aid provided does not always translate into improved conditions for migrants; in fact, aid providers tend to exploit migrants more in these cases. This refers back to an earlier point about the exploitation of migrants being a self-perpetuating cycle, where those who take advantage of migrants create the most opportunities for exploitation through their predatory behaviour. Since 2005 the Middle East’s migrant population has more than doubled, creating spaces for increased migrant exploitation as well as exploitation of the humanitarian crisis and both these situations fundamentally harm the vulnerable migrants.
Conclusion
In essence, the phenomenon of migrant instrumentalization is not new, but rather appears to be developing as a foreign policy tool. The MENA region in particular continues to face unprecedented levels of population displacement, and as the ramifications of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate change continue to challenge governance in the region, opportunities to exploit and instrumentalise migrants will continue to grow and develop. Growing evidence of migrants being recruited for military purposes, such as Iran’s use of migrants as proxies, continues to raise concern about the ethical and human rights implications of migrant exploitation. These trends point to a growing need for international attention and a more decisive legislative and practical response, both domestically and internationally, in order to safeguard the rights of migrants globally.
The EU has labelled the instrumentalization of migrants a hybrid threat, and the overarching question is how to deal with it. There is an acknowledged difficulty when it comes to the conflict of interest between trying to help mitigate a humanitarian crisis and putting emphasis on national security. One approach could be legislative, as the EU is doing, and attempt to normalise border procedures between target states, in order to enhance information sharing and securitize borders while decreasing harm to migrants. Alternatively, the approach could be more humanitarian, by increasing the involvement of international organisations and relief associations in direct access to migrants to ensure that their rights are respected. Either way, solutions are not straightforward and involve multiple stakeholders, requiring cooperation to address the issue. Overall, the instrumentalization of migrants presents a significant security concern and can be considered an aspect of hybrid warfare, but it is important to acknowledge that the foundation of this strategy is a humanitarian crisis, meaning that utmost importance must be attached to safeguarding fundamental human rights.
The Kosovo Clashes - Escalating Tensions in the Balkans
Following the outbreak of violence in northern Kosovo on 26 May, the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo has deteriorated considerably, and fears of it bringing increased instability in Europe, coupled with the war in Ukraine, have been expressed. Tensions have escalated in other parts of the Balkan region, exacerbating long-standing ethnic divisions. On the international stage, there have been conflicting reactions to the tension, with European countries adopting a more balanced approach, while others, such as China and Russia, firmly side with Serbia. How will the conflict develop and what could an escalation of the situation mean?
Background information
A Western-backed plan between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo was verbally agreed in March 2023 with the aim of defusing tensions between the two countries, and specifically granting further autonomy to Serbs living in various regions of Kosovo, with the government in Pristina retaining authority. To this end, local elections were held in four regions of northern Kosovo where Serbian communities are dominant, after Serbian representatives abandoned their posts in protest at the end of 2022. The aim was to improve representation and coordination in education, healthcare, economic development, and land planning between the Serbs and the government of Kosovo at the local level. However, the low turnout in the April 2023 elections, specifically 3.47%, and the election of ethnic Albanians as mayors of the four municipalities, was not favourably received by the 50,000 Serbs living in the regions, who claimed that they did not feel well represented and that demands for increased autonomy had not been met.
Nemanja Starovic, state secretary of Serbia’s Ministry of Defence said the local elections were a “unilateral attempt by Pristina Albanian authorities to forcefully install Albanian mayors in the four municipalities in the north of Kosovo, which does have a Serbian majority.”
Recent developments
On 26 May in Zvecan, one of the towns where the elections were held, the Kosovo police, staffed by ethnic Albanians, fired tear gas in an attempt to disperse the crowd of Serbs who had broken through security barricades to forcefully enter the municipality building, according to one witness, to prevent the newly elected mayor from entering his office. Furthermore, NATO peacekeepers blocked off the municipality of Zubin Potok to prevent the same attempts to enter, with the other four ethnic Albanian mayors being escorted by police to their offices. Additionally, the President of Serbia ordered an urgent movement of troops towards the Kosovo border, which was announced live on television by the Defence Minister, Milos Vucevic.
Violence has since escalated, with Serbian protesters in Zvecan throwing Molotov cocktails and hitting the riot shields of NATO's KFOR troops in Kosovo with metal pipes, setting cars on fire and firing shots. Hundreds of ethnic Serbs alsogathered with a 250-metre-long Serbian flag. However, some have argued that the flag may be Russian, as reports have also identified spray-painted ‘Z’ on NATO vehicles, a reference to a Russian sign that has been frequently used in the war in Ukraine. The significance of this will be explored further in this article.
International responses
The escalation of the situation prompted NATO to announce “prudent steps” by increasing the number of KFOR troops from 700 to 4,000 in order to give it “the forces and capabilities it needs to fulfil its mandate.” Turkey also announced that they will be sending commandos to Kosovo as per NATO’s request. Furthermore, Stoltenberg commented that “such attacks are unacceptable and must stop. KFOR, the NATO forces, will take all necessary actions to maintain a safe and secure environment for all citizens in Kosovo, and will continue to act impartially, in line with our United Nations mandate.”.
The President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, announced that “We have never had a more difficult and bigger crisis” and that Serbia would “not sit idle”. For his part, Kosovo's President, Vjosa Osmani, asserted that the Kosovo police was acting “against Vucic's illegal structures and criminal gangs… in fulfilment of their constitutional duties to defend all citizens without distinction.”
The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) reprimanded Kosovo for the escalation of tensions with Serbia and urged Pristina to put an end to the violence in order to not face “consequences”. In his statement, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, stated that Kosovo’s actions were “sharply and unnecessarily escalated tensions, undermining [Western] efforts to help normalise relations between Kosovo and Serbia and will have consequences for our bilateral relations with Kosovo”. Furthermore, reports have indicated that the relations between Kosovo and the US have deteriorated, with Washington imposing sanctions on Kosovo, such as cancelling Kosovo’s participation in the Defender Europe 2023 military exercise, because of the violence.
Similarly, Britain, France, and Germany issued astatement calling on Kosovo and Serbia to de-escalate the situation and “to immediately step back and de-escalate, and to closely coordinate with EULEX (the EU mission) and KFOR (NATO's mission) in Kosovo.” Furthermore, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for new elections in northern Kosovo. These developments resulted in ameeting between Osmani and Vucic on 1 June in Moldova, as requested by the EU. No formal agreement has been reached to end the escalation of the situation.
The bigger picture
Aleksandar Vucic is reportedly facing an unprecedented revolt against him following the two mass shootings that took place in Serbia in early May and in combination with his autocratic rule. The opposition accuses him of causing divisions in Serbia. In addition, opposition supporters have mobilised to demand his resignation. As such, one may predict that the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo may be used by the President to strengthen his political position in the country, as he continues to demand the withdrawal of the mayors in Kosovo, and has proclaimed himself as the defender of the nation. In the same vein, Russia, which remains Serbia’s ally, has accused Kosovo of increasing tensions and exacerbating the conflict, while blaming the growing tensions in the region on the US and the EU. More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that “a big explosion is looming in the heart of Europe.” Reports claim that Russia has no interest in the issue with Kosovo being resolved. Furthermore, Russia’s involvement in other parts of the Balkans may be worrying, as the pro-nationalist and pro-Russian Bosnian Serb leader, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, has expressed his desire to see the Serb Republic become autonomous, independent from the rest of Bosnia, in order to unite with Serbia. This has raised fears of ethnic divisions in Bosnia.
Overall, the impact of the escalations between Serbia and Kosovo and the effects they could have on European stability, combined with the destabilisation caused by the war in Ukraine, are still unclear. The international community, specifically the EU and the US, has made significant efforts to support the negotiation process between Serbia and Kosovo. However, Kosovo has been criticised for provoking tensions by allowing ethnic Albanian mayors to take office in Serb-dominated municipalities, despite the low turnout due to the boycott of elections in northern Kosovo by ethnic Serbs. As well as threatening to end support for international recognition of Kosovo, the US has also excluded Kosovo from the "23 Defender" military exercise. In this context, there has been growing frustration among Serbs living in Kosovo at being used as “bargaining chips” in the negotiation process, according to Tare, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
It is essential that efforts are made to integrate the Serb minority living in Kosovo in order to normalise relations not only between the two states, but also with the international community, in particular the EU and the US, especially as the creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities was agreed in the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. With the aim of normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the agreement set out the establishment of the aforementioned Association to integrate Kosovo Serbs from the northern municipalities into Kosovo's institutions. Ethnic Serbs expected the creation of the Association to provide institutional autonomy to the communities concerned and overall integration into Kosovo’s political system. However, the vagueness of the nature and the power of the approved Association was heavily criticised by the opposition and the Kosovar public, leading to mass protests and a petition with 200,000 signatures that was presented to the Parliament. This situation delayed the process of establishing the Association.
Given the current situation and escalating tensions, this Association is all the more essential to ending the violence as it would integrate Serbs living in Kosovo into political institutions and allow a certain level of self-management in Serb-dominated municipalities. Ultimately, the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is key for their respective paths towards Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as for Kosovo’s bilateral relations with the US. Similarly, neutralising Russian influence in Serbia, and more broadly in the Balkans, is extremely important and dependent on how the current situation develops. Only time will tell how tensions between Kosovo and Serbia will develop and how this will affect the region as a whole.
The Third Nuclear Age: Navigating the Intersection of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weaponry and Evolving Nuclear Threats
In the unfolding scenario of the Third Nuclear Age, the world stands at the threshold of profound transformation, triggered by the changing landscape of military technology and the emergence of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW) as well as co-evolving nuclear threat perceptions. This pivotal juncture in history also sees the power disparity among nuclear-armed nations, namely the United States, Russia, China, and India, gradually diminish and the global dynamics fragment into regional nuclear dyads, thereby adding another layer of complexity to an already volatile geopolitical and security milieu.
The Ascendancy of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weaponry (SNNW)
This Third Nuclear Age is marked by a brisk rise in advanced non-nuclear military technologies including precision weapons, comprehensive missile defences, cyber technologies, and artificial intelligence (AI). Such weapons–especially adept as a counter-force arsenal–pose substantial challenges, effectively transforming the nuclear landscape and eroding deterrence architecture, mostly informed by frameworks latching onto the American-Soviet nuclear standoff as precedent.
For example, with AI now incorporated into nuclear operations, weapon systems' precision, speed, and efficiency have significantly increased. This SNNW enhancement demands an immediate reassessment of nuclear doctrines and strategies. Within this context, Zala and Futter suggest four potential future trajectories centred around SNNW, each having distinct implications for global stability and nuclear crisis management.
The Arms Race Scenario: Here, the widespread deployment of SNNW triggers a new round of nuclear proliferation and intensifies arms races. This path leads to a perpetually evolving nuclear landscape due to the need for constant modernization and improvement of nuclear arsenals, bringing about increased tensions and posing significant challenges to crisis management and arms control.
High Likeliness: The Heritage Foundation contends that as China's military prowess grows, it necessitates the U.S. to have a robust nuclear force capable of convincingly conveying to China that the risks of nuclear warfare would significantly outweigh any potential gains. This statement underscores an increasing bipartisan urge for expanding procurement plans for current nuclear modernisation programmes. Meanwhile, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that as of January 2023, the global inventory of nuclear warheads totalled 12,512, with around 9,576 of these held in military stockpiles for possible use. This marks an increase of 86 warheads from January 2022. China's nuclear arsenal, in particular, has seen a steady uptick, rising from 350 warheads in January 2022 to 410 in January 2023. This escalating trend is expected to persist.
This evolving scenario presents a dilemma. The shifting landscape of nuclear arms ownership and the worrisome rate of proliferation signal an escalating arms race that could substantially alter the world's geopolitical landscape. In the context of this, the strategic competition between the United States and China, wherein the U.S. views China as its main strategic rival, has set off an accelerating arms race in Asia, becoming a pivotal issue in global security.
The rivalry between the U.S. and China not only intensifies the predicament but also heightens the risk of a major conflict brewing in the region. These military expansions are more than isolated contests; they form a complex network of interconnected rivalries that could potentially trigger a broad conflict.
China's rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities have prompted India to speed up its nuclear program. This, in turn, has stimulated Pakistan to augment its weaponry. China is enhancing Pakistan's military capability to counterbalance India, while the U.S. amplifies its arms sales to India to curb China's rising influence, thus fuelling the regional arms race further. It is clear that these dynamics are not isolated, bilateral rivalries but are interlinked, potentially sparking a wider conflict. Thus, they underscore the urgency of international attention and action to prevent a catastrophic escalation.
The Strategic Advantage Scenario: In this outcome, a single nation achieves a dominant position in SNNW in terms of both quality and quantity. This disrupts the secure second-strike capabilities of rival nations, instigating a change in the strategies for managing nuclear crises and potential escalations. The implementation of SNNW establishes a significant advantage over traditional nuclear weapons, although it doesn't necessarily render them obsolete as power instruments. This dynamic, however, breeds instability, as it intensifies the entanglement between the nuclear and non-nuclear realms, making nuclear stockpiles susceptible. As a result, there is an escalation of tension that leans towards aggressive posturing as a means of deterrence amidst this vulnerability.
