Energy Security and Hybrid Threats - A General Overview

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The significance and vulnerability of energy to hybrid threats goes beyond what is generally recognised. Ensuring energy security is fundamental for the sustenance of technologically advanced societies and nation-states. Energy security is defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.” It is important to keep this definition in mind because hybrid warfare, which involves the use of traditional and non-traditional instruments of warfare against an enemy, could disrupt the availability of energy supplies and  increase their price.  

The energy sector’s broader economic and security implications are evident  in the context of hybrid warfare. For example, various hybrid threats have been employed by Russia against the energy policies, assets, or supplies of not only NATO allies, but also other nations. Furthermore, challenges posed by hybrid warfare to the energy sector can undermine the defence and development of a nation-state, both in times of peace and conflict. 

Global Energy Security Index (Source: Azzuni and Breyer, 2020)

The ongoing reliance on fossil fuels or their substitutes creates a vulnerability in which major energy exporters can leverage their position to exert political, economic, and military influence over countries that are dependent on them for energy. 

Energy as a weapon in hybrid warfare

The current Russia-Ukraine War offers significant lessons on energy security, highlighting how geography remains a decisive factor for energy security and that  control over pipelines continues to yield economic and political leverage. Russia has utilised a blend of ‘’military, semi-military, and strategic communication’’ tactics to create instability in Ukraine. By confiscating Ukrainian energy assets and exerting pressure on gas prices, Russia has successfully integrated energy security into its strategy. 

With the advent of cyberspace, methods of aggression and disruption have become increasingly covert and indirect. The challenges of attribution in cyberspace add another layer of vulnerability. Cyberattacks, coupled with hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns, have elevated the threats to energy infrastructure to an unprecedented level.

Hybrid threats targeting energy infrastructure are likely to persist as the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy will introduce new vulnerabilities. While renewables can enhance energy security by reducing reliance on geopolitically sensitive oil and gas imports and pipelines, their intermittency requires sophisticated industrial control systems, distribution networks, and energy storage solutions, all of which are susceptible to cyberattacks. 

Hybrid threats and businesses 

Companies have long been susceptible to what is now referred to as hybrid threats. In contrast to military conflicts, there can be no true enemies in the business sector, as direct methods of confrontation cannot physically destroy or eradicate competitors. Rather, companies engage in extreme rivalry, which can result in an escalation of competitive tensions that endures over time. 

Unlike the laws of war, business competition is governed by market regulation and societal codes of conduct applicable to international relations. Consequently, adversarial conduct within this competitive ecosystem is characterised as hybrid due to its clandestine nature, targeted objectives, and difficulty in attribution. In this context, states act in support of their domestic enterprises, amplifying the impact, breadth, and repercussions of hybrid tactics deployed. 

In addition to competitors and state actors backing their domestic firms, the realm of possible hybrid aggressors includes other autonomous actors operating outside both public and corporate frameworks. Their actions can be either sponsored or independent. Non-state actors have a wider spectrum of agency, ranging from conscious to unconscious involvement in the planning or execution of hybrid actions or threats against a company. In some cases, these actors such as journalists, social media platforms, labour unions, NGOs, and other civil society groups affiliated with the business sector, are unwittingly influenced or manipulated by third parties. As a result, clients and providers can also constitute the origin of hybrid threats that impact a company. 

The most common and affordable hybrid threats to businesses are cyberattacks. Their impact on businesses could be grouped into two categories. The first category is  ‘’above the surface’’ impacts which are also known as cyber incident costs. These impacts include technical investigation, customer breach notification, regulatory compliance, attorney fees and litigation, post-breach consumer protection, public relations, and cybersecurity improvements. The second category is ‘’below the surface’’ impacts which are also known as hidden or less visible costs. These impacts include increases in insurance premiums, increased cost to raise debt, operational disruption or destruction, value of lost contract revenue, devaluation of trade name, loss of intellectual property, and lost value of customer relationship.

What can be done?

Ensuring the security of critical energy infrastructure requires  more than  defence or deterrence. Resilience is a more appropriate approach. A resilient energy infrastructure may even have a deterrent effect in itself, as attackers may be less likely to target it if their attacks are unlikely to achieve the desired impact. 

The debate on this topic must acknowledge the importance of cyber and hybrid dimensions in the planning process. Allies and partners should also share their experiences in developing new legislative tools to counter hybrid actors, such as imposing restrictions on entities of certain countries purchasing national energy infrastructure. This will lead to the creation of a repository of knowledge that can help countries address and mitigate hybrid threats.

The military community also needs to establish stronger connections with academia and the corporate sector. It is essential to form ‘communities of trust’ through public-private partnerships that should allow different stakeholders to confidentially exchange information on security issues, including cyberattacks. For example, in the recent Russia-Ukraine War, various tech companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Starlink, Maxar Technologies and others played a strategic role in defence and security policy by assisting the Ukrainian government in implementing various counter-offensive measures against the Russian hybrid war.  

Finally, managing and responding to hybrid threats must acknowledge the value of intelligence. Companies can employ intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to detect potential threats at the planning stage. Given the digital nature of most hybrid threats against companies, cyber intelligence has proven to be the most effective tool for identifying, comprehending, and neutralising them. 

Hybrid Threats 101 - Conceptual and Historical Context

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Hybrid threats collectively constitute a relatively new concept, their practice, however, is not so recent. At the same time, their definition, categorisation, and historical context remain relatively elusive, even as their use, and therefore the necessity of countering them effectively, increases. In this introductory article to the series ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’, we aim to set the foundation by tackling these exact questions.

The Concept of Hybrid Threats

Hybrid warfare was defined by Hoffman for the first time as a method of conflict that combines both traditional and non-traditional tactics, including irregular formations, terrorism, and criminal activity, used by both state and non-state actors to achieve political goals. The primary objective is to disrupt the target nation through a blend of tactics, rather than to progress through traditional phases of warfare. Hybrid warfare presents a complex challenge for defence planning in the modern era, as it challenges conventional notions of warfighting, by erasing the boundaries between what is war and what is not. Ambiguous and unpredictable in nature, it securitizes every aspect of politics and society as everything is susceptible to becoming a threat to states.

Definitions by different international organisations

NATO defines hybrid threats as a combination of  “military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyberattacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups, and use of regular forces.” According to the Alliance, “hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations.” The EU recognises the diversity of definitions of hybrid threats as well as the evolving nature of these threats and defines the concept in a similar fashion as NATO, as “the mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.” 

As encompassing as the concept of hybrid threats is, the UN does not have a formal definition of the concept due to the differing views of all Member States, which poses a problem in building consensus around the term and the steps that need to be taken to combat these threats. Similarly, the OSCE does not have a formal definition as such, but its Member States have discussed the issue in several meetings with the Secretariat, showing a common concern to counter them.

Types and categories

Hybrid threats take many forms, and the types and categories delineated below form a list that is by no means exhaustive. Their irregular and blurry nature, in fact, may contribute to the notion that even categorisation as such can remain elusive. Nevertheless, we attempt to describe and briefly evaluate some of the more common ones below.

Grey zones

Grey zones are operations between war and peace; in some circles, “military operations other than war”. These may range from election interference to the use of ambiguous forces. The broad scope of action that can be considered as a part of grey zone operations poses a two-fold problem: (1) there is difficulty in determining which operations are taking place in the grey zone, i.e. the definition problem; and (2) another difficulty lies in establishing criteria of prioritisation for countering threats in the grey zone.

Due to their shadow nature, the principal use of grey zone operations tends to be attributed to non-democratic states such as China and Russia, although, with the diffusion of digital technology, these tactics are available to any state and non-state actor. Nevertheless, democratic states are generally considered at greater risk due to their open and transparent system of governance. This furthermore extends to businesses based in democratic states, who may be the direct target through economic pressure, or be indirectly affected by quasi-military activities or fluctuating and polarised public opinion. At the same time, freedom of speech and cooperation can be leveraged as key tools for exposing threats from grey zone activities.

Economic pressure

Economic coercion and pressure are threats targeting the economic and business activities of a state, including tactics such as debt dependency, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers and punitive trade disruption. As a result of unfair trade practices by China, for example, and the narrowing of the global free trade space, countries like the United States have increasingly resorted to retaliation measures in the form of sanctions and tariff imposition. 

Although it is unclear to what extent economic coercion helps states achieve their geopolitical goals or greater influence, it is clear that economic issues are increasingly understood as political and security issues as well. The implications for states and businesses alike need to be taken seriously. For all the dismissal of sanctions as ineffective, economic coercive measures and counter-measures are evolving towards more specific targeting, putting the pressure directly on businesses, their representatives, and individuals connected to the state rather than states as a whole. Furthermore, with a globalised and interconnected economy, the potential for secondary and tertiary impact remains high.

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity is the practice of safeguarding computer systems, networks, and sensitive information from unauthorised access, theft, damage, or disruption. Governing cybersecurity is challenging due to the constantly evolving nature of cyber threats, the difficulty in attributing attacks to specific actors, and the absence of international norms and agreements on cyber warfare.

Cyberspace operates differently from the physical world due to the lack of physical boundaries. In cyberspace, information can be copied and disseminated instantly, and digital assets can be accessed and transferred without the need for physical presence or travel. This opens the door to attacks from anywhere in the world, with a lack of transparency and accountability. Cyberspace is also a relatively new domain of governance, and the existing legal frameworks, such as the Tallinn Manual, need to be updated accordingly. This legal uncertainty creates gaps and inconsistencies in the regulation of cyberspace and its treatment as a security issue.

Cybersecurity is an essential and cross-cutting component of hybrid warfare, as cyber-attacks can disrupt communications, steal sensitive information, and cause physical damage to infrastructure. This is directly linked to other hybrid threats such as critical infrastructure protection, management of dual-use technologies for Artificial Intelligence (AI) or strategies against disinformation: they require an adequate cybersecurity framework.

Disinformation and election interference

Disinformation, which can be defined as the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information to deceive people, is a major security threat because it can manipulate public opinion, destabilise governments, undermine trust in international norms, and institutions, and incite violence. It can be used to interfere in elections and justify acts of aggression and even war crimes. Disinformation can achieve strategic objectives without resorting to direct military action, making it a cost-effective and low-risk tool for state and non-state actors. 

The subjective nature of information and perception, along with the horizontal and democratised nature of social media makes disinformation a risky matter to address. While censorship may appear to some as the easiest way to counter disinformation, it highly undermines the legitimacy of a state, as it raises complex ethical questions and debates, such as the lack of freedom of expression or media plurality, and the respect for civil rights and freedoms.

Psychological warfare

Psychological warfare is by no means a new tactic, however, its use as a hybrid threat has greatly evolved since its employment in historical conflicts such as WWII. In theory, psychological warfare constitutes operations targeting morale, exploiting the fears, dispositions and emotions of enemy troops and the wider population. In practice, however, the lines are blurred between what constitutes psychological warfare, information operations, or foreign influence operations more broadly. The uniqueness of psychological warfare is that it is designed to target deeper feelings and processes outside of perception, many of which are difficult, if not impossible to control. Its use is not restricted to a time of war, however, and psychological operations can be used to intimidate adversaries and delay or deter military action. Modern-day use of technology, and especially the psychological impact of social media algorithms, has also expanded its potential reach beyond its traditional boundaries.

Energy

Using energy as a coercive measure is often construed as a subset practice of economic coercion, however, as recent events in Europe have demonstrated, the manipulation of energy resources has the potential to cause damage in more than one way. The reliance of a number of basic human needs on energy is only increasing, making energy a potent instrument of war and peace. Furthermore, the scarcity of resources has been discussed as a security issue long before energy specifically emerged as their frontrunner. Another challenge facing the reality of scarce energy resources is the exacerbation of such needs by climate change.

At the same time, energy as a hybrid threat faces serious shortcomings, namely traditional supply and demand calculations, sourcing of secondary material, and crucially, the availability of energy transport infrastructure. Confronting these aspects is thus a key stepping stone for states, businesses, and other non-state actors to guard against energy exploitation. In other words, with the right tools and policies, the cause of mitigating this hybrid threat remains at least partially hopeful.

Transport and supply chains

Supply chains are key to the functioning of economies and national security, as the US-China trade war currently demonstrates. Governments can leverage their control over supply chains to achieve objectives such as promoting domestic industries, protecting national security or exerting political influence through tactics such as export controls, investment restrictions or favouring domestic companies.

Supply chains are vulnerable to hybrid threats because they rely on the fragmentation of production and manufacturing processes across different states. The comparative gains from diversification and fragmentation of supply chains also open the door to dependency and vulnerability, as states and non-state actors often use supply chains and their facilities to disrupt other states, organisations and private entities.

Supply chain disruptions often target critical infrastructures, such as maritime trade routes, airports, air traffic, power plants, energy transmitters, and cyber infrastructures. Sustained supply shortages can have a significant impact on the economy and stability of states, leading to major disruptions in public security and a lack of long-term access to commodities, as seen in the crisis that erupted following the loss of agricultural exports since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Critical infrastructure

The term “critical infrastructure” refers to those assets, systems, and networks, physical or virtual, whose disruption or destruction would have an effect on security, economic security, public health or safety due to their vital contribution to peace, security and safety. Critical infrastructure enables the normal course of daily life. The term is all-encompassing and subjective in nature, as what is critical and what is not is left to the discretion of states. The US government has so far considered 16 sectors that could meet this definition: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing assets, dams, defence industrial base, emergency services, energy and power plants, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology (ICTs), transportation systems, water and wastewater systems, nuclear reactors, materials and waste.

Identifying and understanding the interdependencies between infrastructure elements and sectors is important for assessing risks and vulnerabilities and for determining measures to increase security and resilience. Damage, disruption or destruction of one infrastructure element can have cascading effects, affecting the continued operation of another. Depending on the degree of interconnection between infrastructures, the effects of disruption may be different. Therefore, if the exposure to risk is different from one infrastructure to another, the response must also be addressed in a distinct manner, complicating the management, governance and security of critical infrastructure. 

Technology

States, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded terrorist groups, exploit many military technologies such as encrypted command systems, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and other modern lethal systems. Nevertheless, technologies that had no original military use or purpose are now being transferred into the military domain: these are known as dual-use technologies and are key to understanding hybrid warfare and how traditional conflicts have changed.

Dual-use technologies have both civilian and military applications, blurring the line between the military and the non-military. They can be used for peaceful purposes such as transportation and communication or for military purposes such as weapon systems and intelligence gathering. Adversaries can misuse dual-use technologies in hybrid warfare. GPS technology, for instance, can guide missiles or drones to different targets, whether involved in a conflict or not, while social media platforms can spread propaganda or coordinate hybrid operations. 

While the export of some dual-use technologies is not prohibited a priori, it is subject to restrictive controls, usually in the form of a licensing requirement. However, some countries are subject to import or export restrictions. For example, since 2018, the United States has imposed semiconductor export controls on China, targeting those that can be used for AI and military capabilities.

