Widespread political instability in Pakistan after the attempted assassination of Khan
On 3 November 2022, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was the victim of an assassination attempt while demonstrating against his removal from office in the Wazirabad district of Punjab province. Khan was on top of a container-mounted truck giving a speech to his supporters when he was attacked by what the state interior minister describes as a “religious extremist.” The attacker had been radicalised by religious extremists and had specifically attacked Khan for what he allegedly believed to be blasphemous remarks during speeches. The attacker confirmed that he acted alone. The attack took place as Khan was travelling in a large convoy of trucks and cars towards Islamabad, the state capital.
Pakistan has a long history of assassinations of its political leaders. The first Prime Minister to be assassinated was Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. The late Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in December 2007 after escaping an assassination attempt in October 2007, while addressing a rally similar to Khan’s. Khan is the latest political leader in Pakistan to be the subject of an assassination attempt. He accused current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah, and a senior military official of orchestrating the attack on Khan’s convoy.
Khan has been protesting since he was removed as Prime Minister in April 2022 by a vote of no-confidence in Pakistan’s National Assembly. The attack raises new concerns about the growing instability in Pakistan, as Pakistani society has become increasingly polarised since Khan’s ouster. The former prime minister successfully mobilised mass rallies across the country by selling his supporters a narrative that he was ousted by a US-led “foreign conspiracy” in collaboration with the Pakistan Democratic Movement – Pakistan’s opposition parties to Khan’s Pakistan Movement for Justice (PTI) – as well as the powerful military.
The attack on Khan risks sparking violence across Pakistan and increasing political instability and insecurity in a country recovering from unprecedented floods that killed over 1600 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Before leaving Lahore, Khan described his protest as a peaceful march. He said his political struggle against the government would continue until the Sharif administration accepts his demand for early elections or the army intervenes and uses its political power to demand early elections. The Sharif government has repeatedly stated that the next general election would be held as scheduled in August 2023.
Since the attack, state authorities have deployed additional security around Islamabad to deter any confrontation or violence. In the wake of the assassination attempt, Khan’s supporters began to “step-up protests with road blockages” across the country, and in towns and cities, protesters took to the streets in support of Khan. In Rawalpindi, a garrison city that houses the army’s headquarters, Khan’s supporters began shooting slogans and burning tyres. As a result, education authorities ordered the closure of schools and cancelled exams for two days on account of the “prevailing law and order situation” in the city. The decision to close schools was taken after school vans, ambulances and the general public were stranded at different places during protests. Khan’s political party called on its supporters to “protest peacefully” until the three officials accused of orchestrating the attack on his life resign and early parliamentary elections are held. The protests escalated when the Punjab police appeared reluctant to prosecute an army officer whom Khan and his party accused of masterminding the attack, because of his senior position in Pakistan’s intelligence services. The Supreme Court issued an ultimatum to the Punjab police to prosecute the accused within 24 hours.
It is likely that the popularity of Khan and his political party will increase, and that dissent within Pakistani society will grow in the near future. The armed forces will be challenged by Khan’s popularity as it is widely believed in Pakistan that the military brought Khan to power due to its political influence within the state. Furthermore, when relations soured, senior military commanders became neutral in their political stance leading to Khan’s exit from power. Participation in the marches is expected to increase as Khan continues to target the armed forces and the “imported government” in his speeches. As Khan has completed his recovery and aims to return to the stage, we can expect tensions to escalate between the incumbent government and the PTI protesters. Based on previous attempts by the PTI to enter the capital, it would be fair to suggest that if demonstrators begin marching towards Islamabad there is a high probability of violence and clashes between protestors and law enforcement authorities securing the capital. The threat of violence is imminent in Pakistan’s political gatherings. There is also reason to believe that protesters have been armed whilst attending PTI rallies.
Historically, the Pakistani military has dominated the country's politics since the state gained independence. The military and the bureaucracy have been dominant institutions of the state and have remained so because the state has been unable to distance itself from its colonial legacy. The military has been involved in numerous military coups that have weakened the process of democratic consolidation within the state. Since President Musharraf’s ouster, the military has controlled Pakistani political affairs from the outside. The civilian government is typically composed of pre-partition classes that align themselves with the armed forces in order to preserve their elitist interests. The military opposes any questioning of national security and foreign policy issues, and jealously guards its institutional interests within the state. Given the critical role of the military in Pakistan, the retirement of the current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) will be a turning point for Khan and his party. Indeed, the incoming COAS, General Asim Munir, was chief of intelligence when Khan had come into power in 2018. Khan had replaced Munir with LT Faiz Hameed after Khan and Munir fell out. It can therefore be argued that Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif’s nomination of Munir could be politically motivated and threaten Khan’s chances of coming to power.
Following the no-confidence vote that removed Khan from office, he has repeatedly accused the military for playing a role in his removal. However, Khan’s accusations are not intended to displace the military’s hegemony within the state, but rather are a “tactic to mount pressure on the military to concede to his demands” to dismiss the coalition government and force early elections. As such, the potential of shifting away from Pakistan’s hybrid system of governance, which consists of a supreme army and subservient civilian government, is unlikely despite Khan’s strained relations with the armed forces. Whether or not Khan succeeds in securing early elections, Pakistan’s democratic backsliding will remain unaffected, as political leaders rely on the support of the armed forces. Pakistan’s President and founding member of the PTI, Arif Alvi, has decided to act according to the constitution and law by approving the nomination of General Asim Munir, irrespective of PTI’s strained relations with the army. This can also be interpreted as a peace offering from the PTI, which is seeking closer ties with senior army officers. IK also welcomed the new military chief and praised the military as a “professional force”, but added that they must obey the constitution. That said, the military has never been so criticised since Khan began protesting against his removal from office. Therefore, further governmental instability can be expected, as well as a relatively similar hybrid relationship between the civilian government and senior military commanders.
Khan recently attended his first rally since his assassination attempt. He decided not to pursue his original intention of marching to Islamabad and protest against the incumbent government, which he accused of conspiring with the US. This decision risked aggravating the political turmoil in the nuclear-armed country, which is in the throes of an economic crisis. Instead, Khan decided that his party would resign from state assemblies in a new bid to push for early elections. The PTI has already resigned from the federal parliament but remains in power in two provinces and two administrative units – Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Dissolution will create major chaos in the country leaving state officials no choice but to call for early elections. While Khan will not be marching to Islamabad, his ‘Haqeeqi March’ movement will continue protesting in cities across Pakistan, which could have an impact on daily life and business. More than ever, Pakistan faces the likelihood of governmental instability and political unrest.
Elections in Tunisia: Political Unrest to Come?
Tunisia is preparing for parliamentary elections on 17 December 2022, an event that could be the final step in cementing the power of President Kais Saied. The elections are set to be the culmination of the Tunisian political crisis, which has dragged on since mid-2021. Although the results are unlikely to bring any surprises, the event is destined to bring large-scale instability.
Turnout is expected to be low as the main opposition parties have decided to boycott the elections, which are guided by the new electoral law that imposes restrictive measures on candidates. In addition, Tunisia has recently adopted a new constitution that significantly restricts the powers of parliament. With this, hopes for political change are rather unlikely, thus contributing to low turnout expectations.
With such a bleak outlook, the events leading up to and following the elections will be crucial. The Tunisian political crisis has been going on for over two years after President Kais Saied dissolved parliament. With tensions and stakes so high, the planned protests could very well turn violent, as they have in the past. How these events unfold will determine the political stability and state of democracy in Tunisia.
Where it all began
The political crisis in Tunisia started on 25 July 2021, when Kais Saied dismissed the government and Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi while also halting the activities of the parliament to appease those protesting against the government. Subsequently, President Kais Saied claimed all executive power. In the following months, he faced massive protests and calls from opposition parties to restore the balance of power. However, this was only the beginning of democratic backsliding in Tunisia.
The situation was further exacerbated on 6 February 2021, when the president dissolved the Supreme Judiciary Council, which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. This was another attack on the country’s democratic institutions, signalling that Kais Saied’s power grab was not temporary.
To further limit any challenges to Saied’s rule, a new constitution was drafted, setting limits to the Assembly of the People's Representatives and concentrating executive power in the hands of the president. The draft of the new constitution was approved in a widely unpopular referendum, with the opposition boycotting it. Although the referendum approved the new constitution, the low turnout highlighted the lethargy and political apathy into which the country had sunk.
The last remaining hope was the parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2022. However, the electoral law was amended by a presidential decree introduced on 15 September 2022. This change came shortly before the deadline for announcing candidacies, which was set between 17 and 24 October 2022, thus significantly limiting the number of those who could stand for election. The new law changed the requirements for candidates, making it considerably more difficult to obtain the required support and endorsements, while leaving out the gender parity clause intended to ensure diverse representation.
The new law also limits the involvement of political parties in campaigns, which severely weakens their chances in the run-up to the elections. Unsurprisingly, the limitations imposed on political parties, designed to weaken any opposition to Saied, have led to announcements of boycotts of the upcoming elections. All these measures mean that the election results will not bring many surprises or significant changes that could have an impact on the autocratisation of Tunisia. However, it is the events leading up to and following the parliamentary elections that will be largely significant. While protests are expected during this period, whether they can be sustained in the long-term and bring about change will depend on external factors.
Economic indicators and crucial foreign aid
Although political apathy and a flawed electoral system are unlikely to be the cause of political change, external pressures could have an impact on the current political situation. While opposition forces struggle to unite and organise due to past antagonisms, Kais Saied's position remains protected by the contingent support of the influential Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) labour union.
The seemingly symbiotic but fragile relationship means that the president relies on the widely supported UGTT and its power to quell protests or dissent. This could change as Tunisia’s economic situation worsens, with inflation soaring high and foreign aid becoming a significant source of economic recovery and stability for the country. In negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tunisia has managed to secure a staff-level agreement on a loan of approximately US$2 billion to stabilise the economy. However, the IMF is demanding strict measures regarding state-owned enterprises, which is a source of concern for the UGTT, and could jeopardise relations between the government and the union if the president complies with the restrictive measures. The loan package is a lifeline offered to the Tunisian economy affected by COVID-19, high inflation, and the war in Ukraine. Yet, delivering the necessary economic changes under the current IMF agreement could anger the UGTT to the point that it would support the protests. The already tense political situation could flare up and become violent.