Moderate-High Likeliness: A deeply isolated state with a turbulent relationship with the international community, North Korea faces an extraordinary level of perceived vulnerability. This perception stems from both internal factors—like the country's faltering economy and the fragility of its political structure—and external factors—such as the heaps of crippling international sanctions and geopolitical pressures. Thus, examining the Strategic Advantage Scenario further could benefit from delving into North Korea's past nuclear exploits to get a grip on the connection between perceived vulnerability and brinkmanship.
Perceived vulnerability, stemming from internal factors such as its faltering economy and fragile political structure, as well as external pressures such as stringent international sanctions and geopolitical stress, has placed North Korea in a position of severe isolation. This perceived vulnerability often fuels the nation's aggressive actions, prominently represented by its pursuit and development of nuclear weaponry and frequent missile testing. Throughout 2022, North Korea engaged in numerous assertive displays, launching 65 ballistic missile tests, including eight intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, seems undeterred from surrendering the military initiatives deemed crucial for his regime's survival, indicating that, unless a strategic shift occurs, Pyongyang will continue its chosen path in the years to come.
North Korea's defence agenda currently focuses on the development of a large range of tactical nuclear weapons. Successful creation and deployment of these weapons would significantly lower the threshold for nuclear warfare on the Korean Peninsula, exacerbating regional vulnerability to nuclear conflict. The nation's strategic pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology has been marked by calculated escalations that ignite international concerns and increase tensions to force negotiations where North Korea is aiming to gain foreign aid, sanctions relief, or security assurances. This cycle of provocation and negotiation enables North Korea to survive its strategic position. But at a high cost, as the fielding of these weapons might necessitate riskier nuclear command-and-control practices, introducing possibilities for unintentional or accidental nuclear engagement.
At its core, North Korea's strategy involves brinkmanship–a willingness to teeter on the brink of war, unfazed by potential catastrophic consequences. This high-risk, high-reward tactic has come to symbolise the nation's foreign policy. From North Korea's perspective, this approach was indispensable, facilitating the growth of its nuclear program while intermittently gaining concessions from the international community to survive despite the (expected) barrage of sanctions. North Korea's nuclear program serves dual purposes in its security policy: deterring perceived threats and amplifying its global standing. Paradoxically, this program, while providing a semblance of a protective shield, enhances the nation's vulnerability due to consequential international isolation and punitive measures. This intricate interplay of vulnerability and aggression forms the crux of North Korea's nuclear policy, highlighting the country's challenging navigation through the global nuclear order.
The Controlled Restraint Scenario: This trajectory sees nations exercising restraint in their development and use of SNNW, aided by arms control and normative frameworks. The focus is primarily on reducing nuclear risks and advancing disarmament. This path attempts to counter the destabilising effects of SNNW, thus retaining nuclear weapons as the primary instrument of power in international politics.
Low-Moderate Likeliness: Viewed from the standpoint of a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), the Controlled Restraint Scenario is strategically appealing as it offers a way to sustain the current international power structure while simultaneously curtailing the global influence of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNW). This approach stresses the role of nuclear weapons as the primary lever of power in world politics, thereby potentially safeguarding the sway of nuclear-armed states, rather than advancing nuclear disarmament.
The NWS's endorsement of this scenario is motivated by an intent to maintain the power equilibrium between nuclear "haves"—those with nuclear weapons—and "have-nots"—those without. Mexico's UN representative poignantly conveyed this dichotomy in 2022, stating that the 184 non-nuclear-weapon states fulfil their obligations under international non-proliferation and disarmament agreements on a daily basis, yet receive no tangible benefits in return. Rather dishearteningly, they endure a perpetual threat of annihilation by nuclear weapons, despite their commitment to non-proliferation principles.
Furthermore, in the same context, Indonesia's representative drew attention to the lingering challenge of nuclear disarmament, castigating the NWS for their apparent reluctance to commit to the process. The representative underscored that these states often rationalise retaining nuclear stockpiles as a necessary measure for ensuring international security, which underscores the realpolitik approach of the NWS. The tension surrounding this issue has only been heightened by recent moves like the Russian Federation's plan to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus.
In light of these circumstances, the Controlled Restraint Scenario is emerging as a potential strategy for the NWS to retain command over the evolving global nuclear narrative and maintain their dominance in the international system. This method aligns with their strategic interests as it enables them to curb the spread and influence of SNNW while preserving their nuclear weapons stockpiles, thereby supporting the power dynamics underpinned by these weapons.
However, the successful execution of the Controlled Restraint Scenario requires substantial diplomatic outreach, mutual trust, and collaboration among nations—particularly between the NWS and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). This shift would necessitate a reorientation of the current global order, moving from a framework of domination to one of shared responsibility. It would involve a leap of faith by NNWS, trusting that they will be duly compensated for not enhancing or even dismantling their SNNW capabilities.
The Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario: The final potential outcome foresees the proliferation of SNNW rendering nuclear weapons and secure second-strike capabilities obsolete. In this scenario, non-nuclear forces reach a state of equilibrium, creating stability rooted in deterrence by non-nuclear denial. This path could potentially lead to a world where nuclear disarmament is driven by technological advancements.
Low-Moderate Likeliness: The steadfast trend of nations to augment and diversify their nuclear arsenals–with the remarkable exception of South Africa, who built and then dismantled their nuclear arsenal–forms one of the primary impediments to the realisation of the Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario. The global inclination towards nuclear armament reaffirms the enduring strategic value of nuclear weaponry, thereby casting a shadow over the potential predominance of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW) despite their advancements.
The technological revolution in the military sector further dials down the probability of a transition to a non-nuclear world. As artificial intelligence becomes also an integral component of nuclear operations, the strategic worth of nuclear capabilities is rather amplified. The resultant enhancement of weapon systems' precision, speed, and efficiency underscores a transformation within the nuclear domain that could inhibit the shift towards SNNW dominance.
The non-resolution and fluctuating nature of global arms control negotiations accentuate the moderately low probability of this scenario's manifestation. The ambiguity and stagnation that characterise these negotiations suggest an international reluctance to abandon nuclear weaponry despite the accompanying high risks. As a result, the potential for nuclear capabilities to maintain their stranglehold over strategic weaponry persists, thus potentially hindering SNNW's ascendancy. While it's plausible that accelerated technological innovations could outstrip nuclear policymaking and surpass the strategic rivalry, this dynamic primarily heightens nuclear risks rather than establishing the immediate superiority of SNNW and subsequent hard-earned stability through collective effort.
Despite these inhibiting factors, catalysts exist that could potentially steer the world towards the Non-Nuclear Stability Scenario. The escalating global discourse on the urgency of nuclear disarmament could spark a shift towards a global aspiration for non-nuclear stability. Technological innovations that bolster crisis stability, particularly those that improve the accuracy and timeliness of intelligence acquisition, combined with growing international pressure to abolish nuclear weapons, could expedite the transition towards a non-nuclear equilibrium.
Nevertheless, these changes concurrently introduce new risks such as unintended escalation, miscalculation, and potential nuclear use as the nuclear and non-nuclear domains continue to be deeply intertwined. Therefore, it's crucial to explore an array of future scenarios rooted in the ongoing evolution of current trends. We must acknowledge that we are dealing with what Lieber and Press describe as a "new era of counterforce."
We are transitioning into a phase of having to carve out strategic stability from a nuclear order brimming with both nuclear and non-nuclear challenges, regardless which capabilities finally supersede. Weeding out the nuclear part of the equation and consequently forging a durable balance among SNNWs is no doubt a highly complex task.
The Reconfiguration of Strategic Stability
Historically, strategic stability has been firmly anchored onto nuclear weaponry. However, this established paradigm faces upheaval due to the advent of SNNW and shifting perceptions as well as entangled nature of nuclear threats.
The perceived value of nuclear weapons as a coercive “magic wand” in international politics is now being reassessed, with some experts arguing their primary utility is in defensive deterrence. The correlation between nuclear weapons acquisition and geopolitical influence no longer holds true, as exemplified by North Korea. Despite enduring sanctions and isolation, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has not resulted in substantial global influence.
Current mechanisms, normative frameworks, and agreements are ill-suited to address the challenges posed by SNNW. The potential for fostering stability through mutual vulnerability, adept crisis management, and addressing the linkages between SNNW and nuclear weapons remains underexplored. This new era requires a departure from the fixed mindsets, and a return to novel, critical thinking to cut through the fog. Meaning, key technological developments in the Third Nuclear Age, such as the advancement of comprehensive missile defence systems, proliferation of non-nuclear weapons, surge in cyber warfare capabilities, and integration of AI in military operations, are collectively reshaping nuclear dynamics. As the lines between offence and defence blur and the nuclear and non-nuclear spheres entangle, a complex and quite likely perilous nuclear order emerges.
Global Security Implications and Future Challenges
Promoting stability in the Third Nuclear Age seems feasible, yet daunting, requiring robust political planning and decisive action. The seismic shift in technology and evolving nuclear threat perceptions inherent to the Third Nuclear Age carry profound and novel implications for global security. Nations may increasingly rely on the development and deployment of SNNW to bolster their national security and global standing, potentially intensifying arms races and destabilising existing power balances.
The global security ramifications, including the increased risk of nuclear warfare and the undermining of nuclear non-proliferation treaties, are substantial and warrant urgent attention. Key policy recommendations should encompass fostering international dialogue on nuclear stability and promoting research and transparency in the development and deployment of SNNW.
However, issues such as the defiance of states like North Korea and Iran, the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan, and the disintegration of Russo-American nuclear arms control present significant hurdles to nuclear stability. North Korea's refusal to surrender its nuclear program and Iran's potential infractions of the JCPOA complicate diplomatic negotiations. Both nations have consistently displayed a pattern of resistance to international pressure, leading to a myriad of unfulfilled commitments. The volatile relations between nuclear-armed nations Pakistan and India further impede progress, as recurring border disputes and a history of military confrontations often overshadow dialogue on nuclear stability. Compounding these challenges is Russia's recent departure from the New START, a once key pillar of nuclear arms control. This withdrawal threatens to erode mutual trust and oversight between the world's major nuclear powers, hindering constructive discussions.
These significant hurdles illuminate the complex task of fostering dialogue on nuclear stability and transparent SNNW development. As we venture further into the Third Nuclear Age, evolving nuclear threats essentially calls for a redefinition of our conception of global security, leaving many known frameworks behind. Recognizing these novel dynamics, integrating them into policy debates and forging new frameworks is not merely essential—it is vital for international stability.
Hybrid Threats in the 21st century: The Case of Cyber Espionage
Hybrid warfare involves traditional and non-traditional means of subverting an enemy, incorporating the use of military force, political and economic pressure, proxies, extremist groups, and disinformation campaigns among other tactics. One medium which provides countless opportunities and is increasingly used for hybrid campaigns is cyberspace.
The online world is expanding at a pace both impressive and worrying. In 2022, the number of devices connected to the Internet – the Internet of Things (IoT) – stood at 14.4 billion, almost twice the world’s population. The digitisation of virtually every aspect of our socio-economic space, both in the public and private sector, brings countless opportunities for automation and optimization; however, if this trend is not followed by a strengthening of the security of these devices, it renders users – including state actors – more vulnerable to a plethora of risks.
The security of data and intellectual property is one of the most critical issues that stem from this situation. Digitization of state archives and communication between and within state agencies as well as storage of classified data and trade secrets on online databases pose significant risks to the public and the private sector alike. With the continued development and increasing reliance on cloud services, data and intellectual property security will only become more crucial. It is estimated that by 2025, 100 zettabytes will be stored in cloud services, or 100 trillion gigabytes of data. For that reason, one of the most notorious yet overlooked hybrid threats is cyber espionage, massively used first by the US following the September 11 attacks under the programme Total Information Awareness (TIA). This term refers to the use of cyber means to obtain unauthorised access to, monitor, and collect sensitive data stored or transmitted electronically, usually to influence or gain a competitive advantage over a rival state, even in peacetime.
Methods of data interception
The modus operandi of cyber spies can take many forms. The most direct way of intercepting data is through fibre optic cable tapping. Western intelligence agencies like the US National Security Agency and the British GCHQ are known for tapping into undersea optical cables, allowing them to intercept millions of communications every day. Usually, however, access to a target’s data requires infiltrating their local network, which can be done in multiple ways. Hackers may, for example, try to identify potential vulnerabilities in the software run by the devices connected to networks. As the number of IoT devices connected to the network increases, so does the likelihood that the software of at least one of them will have an unpatched vulnerability. These vulnerabilities, or flaws in the software’s code, may be then taken advantage of by an exploit – a carefully crafted program that triggers a response unanticipated by the software’s developer – to gain access to the network. Nowadays, a thriving grey market has emerged where zero-day exploits (exploits that the software manufacturer is not yet aware of) can be bought and sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on whether prior access to the network is needed (local exploit) or not (remote exploit) and whether the software in question is widely used.
