The End of MINUSMA: An Uncertain Future for Mali’s Security

On 16 June, the Malian transitional government asked the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to terminate all activity in the country. The UN mission, currently comprised of 15,000 personnel, had been involved in Mali as a peacekeeping force since 2013. Its aim was to help facilitate peace amidst a war in 2012 between the Malian government and armed separatist groups in Northern Mali; Tuareg separatist groups were demanding the independence of a region they call ‘Azawad.’ In accordance with the Malian government’s decision, the UN Security Council voted to conclude its operations and progressively withdraw its personnel, a process that will likely be completed before the end of this year. The transitional government’s decision was not completely unforeseen; the military junta had begun to make changes in the actors and methods employed in combating terrorism since it claimed power in 2021. The countries involved in the MINUSMA operation were concerned by this decision, taken by a government which is still largely struggling to maintain peace and abate the threat of advancing terror groups. The presence of Wagner troops is another source of anxiety for the West, as the group’s deployment represents a further extension of Russian influence on African soil and could be detrimental to peace and security in the country. 

The Malian Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, justified his government’s decision by highlighting MINUSMA's failure to resolve the security crisis in Mali after 10 years of engagement. He also claimed that the mission’s reporting of human rights violations fostered distrust towards the government and fuelled communal tensions. The UN published a report in May 2023 accusing - through a well-evidenced investigation - the Malian Army and foreign mercenaries of killing 500 civilians during a counterterrorist operation in Moura a year prior. This accusation contributed to the deepening of tensions between the UN and the Malian government. In response, Mali announced the opening of an investigation against the multilateral organisation for “espionage, undermining the external security of the state” and “military conspiracy.” This decision follows a general shift in the country’s security strategy undertaken by the transitional government.

Since 2019, Russia has been actively engaged in a propaganda campaign in Mali that has effectively swayed public opinion. Russia has deployed paid and non-paid activists and influencers, multimedia platforms, and bot accounts on social media platforms to successfully win over hearts and minds in Mali. According to Jean le Roux of the Atlantic Council, Russia coerces communities “through the influence of these talking heads,” referring to local activists. Many of these disinformation efforts are being directly carried out by the Internet Research Agency, a bot farm financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group (now deceased). A 2023 study revealed that over 90% of Malians now trust Russia as a partner. Although the study lacks significant feedback from rural populations, it effectively paints a picture of public opinion. A similar pattern is emerging across the Sahel, particularly in Niger and Burkina Faso, who find themselves in similar security dilemmas. 

A week before Mali’s decision, Malian President Assimi Goïta and Vladimir Putin had a phone conversation, likely discussing the MINUSMA mandate. According to Jean-Hervé Jezequel and Ibrahim Maiga of the Crisis Group, Russian diplomats have also attempted to limit MINUSMA’s withdrawal budget under the threat of blocking funding for other peacekeeping missions around the world. They were likely hoping to create a disorderly withdrawal that would augment the perception that MINUSMA was a failed mission, and during which the UN would have to abandon material that the Malian army and Wagner could retrieve. 

Moscow has a lot to gain from the UN mission’s retreat. Putin is benefitting from countering western influence across the continent, whilst Wagner has found in Africa a great source of natural resources, as well as a space to strategically redeploy its troops after the Russian insurrection. However, for Mali, the advantages of MINUSMA’s withdrawal are less evident than its dangers. The termination of the international mission poses great risks for the country’s security, most notably for the northern regions where most of the UN bases were located. Although MINUSMA did not have a military mandate, the presence of peacekeepers in urban centres helped to reduce the influence of terror groups. In MISUMA’s absence, these groups may now consider cities to be easier targets. In addition, MINUSMA’s departure risks increasing tensions between the signatory groups of the Alger Peace Accords and the government, and could challenge the current state of territorial unity in Mali. 