Migration

Migration is a constant reality of an interconnected world, and despite inflaming rhetoric has been pretty much stable over the past fifty years. Nevertheless, states are slowly coming to the realisation that the movement of large numbers of displaced people, forcibly or otherwise, can be used to pursue nefarious political and security objectives. The talk of ‘weaponising’ migration has entered geopolitical discourse very recently, yet states have been using migration policy in this way for much longer. The chief threat of weaponised migration lies in its socio-economic implications, but also increasingly in public polarisation and political destabilisation, especially when coupled with securitising rhetoric. The latter is often the primary goal, but other objectives may include punishment for what an adversary perceives to be a previous offence, or use as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table, whether in bilateral or multilateral relations.

However, one must also be careful of the use of terms such as ‘weaponising’ migrants, as it comes at the expense of their individual humanity. Not only can migration be used as a hybrid threat, but it can also incite discourses of dehumanisation, polarisation, and political violence, which themselves threaten stability in the long run.

Historical Context and Perspectives - Continuity and Change

Hybrid threats or hybrid warfare might appear relatively recent, decidedly twenty-first-century concepts, and the terminology is certainly quite new. This does not mean, however, that the characteristics and tactics of hybrid warfare are completely without precedent. In fact, warfare has been a complex phenomenon throughout history, whether labelled ‘hybrid’ or not. A number of tactics and events in history have thus retrospectively been likened to instances of hybrid warfare. These range from the Soviet partisan movement in the early 1940s, to the whole of the Cold War, to developments in Chinese military strategy at the end of the 1990s. Certain hybrid threat theorists posit that it is possible to go even further into history with examples such as the Peloponnesian War (431-405 BC) or the American Revolution (1875-1883), where tactics of psychological warfare, economic pressure, and the deployment of irregular forces were used.

Historically speaking, the purpose of hybrid threats as tactics of warfare has been to exploit the vulnerabilities of adversaries, or, where possible, even turn a formerly perceived advantage into a vulnerability by the employment of irregular means. They have thus been used principally by parties that would normally be perceived as being at a disadvantage in traditional settings. However, without the systematic and doctrinal foundations that present-day hybrid threats possess, the manners of addressing them varied greatly depending on the tactics used, and the circumstances adversarial parties found themselves in. The extent to which lines become blurred with the introduction of hybrid threats into traditional methods and tactics of warfare has certainly increased. A partial reason for this is the perceived hegemony of the United States that emerged at the end of the Cold War, which led challengers to the new status quo to pursue new and irregular approaches, incorporating them to fit their strategic, historical, geographical, and economic circumstances, while maintaining the corresponding difficulty of attribution characteristic of hybrid threats. These must therefore each be explored accordingly, in order to form a full and detailed picture of the use, impact and possible countering of hybrid threats in modern conflicts, by states and businesses alike.

Aims of ‘Hybrid Threats in the 21st Century’ 

Such exploration is, in a broad sense, the overall aim of this project. Due to the uncertain and broad nature of hybrid threats, and the fact that they can be difficult to define properly, it is also challenging to counter them effectively. A series of articles is to follow, which thus aims to highlight a variety of hybrid threats, as presented above, ranging from disinformation, disruption and attacks on critical infrastructure, to impacts on supply chains, energy security, economic pressures and cyber attacks, among others. Furthermore, we endeavour to highlight the current and likely impacts on business, non-profit organisations, and conflict more generally. Based on such analysis, tools and frameworks for countering hybrid threats will also be presented and evaluated.

Navigating the Eastern Flank: The Role of Poland and the Baltic Countries in EU-NATO Security Strategy

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Introducing the Eastern Flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia

When Russia extended its military support to the secessionist paramilitary republics of the Donbas on 21 February 2022, preluding the full-scale invasion of Ukraine three days later, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech denouncing the allegedly historically unjust borders established during and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From the Russian perspective, this is considered the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, as the “Western liberal order” has deprived Russia of its perceived “historic homeland”. Putin also claimed responsibility for protecting Russians who have been “deprived of their homeland” and Russian-speaking citizens who live far from their nation.

At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin gave one of his most famous speeches, which can now be understood very differently after the start of the war in Ukraine. He notably said: “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force, military force, in international relations, a force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts, [...] this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe.”

Putin’s sense of “injustice” and “insecurity” is the rationale behind the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinformation strategy to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s rhetoric tends to suggest that he may have wider aspirations to re-establish control over other former parts of the Russian Empire, not only Ukraine. This is why Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are existentially worried. This region, often referred to as “the eastern flank” by NATO, shares a common history and a geographical space, as well as a common existential threat from Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. However, they also share a common deterrence strategy, which will be explained below.

The eastern flank countries are unique in that they all share borders with Russia, either with the mainland or with the semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Lithuania and Poland are geographically vulnerable to Russian attempts to assert control across the narrow Suwalki Corridor linking Kaliningrad to Belarus, where Russia has a military presence. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the sense of threat depends not only on geographical proximity but also on a common identity and cultural struggle within the post-Soviet space. Returning to Putin’s speech, Russia's self-proclaimed right to protect Russian speakers and citizens abroad raises suspicions about Moscow's long-term ambitions toward the Baltic states and Poland. Estonia and Latvia are particularly concerned, as approximately a quarter of their respective populations are native Russian speakers. In this sense, Russia is perceived as a common threat, but with specificities for each country.

Context and chronology of the events

In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Baltic states and Poland began to develop a strategy to deter Russia and strengthen their ties with the West. This strategy was based on NATO enlargement and the Article 5 collective security umbrella. Poland joined NATO in 1999 and the Baltic countries in 2004. Despite enlargement, Russia was still seen by many Western European countries as a potential partner in international security efforts, especially on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and counterterrorism in the framework of the OSCE.

However, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a game-changer, with Polish and Baltic concerns becoming more prominent than before. In particular, Poland and the Baltic States have pushed the EU and NATO to adopt a more confrontational approach towards Russia. The first significant change came at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, with NATO countries agreeing to increase their defence spending by 2% of GDP by 2024 in the Summit. This is what the US called a “credible commitment” against declining defence spending and free rider attitudes within the alliance. After the Summit, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which was created in 2003, was upgraded with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a renewed force comprising land, air, and sea, with a focus on improving readiness and responsiveness to Russia.

The requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence is gaining importance with the war in Ukraine. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already complying with the requirement, with the objective to raise it to 3% in 2024. Along with the US, Poland, and the Baltic countries are pushing other NATO member states to invest more in defence, beyond the 2% threshold, as they consider this to be the minimum requirement for NATO and EU members after the invasion of Ukraine. Yet, many of them remain behind the 2% GDP defence spending target. 

At the heart of the defence spending imbalance is the difference in approach to the EU strategic autonomy as a political project and its role in European security. The EU Strategic Autonomy was the centrepiece of HRVP Mogherini’s 2016 EU Global Strategy, which was welcomed by all EU member states, but without a clear understanding of what it meant. In reality, not all EU countries are on the same page. This difference is mainly divided between the Western countries, which welcomed the term, and post-Soviet countries, which are more sceptical, as they lean more towards Atlanticism and the US as the guarantor of Europe’s defence. In Poland and the Baltic States, the idea of EU strategic autonomy also relies on a stronger European defence, especially in support of Ukraine. For instance, at the Special European Council in Brussels on 9 February 2023, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas spoke of the need to use an approach comparable to that used for the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines for defence contracts to support Ukraine's military capabilities.

Russia’s alleged interference in the 2016 US elections also fuelled mistrust and tensions between NATO and Russia. That same year, at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, Poland pushed for NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), which approved the rotation of four multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This strategy was aimed at deterring potential Russian aggression on NATO's eastern flank.

The Eastern Flank and NATO’s response after February 2022

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies adopted a new NATO Force Model (NFM) as well as a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022.  The NFM  is a high-readiness force of more than 300,000 troops, a significant increase from the 40,000 high-readiness troops of the existing NATO Response Force. The NFM, which is expected to be fully operational this year, comprises 100,000 soldiers deployable within 10 days, and a further 200,000 within 10 to 30 days, to have a rapid and reactive military force. The new model calls for an additional 500,000 troops to be deployed between 30 and 180 days, bringing the total number to at least 800,000 troops. In addition, the allies have indicated their intention to increase the number of troops on the ground from battalion-size (between 1,000 and 1,500) to brigade-size (around 4,000) “where and when required”. Once fully operational, the NFM will significantly enhance NATO’s responsiveness to possible threats, especially from Russia. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the NFM is expected to protect NATO’s eastern flank and its borders with Russia.

Poland and the Baltic states have been key partners in achieving such a defence effort within NATO, as evidenced by the VJTF and the NFM. Nevertheless, military mobility remains a topic on which the four countries and NATO disagree. Efforts to deter Russia in the eastern flank rely mainly on rotating multinational battalions. This has been an issue for Poland and the Baltics since the annexation of Crimea. They have been requesting NATO to establish a more substantial and sustained presence on their soil, and on a permanent basis instead of multinational battalions. The White House has been supporting this request since last year and has recently opened its first military garrison in Poland, in line with their demands. This is the first US permanent base on NATO’s eastern flank and can influence the future of the eastern flank’s deterrence strategy against Russia.

The eastern flank is claiming agency and organising itself, both inside and outside NATO. On 31 January 2023, the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland signed a collective statement in Riga, Latvia, to enhance their cooperation on security matters in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Specifically, the ministers agreed on common positions to be defended within the EU and NATO to ensure sustained assistance to Ukraine and additional sanctions against Russia.

Since joining the European Union in 2004, the eastern flank leaders have warned Europe of the growing danger posed by Russia. Specifically, Poland has taken a leading position in strengthening Europe's response to Putin's ambitions, due to the country's long-standing trauma of Russian expansionism in its tsarist and Soviet forms. Poland also possesses a stronger military than the Baltic States, which explains its central role in deterring Russia and the fact that it has been the EU country that has supplied the most military equipment to Ukraine since the beginning of the war.

Poland and the Baltic states have raised the bar, set standards, and pushed other European countries to strengthen their humanitarian response to Ukrainian refugees and victims of forced displacement. Since the beginning of the invasion, Poland has hosted the largest number of refugees within its borders, with almost 1.6 million refugees benefiting from the Temporary Protection scheme or other forms of national protection. In this sense, we find a causal link in the response: the countries that provide the most military aid to Ukraine in terms of share of GDP are also those most involved in refugee protection. These countries are Poland, the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and the United States, which demonstrates an integrated and comprehensive response, both military and humanitarian.

Risk assessment and outlooks for European security

Given its strategy to strengthen its defence capabilities, the eastern flank also faces an important cost in terms of the region's economic stability. The European Commission has stated that Poland’s GDP growth will fall from 0.7 to 0.4%, as high inflation rates and low consumer confidence will continue to impact Polish economic cycles. Nevertheless, we should expect to see a GDP growth of 2.4% for the Polish economy in 2024, which gives a good outlook for Poland’s long-term economic performance. The situation is quite different for the  Baltic states. They are expected to suffer more severe and greater economic and social repercussions due to their involvement in Ukraine. From military aid to Ukraine to enforcing sanctions against Russia, and even against China in the case of Lithuania, this will come at a cost to the Baltic countries. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facing declining GDP growth rates due to mounting inflation. There is a substantial reduction in the average GDP growth rate from 5.0% in 2021 to 1.6% in 2022, and a growth rate of 0.4% is forecast for 2023 in the Baltic countries.

Given how the eastern flank is central to the security of the European continent, it is concerning to see the difference between the eastern flank and the western countries in the management of the Ukrainian crisis. This has a cost for the domestic economies of these countries, but also for the traditional powers, the UK, France, and Germany, whose central role in transatlantic relations is changing. The leadership of Poland and the Baltic states in deterring Russia sets an interesting precedent for the future of European security, which will be based in the East for some time to come.

How the Private Security Industry Is Shaping Conflicts Around the World in 2023

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During the last 13 months, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted both the ubiquity and potency of private military contractors (PMCs) as several, led by the now infamous Wagner Group, have garnered international headlines. While Russian PMCs have become prominent, groups based out of other countries are increasingly influencing conflicts around the world. Indeed, the industry still seems to be broadly dominated by Western private security companies. One 2015 study suggested that 27 of the world’s 50 largest security providers originated from the USA, while another 12 operated from the UK and another one from Canada. Meanwhile, as the scope of China’s foreign policy widens, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing, too, is increasingly using private security firms.

There is a vast array of companies operating within the private security industry from security firms and PMCs to mercenaries, and it is important to distinguish between them. Part of the difficulty in defining PMCs lies in their versatility; they are involved in combat, supply lines, logistics and training, among other tasks. And every actor, from powerful states such as the US and Russia to developing states, non-governmental organisations, international organisations and multinational corporations seem to have engaged their services.

PMCs have steadily proliferated since the end of the Cold War, filling in a security gap and adapting to the changing nature of war in the pro-free market conditions of the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, by their very nature, PMCs normally contain top military experts who exert a genuine influence on the outcome of conflicts. 

But, as well as fighting in wars, PMCs can influence conflicts through covert operations, maritime security or by complementing a state’s foreign policy. Given the shadowy nature of the industry, it is difficult to find contemporary open-source intelligence for each individual example but, using recently reported events and openly available data, it is possible to pinpoint these areas as likely trends in the private security industry this year.

Military operations in wars

The roots of the 21st-century private military industry are situated in the American-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, launched in 2001 and 2003 respectively, partly because of public backlash to the deployment of troops. PMCs are still fighting in wars today, notably in Ukraine. As well as Russian PMCs, there are other private groups present in the conflict.

Former US Marine colonel Andrew Milburn founded the Mozart Group – its name a response to the Wagner Group – and was among the private contractors fighting in Ukraine until it imploded in February following infighting among its leadership and a series of allegations against Milburn that included making disparaging comments about Ukraine’s leaders. He and his staff, mostly former special operations soldiers, were involved in many different aspects of fighting from rescuing civilians to conducting frontline training and workshops on drone warfare. However, his group, though largely aligned with American foreign policy, seems independent from it. His biggest donors were hedge fund managers from New York and a humanitarian organisation specialising in evacuations.

The Mozart Group was just one of many Western-led volunteer groups operating in Ukraine where an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 foreign fighters are reported to be active. However, while the aims of these groups largely align with Western states, their methods can end up contradicting NATO and the Biden administration’s efforts to avoid direct involvement in the war.

Maritime security

Anti-piracy has become another central tenet of the private security industry with several companies highlighting their work in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa, and Somalia. These groups provide a wide range of services from training crews against piracy attacks to maintaining weapons systems and protecting ships. This has unequivocally succeeded in reducing piracy, but a growing reliance on private contractors has exposed the human rights violations perpetrated by these groups, UN experts said in November 2022. Its use of floating armouries has also intensified weapons proliferation at sea. Such issues are compounded by non-existent or weak regulatory frameworks far away from land-based law enforcement. But this side of the industry seems to be changing of late, due to its very success. Piracy is becoming less of a threat and bandits are increasingly targeting inland waterways instead, creating a different role for PMCs. Guaranteeing security in these situations is becoming hybrid, involving both state navy and PMCs, bound together by highly profitable contracts.

Complementing state foreign policy

The private security industry is also used to complement a state’s foreign policy, helping to protect strategic sites and people abroad in less secure countries.