Yet, despite all efforts to secure a network, it is often human error, if not insider threat, that allows the initial access – according to the 2022 Data Breach Investigations Report, 82% of breaches involved a human factor, notably when credentials of an employee with network access are compromised. Phishing messages remain one of the simplest methods of password theft, but hackers often resort to more complex social engineering tactics to deceive their targets into giving up their login information. These include scareware (sending fake virus alerts and offering a program to "fix" the issue), impersonating colleagues or superiors through fake social media accounts, or tailgating (entering a physical area without authorisation to access its network), to name a few. In some cases, however, even “brute force” attempts to crack users’ weak passwords may be enough.
Initial network access is usually the first step. Unlike other forms of cybercrime, espionage typically involves maintaining persistent access to a system in order to extract data over an extended period, often spanning several months. That is because, besides collecting information stored on local or online databases, spyware often monitors the continuous use of a device, collecting keystrokes – including from smartphone touch screens by analysing fingers’ motion data – and mouse movement, webcam footage, GPS location, or capturing screenshots. The hacker groups responsible for these prolonged network infiltrations are typically referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats, or APTs, although their activities often go beyond passive espionage. The difficulty of detecting and mitigating cyber espionage lies in its passive nature; if no suspicious activity is being carried out, the intruder may remain unnoticed in the system for months.
Motivations behind cyber espionage
The hybrid nature of cyber espionage stems from the many economic, political, and geopolitical implications and numerous advantages it can bring to intelligence agencies. Of course, cyber spying is far from a monopoly of the state. In fact, industrial espionage by a company against its competitor often takes place in the cyber dimension. However, this profit-driven spying, accounting for most cyber espionage incidents, does not in itself meet the criteria for hybrid warfare. This changes when critical industries of another state are targeted, and when the attacker is state-affiliated. Intellectual property theft allows countries with fewer resources or R&D capabilities to bridge the gap between their respective industries.
One particularly sensitive case involves intellectual property theft against defence contractors. A recent example would be the 2018 theft of US Navy plans by hackers allegedly linked to the People’s Republic of China, notoriously accused, alongside Russia, Iran, and North Korea, of cyber espionage against Western countries. Since defence markets are a monopsony, with the state as the only domestic buyer, espionage against them directly jeopardises the national security of the state. When weapon blueprints and other highly sensitive information are stolen or leaked, it can have a profound impact on the targeted state's military capabilities and narrow the military technology gap between opposing forces. This can result in a loss of strategic advantage and compromise the state's ability to effectively defend itself or project its power.
Beyond its use in stealing intellectual property, cyber espionage can also be utilised as a means to monitor the geopolitical strategies of another state and interfere in its national politics. This can involve accessing confidential government communications, surveilling the online activity of civil servants such as diplomats and politicians, including heads of state, gathering intelligence on defence capabilities, or attempting to manipulate public opinion through disinformation campaigns. One of the most notorious consequences of spying on the domestic politics of other states is electoral interference. The 2016 US Democratic National Committee email leaks, purportedly carried out by Russian APTs Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear linked to the national intelligence agency GRU, represent a striking illustration of this phenomenon. In these instances, cyber espionage acts as a precursor to more disruptive covert actions.
States are well aware of the strategic advantage cyber espionage can bring. In fact, data collection by cyber means has become a staple element of national intelligence agencies around the world. For example, the US technical intelligence body National Security Agency (NSA) employs roughly 30,000 people and is said to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the world. One of the most advanced malware used for espionage and attributed to the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit (TAO) was Flame, which the US has used to spy on multiple Middle Eastern countries throughout the past decade. Its most controversial use involved a more than two-year-long spying campaign against Iran’s oil ministry and main export terminal, collecting information that was then used to launch a wiper attack in 2012, erasing data from the organisations’ network and disrupting the country’s oil industry. Only after the malware was discovered following the oil terminal incident was a “kill switch” activated, effectively erasing any trace of the virus from over 1,000 infected devices in Iran and beyond.
This kill switch, often added to the more advanced malware, is just one of the reasons why it is so difficult to find enough forensic evidence to attribute a cyber espionage campaign to a particular state. States can easily avoid the consequences of their actions by invoking plausible deniability, distancing themselves from the sponsored proxy groups. In many cases, the culpability of states in cyber espionage is only proven through leaks of sensitive state documents. These leaks, notably the 2013 Snowden leaks, can reveal many more worrying trends regarding cyber espionage. As the classified documents revealed, the extensive use of cyber espionage by the US following the 9/11 attacks extended to its allies like Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel. Otherwise, the increasing commercialization of spyware, as illustrated by the NSO Pegasus, implies that these tools may become more and more accessible and adept at penetrating security measures over time. In authoritarian regimes like Ethiopia, UAE, or Saudi Arabia, Pegasus has made spying on human rights activists, lawyers, and the domestic opposition easier than ever before.
Prevention and mitigation recommendations
Protecting information systems from cyber espionage is a challenging task, and it is unlikely that any network will ever be completely secure. However, there are numerous preventive and reactive measures that both states and businesses can consider implementing. While some measures are specific to countering espionage, many others can be extended to provide broader protection against various cyberattacks.
No company or agency can be safe without a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy addressing different types of cyber threats. There exist numerous frameworks companies could follow to reduce their exposure to cyber risks such as cyber espionage. The two most important international standards are ISO 27001 and ISO 27002, created by the International Organization for Standardization. The former stipulates requirements for managing cyber risks through an Information Security Management System (ISMS), providing necessary guidelines and policies for asset protection. The latter is a collection of guidelines and best practices for the implementation of an effective ISMS. In the US, the go-to model is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. It emphasises the division of cyber risk management into the following segments: 1) identification of equipment, software, and data; 2) protection of the network; 3) detection of intruders; 4) planned response to the crisis; and 5) recovery after the attack. The European Union has its own cybersecurity certifications framework, introduced by the EU Cybersecurity Act, which aims to strengthen and harmonise the cyber risk management systems across the member states.
In the case of cyber spying, regardless of the framework chosen, espionage risk exposure of different sectors and positions within an organisation needs to be carefully evaluated. To limit access to sensitive data to only those employees who need it to perform their duties, it might be necessary to redefine the authorisation policy. Regardless of the position in the company, however, all employees should receive security education about the dangers of social engineering attacks and the necessity of strong password protection and multi-factor authentication. More generally, the cybersecurity team must ensure that the software running vulnerable systems is regularly patched, and authorise network access only to a limited number of limited trusted critical third-party applications.
As previously mentioned, simply gaining access to a network is not enough for hackers to be able to monitor all the information. As a result, the impact of espionage campaigns can be reduced even if the attackers manage to bypass the network's security measures. Organisations should consider using an advanced encryption method to render the contents of the most sensitive documents inaccessible to unauthorised users even if the files themselves get compromised. Finally, given that espionage activities tend to occur over extended periods, regular monitoring for unusual network traffic is essential.
Economic Pressure and Sanctions: Aim for the Wallet
Economic pressure is nothing new in global politics: trade wars, sanctions, and economic diplomacy have been a cornerstone of the international system since at least the Napoleonic Wars. While the threat may not be new, economic pressure has grown in significance in the post-Cold War world, and particularly in the past decade.
This series on hybrid threats has attempted to illustrate the huge diversity of channels which states can use to compete with one another on and off the battlefield. The term ‘hybrid threats’ is a broad one, characterised as threats involving both military and non-military pressure which blur the lines between war and peace. Within this categorisation, economic coercion is perhaps the broadest of all, encompassing everything from tariffs on barley to the suspension of states from the global banking system. Following the American Congressional-Executive Commission on China, economic coercion (or pressure) is taken to mean the “threatened or actual imposition of economic costs by a state on a target with the objective of extracting a policy concession”.
This article will instead focus on the largest weapon in the economic arsenal: sanctions. In recent years, two case studies have especially highlighted the power of economic sanctions. Firstly, the comprehensive response by Western states to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine; and secondly China’s trigger-happy approach to economic pressure for states which have even minor disagreements with Beijing. The aim here is to demonstrate how contemporary economic pressure operates, whether it works, and what to expect moving forward.
A Brief Overview of Sanctions
Broadly defined, sanctions refer to effectively any commercial penalty imposed on a state or individual. Sanctions can be divided along several axes:
Economic or political: some forms of sanctions clearly fall under the remit of economic statecraft, such as protectionist tariffs. Others are explicitly political as when sanctions are imposed due to human rights violations or to punish aggressive state behaviour. The division between economic and political sanctions has been harder to maintain in the era of hybrid threats. Strategic and economic interests increasingly go hand-in-hand, as visible in the CHIPS and Science Act which bolsters the competitiveness of American chip production for economic as well as geopolitical purposes.
Comprehensive or smart: sanctions can be sweeping across an entire state (comprehensive) or targeted to specific individuals (smart). The effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions is hotly disputed on both strategic and humanitarian grounds: civilians are often disproportionately victimised, while regime leaders have the resources to not only evade the sanctions but also to enrich themselves through smuggling operations. Smart sanctions have been more popular by policymakers recently, particularly against Russian oligarchs. Comprehensive sanctions over conflict-related goods such as banning the sales of arms is also a common response.
Trade power or node power: sanctions traditionally involve cutting trade off from the targeted state, but since the end of the Cold War there has been a rise in a different style of sanction in which states are denied access to the infrastructure on which the international financial system is built. For example, the United States controls economic ‘nodes’ such as the global reserve currency as well as the SWIFT financial messaging service. Excluding target regimes from the perks of these nodes can also be a powerful economic force.
There is considerable disagreement about just how effective sanctions are at coercing target states. Evidence suggests that comprehensive sanctions are marginally better than smart sanctions for coercive purposes, although at considerable humanitarian cost. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of sanctions in general is questionable: scholars differ in their interpretation of the data, with the success rate of sanctions varying from 34% to as low as 4%. Given the potential weakness of sanction pressure, it is not surprising that some policymakers have dismissed sanctions as a tool primarily of rhetoric: Veteran diplomat Sir Jeremy Greenstock has described how sanctions are primarily used to send a stern message to the target regime: “there is nothing else between words and military action if you want to bring pressure upon a government.” Ultimately, sanctions are rarely used in isolation and are usually part of a wider response to states’ behaviour.
To help illustrate the current global climate around sanctions, it is beneficial to turn to two recent case studies. Firstly, there are the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022 and 2023. And secondly China, in the context of delivering sanctions against unfriendly trading partners rather than being the recipient.
Russia: An Economic Manhunt
The sanction response to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was unprecedented. Perhaps the most radical sanction of all was the freezing of $300 billion in Russian central-bank reserves held abroad – an unheard-of tactic. Russia was also disconnected from SWIFT, the critical messaging service for the international economy. The US, UK and EU issued a flurry of smart sanctions targeting politicians, oligarchs, and pro-Kremlin propagandists. Embargoes on arms and a plethora of Russian imports were imposed, decoupling Russia from western trade outside of hydrocarbons.
Economic warfare requires economic thinking. In December 2022, G7 states implemented a price cap on Russian Urals crude oil, and then in February a cap was introduced for refined oil. The price cap was an economist’s solution to the weakness of using a standard embargo: if Western states simply refused to purchase Russian oil, non-sanction-abiding nations could easily step in as new buyers and Russia’s revenue would be unchanged while Western economies suffered in the transition away from Russian imports. Instead, the price cap prevents firms which sell Russian oil from receiving insurance on their oil tankers if oil is being sold for more than the cap permits. G7 states comprise around 90% of shipping insurance providers (the UK alone accounts for 60% of global protection and indemnity insurance). As a result, the thinking behind the cap is that Russian oil must either be sold at a discount to compensate buyers for the unavailable or more expensive insurance, or otherwise Russian oil must be sold at below cap levels to warrant access to Western insurers. Either way, the outcome would be cutting the Putin regime’s funds. States such as India which are explicitly neutral in the Russia-Ukraine War are nevertheless incentivised to follow the price cap for their own self-interest: the price cap forces Russian oil to sell for cheaper in order to gain access to tanker insurance, offering New Delhi discounted oil. As the graph below indicates, preliminary evidence suggests the price cap has had some success at cutting Russian state revenue whilst avoiding a spike in demand for Russian oil exports.
Figure 1: Russian Oil Revenue and Seaborne Export Volumes
Debate has continued around the effectiveness of the sanctions in general against Putin’s regime. It’s clear that the sanctions have been less effective than was first assumed. While the rouble initially crashed, it has since rebounded higher than pre-invasion levels, and unemployment is recorded at an all-time low. Luckily for Putin, Russia’s budget has also been boosted by high energy prices since the invasion began. However these figures have been heavily massaged by the Russian state, and much of the data is questionable: the official statistics do not include a variety of hidden forms of unemployment, and when accounted for the corrected Russian unemployment rate is comparable to the worst points of the financial chaos of the 1990s. Even if the Russian budget has been propped up by higher hydrocarbon prices, this boom is unsustainable given the regime’s revenue from sources other than oil and gas exports has dropped by 20% – a startling amount.