Future outlook
Negotiations with the IMF and the UGTT will determine whether Kais Saied will succeed in both parties, while domestically, the opposition or trade unions will probably organise large-scale demonstrations that could easily turn violent. Democratic backsliding has been going on for over two years and Kais Saied has managed the transition to an authoritarian system with an iron fist and repressive measures. However, resisting external pressures in the form of IMF demands without upsetting the carefully balanced authoritarian regime will be an additional difficulty. For the opposition parties, the failure of Kais Saied and a conflict with the UGTT would give them a second wind to fuel efforts for systematic political change. Thus, the coming weeks will be crucial in determining Tunisia’s political future.
Landslides in Venezuela: Climate Refugees and Increased Political Risk
Throughout the month of October, Venezuela’s northern cities of Maracay and Las Tejerías were severely impacted by continuous and heavy rainfall. As a result, landslides and inundations affected both towns and their surroundings. Located less than 100 kilometres away from the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, the region is facing not only significant infrastructural damage, but also considerable human losses: more than 55 people have lost their lives, and at least eight remain missing. Moreover, local authorities estimate that 1,160 families have been directly or indirectly impacted, contributing to a potential group of displaced people that could amount to approximately 3,770 individuals.
Although some news websites have exclusively associated the heavy and abundant rainfall with the natural weather phenomenon La Niña, a “climate pattern that describes the cooling of surface ocean water along the tropical west coast of South America”, according to National Geographic, other sources have drawn attention to climate change and its impacts. It is suggested that intense rainfall events and other extreme weather events are directly linked to climate change. In addition, reports of heavy rainfall and severe flooding in Venezuela from 2015, prior to La Niña, seem to indicate that climate pattern is not the only factor at play. It is worth noting that, according to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), “all naturally occurring climate events now take place in the context of human-induced climate change.” In this sense, the current La Niña event has become the first “triple-dip” of the century, lasting for an unusually long period, from 2020 to 2022. A cautious and nuanced approach to the matter would lead to the conclusion that both natural weather events and human-induced climate change are responsible for natural disasters as severe as those that occurred in Maracay and Las Tejerías.
The landslides in Venezuela and their aftermath highlight an often overlooked phenomenon that links climate change and the current climate emergency with political risk and security threats. In particular, there are several ways through which climate change can operate as a threat multiplier. One of them is the emergence of climate migrants and, subsequently, climate refugees, which involve migration, displacements, and mass movements of people as a by-product of climate-related disasters.
Data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shows that the number of people displaced by such disasters since 2010 amounts to 21.5 million worldwide, indicating that this is an urgent issue. Furthermore, Venezuela is currently facing a major migrant and refugee crisis: more than 7 million have been displaced from their homes as a consequence of critical political, economic, security, and social conditions. According to USA for UNHCR, “rampant violence, inflation, gang-warfare, soaring crime rates as well as shortages of food, medicine, and essential services have forced millions to seek refuge in neighboring countries and beyond”, resulting in an 8,000% increase in the number of Venezuelan refugees since 2014.
In this context, climate change-related disasters and severe weather conditions are likely to have a twofold negative impact on Venezuela’s current state of affairs. Firstly, these events have the potential to significantly increase the number of migrants, especially internally displaced populations. As mentioned, on this occasion alone, more than a thousand families have partially or totally lost their homes and have therefore been forced to relocate, sometimes even abandoning the area completely. Secondly, such weather conditions worsen the already vulnerable and highly exposed situation of the groups that have been displaced or are migrating due to other concerns, be they political, economic, or otherwise. Whether living under precarious conditions as internally displaced populations or migrating to neighbouring countries to formally leave Venezuela, there is an increased risk of serious injuries, illness, and even death due to extreme weather events.
Beyond the direct consequences affecting the safety of displaced populations, other issues are likely to arise. As seen in several cases in Western Europe, a sharp increase in foreign migrant and refugee flows can negatively impact the political landscape of host countries, by fostering political polarisation and facilitating the rise of far-right politicians. The social trends underlying such political developments contribute to the destabilising potential of refugee crises, manifesting in the adoption of reactionary discourses and hate speech, the regular occurrence of episodes of harassment and discrimination, and the rise of hate crimes. In this context, it is worth noting that large migrant influxes and refugee crises are considered to aggravate and expose already existing problems in a country, rather than creating them directly. By potentially increasing the number of displaced people and deteriorating the livelihoods and living conditions of migrants, climate change intensifies political risk in this sense, as it does in many other ways.
Particularly, the recent landslides in Venezuela and the subsequent displacement of people are of great concern given that the country is already experiencing an acute refugee crisis. The 2022 Refugee and Migrant Needs Analysis (RMNA) published by the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants (R4V) suggests that, of the 7.1 million Venezuelan refugees aforementioned, 4.3 million face difficulties in accessing food, housing, and stable employment. In other words, more than half of the refugees and migrants from Venezuela struggle to access basic services in Latin America and the Caribbean, making it “difficult for many to rebuild their lives and integrate into host societies.” While Colombia has received the largest number of Venezuelans (1.8 million), Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and the United States have also taken in large numbers of refugees. These countries, as well as others in the region, are already facing their own socio-economic and security challenges, mostly related to growing inequalities, unemployment, and soaring crime rates. Thus, a larger inflow of migrants due to difficult climatic conditions is likely to exacerbate existing social tensions in the receiving countries. In 2018, the Colombian government expelled 18 Venezuelan migrants from refugee camps after some caused unrest by fighting over food and others stole from a van. Examples like this feed into the “overall rising levels of xenophobia and discrimination [which] continue to pose barriers to refugees’ and migrants’ access to rights and services, influencing overall social cohesion in host communities”, as stated in the RMNA. Additionally, even though the Venezuelan economy is now showing signs of slow but steady recovery, difficult living conditions and food shortage persist. Such violent episodes are also likely to occur among internally displaced groups.
Immediate and timely response from the local and national authorities is necessary, but not sufficient. Further critical scrutiny of the effects of climate change becomes decisive, including an assessment of the specific manifestation of climate change in each regional context as extreme weather events and an evaluation of how structural and/or systemic deficiencies might make local populations vulnerable to them. Even more pressing is the formulation of an evidence-based strategy to tackle the already well-known contributing factors to climate change, on the one hand, and to reduce the risk posed by the resulting severe weather conditions, on the other.
The Truce Ended, What's Next for Yemen?
Failure to extend the truce agreement
The warring parties of the protracted conflict in Yemen failed to extend a six-month-long truce that ended on 2 October 2022. The failure to renew and prolong the UN-brokered ceasefire is a massive blow to the fragile negotiations led by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg. The original agreement, which came into force on 2 April 2022, has been renewed twice. However, this time, a stalemate in the negotiations and a rapid escalation of the conflict loom over the future of the truce.
The initial truce agreement in addition to the suspension of hostilities and cooperation relied on three major points: (1) allowing a limited number of commercial flights to Sana’a airport, (2) allowing entry of fuel ships into the Red Sea port of Hodeida, and (3) opening road access to the city of Taiz. The last, and currently the most contentious issue has seen the least amount of progress since the truce came into effect. While optimism for a lasting and sustainable peace agreement overshadowed the developments, the worsening crisis in Taiz steadily became a major impediment. Despite a reported significant decrease in casualties, the roads to Taiz remained closed, blocking humanitarian aid, emergency transits, and work travel, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.
As it currently stands, the Houthi rebels have declared that the negotiations have stalled, claiming that they have made too many concessions without seeing any positive results. Conversely, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which is the initiative of the anti-Houthi bloc to replace former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and unite the opposition forces, opposes the deadlock, arguing that the Houthis are hindering the peace process and not demonstrating an honest commitment to resolving the conflict. The statements highlight the lack of trust between the negotiating sides revealing a gradually more incompatible perspective. As an immediate reaction to the failure UN Special Envoy Grundberg called for restraint on all sides to avoid a rapid escalation that could set back any progress made since 2 April 2022.
The Houthi long game
The strategy of the Houthi rebels looks like a bet on dragging out the negotiations, despite the territories under their control remaining overly reliant on humanitarian aid with limited supplies. This move could potentially expose the weaknesses of the PLC which is struggling to maintain a united front in its objectives. Repeated instances of infighting reveal that the anti-Houthi coalition is deeply divided. The idea of a representative PLC backed by both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi brought previous grievances and the unsettled issue of southern secession to the forefront. To the Houthi leadership, this signalled rifts in the opposition that could rapidly escalate, especially without a ceasefire agreement that forces the anti-Houthi coalition to act united.
A Security Council Forecast for October 2022 highlighted the readiness of Houthis to restore to active warfare yet again. Empowered by the gradually more observable internal struggles of the PLC, the rebels held multiple military parades and attempted to encircle Taiz further. The latest developments show worrying signs that hostilities could return and escalate rapidly, while hopes for extending the truce for the third time begin to fade.
The future
The upcoming weeks will be critical in determining the future of the conflict in Yemen. As the divide between the warring sides becomes more outlined, and unresolved grievances weaken the PLC, the progress achieved by the 6-month-long truce is under threat. The United Nations Security Council is expected to keep the developments in Yemen high on its agenda while following Grundberg’s course of action. Avoiding an escalation is the priority as the UN Special Envoy already cautioned the parties to refrain from engaging in hostilities until the negotiations about the future of the truce are resolved. However, Grundberg faces an additional hurdle as the Houthis are accused of hijacking the negotiations for their objectives while giving no concessions. Should Grundberg achieve extending the truce agreement for the third time, it will be crucial to achieve constructive engagement from all the parties and avoid false optimism with superficial gains.
Iran Update: Protests Continue, Islamic Republic Falters
Now entering the 18th day of protests in Iran, the momentum and mass mobilizations behind calls for Mahsa (Zhina) Amini’s justice have spread worldwide. Protests continue in all 31 provinces of Iran, and the Iran Human Rights group estimates the death toll to be 133 as of Sunday, 2 October.