With the growing footprint left by the BRI, it seems that there will be an increasing role for Chinese private security companies (PSCs), employed to protect strategic interests in other countries, such as mining facilities, ports, and infrastructure projects. Unlike their Western counterparts, however, these groups are closely controlled by the central government, limiting their operations. Once again, it is important to distinguish between PMCs and private security companies as China forbids PMCs but legalised PSCs in 2009. As such, these groups have largely fulfilled security functions rather than engaging in military operations. It seems likely that their role will increase following President Xi Jinping's remarks at the 20th Communist Party Congress in which he said: “We will strengthen our capacity to ensure overseas security and protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities overseas.”

Several other states also use PMCs to augment their foreign policy. As of 2018, dozens of big private British security companies “are all either already involved across either sub-Saharan Africa or north Africa, where there are vast security issues,” John Hilary, executive director at War on Want, told Open Democracy. One British company alone, G4S, employs more than 500,000 people and is present in more than 90 countries, as of 2020. Its role includes providing event security, security systems and running prisons.

Covert operations

The more clandestine side of the private security industry also lends itself to covert operations, offering plausible deniability for those commissioning the work. In one instance, members from a PSC called CTU Security have recently been arrested for assassinating Haiti’s President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. This US-based company recruited 20 Colombians with military training to help storm the president’s home and assassinate him. During the subsequent investigation, CTU Security was also accused of hatching a plot to assassinate Bolivian President Luis Alberto Arce Catacore in October 2020. Representatives from the company reportedly travelled to the country and planned with the Bolivian defence minister Luis Fernandez López to assassinate the president, preventing him from taking power after an election.

Although this example is extreme, it illustrates the wide-ranging effects that PSCs can have on a country’s politics and security, intensifying a pre-existing conflict. The assassination, which prosecutors say was motivated by businessmen who hoped to secure lucrative contracts under a new administration, has plunged Haiti into violence, creating a power vacuum for gangs to fill.

PMCs seem to be involved in the assassinations of other political figures too. Four of the Saudis who participated in the 2018 assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi received paramilitary training in the USA from an Arkansas-based security firm Tier 1 Group in 2017. The company said that the training was defensive rather than offensive, but its links to the assassination still illustrate the impact of the private security industry on political assassinations such as this one.

The private security industry is a wide-ranging one, encompassing everything from providing security for multinational companies to mercenary armies. As such it is capable of influencing conflicts in 2023 in ways beyond simply fighting in wars as has been highlighted during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The industry has carved out an important role for itself in maritime security too, influencing the nature of and reducing the potency of piracy. Moreover, by operating in tandem with more powerful states’ foreign policies, such as China or the UK, the private security industry assists these countries in maintaining a greater global footprint. Finally, the industry’s entanglement with more covert activities plays a direct role in influencing the domestic politics of less stable states and, in the case of Haiti, in perpetuating internal conflict.

Securitization and Sinicization: An Analysis of China’s Practices and Mechanisms

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National security has long been a priority for China, particularly in its five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. Since the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao set out to unify the ‘five nationalities’ – Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui (including Uyghur), and Tibetan – under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and maintain a political hold on these territories. Among these regions, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong have been focal sites of conflict and violence, and have seen the implementation of policies aimed at securitization, sinicization, and integration of their populations into the Han majority. 

Sinicization, in particular, is a process or policy that seeks to assimilate ethnic minorities in China or neighbouring Asian communities into the culture, norms, language, lifestyle, and ethnic identity of Han Chinese. It is also carried out in the form of a nationwide campaign (specifically Xi’s ‘religious sinicization’ since 2017) in the hope of strengthening Chinese identity among diverse populations. China’s nation-building framework, modernisation, and marketisation since the 1980s have increased the pressure for sinicization and securitization efforts.

This article will analyse and compare the CCP’s mechanisms and practices in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong, including militarisation and policing, reeducation, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, educational reform, religious repression, demographic control, and surveillance technologies. This article focuses only on securitization and sinicization practices, and it is not the author’s intention to oversimplify the complex situations and histories of each of these regions. 

Uyghurs in Xinjiang

In 2020, more than 12 million Uyghurs lived in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. The Turkic ethnic group is native to the region and culturally affiliated with Central and East Asia. The CCP considers the Turkic-speaking ethnic group, which is predominantly Muslim, a threat to national security because of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” in northwestern Xinjiang. Efforts to combat these threats through sinicization and securitization have intensified under Xi’s 2014 ‘Strike Hard’ campaign’, pushing Uyghurs to conform to the party’s atheist doctrines and Han Chinese society. Repression against the Uyghurs can be traced back to the military occupations of the Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang periods (618-907), which turned the region into a military garrison. 

The economic relevance of the Xinjiang region

The economic importance of Xinjiang plays a role in China’s securitization and sinicization policies. China’s ‘One Black and One White Strategy’ in Xinjiang,  – black for oil and white for cotton production –, is strongly linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The region is home to China’s largest oil and gas reserves: 16 billion tonnes are held in the Tarim Basin, and 1 billion tonnes were recently discovered in addition to the explored 100 million tonnes reserve in the Junggar Basin. 17 million tonnes of crude oil and natural gas were produced in 2022 alone. Xinjiang is also China’s largest cotton producer, supplying about 90% of the country’s cotton and about 6.1 million tonnes in 2022. The ‘Western Development Programme’(WDP), which has promoted urban industrialisation since the 1950s, has also been implemented more intensively in recent times. It aimed at a da kaifa (great development) to improve the conditions of minority populations and reduce the regional economic gap. On paper, the WDP has been a success, with Xinjiang's GDP taking off since 2000 and overall rising by 470%.  However, observers note that the economic benefits of state-owned enterprises and the WDP primarily benefit Han settlers and that Uyghurs are mostly marginalised. The average income of Hans was RMB1,141 (US$165 in February 2023) compared to RMB892 (US$129) per month for Uyghurs in 2011. Many Uyghurs are also employed as forced labourers in textile manufacturing as part of poverty alleviation programmes. This shows the Han Chinese disproportionately benefit from and dominate the Xinjiang economy. This has led many to believe that the WDP is an instrument of sinicization.

Demographic control

Demographic control through the resettlement of Han Chinese in the region began during the Qing occupation period between the 1750s to the early 1900s, long before the CCP was established and Xinjiang became an autonomous region. The Qing regime hoped that resettlement would consolidate its authority over the region, expand its tax base, and improve the living conditions of some Han Chinese. While the Han made up only 7% of Xinjiang’s population in 1949, the de facto Han population in Xinjiang exceeded 45% by 1990 (other minority groups such as Miao, Yi and Buyi have mostly assimilated into Han society) as the lucrative opportunities of the WDP attracted settlers. Han resettlement has been concentrated in Xinjiang’s eight largest cities (with over 300, 000 population– Urumchi, Shihanza, Aksu, Kumul, Sanji, Korla, Gulja, and Kashgar), which were 67% Han, compared to 23.1% Uyghurs in 2000. Some cities, such as Shihanza even had a Han population of over 95%. These cities are the developed urban centres of Xinjiang, where most industrial and economic enterprises are located. In contrast, 85.4% of Uyghurs lived in Xinjiang’s poorest rural areas (Hotan, Kizilsu, Aksu, and Kashgar), compared to only 11.3% of Han Chinese in 2000. Uyghurs make up the majority of the rural population of Xinjiang. Their traditional agricultural lifestyle and economy also depend on the needs of the Han-dominated urban areas, which set the prices for the raw materials produced by the Uyghurs. The rapid urbanisation of Xinjiang’s cities, the preponderance of Han Chinese in these cities, and the use of Uyghur labour in economic enterprises are exploiting and displacing the Uyghur way of life. In addition, the average annual income per capita was RMB1,600 (US$232 in February 2023) in the rural areas, only 32% of the urban income of RMB5,000 (US$725). The demarcation of two types of economies shows the stated objectives of the WDP may have been a facade.

Furthermore, the state-owned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) manages about one-sixth of the region’s territories and population, making it one of the largest economic, political, and paramilitary entities in the region. With at least 2,873 companies operating within it, the XPCC coordinates agriculture, construction, commerce, mining, and most of the state’s economic activities in Xinjiang. The XPCC expansion and the mobilisation of Han settlers are estimated to have contributed to 18.3% of the region’s population growth in the last decade. 

Population control is another mechanism used to reduce the proportion of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In addition to birth-control orders, many Uyghur women, including those in re-education centres, have reported being subjected to forced sterilisations and intrauterine device insertions. Various reports have revealed that population growth rates have declined by 84% between 2015 and 2018, and continue to decline in areas with the highest Uyghur populations.

Securitization and surveillance

China’s advanced surveillance systems have been widely implemented to securitise the region. Observers and journalists have reported the implementation of a grid management system and a multitude of facial-recognition cameras, where squares of 500 inhabitants are closely monitored by a police station. In Kashgar and Hotan, poles with eight to ten cameras can be found every 100 to 200 metres on the streets. Police checkpoints were also found every hundred metres in Kashgar. Police officers routinely scan identity documents, take photographs and fingerprints, and inspect residents' mobile phones. Citizens' biometric data is also stored under the ‘Physicals for All’ programme and collected in a database called the ‘Integrated Joint Operations Programme’. Artificial intelligence is used to report any illegal activity. As a result, over 15,000 residents were placed into week-long detentions after being targeted by the software in June 2017. Information is also collected on Uyghurs abroad, and more than 1,500 Uyghurs have been detained, deported to China, and arrested by foreign governments under pressure from Beijing. 

The CCP is investing heavily in securitization and policing in Xinjiang. Since 2014, party members have been staying in Uyghur homes to monitor any “extremist” behaviour and report religious activities. Officials have destroyed mosques and the selling of halal food has been discouraged. Apart from being an economic entity, the XPCC is also a paramilitary organisation. It has its own military force, which could be easily mobilised alongside the many People’s Liberation Army units stationed there. Residents fear them for their violent tactics and their power to jail dissidents. In addition to running prisons, they are also responsible for building and running re-education centres and forced labour programmes.  Observers believe that Uyghurs have been placed in “reeducation centres” since 2014 and that these re-education efforts intensified in 2017. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than one million people have been convicted since 2017, often on terrorism-related charges. 

Cultural assimilation

Linguistic repression and assimilation are other sinicization and securitization mechanisms used to gradually eliminate all Central Asian, Soviet, and religious influences in the region. The Uyghur language, based on the Arabic system and tinged with Islamic influence, underwent a process of reform, and was slowly suppressed as part of Chinese policies. Since 1956, the minority languages have been reformed to the Soviet Cyrillic alphabet, and then the New Alphabet in the 1960s, to bring them closer to the Chinese phonetic alphabet and writing system. Eventually, the Chinese alphabet (pinyin) and Chinese loan words were introduced into the Uyghur language to get rid of words with religious connotations. The teaching of Chinese in schools became compulsory in the 1970s, and teenagers were encouraged to attend Han schools, thus facilitating assimilation. Uyghurs were further pressured to learn Chinese as the Uyghur language was discouraged from everyday use, and no longer accepted in the economic and public sectors, in local universities, and even in institutional documents. Even in Uyghur academic circles and primary and secondary schools, the use of the language is rapidly declining. Han schools generally have better resources, teaching staff, funding, infrastructure and a higher teacher/student ratio than Uyghur schools. While Han schools may provide better quality education for Uyghur children, the lack of improvement in the Uyghur education system shows that the CCP's policies on minority education are not concerned with protecting minority languages and lifestyles.

Conclusion

As discussed above, the mechanisms of sinicization and securitisation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been implemented under the guise of modernisation and urbanisation. They have led to marginalisation, poverty, inequality and environmental degradation, thus seriously undermining the Uyghur way of life. While the benefits that modern facilities have brought to the region should not be overlooked, the Uyghurs have been little consulted or included in the process.

Tibet

Religious and Cultural Repression

Since Mao’s invasion of Tibet in the 1950s, the CCP has attempted to securitise and sinicise the region. Religious and cultural repression has intensified since 2010, particularly the repression of Tibetan Buddhism. More than 6,000 monasteries have been destroyed, notably during the Cultural Revolution. The crackdown extended to mainland China, where thousands of residences were destroyed in a Tibetan Buddhist centre in Sichuan, displacing 6,000 monks and nuns. Furthermore, the selection of the fifteenth Dalai Lama was controlled, and other religious sect leaders were groomed by Chinese officials. In the past 2 decades, citizens have been punished for attending monasteries or engaging in religious activities, such as the withdrawal of social assistance and subsidies. Local officials also banned the possession or display of images of the Dalai Lama and monitored religious festivals. Authorities launched a “behavioural reform” programme in 2020 with the aim of eradicating Tibetan traditions. As a result, the authorities ordered the destruction of all prayer flags. 

Population Control

Population control and resettlement were also implemented for securitization and sinicization purposes in Tibet. The resettlement of Tibetans to urban housing began in 2003 under the ‘Build a New Socialist Countryside’ plan and accelerated in 2009. The expropriated land was mostly used for infrastructure development and resource extraction projects to meet China’s energy production and carbon reduction goals, such as the building of a dam in Yennom and a highway in Dechen. Over two million Tibetans were rehoused in new townhouses and 50,000 Tibetan nomadic herders were settled in ‘New Socialist Villages’ by 2013.

Although Tibetans have access to schools, electricity, and healthcare in the relocated areas, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Human Rights Council have criticised the policy as coercive and lacking in consultation, arguing that it failed to provide adequate compensation, failed to restore livelihoods, and “increased poverty, environmental degradation, and social breakdown.” Many relocated Tibetans were displaced again in 2016 when the authorities turned their homes into tourist centres and housing for government employees. Deprived of their original land, communities, and ways of life, Tibetans, especially nomads who rely on pastures and forests for their livelihood, struggled as they were forced to settle in cities with a Han majority. Government-sponsored Han resettlement in Tibet was similarly implemented through the WDP in the 1980s. Although there is no official data on the proportion of Han Chinese resettled, many locals claim that the Han population and signs of Han Chinese life in Tibet continue to grow. 

Linguistic Assimilation

Since 1985, Tibetan students have been encouraged to receive an education in Han Chinese in state-run boarding schools (neidi), thus isolating them from Tibetan religious and cultural influences. The Tibetan language was reformed to bring it closer to the Chinese writing system in the 1960s, and Chinese language instruction was made compulsory. Although the Tibetan language has been subject to less reform and repression than the Uyghur languages, its use is strongly discouraged. For instance, a man was arrested and placed in a re-education centre after police intercepted a call in which he discussed the importance of preserving the Tibetan language. The Tibetan language remains marginalised in education and public arenas, which pushes young people to learn Chinese as they risk reducing their chances of employment if they choose to stay on the Tibetan education path. Many also believe that the Tibetan education system, which benefits from China’s aid programmes, is increasingly assimilative and neglects local languages, histories, and ethnic identities.

Securitization and Surveillance

Chinese police forces and surveillance personnel have been found to be monitoring residents and monasteries for any opposition activity. This surveillance extends to digital spaces. As part of the ‘Benefit the Masses’ campaign launched in 2011 to improve the living standards of people living in rural areas, the CCP sent over 20,000 officials and party members to live in more than 5,000 Tibetan villages as “village-based cadres”. They collect information on residents, develop security schemes, and discuss topics about the CCP with residents. The DNA of residents of the Tibetan municipalities is also collected for policing purposes, and facial recognition software was implemented for monitoring.