China: An Economic Gunslinger
Economic warfare relies on a large economic base. As China’s economy increasingly rivals the United States, the bite behind Beijing’s sanctions has grown stronger. China imposes significant tariffs, sanctions, or embargoes on trading partners who deal with Taiwan, support democratic Hong Kong, call out human rights abuses in Xinjiang, or mention the suppression of Tibet.
China has embraced the reality of hybrid threats and now wields economic pressure as its primary response to international snubs. For opening a Taiwanese embassy in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, China banned the import of Lithuanian goods including EU goods that contained Lithuanian parts. Non-state actors and businesses are also vulnerable to China’s strong-arm tactics. Marriot Hotel’s website was put offline for a week following the mention of Taiwan on their website, and the American National Basketball Association was heavily sanctioned after a player for the Houston Rockets tweeted “Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong”. Even Norwegian salmon was heavily restricted from entering China after the Oslo-based Noble Prize Committee awarded the 2010 Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident.
Some states have stood up to China’s economic pressure and survived. Australia did just that after a trade war starting in 2020. Sanctions are always a double-edged sword: cutting trade ties injures both parties, but the power of sanctions lies in the assumption that the target will suffer more. While Australia was deeply exposed to Chinese economic influence (37% of Australian exports were to China), it turns out the relationship went both ways and Beijing eventually had to back down after an 80% tariff on Australian barley hurt Chinese beer-makers more than anyone else.
China is certainly not the first nation to use punitive sanctions, but what is novel is how freely they use their economic power for authoritarian and even petty ends. In the Australia episode, Beijing’s justification for their sanctions included a complaint that Australia’s parliament were openly criticising the Chinese Communist Party and that Australian media was especially hostile to Beijing. Not every state is large enough to weather the sanctions, and a significant portion of the world could easily be bullied by Chinese economic might.
Sanction Saturation
Looking ahead, there are consequences to the overuse of sanctions. Targeted states will innovate new economic channels to avoid dependence on rivals who weaponize their trade against them. This concern was voiced as early as the 1990s when President Bill Clinton warned that the US had become “sanction happy” and that the overuse of economic tools for strategic purposes would breed global resentment.
Some strategists have argued that given China’s frequent use of economic pressure, the natural response is to form an anti-coercion coalition: Norway may not be able to fight back against China’s sanctions, but a united coalition which includes the G7 could counter-sanction Beijing and thereby deter any economic pressure in the first place. Decoupling between the United States and China is a further potential consequence of sanction overuse. Economic pressure turns business into a security issue, resulting in states reducing their exposure to one another, as could potentially be the case between China and the US.
By weaponizing control over the global financial system and America’s status as an economic superpower, the US has pushed Russia and China away from the dollar’s dominance towards alternative global financial models. China has experimented with the digital renminbi as a counter to the dollar, and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a trading bloc that includes Russia, China and India) have increasingly relied on bilateral currency swaps which evade the dollar altogether. China has also constructed the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to the SWIFT messaging service. As the developing world becomes increasingly integrated into the global economy, they will face a choice between remaining with SWIFT and the America-led global economic order – or moving to an international financial system with Chinese characteristics.
Conclusion
Sanctions and economic pressure turn international trade into a weapon, and as a result, the line between beneficial trade and potential vulnerabilities is blurred. Economic power may not be a magic bullet against rival states, but sanctions are not useless – especially against smaller states or to complement other forms of pressure. Sanctions have grown more sophisticated with experience and are much more widely used in the 21st century than ever before. The power of economic pressure on commercially weaker states such as Russia is significant, even if sanctions have not been as successful as was initially assumed at the start of the war. However, the same method of sanctioning will not work on an economic juggernaut like China which can turn around and apply the same pressure back. As the economic battle between China and the United States continues (in the semiconductor industry and beyond) we can expect China to develop parallel financial institutions to avoid American node power, and for greater decoupling as the private sector increasingly becomes a security issue.
Shades of Ambiguity: Exploring Grey Zone Conflicts in a Shifting Global Landscape
Throughout history, ambiguity and clandestine methods in geopolitical manoeuvres have consistently attracted attention. As early as 1948, U.S. diplomat George Kennan highlighted the existence of political warfare in a policy memo, defining it as the application of a nation's resources, excluding direct war, to achieve its national aims. Similar notions, namely “hybrid threats” and the “grey zone” currently dominate dialogues within this context. However, as underscored in our introductory piece, these concepts do suffer from a lack of clear definition, creating a challenge in formulating a uniform framework for comprehension and breeding passivity when it comes to formulating effective responses.
According to our understanding, grey zone coercion is a critical element of the broader concept of "hybrid threats". More precisely, the grey zone can be envisioned as the strategic domain that extends beyond ordinary statecraft but consciously avoids escalating into open conventional warfare. But both concepts can overlap, as their boundaries are rather fuzzy. Therefore, when diplomatic endeavours falter, and conventional warfare seems unlikely to yield the strategic cost-benefit balance aspired to, the grey zone presents itself as an alternative. The appeal lies in the inherent ambiguity for strategic effect and deniability regarding legal contexts that the grey zone can provide.
Grey zone activities may comprise a diverse range of tactics, all forming an essential part of the “hybrid toolkit”. These tactics can include cyber operations, ranging from infiltrations into critical infrastructure to the theft of sensitive data or orchestration of destructive attacks on a target nation's digital infrastructure. Economic coercion, where states manipulate their economic strengths to destabilize an adversary, is another popular activity. This could take the form of trade wars, financial manipulations, or other forms of economic pressure, which are often strategically employed to maximise plausible deniability. Equally prominent is the use of (dis)information campaigns or political interference. Such campaigns strategically craft narratives to misdirect public sentiment, sow discord or seek to directly influence voting behaviour. They aim to breed confusion, and–most crucially–erode trust in public institutions, including the democratic process. Essentially, the aim is to alienate people from trusting and utilising their own governmental apparatus, thereby turning public sentiment against the institutions meant to serve them. Aided by the proliferation of digital media, these campaigns can propagate rapidly, increasing their potential for disruption. Proxy wars and the use of ambiguous forces, both long-standing tools of geopolitical influence, are also part of grey zone activities. They involve the deployment of third-party actors to engage in conflicts, allowing the sponsoring power to avoid direct confrontation. Lastly, targeted assassinations represent another facet worth mentioning. These are covert operations aiming to remove specific individuals, often key political or military figures, all the while not triggering a full-scale conflict, with the hopes of critically disrupting enemy forces from the top down.
In the grey zone, the boundaries between peace and war are purposefully obscured. Grey zone activities aim to complicate the identification of the real perpetrator, classification of the action, as well as the determination of an appropriate response. However, as the lines of routine statecraft are undoubtedly trespassed when stepping onto grey zone territory, crafting an adequate response is not impossible, should the political will to do so be pivotal. Frequently though, they lead to a paralysis in the decision-making processes of the target nation. The resulting hesitance is a quintessential effect of the grey zone and further buffers the arena of plausible deniability and sub-threshold conflict that capitalises on risk aversion.
The Role of Narrative
The arguably most prolific and primary actors in the grey zone, namely China and Russia, do not conform to the Western terminology of “grey zone”. This distinction perhaps serves as a further testament to the inherent vagueness of these concepts and demonstrates the vital role narrative plays in cultivating the pivotal ambiguity from which the grey zone derives its impactfulness.
Russian tactics that would be defined as "grey zone activities" in the Western context trace back to the Russian Revolution and the necessity to construct a Soviet Sphere of Influence. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was perceived as a proficient practitioner in the grey zone domain, and Russia, has maintained a similar reputation, especially following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, Russia's resort to overt, large-scale conventional force in Ukraine in early 2022, after years of operating in what we call the grey zone, may very well demonstrate the limitations of such activities in achieving tangible strategic success. Moreover, the measures of success in grey zone warfare remain nebulous.
Coincidentally, Russia also rejects the umbrella-terms “hybrid warfare” or “hybrid threat”, nor does it correspond with Western phase-based classifications of escalation–as opposed to seamless progression. This has not only ramifications for the “sub-conventional” grey zone but also for the “supra-conventional” nuclear dimension. Significantly, despite exploiting the opportunities offered by the grey zone, Russia has coincidently abandoned its long-held, albeit widely distrusted, no-first-use nuclear doctrine. Instead, it has adopted an approach of "escalate to de-escalate", which includes the potential for nuclear "de-escalation" strikes even during the early stages of conflict.
China, too, does not use the term “grey zone” but refers to “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW). While the grey zone is seen in the West as an ambiguous, coercive tactic that lies beyond the bounds of ordinary statecraft and diplomacy, China regards MOOTW as a seamless extension of statecraft and a legitimate facet of exerting state power, not unlike Russia's mindset. China has frequently utilised MOOTW that fall below the level of armed conflict in recent years, primarily against Taiwan, Vietnam, India, and the Philippines. Though recent developments have seen the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China grow into a highly capable Anti Access/Area Denial (A2AD) force. As a consequence, China is now more likely to co-deploy lower-level military means of expressing disapproval, exerting overt pressure, or countering perceived threats–particularly from the U.S. and its allies in the East and South China Sea. Such measures include sophisticated naval exercises that mimic the blockade of the Taiwan strait, increasingly aggressive flyovers or patrols close to and entering Taiwanese airspace and, most recently, the drills of joint precision strikes on Taiwan, like the “United Sharp Sword” exercise from April 2023.
To sum up, it's not only the terminology and narrative that varies across nations, but also the understanding of what is considered "below the threshold" of conventional warfare. The perception and understanding of grey zone activities play a crucial role in determining their significance and threat level, and critical thresholds are never truly rigid, and may shift depending on domestic politics, threat perceptions, and levels of risk aversion.
The Nuclear Connect
The shifting landscape of global politics has not only brought strategies such as hybrid threats and grey zone warfare back to the foreground of discussion but has also necessitated a pressing re-examination of nuclear issues. As the geostrategic attention pivots from West to East, America's prolonged conventional military superiority has possibly acted as a catalyst for both Russia's and China's moves toward means of non-conventional grey zone methods and an emphasis on nuclear modernisation. Just as there is an overlapping and ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of grey zone warfare, a parallel hazardous confusion is emerging between conventional and nuclear warfare. This is perceptible not only in the increasing deployment of grey zone-style tactics but also in the prominence of dual-use systems, and the co-location of nuclear and conventional weaponry, aiming to enhance ambiguity.
Both the grey zone and nuclear warfare circumvent the domain of conventional warfare. It is therefore not surprising that the most influential grey zone actors in recent years - Russia and China - are also nuclear powers. Russia, a nuclear peer of the U.S., has devoted the 2000s to modernising and diversifying its nuclear arsenal to achieve tactical nuclear superiority over U.S. forces. Meanwhile, China, an economic rival of the U.S., has forsaken its longstanding commitment to minimal deterrence and is rapidly accelerating its own nuclear modernisation efforts.
These developments could suggest a complex intertwining of grey zone tactics and nuclear strategies. The implications of this are significant and necessitate further investigation to fully understand the new realities of global security. The emergence of a multifaceted warfare environment marked by ambiguity–both in the grey zone and in the realm of nuclear capabilities–warrants a comprehensive revision of our understanding of security threats, deterrence mechanisms, and the intricacies of tactic and strategy, as well as their relation.
A Look Towards the Future
As we grapple with the intricacies of tumultuous international relations, the future trajectory of grey zone activities–defined by their inherent ambiguity, deniability and induced passivity when it comes to responding effectively–presents a mix of (de-)escalation strategies. Formulating effective strategies to maintain stability becomes pivotal in such a scenario, as, in the wake of the fast-evolving “hybrid” facet of warfare, grey zone activities are adept at challenging established security architectures, further undermining already fragile (nuclear) deterrence frameworks. The population and popularisation of the grey zone is creating another layer of complexity, steadily reshaping the exercise and contestation of power. Establishing criteria to assess the severity of grey zone tactics and develop a hierarchical risk-based framework for response could streamline the management of such threats. Prioritising investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure, along with enhancing regional cyberdefence capabilities, can enhance situational awareness, and better attribute activities to specific actors. In the same vein, as technological advancements transform the nature of grey zone tactics, they too, may empower the perpetrators, but also offer potential solutions to combat such threats. Innovations in cyber defence, artificial intelligence, analytics, and machine learning can aid in detecting and neutralising grey zone activities. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure or disinformation campaigns can have global implications but may very well be mitigated with capable technological defences in place.
Great powers are increasingly leveraging grey zone activities to shape power dynamics on the world stage. While these actions often target the most transparent political and economic systems–i.e., democracies and open markets–, the growing exchange of information brought about by a globally hyperconnected environment could also serve as a potent deterrent for grey zone activities due to the increased risk of detection. Countering grey zone threats thus necessitates a collaborative, informed, and long-term strategic approach. Engaging in dialogue on grey zone scenarios with key allies and partners can illuminate these concerns and aid in devising capable counterstrategies. Furthermore, evolution in international norms and laws to define and penalise such actions could potentially shape the development of grey zone activities.