Crackdowns are increasingly targeting ethnic minorities and student groups. Late Sunday night, Iranian police stormed and laid siege to Sharif University, where students have been organising protests and boycotting classes. Videos from the University show students chanting against Ayatollah Khamenei early Sunday morning. Reports emerged that evening of police surrounding the entrances to the University – shutting students in and firing live ammunition and tear gas. On 1 October, a planned boycott of classes began across 100 universities in Iran, cementing the centrality of universities in the protests. By law, Iranian uniformed police cannot enter university campuses, although reports of plainclothes officers entering and shooting at protesting students have been increasing. Just on Friday, 30 September, the deadliest confrontation between protesters and police occurred in the southeast area of Zahedan, where 19 were killed as minority Sunni Baluchi worshippers exited Friday prayers at the Makki Grand Mosque.
Iranian police forces are additionally targeting prominent celebrities and public figures in hopes to highlight the wide-reaching ability of the Islamic Republic. Last week, Elahe Mohammadi and Niloufar Hamedi, two prominent journalists responsible for covering and reporting on Amini’s death, were arrested. Singer Shervin Hajipour, who went viral across the world for his songs composed of protesters’ tweets, was also arrested. Meanwhile, Iranian officials call the acts of solidarity from journalists, celebrities, and athletes ‘fanning the flames’ of the protests. In arresting high-profile figures, the Islamic Republic has done the opposite of diminishing protesters’ drive – it has only emboldened them.
Similarly, international mobilisation has increased significantly, with the Iranian diaspora in major cities organising solidarity protests. 1 October was deemed an international day of protest, which saw collective action in Washington DC, Brussels, Cologne, Amsterdam, New York, Los Angeles, Montreal, Barcelona, and others. International figures such as Bella Hadid, Angelina Jolie, Nazanin Boniadi, and more are also drawing attention to the protests and calling for support. In the political and diplomatic realm, the UN has condemned the protests. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has been pushing the EU for further sanctions on Tehran, with France appearing to support the move. The United States has introduced a new round of sanctions in hopes of “severely restricting” Iranian oil and petrochemical exports, while keeping previous sanctions in place. Notably, the Biden Administration has linked these new sanctions, which target one of Iran’s primary exports, to Iran’s alleged failure to meet a renewed nuclear deal, not to the recent protests. While showing support for the protests, the Administration has noted that it is willing to sign a nuclear deal based on mutual compliance.
Meanwhile, the response from the Islamic Republic has been incohesive, signifying Iran’s flailing attempts at controlling the protests. Ayatollah Khameini has been notably abstaining from commenting on the protests, while other top leaders have urged security forces to harshly deal with those engaging in the protests. In absence of a top-down political directive, Amnesty International uncovered an official document from the General Headquarters of Armed Forces on 21 September that urges security forces to “severely confront troublemakers and anti-revolutionaries”. In addition, the Islamic Republic is engaging in the flare-up of regional conflicts in an attempt to cast a shadow on the protests. On 28 September, Iran launched 73 ballistic missiles into Iraq’s Kurdish region targeting opposition groups and killing at least nine civilians.
Iran’s targeting of Iraqi Kurdish opposition is crucial to the significant undertone of the protests: Kurdish identity and the Islamic Republic’s historic treatment of Kurdish communities. Mahsa (Zhina) Amini was a Kurdish woman from Iran’s Kurdish-dominated northwest, and the Islamic Republic’s response has not shied away from blaming Iranian Kurdish dissidents for causing and amplifying the protests. The protest chant, “Women, life, freedom” has emerged as the leading rallying call globally to represent the protests, a phrase that comes from the Kurdish “Jin Jiyan Azadî” which has been traced to Kurdish women’s organising throughout the region. Activists are increasingly noting the importance of Iran’s historic suppression of Kurdish regions and communities, and the protests – in addition to calling for women’s rights and “Death to the Dictator” – also feature a significant call for Kurdish justice and rights.
The sustained protests have captured the globe in ways far different from protests in recent Iranian history. The current women, student, and minority-led movement highlights the solidarity across groups, and international calls for justice have ranged from celebrities to heads of state. As the protests enter their third week, some significant domestic and international factors should be given particular attention:
The call for increased EU sanctions by the German Foreign Minister and the addition of new sanctions by the Biden Administration are concerning. Sanctions over the past decade have effectively crushed Iran’s economy, leading to internal discontent, as evidenced by the 2019 protests, which were ignited by rising fuel prices. Activists are drawing attention to how the sanctions are most damaging to women, working-class people, and ethnic minorities – the very communities that are at the roots of the current protests. Further economic sanctions, even if framed in response to Iran’s alleged noncompliance with a renewed nuclear deal, will embolden the Islamic Republic to continue its crackdown. Iranian officials’ targeting of public figures and journalists domestically and abroad highlight how any international action against the Islamic Republic will likely be framed in ways that target protesters.
The current mobilisation of the Iranian diaspora is unparalleled in recent history. It will be crucial to pay utmost attention to the calls being made from Iranians and others abroad, as they will not only remind the Islamic Republic that solidarity exists beyond borders, but will also play a significant role in how states within the EU, as well as the United States, respond.
The Islamic Republic’s disjointed response signifies Tehran’s flailing strategic arms in attempting to crack down on the protests. Iranian President Raisi’s participation in the UN General Assembly at the beginning of the protests made a brutal crackdown – similar to what happened in 2019 – impossible. Raisi’s return to Iran from New York might have been too late into the protests’ international spread for Tehran to institute crackdowns similar to 2019. Instead, Iran’s current strategy has consisted of vague and contradictory signals. The silence from Ayatollah Khamenei and Raisi’s continual use of enemy conspiracy language reduces the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic in executing a cohesive response. The directive from the armed forces headquarters that seemingly allows and encourages violence against protesters alludes that instead of a diplomatic or political response, the policy on demonstrations comes from the security forces themselves. This fractured approach might be serving as a way to shield the Ayatollah – and therefore the Islamic Republic – from critique as Khameini ages and his successor is being sought out. However, reports are noting internal factions over the search, with one hardline official being quoted saying “this race has caused disarray inside the leadership. The deepening rift is the last thing we need when the country is in turmoil.”
The future of the Islamic Republic seemingly coincides with these unprecedented protests, and the combination of a flailing domestic strategy, international diaspora attention, and misguided calls for sanctions constitute a serious destabilising factor not only for Iran, but for the region as a whole.
Mozambique: Unwarranted Optimism in the Face of Renewed Terrorist Attacks
On 20 September, Mozambique’s President Filipe Nyusi landed in Mocímboa da Praia in Northern Mozambique, about a year after the town was recaptured from armed groups of Islamist extremists linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The visit was strategic as Nyusi attempts to assert the security of the region and the stability of the country despite a succession of attacks since the beginning of 2022. It also coincided with the visit of the European Union Training Mission in Mozambique by a delegation of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, where Nathalie Loiseau, Member of the European Parliament and Chair of the Subcommittee underlined the need to accelerate the delivery of military material to the Mozambican armed forces. The handover of military equipment started on 9 September following the official visit to Mozambique of the EU High Representative, Josep Borrell. Borrell stressed that even though all eyes are on Ukraine at the moment, the EU remains concerned about all the crises in the world. This renewed focus on Mozambique is strategic, as the EU seeks new energy suppliers in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Mozambique, which has the third largest gas reserves in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria, is a potential gas supplier to the EU. It is expected to start exporting liquified natural gas (LNG) for the first time, with upcoming shipments from ENI’s Coral-Sul floating LNG project. The company confirmed its interest in other hydrocarbon exploration areas and therefore its willingness to participate in the 6th licensing round organised by Mozambique’s National Petroleum Institute. TotalEnergies is another major player in the development of LNG with a $20 billion project still waiting to resume. The project was interrupted in 2021 following jihadist attacks that led to the Battle of Palma in Cabo Delgado Province. At the time, the company declared a situation of ‘force majeure’ and evacuated all employees. Last June the company made it public that it would resume work once it was certain the area was secured. On 16 September, Mozambique Finance Minister Max Tonela expressed optimism that the company would eventually resume the LNG project by March 2023. Similarly, Nyusi urged Western energy companies to resume work in Northern Mozambique, assuring them that stability has returned and security has improved.
However, the current security landscape in the northern region should raise concerns. A severe humanitarian crisis continues to affect nearly 1 million people, all of whom are internally displaced due to violence perpetrated by the Islamist group Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama’ah (ASWJ). The Islamist group has links with ISIL and has managed to defeat the army, leaving behind a trail of death, rapes, sexual enslavement and abductions since the insurgency began in 2017. The attack on Palma, which led to the evacuation of TotalEnergies’ employees in 2021, was carried out by militants of ASWJ. The city was retaken after 11 days of fights and extreme violence against civilians. Sporadic attacks continued in April and May. The situation seemed to improve in the following months thanks to the intervention of the Southern African Development Community forces, and Rwandan troops in July 2021.
Nevertheless, security deteriorated again in 2022. In March 2022, the UN Refugee Agency sounded the alarm about the ongoing violence and related humanitarian crisis in northern Mozambique. According to the agency, security continued to be fragile in some areas, despite localised improvements. In June, new signals of deterioration emerged: the extremist militants launched a campaign of attacks spreading southward, reaching areas such as the previously violence-free districts of Ancuabe, Chiure, and Mecufi. In early September, militants continued to attack villages as they moved south, reaching the Erati and Memba Districts of the Nampula Province. According to a statement by President Nyusi, six citizens were beheaded, three kidnapped, and dozens of houses torched. Government buildings were also set on fire. On 6 September, an Italian nun was killed in Chipene, Memba. According to local authorities, the situation in Nampula Province was stable on 19 September thanks to a large-scale military deployment. In response to these attacks, Tanzania and Mozambique signed an agreement on 21 September to fight terrorism.