Conclusion

While surveillance and religious repression are commonplace, linguistic repression and “cultural genocide”, in the words of the Dalai Lama, seem less extreme than in Xinjiang. To some extent, Tibetan cultural life is preserved in the diaspora communities, but the CCP’s securitization and sinicization efforts have and continue to subvert many Tibetan traditions and ways of life. 

Inner Mongolia

Inner Mongolia was colonised by Chinese warlords in the early 1900s, and integration mechanisms were put in place during the Republican period (1912-1949). There were about 4.61 million Mongols living in Inner Mongolia in 2020, only 18% of the region’s 25.7 million inhabitants. Land reforms in the early 1900s redistributed Mongol land to the majority Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia, displacing many Mongols from their homes and eroding their nomadic herding lifestyle. During the Cultural Revolution, mass violence was committed against the Mongols, mostly against members of the self-determination and independence Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party – a party promoting self-determination and independence and supported by Outer Mongolia – and symbols of Mongol culture were destroyed. Accused of separatism, an estimated 2 million Mongols were arrested and tens of thousands were killed. The Cultural Revolution subverted Mongolian pastoral society, Mongolian nationalism, and traditional customs and cultures. Lamaism practices and traditional dresses were practically eradicated as a result. 

Cultural and Linguistic Repression

Although there have been no re-education camps or violent mass arrests in Inner Mongolia, cultural and linguistic repression has prevailed. More and more Mongolian language inscriptions, statues, and cultural symbols have been altered or destroyed since 2020. Further education reforms were also enforced in 2020: Mongolian materials were removed, Chinese replaced Mongolian as the medium of instruction, and patriotism classes were introduced. Protests, boycotts and sit-ins following these reforms led to arrests and intimidation. 129 protesters identified by security cameras in Horqin district were sought by police, four were arrested in Bayun Nur city, parents of children involved in the boycotts in Tongliao were threatened with suspension of pay and investigation, and six officials from the Xilin Gol League were sanctioned for failing to quell the protests. As in Xinjiang and Tibet, pressure was put on students to learn Chinese to remain competitive in the labour market.

Securitization and Sinicization

Securitizing and sinicizing the Inner Mongols may have been less challenging for the CCP than securing and sinicising the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Tibetans for several reasons. The dispersed nature of nomadic Mongols potentially affects their capacity to mobilise on a large scale. Even in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia where most Mongols are concentrated, they make up less than half the population. For example, in 1995, Tongliao city had only 36.6% Mongolians and Hinggan prefecture 17.6%. They also lived among the Han and were integrated into their culture early on. Furthermore, the Mongols do not have a central political leader like the Muslim Uyghur leaders or the Tibetan Dalai Lama. Besides the lack of a strong religious identity, it was difficult for anyone to rally and build strong Mongol influence or resistance. Lastly, the Mongols are one of two ethnic groups to have exercised dynastic power over China and to have been part of China since the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century, which gives them a greater historical affinity. Inner Mongolia is also geographically closer to Beijing, and the long history of Inner Mongolia being a separate state from Mongolia has allowed the Mongols to have a different trajectory in constructing their identity. As a result, Inner Mongolians’ belief that they enjoy better economic well-being than (Outer) Mongolia, the Outer Mongolians’ rejection of Inner Mongolians as proper Mongols, and a closer affiliation with Chinese national identity and citizenship have resulted in a unique Chinese-Inner Mongolian identity. However, although the Inner Mongolians are perceived as less of a separatist threat, China continues its securitization and sinicization efforts in the region. 

Hong Kong

Since Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, after 99 years as a British colony, the Chinese government has increasingly focused on the securitization and sinicization of the territory for national security reasons. Most Hong Kong residents are not ethnic minorities, have no strong religious affiliations, and many identify as Chinese culturally. However, since the 2000s, the Special Administrative Region has seen a growth in localist identities, a decline in political identification as Chinese, and protests for democratic reforms, which the CCP sees as a threat. 

Education Reforms and Linguistic Assimilation

Education reform, nationalistic practices, and perceived linguistic assimilation have been implemented in Hong Kong. Putonghua (Mandarin) as the medium of instruction was introduced in 2009 to replace the use of traditional Cantonese to teach Chinese. While it was optional for schools, many saw it as an attempt to replace Cantonese. This view was reinforced after the removal of the Cantonese language from the local university entrance exam (Diploma of Secondary Education) in 2020. The CCP has also tried to introduce a national education curriculum since 2012, similar to the patriotism courses introduced in Inner Mongolia. This led to mass protests, with many fearing that the curriculum would brainwash students with nationalist and patriotic ideas. Although the government withdrew the curriculum after the protests, it re-launched the implementation of national education in 2021, starting with universities. This was accompanied by ordinances making flag-raising ceremonies and the singing of the national anthem in schools mandatory.

Securitization and Surveillance

The degree of security was higher in the 2000s, as pro-democracy protests and protests against CCP encroachment policies affected the city. The National Security Law introduced in 2019 allowed the CCP to jail dissidents and tightened control over the media, electoral, and legal systems. More than a million protesters were arrested. In addition to a higher degree of policing, observers believe that surveillance has been widely used in the wake of the backlash, including filming protests and using facial recognition technology to identify protesters. There have also been instances of anti-government, doxxing, and protest-related websites, such as those of advocacy groups Hong Kong Democracy Council, HKChronicles, and Hong Kong Watch, and phone signals being blocked. In 2023, residents were also required to provide identification and register their real names to purchase SIM cards. Although the securitisation and sinicization of Hong Kong are still in their early stages compared to other regions, citizens are concerned about the increased surveillance and securitization efforts. 

‘Mainlandization’ and Regional Assimilation

‘Mainlander’ settlement and economic assimilation have also been implemented in Hong Kong. Scholars argue that the CCP is attempting to assimilate Hong Kong in a process known as ‘mainlandization’. In the 1980s, 150 daily quotas of ‘one-way permits’ were introduced to allow mainlanders to settle in Hong Kong. There were around 50,000 new settlers per year between 2016 and 2018. The Guangdong-HK-Macau Greater Bay Area was introduced in 2017 to create an integrated economic powerhouse of nine Chinese cities. This framework encourages residents to study and work within the area, facilitating greater regional and economic assimilation. The Individual Visit Scheme introduced in 2003 had a similar result, allowing travellers from most cities in China to visit Hong Kong for up to seven days. This has increased mobility between the mainland and Hong Kong: in March 2004, 1.47 million mainland travellers visited Hong Kong. The number increased tenfold, reaching 17.2 million in December 2006 and exceeding 40 million in 2013. These policies sparked fear of a decline in Hong Kong’s economic autonomy as the economies of Hong Kong and China became increasingly intertwined, and mainlanders were allowed to buy properties and run businesses in Hong Kong. Even if these policies are politically motivated, they blur the “physical, social, cultural and psychological border between Mainland China and Hong Kong.” 

Conclusion

Over the years, the Chinese government has sought to increase securitization, sinicization and ‘mainlandization’, and to centralise state control over Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong. These efforts have been characterised by mechanisms of resettlement, demographic control, religious repression, cultural and linguistic repression/assimilation, education reforms, as well as policing and surveillance – whether or not their original aims were political. 

Critics have argued that these practices resemble internal colonialism or modern colonialism, where state practices are legitimised through groups being represented as sources of insecurity or through the use of official narratives of cultural backwardness. Others argue that these policies are simply about nation-building to safeguard national unity and social stability. Despite efforts to modernise infrastructure and increase economic activities in these regions, they often result in the marginalisation of minority groups and the erosion of their traditional customs and ways of living, both in the past and present. It is important to recognise that the realities of China’s mechanisms and their effects on the regions’ inhabitants are multiple and cannot be reduced to simplistic narratives.

The CCP’s securitization and assimilation efforts in these regions have drawn international attention and strained China’s bilateral and global relations, particularly with Western nations such as the US and UK. In addition to repeated condemnations by governments and international organisations for human rights violations, China has also suffered economic repercussions. G7 trade ministers, the European Parliament, and UN joint statements have taken steps to stop trade with any “...use of forced labour in global supply chains.” The US has sanctioned Chinese officials and companies in Xinjiang, and the UK and other Western countries banned imports of goods made in the region. Many international corporations have also ended cooperation with Xinjiang companies or left Hong Kong to avoid compromising their economic autonomy. While the deterrence and boycotts by governments and companies may indicate a decrease in trade and foreign investments in China, its economy remains strong as its annual foreign direct investment has continued to grow in recent years.

Lastly, the importance of understanding these mechanisms extends beyond China’s borders.  As one of the leading developers, producers and exporters of AI, China has exported many of these surveillance technologies to governments and private companies around the world, particularly in the Belt and Road countries. This poses another security concern, as autocracies and fragile democracies, especially those with little domestic AI investment or experiencing political unrest, are more likely to import Chinese surveillance technologies. If they are used for mass surveillance or repression of political dissent as in Xinjiang, Pakistan, or Zimbabwe, China’s leadership in the global AI trade risks strengthening surveillance regimes and autocracies.

Congressional Chaos: Will Republican Discord Lead to Productive Governance or Fuel Dangerous Division?

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In January 2023, the US House of Representatives attempted to elect a new speaker of the house. The Speaker is important, as the House cannot function without one by law - meaning legislation cannot pass, and budgets unset, leading to a halt on normal governing functions. Historically, the majority party simply elects their party leader to preside over the House. However, this time around, the Republicans have found it difficult to elect Kevin McCarthy as a 20-member faction, ideologically opposed to the majority of the Party, prohibited the election of a Speaker for five days, until their demands on policy, committee seats and rules for the House of Representatives were met.

The lack of a House Speaker for any period is quite unusual. It has only happened twice since the civil war. Most importantly, Congress can only govern with a Speaker. As the rules stand, the House of Representatives cannot pass laws, or respond to emergencies, lawmakers cannot view classified or sensitive materials, or any other government action it needs to in order to oversee other Federal agencies and branches of government until a speaker is elected. The legislative branch is therefore paralysed during that time.

Aside from the difficulty to elect a new Speaker, the event points to further legislative chaos emanating not just from a divided Congress, but a divided Republican Party. What the Speakership election has shown is that a small group of Republicans, known as the Freedom Caucus and ideologically opposed to many in their own party, are willing to stall governing in order to force through their agenda.

Further Congressional Chaos

The rebellion against Kevin McCarthy’s speakership bid was rooted primarily in an ideological drive of the most conservative Republicans to drastically limit the size, scope, and reach of the Federal Government, taking up the banner of the Tea Party.

Many dissidents are focused on balancing the federal budget, coming to blows with senior Republicans and potentially setting up a showdown over the US debt ceiling. The Freedom caucus seeks radical changes such as slashing the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) budget and replacing federal income taxes with ones on consumption. The faction further demands seats on top committees, the cessation of Republican funding primary challengers against Freedom Caucus members, and even limiting US aid to Ukraine.

In order to achieve all of this, the Freedom Caucus has used their small numbers, and the Party’s overall slim majority, to hold the speakership hostage if concessions were not made. For instance, the threshold to call a vote of no confidence in a sitting Speaker has been lowered, meaning that if McCarthy tries to keep the Freedom Caucus at bay, they could now more easily trigger a vote of no confidence and remove him. The Freedom Caucus members have also demanded changes in the reading of bills - they can no longer be rushed to a vote, but a 72 hours notice must be given to give members of the House time to read the legislation.

The Freedom Caucus’ demands place the country in an unstable position. As demonstrated, the group does not hesitate to hold up the legislative process if their demands are not met. As a result, the changes to Congress could potentially slow down the legislative process, hampering any ability to respond quickly to crises. The actions of the Republican faction threatens to make an already divided government, as the House of Representatives and the Senate are controlled by competing parties, even more divisive and unresponsive to the country’s issues. 

What it means for Congress

With the breakdown of Republican Party discipline, some are worried about what it will mean for Congress's ability to govern over the next two years. “This concerns me that we might end up in some deals that might not pass and then possible shutdowns,” said Rep. Henry Cuellar, a Democrat from Texas and a member of the House Appropriations Committee. Cuellar’s statement illustrates how Democrats and some Republicans are worried that the conflict over the speakership is a sign of the majority’s inability to govern and ultimately its instability.

McCarthy’s difficulty to be elected shows how fragile the Republican Party and by extension the US government are. Working with a Democratic-controlled Senate and Presidency was always going to pose a challenge for House Republicans. But the power of the Freedom Caucus means they can hold up key policy decisions and hinder important government functions - passing budgets, raising the debt ceiling, and scrutinising the work of governing branches and departments - in addition to preventing compromise with Democrats.

A divided Republican Party will only enhance the division present in American Government. Following the midterm election in the Autumn of 2022, Congress found itself divided, with Democrats holding the Senate and the House held by the Republicans. The division means that making laws, overseeing the other governing branches and enacting spending bills will be increasingly difficult. In the void left by government inaction, partisan divisions are likely to be heightened, as each side blames the other for the inability to get anything done. Tensions are likely to heat up around critical debates, such as the one around whether or not to raise the debt ceiling. 

One of the key issues facing Congress, and maybe the most important decision it will make in the next 12 months, is whether or not to raise the debt ceiling. The debt ceiling is the maximum amount of debt the Federal Government can accrue. Once the ceiling is hit, the government is no longer allowed to issue any more debt. In the short term, extraordinary measures may be taken to meet financial commitments, but if negotiations to raise the ceiling stall, the long-term result may be a default on government debt.

If the US Federal Government defaults or comes close to a default, the result could be economic chaos. Default would mean interest rates rise, investors stop or scale back investments in Treasury securities, and interest rates would rise on car loans, credit cards and mortgages. Even the threat of hitting the ceiling could raise borrowing costs, as The Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggests. The result of a debt limit impasse was estimated by Moody’s Analytics in 2021. The US economy could see a 4% decline in GDP, the loss of 6 million jobs, with unemployment rising to 9% and a $15 trillion loss in household wealth. Ultimately, the result would be a recession on par or worse than the Great Recession in 2008. 

If Congressional inactivity leads to economic chaos the results can lead to increases in people turning to extremist movements and ultimately violence to rectify the stressful living situations they find themselves in. As we have seen in the decade after the Great Recession, or the post-Great Depression, extremist parties and factions gained adherents as they claimed they were the only solutions to the issues plaguing their societies. But, with today’s Congress, economic downturns are not the only driver pushing people towards extremism and violence.

Risks of violence

Intra-Party conflict, and Congressional deadlock, leading to economic recession can increase the chances of violence as people turn to extremist groups as outlets. But economic conditions are not the only source of people’s frustration and cause of their turn towards extremism and violence. In the current climate, unresponsive governing institutions, including the established political parties, are used as points in party rhetoric to stoke polarisation and existential fears.

The Senate and House are controlled by opposing parties who refuse to work together, and the Republican Party in the House of Representatives is internally divided. All of the division leads to a legislative branch that is unable to enact legislation that may positively shape people’s lives and respond to crises. Historically, government inaction on key issues has led to a response by citizens who believe they have no other choice: The French Revolution is a famous example, as is the Arab Spring. 