The Alger Accords, signed in 2015 between separatist groups and the government, established a system of decentralisation, the creation of a common army, and specific development measures for the northern regions. Few of the agreed reforms had been implemented since its signing, but MINUSMA’s departure makes it even less likely to be upheld. The UN mission not only provided government representatives and humanitarian missions with secure access to the country’s north, but also invested in stabilisation projects which created thousands of jobs for the local population. The deterioration of security in certain areas, hindering access to many of these regions, and the loss of economic opportunities accompanied by the current government’s failure to offer economic incentives to leave armed groups, are signals that the security situation is likely to continue to worsen. The Malian government signed the Algiers Peace Agreement from a position of weakness, but has been able to develop its army during the eight years since its signing. The authorities will now likely favour a solely military solution over investing in peace and economic development.

Imperfect efforts that combine security and development initiatives continue to see success in the Ivory Coast and the Lake Chad Basin Area; combatants were provided with incentives - such as amnesty, job training, and more - to leave extremist groups. In the Ivory Coast, the government coupled these programs with efforts to invest in infrastructure and public services in affected regions. In both cases, membership in extremist groups fell following the implementation of these initiatives. The Malian Junta’s security focused approach is unlikely to be successful, as it is likely to merely drive more Malians into extremist groups to protect and provide for themselves and their families. This is especially relevant in Mali given the human rights abuses frequently committed by the army and the Wagner Group.

If the Malian government continues to respond to the terrorist threat and inter-communal conflict by sending Wagner troops alongside the Malian military, who has also accumulated a grim record of human rights abuses, levels of violence and conflict are likely to worsen. Wagner has been active in Mali since at least December 2022, playing an active role in security provision in Central and Northern Mali. In doing so, the group has killed thousands of Malians. It is not clear how many were members of armed or extremist groups. Since 2020, after the first of two military coups, deaths from armed violence have more than doubled. Almost all of these deaths can be attributed to extremist violence and the security response to it. Terror groups across the Sahel, including in Mali, are targeting civilians more frequently in 2023 than in years past. 

In West Africa, where security challenges often transcend national borders, this poses a serious threat to Mali’s neighbours. Over the last several years, jihadists have streamed across the Malian border with Burkina Faso, where armed and extremist groups control almost half of the country’s territory. If the Malian Government fails to take a more holistic approach to addressing extremism, extremists within Mali may begin to pose a serious threat to the Ivory Coast, Niger (where a military junta has just overthrown a government with an effective policy track record on extremism), and even Guinea, Senegal, Algeria, and Mauritania. This is why the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken such a strong stance against the most recent coup in Niger, having recently deployed a standby force for a potential intervention.

The continued proliferation of terror groups across the Sahel is not inevitable, but local, ECOWAS, and western efforts to address it are being further complicated by the actions of the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Starting in January, Algeria will sit on the UN Security Council and may be keen to get more involved in the peace process to avoid regional insecurity. The Malian opposition has also expressed its concerns, and some segments of the population are lending support to their views. Despite this, the lack of a holistic strategy and the likely prospect of increased Wagner involvement in Mali does not bode well for the country or the continent as a whole. 

Energy Crisis in Africa

Examining Challenges and Solutions in Energy Development

The African continent has fallen behind in energy development and is struggling to catch up while facing the impending repercussions of climate change. In this report by Africa Watch, we aim to analyse some of the most pertinent drivers of the energy crisis, their impacts, and possible solutions. This collection of analysis examines Africa’s place in the world before the energy crisis, economic factors, ongoing political issues, and future prospects of clean energy transitions.