The surge in gas demand, the EU’s renewed interest in the country, the state’s desire to see gas projects resume, and the partial successes in the fight against terrorism could lead to an unintentional blindness and unwarranted optimism. According to a report from Cabo Ligado, a conflict observatory in Mozambique, there is no clear evidence that ASWJ has been weakened sufficiently to rule out future attacks of the same complexity as the Palma terror attack. Furthermore, the return of TotalEnergies to Mozambique could be an element of destabilisation. The resumption of the gas project and related activities could fuel grievances and eventually prepare a fertile terrain for the proselytising of ASWJ. TotalEnergies’ activities have caused the displacement of hundreds of families, the expropriation of agricultural land without adequate compensations, and the relocations of families far from their sources of livelihood. Grievances also stem from resentment towards the poverty of the region, which has so far not been able to benefit from the economic spin-offs of the TotalEnergies project. Additionally, during the 2021 escalation, the government deployed military personnel to protect the oil and gas giant’s areas of operations, neglecting the security of local communities. On 21 September, Mozambique’s Public Integrity Center expressed concern about the return of TotalEnergies, calling it hasty and potentially damaging to the security of the Northern Provinces.
At a time when Europe has a vested interest in strengthening ties with Mozambique, and Mozambique has much to gain from demonstrating that it is performing well and managing the terrorist threat to attract oil and gas companies back. Yet, stability in Mozambique remains fragile. Tensions, previously limited to the north of the country, are spreading to the south, while the threat of terrorist attacks persists. Mozambique’s ambition and the EU’s interest in importing LNG from the country could lead to the resumption of gas projects in unstable areas, which could ultimately result in the rapid deterioration of security, with civilians paying the highest price.
Rwandan military assistance to Benin: strategic cooperation in the fight against terrorism
Wilfried Houngbedji, the spokesperson for the Beninese government, officially confirmed on 9 September the upcoming signing of military cooperation with Rwanda. Revealed by the media Africa Intelligence on the same day, the discussion between the two governments started in the spring of 2022, following the visit of Aurélien Agbénonci, the head of Beninese diplomacy, to Rwanda in March. At the end of July, Benin’s Chief of the Defence Staff, Fructueux Gbaguidi, visited Kigali where he held bilateral talks aimed at deepening cooperation between the two countries.
The agreement, which is expected to be implemented during the month of October, will include logistical support and expertise from the Rwandan armed forces in the fight against jihadism, but does not include the deployment of troops on the ground. The number of Rwandan troops expected to be deployed is estimated at around 350, but could double in the future.
The military cooperation occurs as Benin and its neighbours seek to build up their military forces to address the growing threat of terrorism in West Africa. Since the end of 2021, jihadist groups in Niger and Burkina Faso have made inroads into northern Benin and carried out more than 20 terrorist attacks, mainly targeting security forces. At the beginning of December 2021, two Beninese soldiers were killed by terrorists in the town of Porga. Northern Benin experienced several terrorist attacks in the following months, including against the police stations of Monsey and Dassari.
Beninese President Patrice Talon’s decision to partner with Rwanda is part of a response strategy that aims to diversify Benin’s military alliances with states with experience in the fight against terrorism. Rwanda has developed expertise in the field of counter-terrorism and proven the professionalism of its army during its intervention in the Central African Republic and in Mozambique, where it deployed about a thousand soldiers in the north of the country to help the Mozambican government in its fight against jihadists. As such, the country appears as a strategic ally. However, the 35,000-strong army, trained since the 2000s to participate in external operations, has no experience in Benin or in the Sahel, which could limit the relevance of its expertise.
For Rwanda, the advantages of this agreement are threefold. It represents an opportunity to train its army and develop its expertise, especially in foreign environments. By actively employing the army, Paul Kagame also reduces the possibility of a military overthrow, in a country where the armed forces have had a historic role in governance, and where social demands are growing. Finally, sending troops abroad allows Rwanda to expand its influence on the continent and to appear more strongly as a key security actor that can be relied on. The country is the largest African contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in terms of military and police personnel. Kigali is also pushing for reforms to avoid a repeat of the dramatic failures of the UN troops during the Rwandan genocide from happening again. In particular, Rwanda is, alongside the Netherlands and the United States, at the origin of the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, which reform UN operations in terms of decision-making, accountability and resource allocation.
The upcoming months will bear witness to the effectiveness of Rwanda’s assistance to Benin in its fight against terrorism, potentially reinforcing Rwanda’s role as the continent’s key security actor.
Controversy About the Recent EU Parliament Resolution Against Uganda
On Thursday, 15 September, the European Parliament voted an emergency resolution denouncing the repercussions of the mega oil projects planned in Uganda and Tanzania, particularly targeting those of the French oil giant TotalEnergies.
The multinational intends to exploit the substantial reserves of oil sleeping under Lake Albert in Western Uganda, which implies the drilling of more than four hundred wells from December 2022 including 132 in the protected natural area of Murchinson Falls. The output of those wells is expected to be approximately 190,000 barrels per day. This production will be exported to the port of Tanga in Tanzania through a 1,445-kilometre-long underground pipeline heated at more than 50°C. Called the East African Crude Pipeline (EACOP), it will be the longest heated pipeline in the world. TotalEnergies has committed to investing approximately $3.8 billion in this project scheduled to start in 2025. When fully operational, it will emit up to 34 million tons of carbon emissions per year, more than thirty times the current annual amount of carbon air pollution of Uganda and Tanzania combined.
According to a report published by the International Energy Agency in 2021, all new oil and gas extraction plans must be abandoned immediately to limit global warming to 1.5°C from pre-industrial times. This massive oil project thus constitutes a direct threat to human prosperity. At the local scale, it also endangers various sensitive environments. The Murchinson Falls National Park is Uganda’s largest protected natural area, where many vulnerable species such as giraffes and elephants are currently thriving. The deforestation needed to install the project’s infrastructure will significantly alter their natural habitat, which could be irremediably damaged in case of an oil spill. According to the World Wildlife Fund, EACOP will significantly deteriorate as much as 800 square miles of sensitive wildlife habitats as well as a 250-mile stretch of the Lake Victoria basin, on which more than 30 million people depend for their water and food supplies.
Additionally, approximately 18,000 households will have to cede their properties to enable the project’s completion, an effort for which they will only receive a meagre compensation that does not include the value of improvements made since a 2018 assessment. According to local activists, those expropriations will significantly impoverish farmers living along the route of the pipeline. Most of those who have already been expropriated have resorted to planting subsistence crops such as maize instead of cash crops that need more time to mature like bananas and coffee, effectively making them more vulnerable to food insecurity. Residents attempting to resist this process have suffered acts of intimidation and manipulation and been forced to abandon their lands for derisory cash compensation.
The European Parliament’s resolution recommends halting the drilling in protected areas and the postponement of construction work related to EACOP for one year. This delay would be used to contemplate alternative routes for the pipeline to minimise its environmental impact, and “consider other projects based on renewable energies.” The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) also urged the Ugandan and Tanzanian regimes to stop committing human rights violations linked to these oil projects and to fairly indemnify people adversely affected by them. Although non-binding, this resolution has intensified the already significant pressure exerted on TotalEnergies to waive its exploitation rights on the project. The controversy surrounding EACOP is so huge that twenty banks and 13 insurers, including Allianz Group, HSBC and BNP Paribas, have already announced that they would not support the plan.
In Uganda, the resolution was met with outrage. Ugandan lawmakers loudly condemned this motion which they believe reflects the “highest level of neo-colonialism and imperialism against the sovereignty of Uganda and Tanzania”, in the words of their Deputy Speaker Mr Thomas Tayebwa. In his statement, he accused MEPs of “economic racism” and qualified their resolution as an attempt to sabotage Uganda’s economic development. He also underlined the hypocrisy of European legislators on the climate argument, as EU member states continue to use and even exploit fossil energies to ensure their energy security, stating in his communication to the Ugandan House of Parliament: “Fifty-three licences have recently been issued in the North Sea and Germany has revived its coal plants. In addition, western countries are seeking to import gas from African countries. All this is in a bid to ensure energy security in their respective states. Is energy security a preserve for only the European Union? Does Uganda not have the same right?”
In addition to raising these interrogations regarding individual countries’ responsibility for climate change, the motion appears to reflect the EU’s animosity toward the Kampala regime. It is the second time in less than two years that MEPs vote a resolution against Uganda. Following the widespread violence and human rights abuses committed in the weeks prior to the 2021 Ugandan General Election, the European Parliament had unanimously voted to instruct the European Commission to sanction responsible individuals and organisations by invoking the Magnitsky Act. This anti-EACOP resolution may be another manifestation of Brussels’ desire to punish the Kampala regime’s violent repression, which is implied by the aforementioned emphasis on the human rights abuses linked to the oil projects in the text of the motion.
The recent revelations concerning TotalEnergies’ alleged contribution to the war in Ukraine constitute another possible political motivation behind the resolution. Last month, the NGO Global Witness and the French newspaper Le Mondedisclosed that the French multinational produces gas condensate that is subsequently transformed into kerosene and used by the Russian air force to bomb Ukrainian cities. Although TotalEnergies, which is the only western company still operating on Russian soil,denies them, these accusations have sparked shock and anger in Brussels. As the EU is mobilising funds and deploying exceptional measures to support Ukraine, this explicit denunciation of TotalEnergies’ engagement in an environmentally and socially dangerous project could represent a form of retaliation.
The Death of Mahsa Amini – Understanding the Iran Protests
Violent protests, marked by calls for dismantling state-controlled modesty laws, continue in Iran following the arrest and subsequent death of Mahsa Amini last week. 22-year-old Mahsa Amini was travelling with her family from the northwestern Kurdistan province to Tehran when she was detained on 13 September for what police alleged to be ‘immodest clothing.’ Amini died three days later, on 16 September, due to what state authorities claim was a heart attack in their ‘guidance centres’ - the infamous re-education centres where detainees are taught compliance with Iranian law on female clothing. Her family rejects this claim, saying she had no heart problems that could have led to cardiac arrest. A source from the hospital where Amini died claims that she was transferred to the hospital only two hours after her arrest, where hospital staff found her lungs filled with blood and multiple blows to the head. In a Sunday interview with BBC Persian, Amini’s father Amjad Amini said he was barred from viewing her body by hospital authorities, and that Mahsa’s younger brother Kiarash had been told she was beaten by the police, in what Amjad Amini called a government cover-up.