Historically, The US has experienced periods where divided governments have led to inaction over policy issues and resulted in violence. The most prominent example is the division over slavery in the run-up to the Civil war, in which neither side could compromise on the issue, making violent conflict inevitable.  During the Gilded Age (1877-1896) Congress found itself split between Democrats and Republicans for 13 years. Division in Congress also came at a time when a bargain was struck to end reconstruction in the southern states, allowing those states to roll back rights for former slaves without any resulting Federal Government reaction. Without a federal presence, violence reigned as whites attempted to take the rights of former slaves away from them. However, continued division in Congress meant a concerted effort to protect Black Americans and their rights were impossible and led to Jim Crow laws being adopted across the South.  A divided Congress was also at the centre of attention in 1932, when they were slow to provide bonuses to WWI veterans during the Depression. As a result, the veterans and their families protested in Washington, with the government calling in the military to deal with the unrest. The violence resulted in the deaths of several protesters, including two infants, and injured hundreds of others.

When the government becomes unable to respond to issues impacting people’s everyday lives, party rhetoric aims to blame the other side, framing them as a threat to their perceived way of life. For example, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene spoke about a “national divorce” between red and blue states, stemming from a belief that Democratic politics pose a threat to Republicans. The result is that people cluster into ideological groups, fueled by their side’s messages demonising their political opponents. The result is a deeply polarised political landscape. 

Polarisation is further amplified by a sense that if the other side wins the next election, “our way of life will be threatened”. If people buy into the thought that they are threatened, they may lash out in a violent way. The most well-known example of political polarisation leading to violence is the January 6 insurrection. On January 6, followers of Donald Trump perceived the victories of Joe Biden and the Democrats in the House and Senate as an existential threat. Supporters believed that the election had been stolen from them by establishment political figures that had conspired to get rid of Donald Trump. Some of his supporters saw Trump as a saviour that would protect America from immoral people at the top of society. The result was a group of Trump’s supporters attempting to overturn the election with violence.

The political landscape in the United States is at its most divisive since the civil war. Neither side of the aisle has worked with the other in many constructive ways on domestic policy. However, there is hope that a partnership is being foraged in foreign policy that may lead the parties to work together elsewhere. Yet, polarisation in a deadlocked Congress may be exacerbated by a divided Republican Party, held captive by a small internal faction, which is unable to legislate or respond to a crisis. These tensions are building upon one another and could lead to violence if one side loses to the other and members of the losing faction fear what it will mean for their way of life.

With recent history showing that some groups are willing to commit themselves to violence for the political cause, the situation over the next two years may prove to be exceptionally difficult. Multiple societal stresses and a more relaxed view of political violence mean that conflict is likely to erupt unless the issue is taken seriously and effectively mitigated by the governing authorities.

Greenwashing as a Security Strategy: Clever Shortcut or Hopeless Mistake?

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The concept of “greenwashing” — understood as a marketing technique involving the spread of false, unsubstantiated, or outright misleading statements or claims about the sustainability of a product, service, or even an organisation — is now part of the current lexicon that both experts and the general public utilise when discussing climate change mitigation and environmental concerns. Interest in the term has rapidly grown since the early 2000s, being featured not only in academic papers but also in social media posts.

First coined in 1986 by environmentalist Jay Westerveld, greenwashing has traditionally been related to the corporate world. As previously stated, it is often described as a business strategy for marketing a specific product or service. However, the term does not elude other organisations or institutions. In fact, states can also be responsible for greenwashing, and they can even be so deliberately, undertaking such deceitful efforts as a part of their security policy.

As a result of the intensification of global warming and climate change and the ever-accelerating occurrence of natural disasters associated with that trend, the perception of a rising worldwide security threat has consolidated. Accordingly, the international community and its cornerstone institutions have implemented a series of systems and agreements destined to generate incentives for those state actors that commit to becoming environmentally sustainable. Unlike several individual countries, which have themselves enforced policies such as green taxes within their respective jurisdictions, international bodies cannot possibly impose any robust instrument to punish states that harm the environment through their greenhouse emissions. However, there are mechanisms aimed at generating positive incentives for policy reform favoring climate change mitigation. For example, the World Bank has set an Environmental and Social Framework, as approved by its Board of Directors in 2016, which among other things, sets environmental and social requirements for borrowers through the Environmental and Social Standards (ESS).

Additionally, those countries which have implemented environmental policies have become publicly recognised in news media with a predominantly positive framing. Conversely, leaders who have disregarded or even downplayed concerns related to climate change have received substantial negative coverage, while others who have neglected sustainability efforts have been widely criticised. Such is the case of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Notably, the indifference of his administration toward the environment was so blunt that leaders from the European Union refrained from signing a trade deal with its Southern Cone counterpart, the MERCOSUR – a free-trade zone encompassing not only Brazil but also Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina – until Bolsonaro committed to tackling Amazonian deforestation following a record number of fires in 2019.

Furthermore, while it seems apparent that the pursuit of climate change mitigation actions carries significant benefits, it might also imply several costs, at least initially, most of them related to the efforts needed to replace traditional sources of non-renewable energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, most countries face incentives to portray themselves as “green” before the international community without bearing the associated costs, thus leading to greenwashing practices at the state level.

At a more superficial level, states might sign international treaties and protocols on topics related to the environment and climate change without an intention to comply with them or even ratify them. Such was the case of the United States with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and Iran with the 2015 Paris Agreement. Moreover, states might engage with greenwashing corporations or local governments, condoning or supporting their misleading practices. An example of “state-sponsored greenwashing” is denounced by The Australia Institute in a 2022 report. The authors suggest that “the Australian Government doesn’t just turn a blind eye to dubious net zero commitments by corporations, it also actively endorses them through its policies and programmes.”

A further and much more unsettling instance of greenwashing at the state level is closely related to national security. As explained by Naomi Klein in her “Greenwashing a Police State” article, authoritarian regimes can undertake greenwashing strategies to improve their international image by deviating attention from human rights violations and political oppression tactics towards environmental pledges and policies. The case of Egypt hosting the COP27 Summit in November 2022 is a clear example of the latter. While climate activists and political opponents were arbitrarily imprisoned, with a 2019 NGO Law enforcing a ban on transparent and facts-based reporting on the environmental situation of Egypt for considering the topic “too sensitive,” and after it has become “impossible” to work in the field for local environmental groups due to political constraints, leaders from all over the world traveled to Sharm el-Sheikh. There, President Al-Sisi was praised for his role in the Summit, as values such as “transparency” and “justice” were proclaimed.

Besides strategic and reputational benefits, material advantages can also be derived from greenwashing practices. In the case of Egypt, this concentrates on key sectors for national security, such as energy, transportation, and water management. Even prior to the COP27, the German giant Siemens Mobility announced a “historic” multibillion-dollar contract to build electrified high-speed trains across Egypt, and the government-backed British International Investment (BII) disclosed a $100m investment to support local startups. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Summit, it was reported that Egypt secured $2.24bn in funds for sustainability projects, including a grant from the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for the Nile Delta Water Management Program project.

Finally, the often divorced topics of national security and environmental policy interweave when considering the impact of armed forces and the military industry's greenhouse gas emissions. Dr. Stuart Parkinson, Executive Director of the organisation Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR), estimates that “the carbon emissions of the world’s armed forces and the industries that provide their equipment are in the region of 5% of the global total”. This figure, however, does not include the carbon emissions of the impacts of war – covering sources such as fires, deforestation, health care for survivors, and post-conflict reconstruction. A 2022 SGR report highlights how the international instruments that underpin the efforts for climate change mitigation, such as the Paris Agreement, often bypass this concern by making military emissions reporting a voluntary rather than a mandatory action. Even some countries that have presented themselves as avid participants of the “green agenda,” such as Canada, seem to have purposely sidelined the issue of the impact of security forces, assets, and exercises on climate change.

Notably, these “legal loopholes” and “information gaps” might not be the byproduct of a lack of interest in climate change by defence policy officials. The case of the United States illustrates the awareness and deep strategic knowledge that the military establishment often has regarding climate change as a critical issue. According to Alejandro de la Garza for TIME, the U.S. military “has been talking about climate change for a long time, even as the issue has fallen in and out of political favor.” However, it has done so in tactical terms, focusing on “climate adaptation — finding ways to protect military installations like Navy bases from rising seas and extreme weather — or on a changing geo-strategic landscape — like new theaters of conflict in newly opened Arctic waterways.” As also shown in a NATO publication from July 2022 titled “Environment, Climate Change, and Security,” the securitisation of climate change and its associated risks is also a concerning possibility.

Interestingly, some emerging initiatives from the Army and the Air Force have considered incorporating “green technologies,” proposing a win-win approach for fighting ability and reducing carbon emissions. Nevertheless, de la Garza sustains that “the military isn’t interested in emissions reductions that run counter to its broader aims.”

Greenwashing might be a deliberate security-driven action, although it might not likely be the sole component of a country’s national strategy. Moreover, it is unlikely that greenwashing efforts at the state level stem exclusively from security preoccupations: financial considerations and domestic policy calculations might also be prominent factors to consider. The most distressing thoughts come to mind when considering the missed opportunities and the misused time spent advancing such greenwashing tactics instead of conceiving meaningful and legitimate plans to tackle climate change, which is undoubtedly an urgent matter.

This becomes even more striking when considering that several assumptions that underpin greenwashing as an effective alternative can be seriously challenged. As an example, the cost of renewable energies remained competitive in the international markets in 2022, according to a report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). According to the Agency, the costs for renewables have been falling since 2021 amid a fossil fuel crisis caused by supply chain challenges and rising commodity prices. A study from Oxford University also suggests that, for these reasons, switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy could save the world as much as $12tn by 2050. Moreover, a 2018 study from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) indicates that every dollar spent on reducing pre-disaster risk, which includes community climate action, saves between $6 and $13 in damages. The often widespread notion that expects greenwashing to be a more accessible, cheaper, and savvier strategy becomes questionable at best and senseless at worst.

Barcelona Summit: A New Era for France and Spain's Energy and Defence Cooperation

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On 23 January, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and French President Emmanuel Macron signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic within the framework of the 27th Spanish-French Summit held in Barcelona. 

The summit aimed to strengthen the relationship between Spain and France and to address the common challenges facing the European Union. The treaty contains two important points - the development of renewable energy channels and grids, and defence cooperation. The signing of the treaty also means that France now considers Spain as its most important ally after Italy and Germany. This suggests a shift in France's foreign policy priorities towards the southern and western regions of Europe. France acknowledges the growing importance of Spain, especially as a key player in energy governance in Europe and as a strategic location for potential gas pipelines or liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, mostly coming from the US.

One of the main developments at the summit was the signing of an agreement to strengthen cooperation on energy. Spain is connected to the rest of Europe by two gas pipelines that cross the Pyrenees and reach France, making Spain an important energy provider to France. The first of these, Larrau-Calahorra, was commissioned in 1993. In 2013, the Spanish company Eneagás began the construction and management of the Irún gas pipeline, bringing the number of pipelines between Spain and France to two. Both pipelines are mainly managed by Enagás. French companies are also regularly involved in the Spanish electricity, natural gas and renewable energy markets. In 2021, Spain initiated negotiations with France over the construction of a new pipeline across the Pyrenees, the Midcat, as they considered the current pipeline infrastructures outdated and insufficient to meet the energy needs of both countries. The project was initially proposed as a way to improve energy security and reduce dependence on imported natural gas. France, however, did not actively support it, mostly due to the environmental impacts of such a project and its well-developed natural gas infrastructure.

The recent H2MED project has revived the energy governance relationship between France and Spain. H2MED is a corridor that also connects Portugal and unites the Iberian peninsula with France. The initial plan to build the H2MED corridor included the term "renewable hydrogen", which left the door open to interpretation, as it did not mention green hydrogen per se. France, which relies heavily on nuclear energy, pushed for pink and yellow hydrogen produced by their nuclear plants and generators to be included, as it regards hydrogen produced from low-carbon energy sources, such as nuclear, as green hydrogen. Paris considers low-carbon hydrogen essential for the EU to meet its emission reduction targets and create a competitive industry, but its lack of distinction between pink/yellow hydrogen and green hydrogen from renewable energy sources has led Spain to oppose the idea, as Madrid views green hydrogen as the only sustainable energy source.

Tensions over the construction of a gas pipeline between the two countries to export energy to the rest of Europe eased when Paris and Madrid committed to transporting green hydrogen and other renewable gases between Barcelona and Marseille through the H2MED. Both countries pledged not only to energy governance and cooperation with the H2MED, but also to work together to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Paris and Madrid bridged their differences in energy governance and committed to working together to increase the use of renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, and to promote the use of electric vehicles. 

It is necessary to contextualise this cooperation by taking into account the energy governance group between Portugal and Spain. Both countries have been less dependent on Russia for gas and fossil fuels, and now pay lower prices for gas and electricity thanks to the Iberian exception approved in June 2022 by the European Commission and technically due to expire in May 2023. The Iberian exception temporarily introduces a cap on the price of electricity produced by combined cycle power plants in the daily energy auctions of the Iberian Peninsula. As a result, electricity prices in the Iberian pool have fallen from €332/MWh to €149/MWh. Taking into account the levy paid to gas power plants, the net benefit of lower prices overall is €54.25/MWh. Under these circumstances, Spain’s role in geopolitics and energy security is important, given its energy independence from Russia and its geographical position. This may partly explain France's decision to strengthen its ties with Spain.

Another objective of the summit was to reach a consensus on a comprehensive defence and foreign policy agenda. Notably, Macron and Sánchez discussed the need to strengthen defence cooperation between Spain and France. They pledged to cooperate, coordinate, and establish defence standards by increasing the number of joint military exercises and possibly creating a joint military unit for crisis management. They also discussed the need for better coordination of defence procurement in order to use resources in the most efficient way. 

Several defence-related issues require further integration between the two countries. First of all, military spending and capabilities have always been major issues between Paris and Madrid. France has traditionally had a higher level of defence spending and a more advanced military than Spain. In 2021, French military spending amounted to 1.95% of GDP. Under a new budget proposal, France's defence budget in 2023 would increase by €3 billion, or 7.4%. This shift in defence spending began in 2017 to meet the NATO requirement to spend 2% of GDP on defence. From the French perspective, the aim is clearly to position Europe as a defence actor through an increase in the defence budget. Macron has pushed to re-energize Europe’s defence policy by insisting on the need for “a common intervention force, a common defence budget and common doctrine to act.”

In contrast, Spanish military spending was 1.37 % in 2021. At the NATO summit in June 2022, Spain agreed to increase its defence spending from 1% to 2% of GDP by 2029, using part of this increase to modernise military equipment, giving priority to Spanish companies for contracts. As we can see, France and Spain still have a significant divergence in defence spending and capabilities. This will hamper cooperation between Spain and France, not only bilaterally, but also in the framework of NATO-EU cooperation and security. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland and Baltic countries have been pushing for European countries to raise their defence spending criteria to 2% of GDP criteria, which Spain is far from meeting. 

France and Spain have also faced some difficulties coordinating joint military operations. For example, the two countries had different approaches to the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, with France taking a more active role in the conflict, while Spain took a more cautious stance. France's permanent seat at the UN Security Council also plays into the fact that the bilateral relation between Spain and France might appear unbalanced. Despite these challenges and differences, France and Spain continue to cooperate closely on security and defence industry matters, both bilaterally and within the EU and NATO framework. 