Read the report HERE

Nigerian Senate Opposes ECOWAS Military Intervention in Post-Coup Niger

The recent coup in Niger led by the head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani, was met with extensive condemnation, both regionally and internationally. Principally, the Nigeria-led ECOWAS bloc imposed various economic and travel sanctions against Niger to pressure the coup leaders to reinstate democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum. The West African organisation also issued a one-week ultimatum to the putschists, which if ignored, would entail a military intervention. ECOWAS claimed the use of force would be a “last resort”.  The bloc aimed to develop a detailed plan for the use of force, including the resources needed and the timing of a possible intervention. Meanwhile, the Nigerian president and head of ECOWAS, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, expressed his support for Bazoum. He declared that “[w]e will stand with our people in our commitment to the rule of law” and signalled Abuja’s “readiness to intervene” in Niger as soon as ECOWAS gave the order. Additionally, Nigeria stopped supplying electricity to Niger - Niger depends on Nigeria for around 70% of its electricity.

Despite these measures, Niger’s coup leader has repeatedly claimed he will not give into pressure to restore President Bazoum. Instead, General Tchiani has proceeded to form his government, naming a 21-member cabinet and appointing a new prime minister, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine, to replace Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou. Given the putschists’ steadfastness and Nigeria’s stern response to the coup, calls for a Nigerian-led ECOWAS military intervention were to be expected. Yet, on 6 August, Nigeria’s senate rejected Tinubu’s plan to send forces to Niger. It instead encouraged ECOWAS to pursue “political and diplomatic options” to resolve the crisis in Niger. This will undoubtedly give the military junta a respite.

Why Oppose an ECOWAS Military Intervention in Niger?

Although an ECOWAS-led intervention in Niger may have helped Nigeria boost its regional geopolitical standing and restore political stability in its neighbourhood, the senate’s decision to oppose this measure was not senseless. Several factors may have informed its ruling on 6 August.

Within Nigeria many believe that President Tinubu’s assertiveness abroad constitutes an attempt to distract from domestic problems, and shore up much-needed popularity. Tinubu has been accused of electoral misconduct and has been criticised for his slow response to the country’s economic and security challenges, including the continued Boko Haram attacks across North Eastern Nigeria. Accordingly, the public has been vocal in denouncing Tinubu’s ‘unnecessary’ external interference. The Nigerian senate may have similarly recognised a need to refocus the regime’s attention to domestic issues. Nigeria’s participation in ECOWAS’s planned intervention may have further risked jeopardising relations with Niger, which remains an important partner in the Nigeria-led joint force fighting armed groups in the Lake Chad region.

While the coup leaders cement their hold on power in Niger, the resistance to a potential ECOWAS intervention is growing. Within Niger, the public has widely shown its support for General Tchiani while President Bazoum has found little support on the ground. Although a former Nigerien rebel and politician has recently launched a movement to oppose Tchiani’s coup, this merely constitutes an incipient campaign that will likely be quashed by the military junta. Public rallies have also evidenced Nigerien citizens’ disapproval of the continued French presence in the country, in which many demonstrators openly displayed support for Russia. Although Niger is one of the world’s poorest countries, its military has been trained to fight jihadists by France and the United States, and may thus have the capability to successfully oppose forces deployed by ECOWAS. Importantly, Niger’s troops would not be fighting alone; Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, as well as Algeria, Mauritania, and Benin have expressed their support for Niger’s new leaders in the midst of a possible ECOWAS intervention. Mali and Burkina Faso have gone further, exclaiming that any attempt to restore Bazoum would be treated as a “declaration of war” against them all. Additional support from private actors like the Wagner Group may also have bolstered Tchiani’s ability to defend against an ECOWAS invasion. ECOWAS’s internal challenges would likely have undermined its prospects for success in Niger, and may have thus pushed the Nigerian Senate to reject ECOWAS’ plans for intervention. 

Analysts have claimed that ECOWAS doesn’t possess the military capacity to launch an operation in Niger. Although the West African bloc intervened in The Gambia in 2017, when former President Yahya Jammeh refused to step down after his electoral loss, the intervention was largely possible because ECOWAS was “invited in by the Banjul government.” ECOWAS also suffers from a lack of coordination in providing security regionally and often fails to align its policies with those of other regional organisations. For example, ECOWAS gave the Niger junta a one-week deadline to reinstate President Bazoum while the African Union issued a 15-day ultimatum. Insufficient trust among ECOWAS members would have further compromised any attempt to mount a strong front against General Tchiani. Lastly, western support may have been necessary to address ECOWAS’ financial and logistical difficulties. The Nigerian Senate’s approval of a western-backed ECOWAS intervention would likely have sparked more protests and resistance in Niger, as well as more divisions within the West African bloc.