Almost immediately after the funeral and burial of Mahsa Amini, numerous protests began in Iran decrying the infamous morality police and the Islamic Republic’s compulsory dress laws. The morality police, officially called the Gasht-e Ershad, are tasked with enforcing the dress code as laid out in Iranian law. It is the Gasht-e Ershad that arbitrarily detained Masha Amini, allegedly over just a few strands of loose hair out of her hijab. While claiming to enforce a strict dress code for all, the force has been notorious for its targeting of women who do not adhere to modest dressing norms and a near-full coverage of hair – what the Islamic Republic has called targeting ‘bad hijab’. The process of detainment by the Gasht-e Ershad is frequently a traumatic experience, where women are treated like criminals and effectively whisked off the streets.
The protests have since escalated, becoming deadly and far-reaching across Iran and the world. As of Thursday, at least 9 have been killed in protests across Iran, although Iranian state broadcasts put the number at 26. Protests are being held in 90 towns and cities across Iran, in which many are ripping off and burning their hijabs, calling for women’s freedom and down with the compulsory dress laws, and for the ‘death of the dictator’, referring to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A viral trend of women cutting their hair in support of the protests has swept across the globe, becoming popular on Instagram and TikTok. As protestors clashed with riot police firing bullets, tear gas, and water cannons, the Islamic Republic shut off internet access in its entirety on Wednesday, with blackouts continuing into Thursday as popular media sites Instagram and WhatsApp, key tools for spreading information out of Iran, continued to be down. Iranian officials have confirmed the blackouts as a method to control the protests. In addition, several pro-government protests began on Friday, 23 September in several cities, with some chanting for the execution of the ‘rioters’. In a widely critiqued statement, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called for an investigation into Amini’s death, while pointing to the double standards from the West in reference to the missing and murdered Indigenous women in Canada. It is important to note that Raisi made the statement on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the leader’s first appearance at the General Assembly since taking office last year.
Condemnation against the Islamic Republic and the Gasht-e Ershad have emerged across the globe, from state leaders to human rights groups. In his speech at the UN General Assembly, United States President Joe Biden showed support for the protests in Iran. At the same time, the Treasury Department pressed sanctions on the Gasht-e Ershad, while easing sanctions on internet sanctions in Iran, in hopes to allow information to move more freely in light of nationwide blackouts. Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif has called for an independent investigation, while the pro-Kurdish HDP party in Türkiye has applauded the resistance by protestors. Amnesty International has called for the world to take action in support of the protests.
While extremely significant, these mass mobilisations within Iran are not new. After fuel prices were raised in November of 2019, massive nationwide protests were quelled with unprecedented use of force by the Islamic Republic – Amnesty International estimates 321 men, women, and children were killed by state forces in the protests. Protests saw around 20 killed by rising prices in January 2018, which were quickly followed by the ‘Girls of Revolution Street’ protests in solidarity with Vida Movahed who removed her hijab in an act of civil disobedience in December 2017. In 2019, Sahar Khodayri dressed up as a man to sneak into a stadium and watch a men’s soccer match. Upon her arrest and learning that she could face up to 6 months in prison, she lit herself on fire in protest and died. In November of 2021, water shortage protests prompted the arrest of 67 in similar violent crackdowns. The saturation of state-led suppression in the past five years is a reason to concern for the future of the current mobilisation.
However, the protests today have new features to them – notably a recognition of Mahsa Amini’s Kurdish identity. Her Kurdish name is Jina, and many activists are urging the use of her Kurdish name in protest of the Islamic Republic’s refusal to acknowledge Kurdish names that reference Kurdish history or places. Kurdish media have referred to Amini solely by her Kurdish name, and former President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani has offered his condolences to Amini’s family. Amini’s killing and subsequent protests are highlighting the struggles Kurdish people face within Iran. Hengaw Organisation for Human Rights, an NGO based in Iran’s Kurdistan province, has reported that dozens of activists in the province have been called and threatened with arrest by Iranian authorities in an attempt to dispel continued protests. Figures in Turkiye’s pro-Kurdish HDP party, including former head Selahattin Demirtaş and former mayor Selçuk Mızraklı, both in prison, have shaved their heads in solidarity. The emerging regional solidarity based on Kurdish identity is perceived as a threat by the Islamic Republic, which explains its focus on suppressing activist organising in the Kurdistan province.
Simultaneously with the violent protests and global outrage, Iran held military parades across the country on Thursday in commemoration of the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War, what the Islamic Republic calls Sacred Defence Week. During the parade in Tehran, the Iranian Armed Forces revealed a new surface-to-surface missile, dubbed Rezvan, that has a range of 1,400 km. The medium-range ballistic missile can travel up to 8 times the speed of sound, according to Major General Hossein Salami, Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard. The introduction of a regional missile seems like an attempt to divert the public and media’s attention from the protests and enhance nationalistic feelings.
What is the future of the protests over Mahsa Amini’s death? It looks unpromising.
Domestically, the protests are unlikely to create much change. Ayatollah Khamenei is 83 years old and will not be moved to modify or alter any element of Iran’s interpretation of Islamic law in response to the protests. As he enters the last stages of his life, Khamenei is looking to strengthen the core of the Islamic Republic and preserve his legacy for his predecessors. Even though studies are finding that increasing numbers of Iranians are opposed to compulsory modesty laws, the legal norm will likely stay the same. Furthermore, violent repression of the protests can be expected to intensify as Iranian President Raisi returns from the UN General Assembly in New York. While under the scrutiny of international leaders as President Raisi makes his first appearance at the General Assembly, an extreme crackdown similar to the 2019 one which saw over 300 killed would spell a diplomatic disaster for the Islamic Republic. The next few days are crucial as Raisi begins his journey back to Iran, and more widespread internet blockages would not be surprising. While the emergence of solidarity protests globally and on social media platforms is unique to these protests, ultimately the events of the past week are likely to continue the long list of bloody repressions perpetrated by the Islamic Republic in recent history.
Regionally, the protests put Iran in a challenging position. Amini’s Kurdish background has already mobilised Kurdish party leaders and activists across the region, particularly from Iraq and Türkiye. Should Iran continue its active repression and targeting of activists – particularly in the Kurdistan province – further regional mobilisation based on Kurdish ethnic solidarities can be expected. While Kurdish parties within Türkiye and Iraq are unlikely to influence national politics that would impact Iran’s diplomatic relations with the states, the potential for grassroots resistance to the Islamic Republic is high. For the Kurdish community within Iran, the death of Amini could likely catalyse further protests in the Kurdistan province targeting Iran’s history of conflict with the Kurds. However, the significant Iranian military apparatuses in the northwest province have a history of quelling Kurdish political movements and military rebellions, so any potential protests are more than likely to be shut down with ease.
The introduction of the Rezvan drone at the 42nd anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War on Thursday is a coincidence that gives few distractions to the significance of the protests. Rezvan’s 1,400 km capacity is a primary threat to Israel – as the Israeli press has already noted the ability for the missile to be launched from Iraq or Syria. The introduction of the missile can also be interpreted as a show of military strength in light of an escalation in violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in which Iran wants to prioritise the stability of its border with both nations. Overall, however, the missile is unlikely to contribute significantly to any distraction tactics that might be underlying the seeming coincidence.
Internationally, the protests will cause an increased condemnation of the Islamic Republic from global leaders. While many have voiced their opinions already at the UN General Assembly, more criticism is sure to arise as protests continue – especially if violent repression intensifies as Raisi returns to Iran. The protests are also likely to add further tumult to an already unstable negotiating table for an updated Iran nuclear deal. President Raisi dedicated part of his General Assembly speech to supporting a revised deal, though critiqued the American counterparts for their willingness to seriously contribute to a deal. As international dissent grows against Raisi’s handling of the protests, any chance of a new deal will become near dormant as diplomatic jabs continue from across the negotiating table. However, it is crucial to watch for renewed calls for sanctions against the Islamic Republic. US President Biden’s updating of technology sanctions and the imposition of sanctions on the Gasht-e Ershad highlights the ease by which the US is willing to further its sanctions regime. The effectiveness of sanctions in promoting political change within Iran has come to the forefront with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as many leaders and human rights organisations now realise that the sanctions regime against Iran continues to harm the most marginalised. At the international level, a call for sanctioning the Islamic Republic further should be seriously cautioned. While a relatively easy diplomatic and economic way of pressuring Iran, adding sanctions will not benefit those protesting.
As people across the globe mobilise in support of Iranian protesters and as President Raisi returns to Iran, the future of the protests remains in flux, dictated by a combination of factors all working against the current movement.
Pakistan’s Devastating Floods, its Ensuing Health Crisis, and the Road to a Just Rebuilding
This year, Pakistan has been grappling with a series of unprecedented climate turmoils. Following the extreme, record-breaking spring heatwaves, the south Asian country is now the epicentre of deadly floods. Since June, torrential monsoon rainfall has led to the worst floods Pakistan has ever seen in a decade, leaving one-third of the country underwater, more than 33 million people affected, 1,500 dead and almost 150,000 displaced, in addition to $30 billion in financial losses.
Climate change is blamed as the culprit of the humanitarian crisis. Pakistan’s climate change minister and UN Secretary-General alike pinned the catastrophic floods on climate change. Scientists suggest that human-induced global warming has increased the intensity of rainfall. However, the risks brought about by climate change have gone beyond. Not only has climate change contributed to the extreme monsoon rainfall that directly led to the deadly floods, but it has also multiplied the magnitude of instability by paralysing the country’s already fragile emergency response system.
One of the most immediate, live-threatening fallouts of the climate disaster is an unfolding health crisis. With a vast amount of stagnant water, outbreaks of flood-related diseases, including water-borne ailments, such as diarrhoea, cholera, gastroenteritis and skin conditions, and mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, are reported in the areas ravaged by flooding. In the hardest-hit province Singh alone, more than 2 million patients have been treated in makeshift health facilities since July, in addition to 588 confirmed malaria cases, and tens of thousands of diarrhoea and skin disease cases.