Since coming to office in 2019, Sánchez has attempted to promote a more ambitious foreign policy than his predecessors. The energy and defence developments discussed at the Barcelona summit should be contextualised in the context of Spain’s fifth Council Presidency, from July to December 2023. A strengthened relationship with France will further establish Spain among the club of Europe's most important member states due to France's influence and presence on the international stage, which Spain may not enjoy as much. Given the economic size and political involvement of both countries in the European Union, this commitment to bilateral cooperation should benefit not only the two countries, but also the European Union as a whole.

Mitigation and Adaptation: Sustain Peace and Build Resilience through Climate Action

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From the monsoon-on-steroids floods in South Asia, to the devastating drought in Africa, to violent competition for water in the Middle East, extreme climate events have pushed societies towards global humanitarian crises, instability, and conflicts. In all of these cases, climate change is not only the crisis itself but a threat multiplier that aggravates existing grievances and fuels instability, making it a recognised concern that challenges security on national, regional, and global levels. 

As the link between climate change and security risks gains recognition, integrating climate action into international security risk assessment and management and committing adequate climate finance are emerging as top global priorities to diminish the compounded security risks and build resilience. This article explores the two main types of climate action - mitigation and adaptation - and offers strategic recommendations for sustaining peace. 

Climate Mitigation: Limiting Climate Change

As scientific evidence points to human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels for electricity as the main driver of climate change, stabilising the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere lies at the heart of limiting global warming and climate change. Efforts to reduce climate change - either by decreasing the amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gas emissions or by enhancing carbon sinks that store these gases - are referred to as climate mitigation. 

Based on the global consensus on limiting global warming to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C, compared to pre-industrial levels, the ultimate goal of mitigation is to achieve net zero - or balancing greenhouse gas removals with greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, though mitigation options take various forms - from transitioning to renewable energy, improving energy efficiency, to expanding the size of forests - they all tackle the root causes of global warming and are key to avoiding, minimising, compensating or offsetting climate calamities. 

Climate Adaptation: Adjusting to Climate Change

While mitigation aims at avoiding and neutralising human-induced climate change, the relentless rise of emissions and climate extremes has caused some irreversible effects. Therefore, adapting to climate change becomes another key strategy where residual impacts remain after mitigation. Climate adaptation refers to adjusting to actual or expected climate change - either by making ecological, social or economic changes in response to the adverse effects or by taking advantage of the opportunities that may arise. 

Unlike mitigation, adaptation alleviates climate impacts by providing climate solutions tailored to each situation, taking into consideration factors such as geographic location, demographics, infrastructure, and institutional capacities. That is, adaptation strategies are never one-size-fits-all and can vary across communities based on their distinct characteristics. Common practices include diversifying crops and livelihood, relocating to higher ground, insuring assets, and setting up early warning systems. 

Sustaining Peace and Security through Climate Action 

While mitigation and adaptation cushion climate shocks, the nature of climate change as the ultimate threat multiplier makes its compounded risks too complex for either intervention alone to be sufficient to address. Tackling climate change as a threat multiplier is therefore imperative to break the climate-fragility feedback loop and sustain peace. 

To achieve that, world leaders, policymakers and international institutions are tasked with incorporating conflict-sensitive, context-specific climate action into their humanitarian aid and peacebuilding efforts. Given that climate vulnerability is highly interlinked with the localised interplay of risk factors, mitigation and adaptation measures should be informed by thorough climate-security assessments and tailored to local contexts - such as institutional capacity and governance, allocation and access to natural resources, livelihoods of marginalised populations, and existing tensions between communities - particularly in fragile or conflict-prone areas. With considerations of local contexts, climate action and peacebuilding interventions are more likely to be effective and compatible with the larger environment, avoid unintended aggravation of existing inequalities and grievances, and strengthen resilience against future climate hazards. 

Another factor enabling mitigation and adaptation to be successfully implemented is climate finance. While it is widely recognised that no climate instruments would work without sufficient financing, mitigation and adaptation finance flows not only failed to keep up with the global pledge of US$100 billion annually, but were significantly incommensurate to adaptation costs and financing needs. As the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) - the main greenhouse gas emitted from human activities and the culprit of global warming - hits record high, the total adaptation finance needs are estimated to skyrocket to US$202 billion per year for the 2021-2030 period aside from incremental mitigation efforts. Dedicating adequate financing to cross-cutting mitigation and adaptation projects, following through on political commitments, and closing the climate finance gap are essential to the effectiveness of climate action. 

As scientists warn that the international society is far behind in delivering on the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2°C, wide-ranging mitigation and adaptation measures offer solutions to limit climate change and enhance capacity to cope with climate stimuli. Only with an integrated climate-security management approach and adequate climate finance will these solutions be turned into successful climate action that neutralises the compound risk of climate change and contributes to building resilience against conflict and insecurity.

Water Wars: The Growing Importance of Freshwater in Current and Future Conflicts

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Climate change has emerged as a ‘threat multiplier’ that adds to other risks of global security, as evidenced by the ever-increasing role water plays in conflict. Freshwater is an unevenly distributed resource, yet vital for human life. By 2030, there could be up to 700 million people at risk of displacement because of drought. Climate change exacerbates water scarcity and can fuel systemic tensions when such a vital resource is threatened. 

The Pacific Institute’s open-source database on water-related violence classifies cases into three distinct categories: trigger, weapon, and casualty. This is either as a trigger, when water is a “root cause of conflict, where there is a dispute over the control of water or water systems”, a weapon when “water resources, or water systems themselves, are used as a tool or weapon in a violent conflict” or as a casualty, when “water resources, or water systems, are intentional or incidental casualties or targets of violence.” As an example, their database identifies 294 cases worldwide between 2010 and 2019 when water was a trigger and 335 when water was a casualty in conflict. These cases occur when water and its infrastructures are linked to violence, frequently when a lack of economic or physical access to water results in water scarcity. Water scarcity in particular highlights the often overlooked phenomenon that links the global climate emergency with growing localised security threats.

This is of particular concern in the Middle East, a region marked by water scarcity. The same database finds a jump in water-related violence in the region from 47 events between 2000 and 2009 to 294 separate events between 2010 and 2019. Aleppo, in Syria, is a clear illustration. During the 2016 offensive on the city, it was reported that water supply systems were deliberately targeted, causing considerable damage to the city’s water network. Since 2017, none of Aleppo’s remaining residents have had access to public water networks, relying instead on alternative water sources that expose them to waterborne diseases. Both state and non-state actors are utilising water as a weapon in this conflict, while the consequences are borne by non-combatants. Such events led the Eurasia Group to predict that in 2023, water scarcity will trigger refugee flows in the Middle East, notably in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 

Can water or lack thereof cause wars? Research shows that water-related violence is increasing over time. However, it is unlikely that water scarcity and access issues will cause large-scale conflicts in the near future. Water scarcity is often linked to underlying tensions, whether territorial, ideological, or economic. Therefore, water scarcity and accessibility problems are probabilistic causes in that they make war more likely, but not deterministic causes in that they are the primary reason for war. This is, however, likely to shift as climate change leads to greater water scarcity, and wars over water could break out in the next decade. 

What can be done to avoid this? On the policymaking side, there is a need to move from simple crisis management to a broader risk management of water scarcity and access. This includes an awareness of the weaponisation of water, which should be emphasised in the security sector. Partnerships need to be forged between national governments, local authorities, the private sector, NGOs, and other institutions to bolster the protection of critical water systems in times of conflict and ensure the equitable distribution of water. Yet global problems also require multilateral solutions. At the international level, there is a need to  strengthen international law to protect access to water in conflict zones is needed to avoid the recurrence of incidents such as in Aleppo. Existing international humanitarian law protects “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” such as water treatment plants, but it needs to be better enforced, and breaches in this regard need to be given greater visibility in the media.

Above all, peace and security can be promoted by strengthening climate resilience and tackling climate change. Anthropogenic climate change is a significant contributor to increasing water scarcity, and mitigating its effects will prevent water from becoming a trigger for war. To strengthen resilience, essential water systems must be protected from the risks of conflict but also from the impacts of climate change. Ensuring reliable and equitable water supply in the face of climate uncertainty will lessen the risk of water being a trigger, weapon, or casualty in war. Urgently addressing climate change will halt the progression of water scarcity and the inevitability of water-related conflicts.

As Kofi Annan, then-UN Secretary-General, said in 2001 “Fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.” Annan’s two-decade-old prediction seems especially prescient today. Since he spoke those words, the propensity for wars with and over water resources has only increased, while the need to address the underlying problem of climate change has only intensified.

Insecurity as the propulsor for cooperation between the United Kingdom and Japan

The international system is suffering from intense insecurity and instability, but besides the difficulties, democracies have been working in unison to counter tremendous threats. An example of this, amongst other cases, is the signature of the UK-Japan defence agreement on 11 January 2023. This agreement marks a turning point in history, as the United Kingdom has become the first European country to sign a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, sharing this status internationally with Australia. After years of negotiations, Rishi Sunak and Fumio Kishida finally signed the agreement, thus accelerating defence and security cooperation between both nations and facilitating the accomplishment of the UK’s “tilt to the Indo-Pacific”, at a critical time. 

Japan has recently been amending its defensive strategy due to the level of unsteadiness that is being sensed in Asia. The state of affairs in East Asia is precarious; insecurity is at its highest and any unusual move could become the catalyst of war. On a first stand, North Korean threats of a nuclear attack, due to its continuous missile testsand Kim Jong Un’s order to exponentially expand its nuclear arsenal, have been increasing the possibility of a conflict, exacerbating Japanese insecurity. On the other hand, Chinese hostilities over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, in addition to Chinese threats to invade Taiwan, have also boosted the Japanese defence agreement with the UK, as Japan seeks to achieve greater protection and strengthen its military alliances. But the Japanese insecurities that have prompted the signing of the agreement are not limited to Asian pressures. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also played a role in securing the defence pact with the UK. Consequently, Japan’s 2022 White Paper, categorised China and Russia as Japan’s biggest security threats because. After the war in Ukraine, scholars and practitioners debate whether Russia's influence over China could motivate a Chinese attack in East Asia. The focus of Western capabilities and efforts on Ukraine provides China and North Korea with the opportunity to attack, hoping for less retaliation from the United States and other great powers that would take action if a war were to occur in East Asia. The concern that the war in Ukraine is creating a window of opportunity for China and North Korea to attack East Asia has led Japan to diversify its alliances, seeking to reduce its reliance on the United States by expanding its sphere of influence and protection.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. Source: Twitter/ @RishiSunak

Although Japan played an active role in the development of the Reciprocal Access Agreement, the United Kingdom also has several motives, sparked by Brexit, for carrying out the negotiations. The UK’s exit from the European Union has obliged the country to increase its diplomatic practices, seeking to develop greater alliances that would support its stance on the international scene. As Chatham House Director Sir Robin Niblett explains, the UK needs to invest in its diplomatic capabilities to “share international challenges” with other powers. This is demonstrated by the many agreements the UK has signed to strengthen its role and ties in the international community; the defence agreement with Japan is one example. The development of Asian countries has pivoted British foreign affairs to Asia, seeking new projects to increase its international legitimacy and protection, now that it sees the world from a “solitary” standpoint. 

Contrary to Japan, the United Kingdom’s change in strategy has not only been motivated by security concerns, but economic incentives have also been a catalyst of the UK’s turn to Asia. The economic development in Asia has categorised its territories as the growth area for the UK to burst its economic potential whilst increasing diplomatic and military ties with Asian countries. As such, signing the Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan, offered the UK greater security, development and legitimacy in the international sphere.

Overall, the signing of the UK-Japan agreement represents, on the one hand, the UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, and, on the other, illustrates Japan’s desire to strengthen its defence capabilities to counter the Chinese and North Korean threat in the region. The desire to overcome defensive challenges is at the core of this relationship, and has not only removed barriers to enable military cooperation when necessary, but has also given rise to the planning and execution of joint military exercises and deployments. Insecurity has united Japan and the United Kingdom, forging a relationship never before seen, nor expected. This tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, not only on the part of the  UK but also of other Western powers, is a clear indication of  Asia’s growing importance in the international system. Xi Jinping’s numerous threats over Taiwan and the South China Sea, coupled with  Kim Jong Un’s threats to launch a nuclear attack on South Korea, have put Asia high on the agenda of Western states. Western democratic countries support their democratic partners in Asia through the development of agreements, uniting them as never before. In this respect, the defence agreement between Japan and the UK stands out as another example of how insecurity has become the driving force behind cooperation between democracies. 

Western Sahara Conflict: Geopolitics of Natural Resources, Foreign Actors and Humanitarian Impact

This report, a collaboration between the Middle East Watch and Conflict & Security Watch Programmes, undertakes an intensive examination of the conflict in Western Sahara. Covering the conflict’s historical, economic and humanitarian dimensions, the report explains the decades-long Moroccan sovereign claims over Western Sahara and highlights the critical humanitarian and economic risks emerging from the conflict.

Read the report HERE

Germany’s Defence Policy: Security Challenges and Adjusted Evolution

German defence policy has been in turmoil in recent weeks. On 16 January, Christine Lambrecht, then-Defence Minister, announced her resignation from Chancellor Olaf Scholz's cabinet, marking both the end of her controversial and much-criticised tenure and the start of a crucial week for the German government in terms of defence policies, particularly with regards to its military involvement in the war in Ukraine. Later, on 25 January, Scholz announced unexpected news to the public: Germany will supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks, after a long reluctance to do so.

Lambrecht, who had no previous experience in defence or international affairs, had held the post of defence minister since 8 December 2021, following the inauguration of Scholz’s administration. At the time, the official view and subsequent foreign policy priorities of the new government were those that ensured “continuity” with the compromises adopted by its predecessors, especially those of Angela Merkel; defence and military-related issues were no exception. Prior to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, analysts suggested that Berlin would once again fail to meet the NATO target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence. 

Nonetheless, the emergence, escalation, and prolongation of the conflict on the Ukrainian territory led to some significant deviations from Scholz’s original plans. Only a few days after the Russian invasion, the chancellor announced his decision to spend €100 billion on military investments in 2022, roughly doubling the funds allocated to this purpose in 2021 (€47 billion), in order to meet NATO’s annual defence spending target. This decision is remarkably striking, considering that, according to a 2019 pledge by Merkel, German compliance with the latter could only be expected after 2030. 

In February 2022, Scholz’s statements mentioned the need to “invest more in the security of our country to protect our freedom and democracy” and introduced a pledge to provide further assistance to Ukraine in terms of “anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and ammunition” after the country’s reluctance to send weapons to conflict zones. Several articles referred to a “revolution” or “U-turn” in the country’s defence policy. At the time, the Chancellor himself introduced the German concept of Zeitenwende (a turning point) to describe what the Russian invasion of Ukraine meant for Europe.

In this context, several challenges emerged for the then-Minister of Defence, given the strategic, logistical, and operational aspects of the German government’s new defence policy and its commitments to support Ukraine’s war efforts. On several occasions, Lambrecht has been questioned on her role as minister after a series of “blunders” and “missteps.” The criticism mostly focused on her management of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces), especially on matters related to their modernisation. However, other scandals intensified public objections to her. Lambrecht reportedly used a military helicopter for a private trip with her 21-year-old son in mid-April 2022. She also recently posted a “tone-deaf” video on her social media in which she discussed the "war raging in the middle of Europe" as fireworks rang out behind her during New Year’s celebrations in Berlin. 