However, the complex nuclear landscape marked by multiple great powers with sizable, and growing, nuclear arsenals and varying perspectives on nuclear strategy adds another ever present shade of complexity to this issue. Russia's substantial non-strategic nuclear arsenal and China's recent ICBM silo expansion underscore the evolving–more so deteriorating–nuclear dynamics, as we move onto the Third Nuclear Age. Thus, comprehending and countering grey zone threats must also factor in this broader context of shifting power dynamics and nuclear arsenals.
The grey zone, characterised by its complexity and constant evolution, will continue to shape the future of warfare and international relations. As we chart our course through this uncertainty, understanding the grey zone, its tactics, implications, and devising the necessary countermeasures becomes increasingly critical.
Hybrid Threats: Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century
Irregular warfare is a dynamic conflict where state and non-state actors engage in a violent struggle to gain legitimacy and exert influence over pertinent populations. It strays from the traditional norms of warfare and employs diverse tactics such as insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. Understanding irregular warfare is crucial in today's world, as it presents an enduring and effective means of achieving political goals. It challenges conventional warfighting notions by blurring the lines between war and peace and employing diverse methods.
Irregular warfare can disrupt businesses by disrupting supply chains, damaging infrastructure, and harming consumer confidence. NGOs have been pivotal in providing humanitarian aid to conflict-affected communities, but they too have faced obstacles. Irregular warfare can prolong and complicate conflicts by creating multiple, shifting factions, alliances, and grievances, challenge conventional military superiority and can impact diplomatic relations by creating tensions and mistrust between actors.
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
Insurgency
An insurgency is a violent, armed rebellion by small, lightly armed groups practising guerrilla warfare against a larger authority, primarily from rural base areas. Insurgencies have political objectives and use propaganda or intimidation to gain population support. They are often motivated by ethnic, religious, or ideological causes, and avoid direct confrontation by relying on hit-and-run tactics, ambushes, sabotage, and terrorism.
The Taliban Insurgency
Examining significant conflicts of the 21st century across the globe reveals an array of insurgencies that have deeply impacted various regions. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan emerged as a critical conflict in the early 21st century. Removed from power by a US-led invasion in 2001, the Taliban commenced an insurgency against the newly established Afghan government and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The insurgency of the Taliban in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 had significant implications for the country's population, supply chains, companies, and NGOs. The population faced numerous hardships during this period, including increased violence, displacement, and a general climate of fear. According to data from the UNHCR, the insurgency led to the internal displacement of approximately 2.9 million people by the end of 2019. Education and public health services were also severely impacted, with many schools and healthcare facilities being shut down or restricted in areas under Taliban control.
Supply chains in Afghanistan were severely disrupted as well. Roadside bombings and attacks on convoys made the transportation of goods hazardous, leading to shortages and increased prices of essential commodities. Many rural areas were particularly affected, as their economies are largely dependent on agriculture and livestock, and they were often cut off from the larger marketplaces due to the conflict. The World Bank reported a marked slowdown in economic activity in areas affected by the insurgency, during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to food and fuel shortages, increased prices, and widespread unemployment.
Moreover, the conflict resulted in an increasingly challenging environment for businesses and NGOs operating in the country. The Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry noted a significant drop in business investment, particularly from foreign sources, due to security concerns. NGOs faced a particularly complex challenge, as they had to navigate the intricate tribal and political dynamics of the region while also dealing with threats and attacks from insurgent forces. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was forced to close a trauma centre in Kunduz in 2015 after it was bombed, leading to the loss of 42 lives.
Boko Haram
Boko Haram's insurgency has caused significant disruption and upheaval in Nigeria, primarily in the northeastern regions of the country. The group's activities have resulted in the displacement of over two million people, causing a severe humanitarian crisis. Large numbers of people have been forced to flee their homes, leading to a surge in internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This massive population displacement has strained resources and infrastructure and increased the demand for humanitarian aid.
In terms of supply chains, the insurgency has led to disruptions and insecurity along key transport and trade routes, especially those connecting Nigeria to its neighbours in the Lake Chad region. Frequent attacks have made it challenging to transport goods and services safely across the country, which has had a knock-on effect on the availability and prices of goods in affected areas.
Companies operating in regions affected by the insurgency have faced significant challenges, including physical damage to assets, disruption of operations, and risks to personnel safety. Some companies have had to shut down operations or move to safer regions, while others, mainly multinational firms with greater resources, are operating with increased risk assessment and mitigation. This has not only affected the companies themselves but also their employees and local communities who rely on these businesses for employment and economic stability.
Counter-Insurgency
Counter-insurgency refers to the actions or programs taken by a group, army, or government to combat insurgencies. Its objectives include restoring peace and minimising civilian deaths, using a combination of conventional military operations, propaganda, and psychological operations. Counter-insurgency involves military and public authorities, requiring a comprehensive and coordinated approach that addresses the root causes of the insurgency, isolates the insurgents from the population, and strengthens the legitimacy of the government.
The U.S. and the Coalition Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (2003–2011)
After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime, an insurgency emerged composed of different factions, including former regime elements, Islamists, and ethnic groups. The U.S. and its allies implemented a counter-insurgency strategy to combat it, which included combat operations, training of Iraqi forces, and efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi population. The "Surge" of additional American troops in 2007, a controversial action, is often credited with reducing the level of violence, even though it exacted a heavy toll.
The United States and their Allies' counter-insurgency operations in Iraq had significant effects on the population, supply chains, companies, and NGOs. One of the most immediate effects was the direct impact on the civilian population. Data from the Iraq Body Count project, a human rights project which maintained a database of violent civilian deaths during and since the 2003 invasion, showed an estimated 185,000-208,000 civilian deaths from violence from 2003 to 2011, inflicted both by US-led coalition forces and Iraqi insurgents.
The implementation of counter-insurgency strategies often led to disruption in supply chains. In a bid to cut off supplies to insurgents, stringent checkpoints and road closures were enforced, leading to delays and sometimes complete standstills in the transportation of goods. For example, in 2007, a report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) highlighted that significant amounts of construction materials intended for infrastructure projects were delayed or lost due to these restrictions.
NGOs were also deeply impacted. The NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) noted that many NGOs faced escalating security threats, with kidnappings and attacks on aid workers becoming increasingly common. Additionally, with the country's infrastructure crumbling and financial systems unstable, NGOs struggled to get much-needed aid to the people who needed it the most. For instance, in 2010, only 30% of Iraq’s humanitarian aid was met, as charities and NGOs simply could not get the aid into the regions it was needed.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
While conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian Government began in the mid-20th century, the 21st century saw significant counter-insurgency efforts by the government, with considerable U.S. support under Plan Colombia. The counter-insurgency operations eventually culminated in a peace agreement in 2016, which led to the demobilisation of FARC as a militant group, although dissident factions remain active.
For the population, the impacts of the counter-insurgency have been multifaceted. The conflict has led to large-scale displacement, with UNHCR data estimating that 6.8 million people had been internally displaced by the conflict by the end of 2022. The violence has also had a significant impact on human rights, with the army engaging in extrajudicial killings to boost statistics and armed groups forcibly recruiting children and adolescents. Public health has also been affected; in conflict zones, access to healthcare became limited as a result of the violence, hampering the health of the population.
Companies operating in Colombia also faced challenges due to the conflict. Particularly in the mining and energy sectors, infrastructure sabotage became a common form of attack by the FARC. This resulted in significant production losses and delays, resulting in financial losses for these sectors. For instance, in 2014, FARC violence cost Columbia’s oil sector roughly $400 million by July of that year.
Humanitarian workers have often been targeted by both FARC and government forces, either through intimidation tactics or by violent methods, limiting their access and ability to provide aid. This significantly hampered their operations. In 2022 alone, medical missions in Colombia were attacked 426 times.
Mitigation Strategies
Addressing the myriad obstacles in counter-insurgency efforts necessitates a multifaceted approach. One must first gain a deep understanding of the root causes and motivations driving both the insurgents and the general population. It is essential to pinpoint and sever the connection between insurgents and their sources of support, though this is notoriously difficult to do, while simultaneously managing the complexities of dealing with various insurgent groups.
A balanced application of force and restraint is crucial, as well as efficient coordination among the different actors involved in the counter-insurgency process. Adapting to ever-evolving dynamics and challenges is equally important.
To surmount these hurdles, strategies should focus on tackling the political, economic, social, and cultural greed and grievances that lie at the root of insurgency. Safeguarding the population from insurgent violence and crippling insurgent capabilities via intelligence-led operations is also vital. Strengthening the legitimacy and capacity of the host-nation government and security forces plays a key role in counter-insurgency.
Moreover, strategic communication and information operations are needed to combat insurgent propaganda. Finally, engaging in negotiations with moderate or cooperative insurgent factions may pave the way for a political resolution or enduring peace.
Guerrilla Warfare
Guerrilla warfare employs strategies such as ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to combat larger and less-mobile traditional military forces. Key characteristics include reliance on local population support or political cause for sustaining fighters and providing intelligence, recruits, safe havens, and resources. Guerrilla warfare exploits terrain and surprise to harass and demoralise enemy forces, avoiding direct confrontation and pitched battles unless conditions are favourable. This type of warfare aims to inflict attrition on the enemy through small-scale actions, gradually eroding morale, supplies, and the will to fight, while adapting to changing circumstances and utilising various tactics and weapons to achieve objectives.
The Case of Myanmar
Myanmar has been in a state of turmoil since the military coup that occurred in February 2021. Following the coup, various resistance groups emerged, some of which formed the People's Defense Forces (PDFs). These groups began employing guerrilla warfare strategies in an attempt to push back against the military junta's control.
The conflict grew more severe when armed rebels declared war on the junta, which escalated the country's situation towards comprehensive urban warfare. This escalation has led to a cycle of human rights violations and abuses, trapping the people of Myanmar in a situation of poverty and displacement, according to the then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet.
Throughout 2021, the military sought to consolidate its authority by ruthlessly killing and imprisoning its opponents. This intensified conflict, coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, caused a significant humanitarian crisis with needs escalating dramatically.
As the conflict further escalated in early 2022, the country saw a heavy military presence, increased military checkpoints, and search and arrest operations. Noeleen Heyzer, the UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, mentioned that the political crisis had opened new frontlines that had long been at peace, further deepening and expanding the challenges in the country.
In response to the escalating situation, brutal assassinations became a common strategy by 2022, for both sides. One reported incident involved a rebel gunman who assassinated a government official by shooting him four times in the head. As a response, the Myanmar military took revenge on the population. For instance, the military was involved in one situation where they killed 17 people in two separate villages. The military has also launched hundreds of air strikes on opposition forces, resulting in the death of more than 300 civilians. Groups allied to the military have also been involved in extrajudicial killings, without facing consequences.
Guerrilla warfare's impact on businesses and economic development can vary depending on the context and nature of the conflict. One possible effect is the disruption of supply chains and markets, which can interrupt the flow of goods, services, and resources, creating shortages, delays, and increased costs. Another potential impact is damage to infrastructure and property, such as roads, bridges, factories, and shops. This can reduce productivity and profitability while increasing repair and maintenance costs.
Countering guerrilla warfare presents various challenges, such as the difficulty in identifying and locating guerrillas who blend in with civilians and use the terrain to their advantage. The asymmetry of the conflict, political and psychological aspects, and logistical and operational constraints faced by conventional forces add to the complexity.
To counter guerrilla warfare, developing a clear and realistic strategy, and employing flexible and adaptive tactics suited to the local context, while coordinating with other actors like local authorities, civil society, and international organisations can be effective. Protecting and engaging with the population by providing security, services, development, and justice, while disrupting guerrilla networks and sources of support, is crucial for a successful campaign.
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Terrorism
Terrorism can be understood as the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, particularly against civilians, to pursue political aims. Definitions may vary across countries and organisations, but some common characteristics of terrorism include the use of violence or the threat of violence, targeting non-combatant subjects, and being politically motivated. Terrorist acts are typically planned and systematic, with groups like Al Qaeda, ISIL, and National Action employing different ideologies, motivations, and methods. By targeting civilians, public places, and symbolic locations, terrorism aims to create widespread fear and coerce governments and citizens to change their policies in favour of the terrorists' agenda.
The September 11 attacks in 2001, orchestrated by Al Qaeda, involved the hijacking of four planes, with two crashing into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, causing their collapse, another hitting the Pentagon, and the fourth being diverted and crashing in Pennsylvania. These attacks resulted in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people and prompted a global war on terror. Similarly, the London bombings in 2005 targeted the city's public transportation system, leaving 52 dead and around 700 injured, serving as a reminder of the enduring threat of terrorism in urban areas. Additionally, the terrorist attack on Garissa University in Kenya in 2015 revealed the targeted nature of extremist violence, resulting in the deaths of 148 individuals and highlighting that even places of education can be vulnerable to such acts.
Counter-Terrorism
Counter-terrorism encompasses political and military activities aimed at preventing or thwarting terrorism. The UK's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) follows a strategic framework with four work strands: prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare. Counter-terrorism efforts rely on international legal cooperation and adherence to human rights standards, requiring collaboration and coordination between countries and organisations while respecting the rule of law and the rights of all people, including those suspected or accused of terrorism.