An ECOWAS-led intervention would have also carried the risk of further escalation; a mere attempt to restore President Bazoum could have ushered in a war transcending multiple African countries. Even in the best-case scenario, an intervention would have likely compelled ECOWAS troops to remain in the country for a lengthy period. This would strain countries’ military budgets and make “Bazoum look like he is only a president because of foreign armies, and that [would] destroy his legitimacy.”

Lastly, civilians would have likely borne the greatest costs of an ECOWAS military intervention. ECOWAS troops have a suboptimal record when it comes to avoiding collateral damage. Before parliamentary talks on 6 August, Nigerian senators issued a joint statement claiming they would not accept military action in Niger because it could worsen the humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Refugee flows from Niger, which shares a 1,600 kilometre border with Nigeria, would have strained the central government’s capacities.

Looking Ahead: A Multi-Level Strategic Predicament

The Nigerian Senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans for a military intervention presents an important question: What’s next? As the West African bloc struggles to find an alternative solution to the coup in Niger, the implications of the abortive ultimatum and intervention are becoming increasingly evident. ECOWAS’s credibility will undoubtedly take a hit. The West African bloc had been criticised for its poor response to the coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali in recent years. The lack of firm retaliation against the Nigerien military junta reiterates this pattern and will further harm ECOWAS’s perceived relevance and effectiveness. ECOWAS’s failure to respond militarily also reveals important cracks in the alliance, as countries scrambled to pick a side between the wealthier pro-democracy states and their military-led counterparts.

The senate’s rejection of ECOWAS’s plans will have grave implications for West African geopolitical stability. First, ECOWAS’s weak response will have a significant impact on how politics will be conducted in the region; it may provide leaders across the region with a ‘green light’ to stage coups or ignore constitutional limits. As such, the use of force may increasingly supersede the rule of law. As a result, democracy in West Africa remains very fragile. Additionally, the lack of military retaliation will open up space for greater Russian presence in Niger and in the wider West African region, at the expense of western influence. In particular, the Wagner group may capitalise on its existing ties in Mali and Burkina Faso to expand its reach into Niger. 

The coup will also likely undermine the efficiency of the western-backed anti-terrorism campaign across the Sahel. Niger has been a key ally and security buffer for western states against al-Qaeda and Islamic State insurgent groups, but the recent coup will likely affect collaboration on counter-terrorism. The new Nigerien leadership will unlikely view the west as a valued partner, but rather as a colonial power. Thousands of French troops were forced to withdraw from Mali and Burkina Faso after their respective coups. As foreign armies retreat, terrorist and armed groups will be able to exploit political instability and uncertainty throughout political transition periods to expand their operations. Islamic extremists may intensify their recruitment exercises and violent campaigns. This occurred in Burkina Faso after its coup last September.

As the putschists continue to strengthen their political authority and support base in Niger, the West African bloc is at a crossroads. Realistically, ECOWAS’s alternatives to resolve the crisis are now largely limited to diplomatic avenues and/or continued sanctions. Both should not be discounted as pathways towards stability. Yet both unfortunately seem to have bleak prospects. On one hand, repeated attempts at negotiations over the past week have yielded little progress. Nigeria may be able to utilise the existing commercial and diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and Niger to pressure the military junta into backing down, but this outcome does not seem probable. Niger’s new leaders retain key leverage, as Bazoum constitutes a valuable bargaining tool. Tchiani is therefore unlikely to surrender. Further, ECOWAS sanctions have thus far had little impact on decisions made by the Nigerien military junta. 