For Chancellor Scholz, the timing of her resignation was critical: that same week, representatives and senior defence officials from 51 countries were due to meet at the U.S. Ramstein Air Base, in the German province of Rhineland-Palatinate, following an official visit to Berlin by U.S. Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin. 

On 17 January, just one day after Lambrecht stepped down from her role as defence minister, Scholz disclosed his choice for her successor: Boris Pistorius, who had, until then, served as interior minister of Lower Saxony. Upon his nomination, the German head of government emphasised Pistorious’ “experience, competence, and assertiveness” in a statement posted on Twitter, eloquently expressing his confidence in him, as he had done with Lambrecht when she was in office. However, Pistorius has “no defense experience, has never held senior federal office, and is not well known outside Germany.” 

Pistorius officially took office on 19 January, one day before the Ramstein conference, while facing mounting international pressure to end the country’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with German-made Leopard 2 tanks. Despite comments by a senior U.S. defence official indicating that Washington would press Germany on the issue, given the possibility of a Russian spring offensive, the Ramstein talks yielded no clear results.

Notably, the hopes of several Western allies for a policy shift after the arrival of a new minister were quickly shattered. It was Chancellor Scholz himself who had repeatedly refused to allow his country and others to export Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Among his arguments was the consideration that supplying arms could potentially draw NATO into a wider conflict with Moscow. 

Nevertheless, expectations remained high. On the one hand, on 20 January the government had not yet ruled out supplying Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks. On the other hand, the Scholz administration had signalled on 23 January that it would not block other countries’ efforts to deliver these tanks, following statements by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock indicating that Germany would not “stand in the way” should Poland decide to supply Ukraine with its national fleet of Leopard 2s. 

The commitment not to interfere with other countries’ willingness to assist Kyiv by supplying tanks not only meant a compromise with the allies who demanded greater German involvement on the matter, but it was also a first sign of a change in Berlin’s posture. Eventually, Scholz announced his decision to supply Ukraine with 14 Leopard 2 battle tanks on 25 January. He did so alongside Joe Biden, who in turn announced a donation of 31 Abrams tanks. With this announcement, both countries have significantly asserted their stance on the war, as the tanks represent the most powerful direct offensive weapon provided to Ukraine so far. Given the scope of this decision and the implications it could have for German national security, it could be said that Scholz took this step reluctantly and in response to the pressures he and his cabinet have been under from several NATO members in recent weeks. Conversely, Russian officials have announced that bilateral ties with Berlin have been irreparably damaged and that this move has changed the nature of the war. 

All in all, since Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, Germany has provided €2 billion in aid to Ukraine, including border protection vehicles, reconnaissance drones, ambulances, tents, clothing, meals, and mine clearing systems, among others. Moreover, the country is expected to supply a further €2.2 billion in 2023 for security capacity building. The 14 Leopard 2 tanks also contribute to this effort.

Nevertheless, Germany’s foreign and defence policy has many aspects of continuity, even after undertaking a “U-turn”. Scholz has balanced his approach with a strong commitment to maintaining other German traditions in these policy areas. These key elements are encapsulated in the post-Cold War efforts to support international cooperation, European integration, and a rules-based international order, while remaining deeply committed to international institutions such as the UN and even the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the words of U.S. scholar Hal Brands, the German approach has been “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” The concept of the Zeitenwende, even after the recent decisions on battle tanks, might actually be better understood as a 'turning point' in the speed of decision-making in public policy, in this case defence and security, rather than as a complete and unambiguous revolution. In addition, further obstacles to major change are likely to emerge when it comes to modernising the German military. According to Judy Dempsey, a Carnegie Europe non-resident Senior Fellow, the Ministry of Defence is affected by “deep structural issues”, such as “its bureaucracy, lack of a strategic military doctrine, and reluctance to embrace modernization.”

Meanwhile, several issues that pertain to German national security remain unresolved. Some are closely linked to the war in Ukraine, such as the question of energy supply. Beyond the dependence on Russian gas, which has officially ended according to Finance Minister Christian Lindner, a deeper crisis affecting the whole region has fueled local demand for candles, coal, and wood. Other pressing issues relate to relations with China: China's ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, recently expressed concerns that the emergence of a new “ideology-based” German strategy towards Beijing could hamper bilateral cooperation and strain diplomatic ties.

Besides some of the novelties that the German defence policy has displayed, the traditional channels and means of shaping its direction remain in place. The Scholz-Macron meeting on 21 January was a public display of the chancellor’s and its counterpart's commitment to European unity and cooperation. Such demonstrations might reassure those concerned about Germany’s geopolitical position in a post-Ukraine war scenario, and might even reassure domestic stakeholders about the future stability of a responsible and timely implementation of the €100 billion Zeitenwende pledge.

Two months after the ceasefire, how has the situation in Tigray changed?

For nearly two years, Ethiopia’s Tigray region has been plagued by a conflict that has claimed the lives of an estimated 600,000 people, according to Olusegun Obasanjo, the African Union’s chief mediator in the peace talks.

From 1991 to 2018, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – Tigray’s main political party – dominated Ethiopian national politics despite representing an ethnic minority in the country. The TPLF’ power began to wane in 2018 after Abiy Ahmed Ali became prime minister. Initially heralded as a peacemaker who could transcend ethnic divisions within Ethiopia, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for reaching a peace agreement with Eritrea. However, Abiy, while weakening the TPLF, began to consolidate his own power by delaying national elections and extending his first term as prime minister in June 2020. Three months later, the Tigray State Council defied federal orders and held parliamentary elections, raising concerns that it was preparing to become a breakaway state, thus increasing tensions between the region and the federal government. After the elections, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of looting weapons from a federal military camp and began an offensive against regional troops in Tigray on 4 November 2020.

The war in Tigray is marked by its brutality. The UN Human Rights Council issued a report concluding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Ethiopian federal governmen and its allies have committed crimes against humanity in Tigray, pointing to the withdrawal of basic services from the region, striking a refugee camp with an armed drone, and perpetrating sexual violence against Tigrayan civilians. The commission added that it also has reasonable grounds to believe that Tigrayan forces have committed war crimes and human rights violations during the conflict.

The conflict escalated in August 2022, but on 2 November 2022, the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan rebels signed a peace agreement in the hope of ending the war. Brokered by the African Union, the November ceasefire goes further than any other settlement attempt, with the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government agreeing to a disarmament plan and the restoration of essential services. Since then, the situation has changed somewhat, with humanitarian aid reaching some, but not all, of the region, basic services restored, and the military ceasefire largely respected.

The ceasefire has been greeted with cautious optimism as previous settlements had failed, and Eritrea – a party in the conflict – was not represented at the peace talks. The ceasefire makes little provision for the role of Eritrea, which is neither a party to the agreement nor mentioned by name in the text. Jeffrey Feltman, former US special envoy for the Horn of Africa, argues that the international community should monitor the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia, as Asmara views the TPLF as “an existential threat and may not be content with a peace deal that leaves the organization intact and its leaders alive.” The Embassy of Eritrea in the USA responded to Feltman in an open letter, saying that his “underlying and transparent intentions are to stoke a new and wider war in the region.” 

There are conflicting reports as to whether all Eritrean troops are withdrawing from Tigray. According to Obasanjo, “ all Eritreans are at the border,” but not all troops have left the country. His words were contradicted by Getachew Reda, the advisor to the President of Tigray, who tweeted “No; Eritrean forces are digging in their heels big time. And the #AU-JVMC are nowhere near. Let them go there & do their job first before such remarks are made!” In early December 2022, Eritrean troops were reported seizing food, vehicles and gold from more than two dozen towns in northern Tigray despite the ceasefire. Nonetheless, on 30 December 2022, Eritrean soldiers, who fought in support of Ethiopia’s federal government, reportedly withdrew from two major towns and headed for the border. This is indicative of what appears to be a military de-escalation. Political leaders are also taking steps to signal it. On 26 December 2022, a delegation from the Ethiopian federal government, led by the speaker of the House of Representatives, Tagesse Chafo, travelled to the northern region of Tigray to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. It was the first high-level federal delegation to visit the region in two years.

As a result of the ceasefire, Obasanjo estimates that “we have stopped 1,000 deaths every day,” although the media reported that civilians were still being killed in early December 2022, a month after the ceasefire.

Some Tigrayans, according to Foreign Policy, have expressed dissatisfaction that the agreement stipulates the disarmament of the TPLF without addressing the root causes of the war. In their view, this will only create a weak Tigray, with the causes of the war still present and latent. Moreover, while the TPLF claims to have withdrawn 65 percent of its forces from the front lines, Tadesse Wereda, the TPLF’s commander-in-chief said that the organisation was still maintaining fighters in some places “where there is a presence of anti-peace forces.” He did not name these locations. Nevertheless, Tigrayan forces began handing over their heavy weapons in mid-January, with Getachew Reda tweeting that the Tigray government “hope[s] & expect[s] this will go a long way in expediting the full implementation of the agreement.” 

The war in Tigray has created a humanitarian catastrophe that leaves more than 13 million people in northern Ethiopia dependent on humanitarian aid, including more than 90 percent of Tigray’s 6 million inhabitants. When the peace deal was announced, the World Health Organization estimated that there were around 5.2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray, of whom 3.8 million required healthcare. No humanitarian assistance had reached the region for two months. Following the peace agreement, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered more than 2,400 tonnes of food – enough to feed about 170,000 people – as well as medical, nutritional and other essential supplies, while the UN Humanitarian Air Service is operating in the region for the first time, carrying passengers and humanitarian aid. However, according to the WFP, deliveries were still below requirements on 25 November 2022. As of mid-January, humanitarian access, “particularly in border areas, areas off the main roads and locations requiring cross-line movements, continues to be challenging,” according to Tghat, a data collecting body in Tigray.

Banking services were suspended in Tigray during the war, further cutting the region off from international aid. Following the ceasefire, limited banking services returned in some parts of the region, allowing people to deposit money and receive it from abroad. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia plans to restore services in all its branches if the conditions permit. Tigray’s dire economic situation extends beyond the banks, as large parts of the region need to be completely rebuilt. According to some estimates, reconstruction over the next three years is expected to cost more than $20 billion.

For much of the war, Tigray experienced a communications blackout that resulted in the “world’s longest uninterrupted shutdown,” according to the Internet rights group Access Now. In early December, Ethiopia’s electricity provider announced that the regional capital, Mekele, had been reconnected to the national power grid after more than a year of power cuts. Phone lines are beginning to be restored in the region, although areas under the control of Tigrayan forces are still cut off, while commercial flights have resumed between the Ethiopian federal capital Addis Ababa and Mekele. With some communication channels restored, people outside the region are only now beginning to learn what happened to their relatives. Restoring the social links between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia is indicative of the overall changes taking place as a result of the ceasefire.

The security situation seems to be evolving as soldiers are withdrawing and the TPLF is disarming. Humanitarian aid is re-entering the region and the political structures overseeing the ceasefire seem to be respecting it. Nevertheless, the situation remains fraught. A ceasefire agreed upon in March 2022 reduced violence and allowed humanitarian aid to reach Tigray for five months until hostilities resumed. 

In August 2022, as the first ceasefire collapsed, the TPLF demanded that the federal government restore essential services in Tigray, allow complete humanitarian access, be held accountable for war crimes, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the return of Western Tigray, which was under Amhara control. Some of these conditions appear stable under the current ceasefire, suggesting that it will be more durable than the one reached in August, but points of tension remain. The territorial dispute over Western Tigray remains unresolved, conflicting reports concerning the withdrawal of Eritrean troops suggest some are still present in the region, and the question of how to administer justice for alleged war crimes remains unanswered. Each of these elements could constitute a potential flashpoint in the future.

United in Hybridity - EU-NATO create a task force on resilience and critical infrastructure to face potential hybrid threats from Russia

As the proliferation of non-state actors, critical technologies, and energy markets have gained crucial leverage in international affairs, security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic have been multiplied and redefined. Hyper-connectivity between states has increased vulnerability worldwide. New emerging domains such as cyberspace have revisited fundamental ideas and concepts of security, conflict, and war. As a result, hybrid threats have become central to political agendas, particularly in the context of EU-NATO cooperation. According to Frank Hoffman, hybrid warfare mixes and blends conventional warfare with other sources of irregular warfare, such as cyber warfare, energy and financial markets, as well as disinformation, diplomacy, lawfare, and foreign electoral intervention. Unpredictability and transversality are fundamental characteristics of hybrid threats.

Hybrid threats have recently been recalled in the recent NATO and EU discourses. In fact, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept specifically mentions them 7 times as a priority for the Atlantic Alliance. That is why, on 10 January, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed on a joint task force on resilience and critical infrastructure protection as part of their third joint declaration. “Resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure are a key part of our joint efforts, as we have seen both with President Putin’s weaponizing of energy and […] the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines,” Stoltenberg announced.

Both Stoltenberg and von der Leyen put this decision in the context of the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022, which was the result of the EU’s position in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Hybrid warfare has fundamentally changed how war is waged - it now includes cyberattacks, export controls, economic sanctions, and disinformation, among other means. Nevertheless, the most concerning aspect of hybrid warfare is that Russia and China have increased their assertiveness through it. And NATO and the EU are aware of this.

As a direct response, both the Alliance and the EU have taken the initiative to ensure the energy security of the European continent. In 2021, the EU greatly depended on external energy markets, importing 83% of its natural gas. Since then, imports from Russia to the EU have been significantly reduced, and the EU has redefined and diversified its relations with other energy partners, such as Norway or Algeria. In order to support this decision, Washington has strategically increased its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU by more than 137% in almost a year. The White House and the Commission also announced last year the creation of a joint Task Force to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. It is important to note that countries like Portugal or Spain are not as dependent on the Russian energy market as Germany, which has led to differences in how to find a common response to the energy crisis. Solutions like the ‘Iberian exception’ to cap energy prices have been fundamental in addressing these differences.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO developed a new Strategic Concept at the 2022 Madrid Summit. It identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to the Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, which is the strongest concept used to describe Russia since 1991. It is also not the first time the EU has acted on hybrid threats: in November 2016, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats to foster the resilience of the EU. The vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure may differ from one Member State to another. Nevertheless, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, the EU Joint Framework, and the new EU-NATO task force have all agreed that energy security, space infrastructure, maritime security, public health, transport, cyber security, communications, and financial systems are the “critical infrastructures” vulnerable to hybrid threats.

The term hybrid is expected to be reinterpreted and revised over time. It should be perceived as an all-encompassing and evolving term aimed at addressing current security challenges, as opposed to conventional means. Hybrid threats break these well-defined guidelines of what is and what is not war. In 2010, when NATO introduced the term, there was no initial common understanding of what "hybrid warfare" meant within the Alliance. 