Operation Barkhane
Operation Barkhane initiated by France in August 2014, is a counter-insurgency operation in Africa's Sahel region aimed at combating extremist groups and replacing the earlier Operation Serval in Mali, within a broader international effort to stabilise the region. Its objective was to combat Islamist militants and provide support to local forces in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania.
Operation Barkhane had a mixed impact on the Sahel region. It led to several high-profile successes such as the elimination of top extremist leaders, including Abdelmalek Droukdel, the head of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in June 2020, and Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), in March 2021. Through this operation, France also provided training and support to local military forces, significantly contributing to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which, however, struggled due to insufficient funding and resources. Despite these successes, in 2020, the United Nations reported a sharp increase in violence in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, with the death toll doubling compared to the same period in 2019. Extremist groups proved to be resilient and adaptable, often regrouping after suffering setbacks. Meanwhile, inter-communal violence and conflicts over resources complicated the situation further, pointing to the fact that the issues at stake extend beyond what a military operation can address.
In some areas, the presence of foreign troops sparked large protests, as seen multiple times in Bamako, the capital of Mali, where thousands demanded the withdrawal of French forces. Reports of civilian casualties, whether in the crossfire or due to mistakes, further fueled anti-French sentiments. Moreover, the dependence on foreign military aid has been a source of concern for some, worrying that it undermines national sovereignty. Ultimately, French forces withdrew from Mali and the operation came to a close following coups in 2020 and 2021 in the country.
Counter-terrorism measures can affect businesses in several ways, including escalating security expenses, regulatory compliance, human rights issues, and opportunities for collaboration. Increased investment in security measures may impact profitability and competitiveness, while adhering to counter-terrorism regulations can introduce additional administrative burdens and market constraints. Ethical dilemmas or human rights risks may arise for businesses operating in areas where counter-terrorism measures are enforced.
Addressing terrorism involves overcoming numerous challenges and executing strategies such as defining and understanding terrorism, preventing and countering violent extremism, fortifying the legal framework and criminal justice system, boosting security and resilience, and encouraging dialogue and cooperation. Counter-terrorism endeavours should balance security and human rights concerns, target the underlying causes and drivers of terrorism, enhance international collaboration and coordination, and adapt to the evolving nature and tactics of terrorism. Employing human rights-based, preventive, multilateral, and adaptive approaches can lead to more effective and sustainable counter-terrorism outcomes.
Conclusion
This article delves into the intricate realm of irregular warfare, examining insurgency and counter-insurgency, guerrilla warfare, as well as terrorism and counter-terrorism. Key takeaways emphasise the significance of grasping the nature and dynamics of these unconventional warfare forms and their potential consequences on businesses and economies, including supply chain disruptions, infrastructure damages, and human capital losses.
Addressing these threats is crucial, as they can not only compromise business operations but also pose risks to global security and stability. Countering these challenges demands continuous innovation and adaptability, with governments, businesses, and civil society joining forces to devise and execute effective strategies.
Persistent innovation and collaboration are essential, given that hybrid threats are perpetually evolving and necessitate multi-faceted approaches that tackle the root causes and drivers of conflict while upholding the rule of law and human rights. This calls for the cultivation of a comprehensive and coordinated response that encompasses military, political, economic, and psychological measures, in addition to international cooperation and dialogue.
Amid these challenges, businesses must stay alert and proactive, adjusting to shifting circumstances and investing in risk management and resilience measures. This involves forging robust partnerships with governments, civil society, and other stakeholders to collaboratively mitigate the effects of irregular warfare and terrorism and foster peace and stability in affected regions.
Ultimately, addressing these threats is a shared responsibility among all members of society, as collective action is crucial to building a safer and more secure global community. Businesses play a vital role in this endeavour by endorsing responsible and ethical practices, investing in resilience, and supporting initiatives that address the underlying causes of conflict and terrorism.
United for Humanity: Spain’s First Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy
The Spanish Government has recently, and for the first time, implemented a humanitarian diplomacy strategy that seeks to place the protection of people at the core of every crisis and discussion, making the country, along with Jordan and its strategy for Syrian refugees, one of the pioneers in the field. This new approach demonstrates how the atmosphere of conflict prevailing in the international system, with a strong epicentre in Europe, has prompted a turning point in policy-making where the protection of the most vulnerable has become the centrepiece of diplomacy. The strategy, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, and drafted in collaboration with other public authorities, gives Spain a leading role in terms of protection, prevention and mediation for the civilian population.
The strategy has a clear structure, with three key goals structured around 14 pillars. The first objective of the strategy focuses on conflict prevention and resolution. The Spanish Government’s commitment to reducing the suffering of the population has been driven by the emergence of numerous humanitarian crises, which have generated the need to turn the situation around in order to eliminate as quickly as possible the threats that these disasters generate for the more vulnerable. As Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares has stated, the illegal aggression of Ukraine, the food crisis in the Sahel and the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria, are examples that highlight the need to adopt a humanitarian diplomacy strategy. To achieve the first objective, the Ministry has developed a set of measures that should be incorporated and implemented, such as preventive diplomacy, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism strategies, among others. The intensity and gravity of the humanitarian crises across the globe have imposed standards for the implementation of certain measures aimed at ensuring the security and protection of the population.
The second objective of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is to promote the respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It stresses the importance of taking appropriate legal action to protect the civilian population against aggressors and to bring the perpetrators of violence to justice. It is highly relevant to mention that the core of International Law is respect for its rules, because without it, the international community will have no protection. The absence of a higher authority in this area of law demonstrates the need for states to follow and respect international law internationally for it to be effective. The Spanish Government has demonstrated this by making respect for international law its second objective of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy. As José Manuel Albares pointed out, respect for IHL must be demanded in every armed conflict. The place of the International Criminal Court should never be questioned, and its position in the legal order should be strengthened to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes and protect the most vulnerable. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has elaborated on these topics through the different pillars that will ensure the promotion of respect for IHL, namely the prosecution of heinous crimes, the fight against impunity and accountability, the protection of medical missions and of boys and girls in armed conflicts. All these pillars have the same objective: to give IHL the place it deserves in the legal system, so that crimes can be prosecuted and humanity protected.
The final objective of the strategy is the protection of people in vulnerable situations. The protection of every human being, regardless of gender or race, is sought, demonstrating that all individuals must be treated equally. This is an important shift towards development and equality in diversity, illustrating the importance of every human being, and representing, as José Manuel Albares stated, Spain’s feminist foreign policy. The final objective demonstrates that, in order to protect humanity, equality must be pursued to avoid distinctions between citizens by eliminating any possibility of leaving certain sectors of the population unprotected. Put differently, this strategy serves as evidence to support the point that everyone has the right to be protected and should feel as such, regardless of personal conditions.
Nevertheless, this strategy also confronts several challenges that Spain will have to address. If in theory it appears to be the solution to some of the world’s issues, in practice the strategy could face serious problems of effectiveness. Although a powerful initiative, the strategy needs to be developed and put into practice so that its successes and failures can be assessed in a coherent way. For now, it mainly reflects a desire to change things and support the most vulnerable.
“It is the first Spanish Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy. It makes us one of the first countries in the world to adopt such a strategy.” Source: Twitter, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation
As it has been demonstrated, the development of the humanitarian diplomacy strategy has placed Spain as a protagonist in the protection of the human rights of the world's population. The development of this strategy demonstrates Spain’s willingness, predisposition and commitment to aid those in need when circumstances require humanitarian assistance. As analysed above, the strategy has achieved this by delineating the three main arguments that should guide the diplomatic practice: conflict prevention and resolution, respect for IHL, and protection of the vulnerable, while providing the necessary pillars to succeed. If the crises we are currently experiencing have demonstrated anything, it is that unity can achieve the unexpected, and Spain’s first humanitarian diplomacy strategy is an example of this. Traditional diplomacy has been shown not to have the capacity and ability to reduce tensions when the situation demands it. The war in Ukraine was a determining factor which, on the one hand, demonstrated that developments in the international system were too complicated to be managed by conventional means and, on the other, revealed the stagnation of political capacity in Europe to deal with war. The development of the Spanish Government’s strategy shows that adopting a humanitarian focus to deal with security issues could be the solution to avoid unnecessary suffering, and could shape conflict-resolution practices in the future. All in all, the humanitarian diplomacy strategy is a new step which, if pursued correctly by prioritising the interests of the most vulnerable, could help to strengthen the idea of peace in the world, by bringing the actors of the international community closer to humanity.
Hybrid Threats - Critical Infrastructure and EU Specific Mitigation Strategies
As outlined in the first article of this series, hybrid threat refers to an action performed by a state or non-state actor to undermine or harm a target by influencing its decision-making at the local, regional, state or institutional level. Such actions tend to be coordinated and synchronised and purposefully attack democratic states’ and institutions’ weaknesses to cause damage below the threshold of overt aggression. Activities can take place in the political, economic, military, civilian or information arenas, using widely-encompassing means. They are an amalgam of coercive and subversive activities, conventional and unconventional methods, employed in a coordinated manner across a plethora of avenues.
Concerns about the effects of hybrid threats first appeared in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and consolidated into the NATO Capstone Concept, which categorises hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.” In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and events in Iraq, the idea of hybrid threats has started to receive increased attention.
Critical infrastructure as a target for hybrid threats
Contemporary critical infrastructure is a viable target in the hands of adversaries who are willing and able to use hybrid tools. The European Commission defines critical infrastructure as “an asset, system or a part thereof located in the Member States which essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in the Member States as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.” Thus, as reiterated in the recent NIS directive, the provision of essential services and their continuity are crucial. Regardless of the nature of the hostile actor (whether non-state or state), infrastructure, essential services and supply chains can be viable targets for disruption, intimidation and pressure.
The activities aim to:
Degrade the quality of goods and services offered (e.g., reduce availability, reliability),
Destroy key elements of an infrastructure,
Increase their operating costs,
Influence demand by putting pressure on the infrastructure,
Decrease/eradicate redundancies and cause unilateral dependencies on the hostile actor,
Acquire or limit access to key resources necessary for their operation (raw materials, technology, expertise, etc.).
Therefore, any tool capable of causing or exploiting a vulnerability in an infrastructure (home-grown vs injected vulnerabilities) and achieving any of these effects could be used in a potential hybrid toolbox. Vulnerability is often related to a specific sector, and can also have a temporal dimension (e.g., increased demand for a service amid a natural disaster, or service degradation due to normal ageing of the infrastructure), or be recurrent (cyclical) based on specific conditions.
The infrastructure domain can be considered a ‘mega-domain’, as it encompasses many sectors, including, but not limited to:
Cyber plays an extraordinary and very specific role with regard to hybrid threats, and not only because every socio-political and military conflict will also take place in cyberspace. For national security planners, this includes cybercrime, propaganda, espionage, influence, terrorism, and even warfare itself. The nature of national security threats has not transformed, but cyberspace is a new delivery mechanism that can increase the speed, diffusion, and power of an attack, while ensuring anonymity and undetectability. The low cost of entry, anonymity, and asymmetries of vulnerability implies that small actors have a greater ability to exert power in cyberspace than in more traditional areas of global politics. This domain refers to the information environment, which comprises the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures (including hardware, software, data, and protocols), and information (including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers). The tools that may be used by a hostile actor are intended to cause degradation, disruption or destruction of networks, or to access data and information. Access to information may also be an objective of a hostile actor to obtain intelligence and reduce detectability.
Space-based services include navigation, communications, remote sensing, science and exploration. There is growing concern about activities related to hybrid threat activities in space, as a plethora of countries have been involved in developing counter-space capabilities with multiple state actors. The impact of hybrid operations in space not only affects the military/defence domain but can also cause a significant impact on civil commercial activities, as these increasingly rely on space capabilities. Most tools that can target the space domain exploit the link between space assets and other domains, and the potential cascade effects if they are compromised, even temporarily. This domain is closely linked to the military/defence, economic, infrastructure, information and intelligence domains.
Furthermore, today’s societies are increasingly reliant on the smooth functioning of large and interdependent Critical Infrastructure systems. Few buildings can be heated by their own systems. Most are connected to a district heating system. Besides district heating systems, many other systems (distribution of fuels, fresh water, sewage) are dependent on the availability of electricity, as they are dependent on pumps. Communication systems need electricity for data transmission. The failure to generate and distribute electricity can lead to multiple failures elsewhere.
Previously, the investment and maintenance of critical infrastructure as well as the continued readiness of critical deliveries, were the responsibility of the state or the public sector. Since the end of the Cold War, governments have reduced their authority over these assets. This is the case, for example, with power generation companies, the electricity grid, telecommunications companies, national aviation companies, airports, airfields, seaports and even many other services that used to be run by the state, such as postal services, road building, shipping channels and pilotage, and health care services. Thus, from a resilience perspective, Western open-market systems have clear vulnerabilities:
Based on the Just in Time delivery notion, the stock of all goods has been purposefully reduced. In the scenario of a major disruption of market-guided logistical systems, reserves near the used end would be scarce.