On the other hand, the climate disaster has disrupted access to healthcare, leaving flood-stricken populations more vulnerable to both pre-existing and flood-induced diseases. With more than 1,400 health facilities damaged and bridges and roads extensively destroyed, essential medical services and supplies are inadequate and inaccessible for stranded, displaced flood victims. The knock-on effect of the floods illuminates the nature of climate change as a threat multiplier that intersects with other risks and threatens global security.
Confronted with ‘a climate-induced humanitarian disaster of epic proportion’, an intense sense of climate injustice is vividly perceived in the flood-ravaged country. Though accounting for less than 1% of global carbon emissions, Pakistan ranks amongst the top 10 most affected countries by extreme weather events from 2000 to 2019. Pakistan’s climate change minister argued that the country is at ‘ground zero’ of extreme weather events, urging the world to take collective responsibility and appealing for climate reparation.
Indeed, while the Global North reaps the economic fruits of industrialisation through fossil fuels emitting high levels of greenhouse gas, it is the Global South that bears the brunt of global warming for which the industrialised countries are largely responsible. To tackle the climate injustice, demands for climate reparation and climate finance have emerged as heated topics on the agenda, with the former referring to remediation actions taken by the Global North to correct their historical contributions to the disproportionate climate liability on the Global South nations such as debt relief, and the latter referring to financing that seeks to support climate mitigation and adaptation actions such as putting in place resilient infrastructure.
However, most developed countries have been falling short of their responsibilities for both climate reparation and climate finance. Most developed countries have contributed to climate finance an amount massively incommensurate with their ‘fair share’ considering their historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and ability to pay. In the case of Pakistan’s floods, the largest aid packages, $58 million and $50 million from China and the United States respectively, are also out of proportion to the donors’ contributions to global warming, far from enough to compensate for the irreparable losses and damage the country has endured.
As climate change becomes an exigent threat multiplier to global security, keeping up with commitments of climate finance and securing funding to address loss and damage are essential to maintain climate justice and global security. When the floods recede and the time for rebuilding comes, it is the collective responsibility of the world, and of industrialised nations in particular, to ensure a just, sustainable rebuilding of infrastructure and livelihoods in Pakistan to prepare for likely recurring extreme weather events ahead.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Border Clashes: Another Opportunistic Advance?
Nearly 100 have been killed in border clashes between the two Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the past week, a significant escalation in a decades-long tension. The conflict arose primarily in the Batken and Osh regions, which Tajikistan has invaded, according to Kyrgyz state media. However, around half of the 970km-long border area has been contested by both states since their independence from the Soviet Union.
The border clashes began on 14 September, and death tolls on both sides have been rising since. The latest official number from Kyrgyz authorities from Sunday, 18 September indicate that 46 have died, meanwhile Tajik authorities have been less transparent, although Facebook posts from the Foreign Ministry indicate 35 have died. Tajik authorities claim civilians have been wounded, but have not published numbers. In addition to official deaths, hundreds have been wounded and both sides have accused each other of using tanks, mortars, rocket artillery, and drones against civilian areas and settlements. In response, Kyrgyzstan evacuated 136,000 people from conflict areas, in what state media calls an invasion, alleging that those without military insignia participated on the Tajik side in the attacks.
A ceasefire was achieved on Friday, 16 September although both sides continued fighting and accusing one another of breaching the agreement. The night of September 17 passed without significant fighting, and Kyrgyz state media reported that some evacuees started returning home on Sunday.
Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and UN Secretary-General António Guterres have called for an end to the violence and upkeep of the ceasefire, with Putin phoning both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s leaders to urge them to find a diplomatic resolution. Russia has historically played a mediating role in the tension, even after both states’ independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. A similar international outcry occurred just last year when another set of clashes erupted – the deadliest in the pair’s history – with 160 Kyrgyz casualties and fears of a full-fledged conflict.
While the most recent border clashes are of significant concern, the history of conflict between the two Central Asian states indicates a somewhat routine and expected outbreak of conflict. However, for both the 2021 and last week’s clashes, no official explanation has been provided by either side, although Kyrgyz state media continues to say that the most recent attacks constituted a planned military action that violates international law. Given the lack of published data from the Tajik authorities on casualties and explanations for the conflict, it remains challenging to interpret the position of Tajikistan apart from continually blaming Kyrgyzstan for escalation.
Yet, the timing of the border clashes alludes to a larger trend in using Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine to advance the position of regional alliances and individual states’ territorial aspirations. The recent and continuing violence between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a prime example of this. Although not as direct as Azerbaijan and Armenia’s conflict, Moscow’s historic mediating power between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could very well be a core pillar that allowed this round of clashes to be so deadly. Furthermore, the striking similarities with the 2021 outburst could suggest that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are becoming used to more routine violence; if this is the case, the region could see more semi-permanent evacuations and a reshaping of the contested border landscape. Both states are members of the Russian-led CSTO, which has condemned both sides for continued violence, meaning that either state cannot overstep its regional influence without serious intervention from the transnational body.
Looking at the short term, the ceasefire achieved on Friday night shows signs of becoming gradually more stable as Kyrgyz communities move back into homes from evacuation and reports from both sides of violence are decreasing significantly. While Russia played a larger role in the 2021 conflict, it is unlikely that current conditions will require sustained diplomatic intervention from Moscow. However, the trend of regional players taking advantage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to launch small-scale conflicts over territory is troubling and highlights the weakness of the region in relying primarily on Moscow as a diplomatic hegemon. While long-term sustained conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is unlikely, the regional and global position of Russia in the ongoing Ukraine war will send shockwaves across former Soviet Union territories. The continued weakening of Russia through sanctions and international condemnation could likely translate into a more unstable region that becomes more focused on local territory battles in favour of regional stability – a stability once upheld by Moscow.
Receding Water and Growing Tensions in Central Asia
In the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, Central Asia has seen over 20 conflicts between at least two of the five countries that comprise the region – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – or two or more communities from these different states. Although the conflicts varied from country to country, water has played, at least in part, a major triggering role. With factors such as climate change, overexploitation, and diverging interests between upstream and downstream states, the demand for the region’s limited water supply has increased rapidly. Coupled with the lack of any unified and coherent inter-state cooperation to address water insecurity, relations in Central Asia have become strained, which will contribute to more local, and even regional, conflicts. Water shortages have already started to hamper economic growth and, without a greater effort to manage and use water more efficiently in Central Asia, the five republics will find themselves struggling to survive.
Although Central Asia’s mountains act as the region's water towers, feeding the two main rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya in abundance, water availability issues arise from accessibility rather than scarcity. The disintegration of the Soviet resource-sharing system has led to disputes over water management between upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, home to the sources of the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, and downstream Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A divergence of interests and policies follows the increasing demand and the rise of nationalistic calls for the securitisation of water supplies for states’ own needs. In this context, ‘water-rich but energy-poor’ upstream states use hydropower dams to power the state, while ‘water-poor but energy-rich’ downstream states require water for their agricultural economies. This situation causes disputes to arise, such as Uzbekistan’s disapproval of Tajikistan’s Rogun Hydropower Plant Project which Uzbekistan claims limits the irrigation of its cotton crops. Access to water is also used to leverage and defend political interests. Upstream countries have been known to cut off the flow of water to downstream ones during times of contention and often in response to the latter withholding gas and electricity to their neighbours when payments are late. This cycle of reprisal only serves to increase tensions and hinder regional cooperation, which is increasingly required.
Whilst dams can be tools to enforce stability through managing river flow to avoid droughts and floods and ensure energy access, the absence of robust institutional governmental arrangements and scientific communities to inform them means no mutually beneficial solution can be reached. Moreover, current bilateral and multilateral agreements tend to be imprecise and poorly enforced, although efforts are being made, such as those by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has concluded border demarcation agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and lifted objections to the Orto-Tokoi reservoir and Farhad hydroelectric power station.
Yet, competing interests are not the only threat to water security in the region. The overexploitation of natural resources and the role of climate change in diminishing already limited resources presents a risk of reduced water accessibility. This will hit farming communities and agricultural economies the hardest, whose livelihoods depend on the irrigation networks that support their agricultural way of life. According to studies, the mean annual temperatures in Central Asia are expected to rise. Additionally, the mean monthly river discharge is expected to decrease in the summer months of this century. The threat of water scarcity will only increase. The impacts of this situation have already been felt as severe droughts have hit the region over the years. In 2021, over 2,000 domesticated animals died due to water shortages in Kazakhstan, whilst in Kyrgyzstan, the lack of water for irrigation led to mass protests from farmers. Similarly, Uzbekistan has suffered crop losses leading to higher vegetable prices, as well as the implementation of water rationing in the Samarkand region. Moreover, the 2021 drought in Turkmenistan’s Ahal region was the worst weather event in 13 years and resulted in low yields and reduced fodder for livestock. These states, which rely heavily on agricultural produce for exports, face insecurity that could threaten their way of life, and potentially global supplies.
The over-exploitation of water resources, particularly in southern regions of Central Asia, is also responsible for decreasing access to water. Excessive water usage in cotton production is causing the fertile Ferghana Valley, which spans Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, to dry up. According to PeaceLab, the increasing decline in water availability has catalysed local tensions “over ethnic fragmentation, disputed borders, and numerous exclaves within the three countries.” Violent clashes have resulted in hundreds being killed in the valley over the years. However, the impacts stretch beyond the region. The World Bank’s report on climate change and internal migration predicted that Central Asia could be home to up to 2.4 million climate migrants by 2050.