This common understanding of hybrid threats is reflected in the document that the EU and NATO presented. The mutual understanding represents a political and diplomatic achievement, as it also integrates the EU’s strategic autonomy in the framework of Euro-Atlantic security and protection. Nevertheless, opinions within EU-NATO coordination have been diverse and often contradictory. Over the years, France has intended to boost the EU's defence industry with the clear aim of making the EU more strategically autonomous. Conversely, some Central and Eastern European countries, like Poland, do not agree with this. These Member States still see the US as the main guarantor of security on the European continent.

EU and NATO members (and allies) should expect to live with the uncertainty surrounding hybrid threats for some time, as there is now a risk of not measuring conflict and instability properly. Hybrid threats allow us to rethink some of the most pressing issues in international security under a different lens, such as the causes of terrorism and violent extremism around the world, as well as civil wars and social unrest in unstable political regimes.

If anything can be considered a threat, then what makes a threat significant? This question should be addressed in a transatlantic and comprehensive approach that can integrate deterrence and the military as well as the social and economic perspectives of states. What makes hybrid threats so unpredictable is that their causes are not short-term based, or solved by increased defence spending. They very often stem from structural causes: climate migration, economic inequality, unequal access to technologies, and lack of digital skills, as well as populism and far-right extremism, among others. In this sense, increasing national GDP in defence spending should not be the only solution to the development of European defence, as resilience in the face of hybrid threats requires a more integrated and transversal security perspective.

As a final assessment, the EU-NATO task force still needs to be properly developed, but a first step has been taken. As Madeleine Albright once stated, the debate on NATO's future has too often reduced the alliance's raison d'être to a one-dimensional international military organisation. Nevertheless, the political aspect cannot be forgotten. It is not only the EU that has served as a force for integration and reconciliation across the European continent. Not only did NATO contain the Soviet threat, but it also helped the EU deal with most of the internal conflicts within the Union: between France and Germany, Greece and Turkey, and Central and Eastern Europe in the post-Soviet space. Now, at the beginning of 2023, while the war in Ukraine is still going on, the EU and NATO have come together again with their third joint declaration. With a specific and dedicated space to harmonise all these differences, hybrid threats have become fundamental to political agendas, including creating a resilient European energy market and cyberspace. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fostered the transatlantic partnership in an unprecedented way, making it clear that NATO remains the backbone of the collective defence of the European continent and the Euro-Atlantic area.

Examining China’s Total Fertility Rate

This cross-collaborative report between Conflict and Security and China Watch provides a broad overview of the challenges and internal security risks China will face in the coming decades due to its declining total fertility rate (TFR). Through providing explanations for its current decline in TFR, this report demonstrates how simply reversing the one-child policy will not solve China’s demographic crisis. Given this background, key social, economic, and political domestic risks heightened by China’s declining TFR are explored, with a focus also on potential international ramifications as well.

Read the report HERE

Mapping Transnational Organised Crime

This special report with the Conflict and Security Watch examines the risks that stem from transnational organised crime activities. Taking a case study approach, we explore some of the most pervasive criminal markets including those of illicit drugs, arms, charcoal, timber, and most devastatingly, humans. From these analyses, we find that organised crime can create or compound several threats to operations including undermining human rights consideration, sustainability initiatives, and fuelling corruption and conflict.

Read the report HERE

War in Europe Accelerates Nordic Defence Cooperation - A Comprehensive Analysis of a Changing Nordic Region

As the war in Ukraine enters its tenth month, the geopolitical landscape of Europe is rapidly changing in response to the aggression. In particular, the war is fundamentally changing security policies in the Nordic region, strengthening beliefs in common security interests and investment priorities, and accelerating Nordic security and defence cooperation. These developments indicate a shift towards a higher level of geostrategic awareness among the Nordic countries, which shapes the dynamics of the regional security discourse.

These regional changes come at a time when Russia is increasing its efforts to taunt its Nordic neighbours. Relations between Norway and Russia have deteriorated in recent years due to increased hostile Russian activities. Norway has seen a surge of Russian drone activity around its critical infrastructure and sensitive facilities, which has resulted in diplomatic disputes between the two countries’ ambassadors. Furthermore, the sabotage of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline in September has increased the vigilance of the Nordic nations. Thus, the threat of infrastructure sabotage by an adversary strengthens the need to coordinate security policies between countries.

One of the measurable effects of the war is the increase in defence spending seen in all new budgets in the Nordic countries. The Norwegian government, led by Labour Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, recently released its new budget, providing for an increase of 7.2 billion Norwegian kroner (around USD 665 million) for its national defence. The country has also demonstrated its commitment to deterring Russia by circumventing its own laws and joining the EU in providing arms to Ukraine, justifying it by the extraordinary situation. Sweden seeks to increase its military spending to meet the NATO target of 2% of GDP by 2026, increasing its defence budget by USD 800 million for the 2023 budget. Finland has decided on a large boost of USD 2.2 billion over the next four years, as it considers that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed its security environment

The most important change seen after 24 February 2022, is the joint NATO application of Sweden and Finland. The accession of these two countries to the transatlantic defence alliance fundamentally changes the geopolitical orientation of European security and broadens the dimensions of security concerns of NATO members from Norway to the entire Nordic region. The increase in the number of countries operating within the NATO framework produces many opportunities to strengthen deterrence capabilities against an aggressive Russia and simplifies the ability of countries to integrate their defence capabilities to ensure a more secure Nordic region. Swedish and Finnish NATO membership will strengthen the voice of Northern European nations in the organisation and will increase the capability of other Atlantic-oriented members to promote their interests. This means that a geographical focus on the North could develop into a strategic priority for the organisation in the coming years, determined in large part by developments in the war in Ukraine.

However, other interesting developments illustrate accelerated Nordic efforts outside NATO. The five Nordic prime ministers met in Oslo on 15 August and issued a joint statement on increased cooperation in security and defence. In the statement, the countries listed their ambitions for further cooperation, including exploring opportunities for political cooperation on security issues in the region, actively contributing to the development and strengthening of NATO, and strengthening classified communication channels between relevant ministries and institutions. The statement explicitly mentions Russia’s war of aggression as a primary reason for the need to strengthen Nordic defence cooperation. This demonstrates how changing geopolitical circumstances are both transforming foreign and security policy doctrines within the EU, but also accelerating increased cooperation between the Nordic countries. Furthermore, a week before the meeting, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden established a framework for cooperation on matters of military equipment. This framework builds on a treaty ratified by the five countries in 2015, which at the time only regulated the main principles of cooperation related to military equipment.

Security cooperation in the Nordic region is not new. The process of integrating the Nordic military forces has been an objective since the formalisation of the NORDEFCO in November 2009. NORDEFCO was established in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis as an austerity measure to optimise defence expenditure. Nordic security and defence cooperation has traditionally been seen as a supplement to existing security frameworks rather than a necessity for the countries, as Norwegian and Danish defence coordination has been embedded within NATO, while Sweden and Finland have sought to operate independently. This has led to NORDEFCO being treated as a secondary structure in Nordic security and defence policy. However, following the war in Ukraine, Nordic countries are showing a renewed commitment to cooperate with each other. The Presidium of the Nordic Council recently hosted a meeting with the chair of NORDEFCO, Norwegian Minister of Defence Bjørn Arild Gram, along with the leaders of the Nordic parliamentary defence committees. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future of Nordic defence cooperation, stressing that NORDEFCO should be updated within the framework of NATO.

The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO will provide new opportunities for Nordic cooperation. Their expected membership will provide new areas for Nordic forces to operate in, more military bases, and aircraft. The Nordic countries alone will have 250 fighter jets, including about 150 F-35 jets and a considerable number of Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. Currently, the individual forces are coordinated separately by the air forces of their respective states. However, to further strengthen Nordic defence cooperation, military officials have called for an assessment of the possibilities of establishing a NATO military air headquarters in the Nordic region. Already in June 2022, a joint NATO air defence exercise involving Sweden and Finland was held, indicating optimism for further integration of Nordic air defence.

In addition to multilateral cooperation under NORDEFCO, bi- and trilateral agreements are also being negotiated to further integrate the Nordic militaries. On  22 November, Norway signed an agreement with Sweden and Finland, with the central objective of planning operations between the parties in strategically vulnerable areas, discussions, and scenario-based exercises in accordance with national operational plans and common security challenges. The possibilities for deepening ties between the Nordic defence institutions thus appear to be dynamic and multi-layered, providing flexibility for the different states to formalise their cooperation interests on different platforms.

In sum, developments in the region indicate a paradigm shift in the perception of the Nordic nations as a geopolitical region, which proves that there is a before and after 24 February 2022 in Europe. Although Nordic security cooperation in its current form is more of an alignment than an alliance, the evidence from this analysis suggests that the deepening of the cooperation through formal institutions offers opportunities to become a central element of European security collaboration in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, a more integrated common Nordic security and defence policy also has the potential to contribute to a stronger security community outside the region, as it can place the Nordic countries in a common European framework outside NATO. If this can be achieved, the region could experience an increased level of security, which is needed given its geostrategic situation.

Moore v. Harper: A Supreme Court decision that could reshape the American political landscape

2022 is proving to be a defining year for US Supreme Court decisions. Over the summer, the Court effectively overturned Roe v. Wade nationwide, leaving abortion legislation to the states. The decision upended decades of settled law and set a precedent for the court to overturn other seemingly settled issues.

One case under review by the Court this autumn and winter is Moore v. Harper. In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether or not a state’s House of Representatives has ultimate authority over federal elections in their state, especially over the drawing of electoral districts. The case was brought to the Court by representatives of the North Carolina state legislature who are challenging the state court’s authority over elections.

The North Carolina state legislature’s argument is based on a theory known as the “independent state legislature (ISL) theory.” Proponents of the ISL theory suggest that state legislatures, particularly lower houses, are granted near absolute authority over federal elections in their states. This notion is based on two clauses of the US Constitution: the Elections Clause, which gives state legislatures wide-ranging powers over federal elections in their state, and the Presidential Electors Clause, which directs state legislatures to appoint electors to choose the president.

Based on the Court’s rulings in 2022, it seems possible that it will side with the North Carolina legislature’s reading of the Constitution, which empowers state legislatures to enact laws governing elections - such as the drawing of electoral districts.

The risk to elections

If the Supreme Court sides with the North Carolina legislators, electoral integrity in the United States could be called into question. For example, state legislatures would be able to gerrymander, that is, manipulate the boundaries of electoral districts to the benefit of one party or the other, without any checks over their ability to do so. 

As a result, if North Carolina’s new electoral maps are accepted, it will hand the Republican Party 10 of North Carolina’s 14 congressional districts (71% of the state’s seats). The potential imbalance is illustrated by the 2020 presidential election: 49.93% voted for Trump, while 48.59% voted for Biden in 2020. Similar figures were shown in the 2022 midterms: 52% of voters voted Republican and 48% Democrat in the House elections, while the state Senate election resulted in 50% of voters voting Republican and 47% Democrat.

FiveThirtyEight, a news outlet specialising in opinion polls, illustrated how gerrymandering can be used to shape national elections. Using Michigan as an example, the competition for seats in the House of Representatives is as follows: 4 democrats, 6 Republicans, and 4 competitive seats, before redrawing electoral maps. However, the state legislature is controlled by the Republican Party. Therefore, using the precedent set by North Carolina, legislators could return a map with 10 Republican seats to 4 for the Democrats (Michigan voted 50.62% - 47.84% for Biden in 2020 and 47.25% - 47.03% for Trump in 2016). One caveat to this example, however, is the power of the Michigan Election Commission, which currently draws district boundaries. This raises the question of whether, in a post-Moore world where the Supreme Court sides with state legislatures, election commissions would retain their authority or whether legislatures would take it away from them?

A shift in the balance of the House of Representatives could have an impact, however remote, on presidential elections. In 1824, Andrew Jackson won a plurality of the popular vote and the Electoral College. However, as no candidate won an outright majority, the US House of Representatives decided the outcome, resulting in a victory for John Quincy Adams (he won 13 state delegations, Jackson won 7 and William Crawford won 4). Adams was preferred to Jackson mainly because of the successful politicking of his ally Henry Clay. Clay held considerable influence in Congress as Speaker of the House and used it to lobby for the election of Adams at the expense of Jackson who was more popular among the electorate. Clay was eventually rewarded with a position as Secretary of State.

Something similar could happen in the future. One scenario is that the Republican ticket could split in 2024, as Trump has announced his intentions to run, but some Republicans have signalled that they want to move forward with a different candidate, possibly Ron Desantis. In theory, Desantis, Trump, and Biden could all win enough electoral votes that none of them could win a majority. In that case, the House of Representatives, which leans Republican in a majority of states, would choose its preferred candidate. Consequently, state delegations could choose the least popular candidate, causing controversy and contributing to further democratic backsliding.

The risk of violence

Political violence can follow elections for a variety of reasons, such as unfair elections (perceived or real), legislative unresponsiveness, corruption, or any other element that may challenge the legitimacy of the elected body. Partisans, feeling hopeless, then react by going outside the established norms to achieve their political objectives.

An entrenched, unresponsive, and unrepresentative government can be a trigger for political violence. By allowing states to gerrymander their electoral districts, a party can entrench itself in power and cause a section of the population to lose the opportunity to change existing policies. An entrenched party can fall victim to violence if it adopts unpopular policies that are insensitive to the wishes of its citizens or fails to act appropriately when a crisis hits. In the mildest cases, this may take the form of protests, while in the most extreme cases, it could involve rioting, insurrections, and rebellions.

There are concerning signs that a large group of Americans believe that elections are unfair. Prior to the 2020 presidential election, 30% of Republican voters, 13% of Democrats, and 26% of all voters thought that votes would not be counted fairly. Since the 2020 election, the perception of unfairness has only increased, with 28% of voters saying they had little to no confidence in the accuracy of the 2022 midterm elections before they happened.

In 2022, a UC Davis research asked Americans their views on the use of violence for political purposes, and found that one in five respondents thought that political violence is justified, at least in some circumstances. 3%, the equivalent of 7 million Americans, responded that political violence is usually or always justified. It was also found that 7.1% of people (about 18 million people) would be willing to kill a person to advance an important political goal. Similar results have been reported in other studies, confirming that a sizable portion of Americans, at least on paper, would be willing to commit acts of violence in order to advance their preferred policies and candidates.

The January 6 insurrection is the manifestation of the shift in American politics towards violence. But it is not an outlier. Over the last decade, politically motivated violence, also viewed as ideologically motivated terrorism, has increased. Much of this increase in violence can be explained by the growing hostility of partisans to a party they see as a threat to their way of life.

Yet, violence is unlikely to lead to regime change. The vast majority of Americans seem determined to defend democracy and attempt to reform the government institutions through constitutional means. However, if the Supreme Court sides with the North Carolina legislature, political violence could become more common, with more small-scale events rather than large-scale acts of violence. Only time will tell, as the 2022 midterms, as contentious as they were, saw little to no violence. The real test will come in the 2024 presidential election, depending on who runs, as the last presidential election resulted in an insurrection at the US Capitol. 

Exploring Russian Private Military Contractors

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This comprehensive report details the presence, contexts, and activities of various Russian PMCs operating in 20 countries across the globe. Through this, the paper seeks to provide a detailed accounting of their impact as well as provide insight into the origins of Russian PMC organisations, their particular relationships, the key actors among them, their operations, and utilisation by the Russian state, as well as other actors, through a comparative lens.

Read the report HERE