Globalisation implies longer distances for many goods. Fewer and fewer countries are self-sufficient in the production of goods to maintain a basic standard of living.
Digital systems have become increasingly dominant. Thus, if IT systems fail, goods will be lost. This means that logistics is a potential target for a cyberattack.
Financial systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. If payments cannot be made, goods will not flow, leading to a shortage of food and basic necessities.
Societies are increasingly reliant on the proper functioning of large and interdependent critical infrastructure systems. Cyber or physical channels can be used to damage them.
All logistics and finance rely on telecommunications. Telecommunication systems are highly vulnerable to cyberattacks, but can also be paralysed physically by hitting key congestion points. Damage recovery would take time.
Domestic actors cannot counteract and remedy problems that occur abroad. A serious disruption of the international market can lead to congestion in deliveries and financing. Such events can lead to serious damage where goods no longer arrive since they are not produced locally.
What are the appropriate countermeasures?
Increase the resilience of critical infrastructure to hybrid threats, which would also improve resilience to natural disruptions;
Increase the likelihood of detecting breaches in systems and, if such a breach occurs, of successfully attributing the actors behind it; and
Facilitate the exchange of information and good practice within and between different areas of critical infrastructure.
Some of the necessary improvements can be achieved through education, training and process development. Others can best be achieved through improved standards and technical improvements. Critical infrastructure is mostly managed by private companies that are based on a commercial logic and aim to make marginal profits. They can be encouraged to propose mitigation solutions and companies can be part of the solution, with authorities having a responsibility to support and guide them. States can use regulations to counteract them. Careful consideration should be given to the functioning of open markets, regardless of national borders. When a state imposes costly regulations on one aspect of a business, this has an impact on the competitiveness of businesses in the country concerned. Thus, one should regulate them in a wider all-encompassing framework, such as the EU. States can also financially support the most vulnerable points of critical infrastructure. This may include support for critical equipment stocks, technical systems or certain types of vulnerable market functions. Moreover, states should formulate responses at EU and NATO-level. The developing RescEU mechanism should be viewed as a possible tool to help EU Member States (or neighbours) to cope with unlikely scenarios beyond national capabilities.
Countering hybrid threats
Countering hybrid threats tends to be primarily a responsibility of the affected state, but the EU is helping to facilitate cooperation between Member States to find policy solutions and share best practice. There are two major policy documents in this regard: the EU’s 2016 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to counteract hybrid threats. The EU policy on countering hybrid threats is based on the following pillars:
Situational awareness: this is fundamental to ensuring that Member States are aware of the challenges, make informed decisions and develop a common strategic culture.
Resilience: the concept of EU resilience implies its ability to help prevent, build resilience and recover from crisis, including multidimensional hybrid attacks. Member States develop their resilience to such attacks and can use the CSDP mission for this purpose.
Cooperation: the EU participates in the fight against hybrid threats in liaison with stakeholders and international organisations, as well as with other civil society bodies. It is essential that any mitigation efforts are not only undertaken at national or regional level, but also at international level.
In the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, Member States intend to build the EU Hybrid Toolbox, which would include prevention, cooperation, stability enhancement, containment and support measures. It focuses on identifying complex and multifaceted hybrid campaigns, and coordinating tailored and cross-sectoral responses to these campaigns Acting as an overall framework, it would bring together other relevant response frameworks and instruments, such as the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox and the proposed Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIIMI) Toolbox. It would help improve the effectiveness and coherence of a range of actions and improve the EU’s capabilities to mitigate hybrid threats.
The analysis of the challenges posed by hybrid threats has led to the evolution of a comprehensive approach that combines all actors and policy instruments: military forces, diplomacy, humanitarian aid, political processes, economic development and technology. The EU adopted its own comprehensive approach in December 2013. However, it is also essential to understand that adjustments to a security scenario afflicted by hybrid threats can have long-term implications for the stability of the international order and can potentially influence global power shifts. Thus, in this regard, a multitude of policy trends are important:
Conceptual trends: Comprehensive government-led approaches now tend to be coupled with whole-of-society strategies aimed at managing risks and building resilient societies. This emphasis on resilience helps mitigate risks that could potentially cause hybrid conflicts in the future (for instance, over energy or access to water), and improved related resource-management practices.
Material trends: Resources to help counter hybrid threats are held by a plethora of stakeholders, i.e. governments, civil society, the private sector and individuals within society. This shared ownership is reflected in the public-private cooperation on security and development. Moreover, governments have taken steps to increase and modernise their civilian and military capabilities.
Legal trends: Some existing legal concepts and frameworks may be anachronistic and generally do not adequately address the issue of hybrid threats. This can lead to the incoherent application of the existing rules, whereby states use treaties and conventions selectively to justify their positions. The choice between the status quo and new instruments could increase the need for other means of dealing with the issue, such as confidence-building measures, law enforcement cooperation and mutual legal assistance.
Institutional trends: Many countries have adapted to hybrid threats by expanding the serving purposes of already existing institutions (i.e. new powers for intelligence agencies, facilitating EU strategic communication) or creating new organisations (for instance, the Ministry of Truth in Ukraine)
Conclusion
Countering hybrid threats is one of the most difficult challenges facing the EU and its Member States. An effective response involves building situational awareness capacity, boosting resilience in all critical sectors, ensuring recovery and response in times of crisis, and cooperating with other countries and organisations. While efforts should be made at the national level to build resilience and detect, prevent, and respond to these threats, efforts at the regional or EU level should support national efforts. Given the cross-border nature of hybrid threats and their EU-wide targeting, coordination at EU level, integrating the external and internal dimensions in a seamless flow and in conjunction with the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches at national levels, are pivotal to counter them effectively.
Although considerable effort has been made, more emphasis needs to be placed on raising awareness and understanding of hybrid threats, on improving resilience and the ability to recover quickly from and respond to such attacks, and on the ability to deter and respond to malicious cyber activity. To counter the increase in cyber threats activities aimed at influencing the outcome of democratic elections, more frameworks must be deployed; one such existing framework is the European Democracy Action Plan. In addition, the international element is highly pivotal as the security environment has changed considerably. Cooperation with partner countries is essential in this regard. Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown how a health crisis triggered the employment of specific hybrid techniques by attacking critical infrastructures and spreading misinformation through digital media to achieve political objectives. There is therefore a need to counter misinformation and strengthen strategic communication.
It is important to consider the limitations of these countermeasures. Firstly, there may be disagreements over what is understood and categorised as a hybrid threat. Different stakeholders may have different notions of hybrid threats, making it difficult to develop a common approach to countering them. Moreover, most mitigation measures focus on the military or strategic dimensions of these threats, thus neglecting economic and financial considerations. A comprehensive response should be holistic and multifaceted, addressing the different areas affected and involving coordinated efforts. Most importantly, it is important that responses are international as these threats tend to be transnational and not localised. Any response that is restricted to a single area would not be effective in combating most of these threats.
Psychological Warfare and Hybrid Threats - Attacks on Hearts and Minds
Psychological warfare may, in some respect, seem an outdated term. Instead, specific concepts such as information manipulation or, conversely, broader terms such as foreign influence operations are increasingly more prevalent. What is often less understood is that while these are important threats to take into account, they generally exclude a potent human quality open for targeting - emotion. Unlike information manipulation, which targets cognitive processes and perceptions, psychological warfare aims to dig deeper, exposing the most basic of human emotions (anger, fear, hatred) and seeking to transform them into something stronger for political, ideological, and security reasons. So, what is the state of psychological warfare today? What are states and other entities doing to combat it, and are their efforts sufficient? This article explores these questions, seeking to assess the prominence of this hybrid threat, and what can be done in defence.
A brief overview of psywar
Psychological warfare has a long history, dating back to Ancient times, although such an explicit label was most likely not available. However, its use really took off during the two World Wars, where targeting the morale of enemy soldiers played a key role in numerous battles. The effects were two-fold: first, the intended effect was to demoralise the enemy, and break his will to fight; second, a common by-product (whether intended or not) was often greater mistrust, confusion and uncertainty within enemy circles. This is due to the fact that, as our previous article mentioned, psychological warfare “is designed to target deeper feelings and processes outside of perception, many of which are difficult, if not impossible to control”, rendering not only the results, but also the source of attack unspecified. As the subsequent section argues, these blurred lines are becoming increasingly difficult to discern properly as both state and non-state entities leverage new technologies and tactics to aim at an ever-wider range of targets.
Targeting modern hearts and minds
Psychological warfare today comprises a range of tactics and actors, including media propaganda, pamphlet distribution, false flag operations, and information warfare. Apart from its historical use, psychological warfare (or ‘psyops’, as it is more readily known in contemporary military circles) has been a standard feature of military doctrine in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Iran, as well as a more diverse set of actors such as Estonia. While its tactics continue to be used in foreign conflicts, they are also increasingly incorporated into domestic defence planning. In other words, countries are not only interested in developing offensive capabilities to strike an enemy and demoralise him psychologically, but also to ensure that the same enemy does not succeed in using such tactics against them domestically. A number of contemporary examples demonstrate the international and domestic security implications psychological warfare continues to bring.
The Russo-Ukrainian war
Since the beginning of the war on Ukraine, Russia has been using disinformation, propaganda, and false flag operations to target the psychological state of Ukrainian armed forces and political and military leadership. Starting with the build-up of troops on and around the Ukrainian border for almost a month, Russia's objective from the outset went beyond mere military preparation for an invasion - an equally important objective of these actions was to intimidate Ukraine and break its will to resist even before the fighting began. Similarly, continuous and coordinated propaganda narratives (fascistic nature of Ukrainian leadership, genocide in Donbas and other human rights violations, development of biological weapons, surrender of President Zelenskyy, and anti-refugee sentiments among others) aimed at domestic and international audiences proliferated.
Russia’s chief method of psychological warfare has been social media, with reports of fake accounts and groups spreading information favourable to the Russian view. Their usage of Facebook, Twitter, but also relatively recent forms of social media, such as TikTok, has increased with the war’s progression. Another common source of dissemination is foreign news outlets favourable to the Russian stance, besides domestically controlled state media and their international branches. These include Chinese state media such as CGTN and Beijing News.
The objectives are varied but converge on a few common goals: first, to demoralise Ukraine, its leadership and armed forces, and break their will to resist; second, to turn Russian, Ukrainian and international public opinion against Ukraine and in favour of Russia. The latter goal is, nevertheless, also associated with political ruling regimes in these countries - the populations most favourably disposed towards the Russian narrative are those whose political leadership entertains (hopes of) positive relations with Russia.
Russia and the Baltic states
Russian psychological operations warrant another section, since outside of Ukraine (as well as Georgia), the Baltic states are also a frequent target. As former Soviet republics and current members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), modern-day Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania occupy a particularly important position in Russia’s foreign policy and on its list of target countries for psyops. Despite a significant shift in cultural and political leanings and the fact that Russian ability to influence their populations has been decreasing, the Baltic states continue to be home to a substantial Russian or Russian-speaking population. This linguistic legacy allows Russia to utilise the same, or similar tactics, narratives, and methods as it might otherwise only be possible domestically. Among the most prevalent narratives are the usual ideological triggers, such as WWII, the USSR, and anti-Western sentiment.
In terms of methods, the primary source of propaganda tends to vary from country to country. In Estonia and Lithuania, Russian social media such as VK (V Kontakte - In Contact) tend to be prevalent, while Latvian audiences turn to Facebook. The salience of the above-mentioned topics also varies accordingly.
Figure 1: Popularity of topics on the Russian social medium, VK
Figure 2: Popularity of topics on Facebook
The goals of these psyops evolve constantly. Besides continuously evoking a nostalgic image of the ‘good old days’ and the Soviet past, Russian psyops also primarily target fear - fear of Western influence and even invasion. Nevertheless, as noted above, its influence has been decreasing steadily. This is a result of geopolitical as well as domestic developments within the Baltic states themselves. First, unlike Ukraine, the Baltics have been quite successful in separating themselves from Russian influence politically and economically after the fall of the USSR. They were furthermore aided in this endeavour by their early admission into NATO and the European Union (EU). Finally, Russia’s own activity domestically (Chechnya in 2004 in particular) and in former Soviet republics, Georgia and Ukraine (2008 and 2014 respectively) has stoked fears in the Baltics of a possible invasion of their own territories, and thus served to alienate much of the now Western-oriented political and social establishments along with the wider population.
France in Mali
The French military operations in Mali (Operation Serval and a later, broader Operation Barkhane in particular) present further examples of the use of psychological warfare during a time of conflict. The motivations for it are complex and steeped in geopolitical interests and considerations of France, the UN, and a number of West African countries. In the former case, France engaged in psyops against separatist rebels during a coup in 2013, an operation which aimed to discredit the Islamist narratives taking over the country. The latter was in many ways a continuation and an extension of these objectives, continuing at least into 2017. The aims of the second operation included further crackdown on Islamist ideology and terrorist activity, as well as boosting the image of France to justify and legitimise the operation.