Despite serious regional tensions and rivalries, however, efforts are being made to build agreements to manage water accessibility both in the Central Asian region and beyond. Kazakhstan has transboundary agreements with China to the east and with Russia to the north. Moreover, promising water management agreements in the Aral Sea basin include Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but are arguably ineffective and inefficient and are seen by some as inequitable with inadequate financing. The agreements also exclude Afghanistan due to it not being part of the Soviet legacy, although it shares borders with the signatories along the Amu Darya River. A 2017 report by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation stated that “despite a general commitment to cooperation, water policies in the region are mostly driven by uncoordinated national strategies. A combination of low water efficiency, negative externalities caused by unilateral action and competing national priorities have caused disagreements and contributed to political and diplomatic disputes.” Passivity in regards to improving water management is predicted to cost the region up to $4.5 billion per year.
Central Asian governments need to act quickly to avoid water insecurity and the social and economic disasters it will bring. Domestic recommendations include supporting water-saving technologies, providing greater support to producers on how to conserve water, promoting practices to conserve soil moisture, and working in collaboration with local organisations and communities. However, the most important focus should be on building strong transboundary agreements between neighbours and cooperating on water management agreements. This requires strong and coherent border demarcation and responsible governments committed to fighting environmental destruction and avoiding stalled negotiations. Effective water management legislation must be complied with by all regional states. They must also reach agreements on the exchange of hydrocarbon energy (from downstream states) for water (from upstream ones). Only when all parties reach a beneficial and peaceful compromise, can the threat of water insecurity, and the challenges it poses, be overcome.
Escalating Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: An Explainer
What happened
On the night of 12 to13 September, a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan flared up. Within hours, both sides blamed each other for the initial provocations. According to the Armenian Ministry of Defence, at around 00:05 local time, Azerbaijan launched intensive shelling against military positions in the direction of the towns of Goris, Sotk, and Jermuk, with the support of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. That same night, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence declared that Armenian armed forces had committed a large-scale provocation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border before 00:05, towards Dashkasan, Kalbajar and Lachin.
On 11 September, the Armenian Ministry of Defence denounced the spread of disinformation by the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan and denied fire exchanges on the night of 10 to 11 September. After the initial news of ignited violence, Azerbaijan issued an official statement denouncing the presence of Armenian disinformation campaigns and denying the targeting of the civilian population, objects, and infrastructure.
Mutual accusations and reports of ongoing fighting continued throughout 13 September. In the afternoon, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told parliament that at least 49 servicemen had lost their lives. In a late evening press release, the Armenian Ministry of Defence included Verin Shorzha, Artanish and Nerkin Hand in the list of areas under attack, rejecting the accusation that the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreements had been violated. According to the US National Security Council coordinator for strategic communication, the ceasefire was "almost immediately broken." The same evening, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence declared the death of 50 servicemen. During the day, the Spokesman for UN Secretary-General António Guterres, released a statement calling for immediate de-escalation, while Armenia officially appealed to the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The Ministry of Foreign Affair made it public that a special session of the CSTO Permanent Council was requested and during the session the Armenian representative described Azerbaijani actions as a gross violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia.
On Wednesday 14, fights continued throughout the day. Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reported to the parliament that Azerbaijani forces had taken control of 10 square kilometres and that the death toll had risen to 105 soldiers. In the evening, the Armenian Ministry of Defence reported tensions had been defused.
Another ceasefire has allegedly been reached on the evening of 15 September, although the situation remains precarious and it is difficult to say whether it will last.
Background
The two countries have been in a frozen conflict for decades since the fully-fledged conflict that opposed the two throughout the 1980s and 1990s over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1991, the region of about 150,000 people declared independence, initially as the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and later as the Republic of Artsakh. The territory is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, a predominantly Muslim country, but with an ethnically Christian Armenian population and under the control of Armenian armed forces. The latter is supported by Russia, which has deployed around 2,000 peacekeeping forces in the area and is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Eurasian intergovernmental military alliance, which entails a mutual defence act. Azerbaijan is backed by NATO member Türkiye.
Fighting has regularly broken out in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2020, a new war started on September 27, with the launch of the operation ‘Iron Fist’ by Baku. The goal of the mission was to acquire control of Nagorno- Karabakh to fulfil the Azerbaijani desire for territorial integrity. During the conflict, thousands of soldiers lost their lives on both sides. After 44 days of conflict and hours after Azerbaijan claimed it captured the town of Shusha, a 9-point ceasefire was reached and signed on 9 November. Azerbaijan managed to reclaim control of areas outside the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including the Lachin area, that had been under Armenian control for decades. The ceasefire represents indeed a new partitioning of the contested area, favourable to the Azerbaijani vision. The last point of the ceasefire concerns the corridor that connects Azerbaijan to the exclave of Nakhchivan and states that economic and transport connections with the exclave should be unblocked. The attention toward the corridor did not wane. In late 2021, the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, supported by the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, described it as a bridge to “unite the entire Turkic world.” In March 2022, Yerevan denounced a new aggression after Baku forces entered the village of Farrukh, in an area returned to Azerbaijan after the 2020 conflict and in which Russian peacekeepers were deployed. At the beginning of August 2022, Azerbaijan accused Yerevan of having violated the 2020 ceasefire provisions and announced the launch of a retaliatory action that resulted in the seizure of chunks of land in the area of Sarybaba.
What’s different
The latest escalation has involved targets deeper inside Armenian territories. Yerevan has accused Azerbaijan of attempting to enter Armenian territory, violating the borders of a sovereign country. Russia is involved in a demanding conflict in Ukraine that is reaching the end of the seventh month; news of an effective counteroffensive by the Ukrainian forces are spreading, while Moscow is appearing more and more isolated and therefore more reliant on Azerbaijani land routes for trade with Asia and Iran. The military effort in Ukraine makes it difficult to imagine that Russia is ready for an intervention in the South Caucasus, and regional geopolitical partnerships are more complex than in the 2020 conflict.
What to expect
The surging conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has implications not only for the future of each state’s borders, but also for a range of regional stakeholders with strong alliances with both nations. In addition, the conflict has serious detrimental potential to energy exports from the Caspian Sea region, as highlighted by Azerbaijan during the 2020 conflict. Russia, Türkiye, Iran, the United States, and Israel have stakes in the conflict, and how each responds will dictate the scale that this conflict has the potential to take.
Türkiye: Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has, and will continue to, stand by the side of Azerbaijan. Erodgan has repeatedly claimed that his relationship with Azerbaijan is one of “one nation, two states”, and his response to the current episode of violence is no different. Erdoğan, on 14 September, said that Armenia will face consequences for its breach of the 2020 agreement reached after the war. While not defining those consequences, Türkiye’s history of military support for Azerbaijan provides an idea of what Turkish support might look like in the coming weeks. While being an exporter of military equipment to Azerbaijan, Türkiye has been conducting joint military training with Azeri forces since 1992. Türkiye’s military capacity-building ventures in Azerbaijan for three decades, along with its prominence in NATO and support for Azerbaijan joining the Organisation, indicates the former will take an unwavering stance in favour of Azerbaijan’s actions in the continued conflict. In addition, Türkiye’s recent history of incursions into northern Syria concretises support for Azerbaijan’s seeming attempt at retaking land.
Russia: Russia arguably has the largest stake in the conflict and has the power to control the future of the violence. With over 2,000 peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, regional Russian influence remains high. Russia has historically kept strong diplomatic ties with the conflict – a Russian-backed truce was signed during the first iteration of the war in the 1990s, and the 2020 peace deal was signed by Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. While Russia might have affiliations towards Armenia as a former Soviet member, analyses after the resolution of the 2020 conflict highlight Russia’s complex way of approaching its relations with Armenia. Scholars have argued that Russia did not directly quell Azerbaijan’s 2020 military violence as it proved the military weakness of Armenia’s military and government, allowing Russia to have a heavier hand in commanding the future politics of Armenia. However, that was two years ago, and Russia is in a wildly different geopolitical situation now. In response to Armenia’s invocation of Article 4 of the CSTO, member states, coordinated by Russia, met on 13 September and are sending a joint mission to Yerevan to assess further action. Apart from Article 4, Russia – as the figurehead of the CSTO – has no solid responsibilities towards Armenia at this time. The Russia-backed ceasefire failed within hours, and an interpretation of Russia’s relative inaction could be a repetition of their 2020 diplomatic policies. However, the more likely reason for inaction is the international awareness of Russia’s military failures and extensive land loss in Ukraine. Ukraine has reclaimed 8,000 square kilometres of land since the start of September, in what some are calling a turning point in the 6-month long war. In the face of the situation, Russia cannot be focusing on Armenia and Azerbaijan at the present moment, and its few mentions of the conflict in the past days might be attributed to diplomatic spectacle to affirm a projected image of Russian stability and integrity in the face of dramatic loss.
Iran: The Islamic Republic will likely play a safe onlooker in the ongoing conflict. With recent scrutiny over the extended revived nuclear deal negotiations, Iranian leaders are unlikely to set forth a strong opinion or policy against Armenia or Azerbaijan. However, territorial integrity remains key for Iran: the Islamic Republic shares a 44km border with Armenia, and the Foreign Ministry called for the preservation of current borders between all states. While Tehran supported Baku’s victory in 2020, the current position of Iran is to avoid another conflict in the region and support a peaceful resolution.
Israel: While not a frequently cited ally of either Armenia or Azerbaijan, Israel remains an ardent supporter of Azerbaijan’s military. Israel’s support for the latter primarily revolves around military exports: consistent supplies of Stinger missiles and Harop drones to Azerbaijan, including a 2021 $2 billion negotiation by Azerbaijan for Israeli arms, are strategically important for Israel. Azerbaijan’s long border with Iran is likely the primary pillar of Israel’s continued support. In the long-term, Israel could be warming ties with Azerbaijan as both a diplomatic and military partner to leverage regional alliances, and become geographically closer, to its foremost geopolitical foe: Iran. Apart from weapons alliances, Israel might be encouraged to take this new episode of violence as an opportunity to assert diplomatic mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as some scholars from within Israel are already recommending. While Israel’s immediate role is less clear, the opportunities are vast for the nation to exert its power in the South Caucasus for its own benefit.