The methods France used in these two operations were both psychological and information-based and supported by direct action on the ground. In the case of Operation Serval, French intervention forces were deployed and consolidated in Bamako, the capital of Mali, within three days. While often overlooked in studies of psychological warfare, such quick consolidation and response often serves to demoralise the enemy in addition to particular pieces of information, since it creates a specific image of the operation - speed, mobility, efficiency. Mobility was especially important, with French troops being on the move almost constantly between 12 January and 11 May 2013. The second set of methods, more typical of Operation Barkhane, consisted primarily of influence operations through social media, Facebook in particular. At the same time, French military personnel posting as locals were attempting to conduct counter-influence operations against Russian disinformation in the country (which carried certain grassroots elements prompted by the Russian government).
The success of the former methods and tactics is considered substantial, and a prime example of effective integration of psyops into operational strategy. Falling under the responsibility of the Centre Interarmée des Actions sur l’Environnement (CIAE), France’s psychological warfare doctrine follows closely from NATO regulations and instructions about psyops integration. Nevertheless, most actions after the conclusion of Operation Serval have not been considered particularly effective, and have rather been cited as the source of regional destabilisation in the Sahel. France ended up withdrawing its troops into Niger in August 2022.
United Kingdom and the United States
Another set of influential players in the domain of psychological warfare are the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Besides using various tactics and methods of psyops for the purposes of safeguarding domestic security and national interests, they also contribute significantly to the psyops strategy and capabilities within NATO. Falling under the organisation’s guidelines the chief focus of psyops as used by the two countries is on studying the target audience, various attributability categories and integration within operations in other domains.
In the UK, this is the task of the 77th Brigade - soldiers trained in special skills pertaining to information warfare, psyops, and influence operations. Furthermore, they are supported by the 15 Psychological Operations Group. These military units specialise in understanding the target audience, creating content for online distribution, as well as evaluating the success of previous operations by studying how particular content is received. Their work is evident in most operations in which UK troops are deployed, with some prominent ones involving operations in Iraq and other parts of the Middle East. They are also particularly used in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency action.
In the US, psychological operations involve additional layers of training, including cultural sensitivity, interpersonal skills, and foreign language abilities. Besides various forms of media, the focus is on establishing strong relationships with the target audience, which is essential for subsequent influence. As in the case of the UK, US psyops are regarded as part of wider military strategy and therefore used in many situations, including to build pro-US sentiments in countries like Russia, China, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, US strategy includes economic considerations, such as discrediting influential businesses.
Nevertheless, there is a concern about the effectiveness of psyops originating from democratic countries, including the ones mentioned. The need for transparency, accountability, and freedom of speech, on which much of democratic legitimacy is based, poses certain challenges to governments and militaries seeking to leverage public media platforms for the purposes of psyops. For instance, social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have inadvertently identified and taken down US military-connected fake accounts whose purpose was to propagate psyops on these platforms, prompting an investigation by the Pentagon. At the same time, these same platforms can sometimes be cooperative in such efforts as well.
Countering psychological warfare
Despite the often adverse use of psychological warfare by various major geopolitical actors, there are a number of counter mechanisms available to those vulnerable to attack. The NATO psyops framework states: “Counter PSYOPS uses assets to analyse an adversary psychological activity and its effect on friendly populations, uncommitted audiences, and NATO forces.” Subsequently, counter-narratives and other methods are deployed to discredit psyops by an adversary and to provide accurate information. Methods include content analysis, evaluation of adversarial motives, cultural significance and audience analysis. At the same time, NATO’s counter-psyops can only be deployed in consultation with other units, such as those specialising in information warfare.
Outside of organisations specialising in issues of international security, supranational entities such as the EU have also explored the threats posed by psychological warfare and the potential means by which to leverage or counter its impact. Although there is no central doctrine on the role of psyops in the EU, it is closely modelled on NATO’s example, and its use has been explored in early crisis management missions. More recently, with the psychological warfare efforts of Russia in Ukraine and beyond, the EU has taken to more focused labelling and banning of disinformation sources. Understanding local culture and history is crucial in this process, since the values associated with these social aspects tend to be targeted. Without sufficient understanding, they would thus be impossible to identify and counter efficiently. Additionally, certain countries, such as the usually heavily-hit Estonia, have developed their own frameworks, centred around collecting detailed information about adversarial targets, strategy, and tactics. Countering psychological warfare therefore involves much of the same methods and skills as the offensive attack, the difference being the overall objective.
Conclusion
Psychological warfare is difficult to predict, plan, execute, and counter as it involves mental and emotional processes of which the intended victim might not be aware. Modern-day strategies and tactics incorporate psychological warfare, making use of all forms of traditional and social media platforms and sources. With the spread of information technologies and the multidimensional prospects of new ones, such as AI tools, the scope and reach of psychological operations may soon encompass unprecedented domains and uses. Both state and non-state entities must thus work towards incorporating such hybrid threats into their organisational frameworks and ensure a full understanding of their potential consequences. Countering the threat of psychological warfare in such an environment must furthermore take increasing priority, especially given its elusive nature, and these disproportionate consequences. Ensuring a thorough understanding of the target audience, methods, effects, and capabilities of adversaries, and countering them using these same methods should not, however, come at the expense of democratic values and citizens’ rights. As such, democratic states have a particularly fine line to tread.
The Sudanese Generals’ Conflict - Overview and Possible Outcomes
A violent conflict broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese regular army and a paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023. The clashes come at a time of economic and political fragility, as Sudan undergoes a democratic transformation. International and intergovernmental agencies had predicted the conflict after efforts to establish a civilian-led democratic government failed, but tensions have only increased.
Overview of the current situation
This conflict has its roots in the regime of former dictator Omar al-Bashir. In 2003, armed movements in Darfur resisted Bashir’s regime, leading him to create the RSF. This paramilitary was led by Lt. General Mohammad Dagalo. He coordinated military operations with the Sudanese regular armed forces led by Lt General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The cooperation between the two generals was strengthened in 2019 when a civilian uprising broke out against al-Bashir. They agreed to overthrow the regime and form a military council to rule the country. After three decades of terror, al-Bashir was ousted from power and, at the same time, prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide and other crimes committed in Darfur in the 2000s. To this day, the ICC is still trying to arrest al-Bashir by cooperating with other states to extradite him.
In opposition to the figures al-Bashir assigned to lead the new civilian government, Dagalo and Burhan staged a coup in 2021 to rule over Sudan. With the country facing a severe economic and security crisis and having failed to establish a democratic government, a military framework between Burhan's regular army, Dagalo's RSF and the pro-democracy group Forces for Freedom and Change was signed in December 2022. However, public disagreements and tensions over the terms of the agreement gradually emerged between the two generals, through indirect statements and sharp accusations. These tensions eventually escalated into today’s violent conflict. The military coup, the failure to establish a democratic civilian government, and the governance of the country by two heavily armed military groups made Sudan a fertile ground for the emergence of armed conflict. It is not clear who initiated the fight, but both armed forces were militarily prepared for a confrontation.
The Generals’ fight
Before the conflict, Sudan was politically and economically weakened. Dagalo and Burhan saw the alliance as an opportunity to rule the country, protect their interests, strengthen their forces, and develop political ambitions. However, the military framework failed to bring about a common agreement between the two most powerful actors. The agreement provided for a transfer of power to civilians, the integration of the RSF into the regular army, the release of their lucrative control over agriculture, trade and other sectors, and the return of military forces to their headquarters. But, the framework was an obstacle to the interests and ambitions of the generals. By complying with it, both parties would have lost power and leadership over the control of the army, weapons, and resources. In addition, the generals' vision differed. On one hand, Dagalo accuses Burhan of being a “radical Islamist” and does not want him to rule the country. On the other hand, Burhan is willing to stop clashes and give back power to civilians only if a government is elected.
The conflict in Sudan clearly illustrates how quickly political alliances change, especially in a period of democratic transition. It also demonstrates the danger of having two heavily armed groups ruling the country and the ease with which the eruption of violence began. Their attitudes prove that this conflict is about power politics. Both generals have the ambition to free Sudan from the other faction. Their personal and professional experiences have accustomed them to always being in control at the top of the hierarchy, to using deterrent and offensive approaches, and to giving orders that include the use of lethal weapons. This idiosyncratic analysis can shed light on how they make decisions and confirm that they are willing to fight, regardless of the safety of the Sudanese.
The consequences and impacts of the conflict in Sudan
The clashes first started in Khartoum and quickly spread to other parts of Sudan, such as the Darfur region, Kassala, Gedaref, Port Sudan, and Omdurman. The conflict will cause a humanitarian crisis if a cease-fire is not reached. Indeed, at least 427 civilian casualties have been reported since the conflict began. The hostilities are destroying public infrastructure and making it impossible to supply basic necessities. Some civilian houses have been requisitioned and transformed into military fortifications. There are also reports of armed men breaking into homes to rob, assault, rape, loot and kill. Sudanese, humanitarian aid and diplomats are targeted. Martin Griffiths, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, confirmed the reports. This raises questions about the ability of the two generals to command and control their soldiers. The inability of the commanders to handle their fighters could prolong the violence and undermine the chances of stability, even if Burhan and Dagalo were willing to reach an agreement.
How would it affect the region?
The conflict in Sudan could spread instability to neighbouring countries through refugee flows and intensify the future humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the wider region. As a result, Chad and Egypt have closed their borders with Sudan, believing that the fight could quickly spread to their countries. However, this does not mean that Sudan will be abandoned. In fact, Sudan is important. Located in a geopolitically important region, it is the third largest country in Africa, sharing borders with seven countries, and has an opening to the Red Sea. Sudan is rich in natural resources - gold, oil, iron, and chromium ore, among others - and has access to the Nile River. All these characteristics make Sudan a strategic country in an optimal but unstable location. Therefore, the involvement of other countries in this conflict can be envisaged, especially if it is prolonged. Dagalo and al-Burhan may seek material assistance from their allies. At present, General Mohammad Dagalo has an alliance with the United Arab Emirates and has close ties with the Wagner Group. For his part, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has an alliance with Egypt. It is important, in the coming days, to pay attention to new or re-established alliances in the region. Without the prospect of peace, other neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries may be tempted to take an interest in Sudan and participate directly or indirectly in the war efforts.
The conflict in Sudan is still at its peak. A 72-hour ceasefire on April 21 2023 came into effect after the emergency session of the UNSC during which the evacuation of foreign citizens occurred. According to Volker Pethers -head of the UN mission in Sudan- the ceasefire was only partially respected and clashes around “strategic locations largely continued and sometimes even intensified.” General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohammad Dagalo are both convinced of their positions and show no willingness to end the clashes. The time elapsed since the 2021 putsch shows that the generals are not willing to give up their seat of power and any response to international or international interventions has been a formality to which they would respond according to their own goodwill and interests. So far, mediators from the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Western and Gulf capitals failed to bring Burhan and Dagalo to the negotiation table. An emergency session of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was held on 25 April 2023. António Guterres urged for a respected ceasefire and to end hostilities in order to launch negotiations and bring humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese people.
Possible outcomes
As international and intergovernmental actors have failed to obtain a proper ceasefire and bring the two parties to the negotiation table, several hypotheses on the evolution of this conflict can be envisaged.
Firstly, one of the issues would be the interference by other countries or private actors in this conflict by sending military, financial or human capabilities. Dagalo has a close relationship with Wagner, mainly for the extraction of natural resources. In order to continue to profit from Sudan's natural resources, Wagner could become directly or indirectly involved in the conflict to enable Dagalo to maintain an advantage in the conflict and gain power in the long term. Burhan and al-Sissi are partners and Sudan and Egypt share a common border. To prevent the conflict from spreading beyond his borders, President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi could decide to intervene in the conflict to both protect his territory and support an ally.
Secondly, one of the fighting parties took control of a laboratory in Khartoum on 26 April and “kicked out all of the technicians”, which represents a biological risk. Dangerous biological samples, such as cholera and measles, are isolated in this laboratory. With power cuts in Khartoum, the WHO has expressed concern about “exposure to highly contagious pathogens.” The exposure could reinforce the upcoming humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict and worsens the economic and health conditions in Sudan. Indeed, the spread of these viruses would decimate the Sudanese population, which is already in a critical situation, and would make it even more difficult for international humanitarian aid to intervene in the long term.
Last but not least, if one of the two generals wins, it is possible that the winner will refuse the establishment of a civilian democratic government and impose a dictatorship in his image. The stalemate of the conflict and the non-respect of international laws make them liable to international sanctions and prosecution before the ICC. Al-Bashir, prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes, is an example the generals do not want to follow. The ICC is actively requiring states like Jordan, South Africa, Kenya, and Angola, among others, to arrest the former dictator. However, there is a lack of cooperation and countries refuse to comply. Indeed, a number of countries are either signatories of the Rome Statute but have not ratified it, or are not signatories or State Parties and therefore do not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction. The generals will avoid falling under international warrants. However, the establishment of a civilian government and the opening of the country to international authorities would make them punishable and isolated. In this context, rivalries between generals are likely to persist and the establishment of democracy unlikely for the time being.