The United States: In a phone call between Secretary of State Blinken and Azeri President Aliyev on 13 September, Blinken called for Azerbaijan to stop shelling Armenia. Blinken is further concerned about Russia’s ability to worsen the conflict as a method to distract from its recent losses in eastern Ukraine, although supports a Russian diplomatic solution to the conflict. In regards to the 2020 conflict, the United States took no real action in the conflict, other than Democrats calling for an end to military aid to Azerbaijan. Focused at the time on the 2020 presidential elections, the United States is facing a similar situation now with upcoming midterm elections and continued pressure to support Ukraine. It is foreseeable for the United States to make statements in broad support of Armenia, but little action can be expected from officials.
Azerbaijan has seized upon a geopolitical opportunity to lay military claim to lands previously unseen in previous iterations of the conflict. The stakeholders in the conflict against Azerbaijan’s present and historical actions are notably preoccupied: both Russia and the United States have significant obligations that take priority over the current conflict. All the while, Azerbaijan’s allies – Türkiye and Israel – have the capacity to take on a large role in shaping the conflict to their own benefit by propping up Azerbaijan’s actions. Azerbaijan is empowered by its regional standing, creating the conditions for this latest escalation to be successful, in line with its victory in 2020.
Within this context, the conflict is unlikely to escalate to a fully-fledged war involving international powers. Rather, the regional environment allows Azerbaijan to continue its offensive, relatively unchallenged by regional or international actors. While some have highlighted the potential energy export implications of the conflict, the current European energy crisis actually benefits Azerbaijan’s offensive. In July, Baku and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding, a deal that would see increased energy exports to European states over the next five years, and Azerbaijan’s current energy pipelines in Georgia, Türkiye, and the Mediterranean mean that Europe has an infrastructure to rely on in advance of the expected winter crisis. In the short term, then, Europe’s energy deficit spells out more benefits for Azerbaijan and its offensive into Armenia: the EU is unlikely to pursue heavy sanctions or condemnation against Baku as the South Caucasus state remains a potential ally in a looming dark winter for Europe.
The end result of the conflict remains clouded, however. There is a possibility Azerbaijan claims sovereignty over more land that is internationally recognized, as was the case in the 2020 resolution. Yet, critiques of the 2020 agreement as organizationally bare and not definitive towards the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory could be levelled against Azerbaijan’s claims once a ceasefire is achieved. It seems, at present, that Azerbaijan has a green light to continue its military operations; however, challenges arise once a ceasefire can be negotiated and committed to. Then, Azerbaijan has to rally the diplomatic powers of its key allies against Armenian claims to land, the CSTO, and potentially a UN-backed resolution. Due to Russia’s current preoccupation with Ukraine, any deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan is unlikely to arise quickly between regional actors: more international players will likely be drawn into the negotiations after military violence ends. When that time comes, Azerbaijan might not have the diplomatic strength, even if backed by Türkiye, to uphold its military gains. While the present is grim for the Armenian side of the conflict, the real fate
Somalia’s Worst Drought in Four Decades and its Repercussions on Security
Climate change has emerged as a critical ‘threat multiplier’ that intersects with other risks and conflict drivers and jeopardises global security. Growing international attention highlights the compounded security risks, including loss of livelihoods, competition for resources, forced migration and displacement, civil unrest, and violent conflicts, fueled by the interplay of climate change with other underlying socioeconomic distress and environmental risks.
An independent report commissioned by the G7 members in 2015 indicates that climate change aggravates existing risks and thus contributes to the fragility of states and societies. Similarly, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept recognizes climate change as a threat multiplier that “exacerbates conflict, fragility, and geopolitical competition”, making it one of the 14 major strategic concerns highlighted in the Strategic Concept.
As climate change accelerates and natural disasters become more prevalent, climate-related security risks have never been more conspicuous. This article series explains the concept of climate change as a threat multiplier to global security, examines international case studies of climate-related instability, and explores strategic recommendations for promoting peace and security by strengthening climate resilience.
Somalia’s current calamity of drought is a vivid example of a climate-related security crisis. Struggling with the worst drought in four decades, the East African nation faces a catastrophic famine that has displaced more than 1 million people and left nearly 6 million people, or 40% of its population, at risk of starvation. Failing harvests, dying livestock, and soaring food prices have suffocated the impoverished country’s main source of income, worsening the economic distress for the 69% of its population that live below the international poverty line.
Aside from the direct impacts of loss of livelihoods, involuntary displacement and starvation, the climate-induced famine has far-reaching repercussions on security as the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab exploits the growing food crisis. The lack of access to food and water makes al-Shabaab membership a source of income for youngsters out of economic options, boosting the violent extremist group’s recruitment and expansion. Meanwhile, militants distribute aid resources and take credit for the supplies, strengthening the terrorist group’s control over and support among the Somalis.
To make matters worse, international aid groups aiming to access unreachable areas controlled by the group have often been faced with multiple hazards: the imminent threat of being kidnapped or killed, and the moral dilemma of paying off a terrorist organisation or leaving people die of starvation. Extreme climate patterns have thus created a hotbed that feeds the terrorist power and cripples the global anti-terrorist and humanitarian effort in the nation, making conflict and violent insurgencies more likely to occur.
Through the drought of Somalia, it is manifest that climate change has become a threat multiplier to global security, especially to countries and communities that are vulnerable to socioeconomic shocks. As climate impacts disproportionately affect economically marginalised populations, strengthening resilience to climate risks, including developing adaptation measures and mitigating climate-related injustice, becomes an indispensable part of an integrated security risk management and peacebuilding strategy.
Türkiye and Greece: A Summer of Hot Tensions
On Sunday 28 August, Türkiye’s state-run Anadolu media reported that Greek missiles had locked onto Turkish F-16 jets completing a mission around the island of Rhodes on Tuesday. The event, which involved Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles located on Greece’s Crete island, has been labelled by Turkish state media as harassment by their Mediterranean neighbour. Under NATO rules of engagement, radar lock-ons are considered an act of hostility, which the Turkish government and press have used to bolster their rhetoric on the increasingly sour relations between the two states. A discourse that has rapidly emerged from this latest act of hostility is that NATO countries continue to criticise Türkiye’s purchases of Russian S-400 missiles, but stay silent on Greece’s use of the older system on Türkiye. Almost immediately, Greek state-run media rejected the Turkish claims.
Greece’s alleged radar lock-on of Turkish jets is just another drop in the bucket for months of tension between the two neighbours. Last week, the Anadolu Agency reported that Türkiye filed a complaint with NATO after Greek F-16s allegedly harassed Turkish F-16s, placing them under another radar lock. Greece’s response was practically the opposite, with the ministry of defence claiming that five Turkish jets appeared in Greek-controlled airspace to accompany US B-52 bombers without prior notification. The summer months have seen accusations on both sides, although Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erodgan has taken the offensive on Athens numerous times. On the 99th anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty, Erdogan accused Greece of undermining the rights of Thrace-region Muslims and hinted at the use of force if Greece militarised its Aegean islands. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu ended the joint mechanism with Greece – a bilateral diplomacy channel historically used between the two states – because of perceived hostile remarks made by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Back in 2021, Erdogan declared a February 2021 meeting between Greece and Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Cyprus as an anti-Türkiye alliance. In June 2022, Greece submitted a letter of request to purchase F-35s, a day after United States President Biden gave his full support to the sale of F-16s to Türkiye. The Greek letter of request has the potential to flare rhetoric by Türkiye against both Greece and the United States as Türkiye was excluded from the F-35 programme three years ago.
The war in Ukraine has had an impact on Greek-Türkiye relations. President Erdogan’s leadership in holding peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, including the August grain deal, has positioned Türkiye favourably within NATO and the UN. Furthermore, Türkiye’s refusal of imposing sanctions on Russia, and Erdogan’s generally positive relationship with Vladimir Putin, are positioning Türkiye in the spotlight of international diplomacy – all while tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean remain high. At the same time, Sweden and Finland are in talks with Türkiye over their now highly contested NATO bid, with approval from Türkiye needed to go forward with membership plans.
In a summer of diplomatic highs for Türkiye, including championing the Ukraine grain deal and coordinating economic support from both the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, the strained relationship with Greece has the potential to take many routes.
Firstly, Türkiye’s diplomatic centrality over the past few months could mean that aggression towards, and in response to, Greece and their actions could be ignored as NATO and the UN aim for a unified approach towards Russia. Erdogan’s continued friendliness with Putin is a risk factor as Türkiye attempts to negotiate for sustained resolutions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s incursions into Northern Syria over the past few years have angered both Russia and Western human rights groups, a policy that makes him largely unpopular on the world stage. Yet, Türkiye’s ability to remain diplomatically agile, mediating between the UN and Russia in the Ukraine war, means that Erdogan has an ability to uphold a foreign policy that is aggressive while keeping criticism at bay. The outlook for Greece, then, is less than ideal as Erdogan has more diplomatic power to continue to criticise Greece’s actions, particularly in the Aegean.
Secondly, Greece could be ramping up its actions on the Aegean islands to take control of the current global spotlight on Türkiye, in the hope of pivoting attention towards what it sees as sustained Turkish aggression on Greece’s sovereignty. Erdogan’s current significance in international diplomacy means that many global conflicts are reliant on Türkiye. As such, Greece could resort to this option as it cannot, for the time being, leverage successful diplomatic avenues of critique against its neighbour.
However, these two situations are unlikely to remain static for long, just as the seemingly never-ending tension between Greece and Türkiye. Both Erdogan and Mitsotakis are facing elections within the upcoming year, and this verbal jesting will only increase as both struggle to retain their electorate. With the latest report of radar locking onto Turkish F-16 jets, the actions of both states might not be about international politics as much as each respective country looks to utilise rhetoric, their militaries, and appeals to international diplomacy to secure a domestic political agenda.
Overlooked Political Risks for 2022: The Politicization of “Everything”
Pressing or emerging political and geopolitical risks that have flown under the radar, including;
Contested perspectives of climate mitigation- Climate justice, reparations, and the politicisation of climate policy as a foreign policy tool and domestic issue.
The politicisation of critical resources- Critical mineral supply chains, water security, and key commodities like semi-conductors.
The growth of state-sponsored organised crime- Cyber activity and state-endorsed opioid sales.