On Tuesday, ECOWAS imposed more sanctions on Niger after General Tchiani denied a joint delegation from West African states, the African Union, and the United Nations permission to enter the country. Yet, the sanctions will unlikely be effective. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, sanctions were lifted soon after they were imposed. Instead, sanctions will likely harm civilians already facing acute poverty and hunger. Sanctions may also prove politically counterproductive; in Mali, the military junta was able to use the “international campaign against Malian sovereignty” to rally people behind it and gain legitimacy.

Niger’s neighbours and the international community are now faced with a critical strategic predicament. Irrespective of ECOWAS’s next strategic move, there is a need for extreme caution. If not properly managed, the coup in Niger may set the stage for similar political disruptions elsewhere, produce deep rifts among African countries, and may eventually be overlooked.

Arms Trafficking in the Sahel

The illicit arms trade is thriving in the Sahel. Arms trafficking in the region serves multiple purposes; arms are a means of making profit, buying protection, and maintaining control over populations and trafficking routes. The region's security remains jeopardised by porous borders and the presence of transnational criminal networks, as well as terrorist and armed groups. This dangerous combination fosters illicit arms trafficking, posing a significant security threat.

The region has experienced a rise in armed actors due in part to the proliferation of illicit arms and the lack of robust state institutions. In fact, some state institutions themselves may be involved in illicit arms trafficking. This has introduced heightened levels of competition and violence in local-level conflicts. The presence of various rebel, separatist, criminal, and violent extremist groups spanning North Africa, the Sahel, and West Africa, along with connections between arms, drugs, and human traffickers, has resulted in the militarisation of traditional trading routes. 

Illicit arms trafficking in West Africa occurs along conventional trafficking and commercial routes and is deeply ingrained within an established system of illegal trade that spans national borders. Numerous trafficking routes, both internal to the region and extending into neighbouring areas, cater to the regional demand for illicit weapons. National stockpiles are a key source of illicit firearms and illegal craft production also contributes to arms proliferation across the region. Particularly significant has been the outflow of weapons from Libyan state stockpiles dating back to the Muammar Gadhafi era, which has served as a crucial source of illicit weapons for sub-Saharan Africa since 2011. Although these flows have decreased after the resumption of civil conflict in Libya in 2014, they still represent a noteworthy source of arms within the region. 

Arms trafficking patterns and actors vary across the region. North of the Niger River trafficking is often more organised than it is to the South. Weak governance and corruption are central to the success of arms trafficking and organised crime in the region. Arms traffickers operate at different levels of sophistication across the region. At the lower level, the majority of individuals engaged in the illicit trade are herders, farmers, gold-mining communities, and migrant smugglers. They typically seek handguns for self-defence purposes. A second tier caters to traffickers and criminal groups who resort to violence to maintain control over smuggling operations and routes. Lastly, specialised traffickers - who are increasingly becoming associated with the drug trade- handle larger shipments of arms.

The illicit trafficking of arms has been tied to state-linked trafficking strategies organised at the highest level of governments. Non-state armed groups are often used as proxies in this process, however, a wide range of actors are involved. Criminal networks with varying levels of organisation, armed groups, tribes, and border communities are all implicated in illicit arms trafficking. As weapons become more readily available and the security situation deteriorates, demand increases. Competition over scarce resources and a desire to protect oneself has created a cycle of violence in which supply creates demand. The presence of firearms in various communities heightens the risk of formerly low-level local conflicts escalating, as traditional weapons and peaceful dispute resolution methods are replaced by modern firearms. Rising insecurity in the region fuels a local demand for firearms, especially easy-to-conceal handguns, for self-protection. The emergence of local self-defence groups, the spread of craft-produced weapons, and the continually increasing market for illicit arms are a clear manifestation of insecurity.

Niger

Niger is predominantly a transit country for arms traffickers. Arms and other illicit goods enter through Northern Niger from Libya’s south-western border and move through millenia-old trans-Sahelian trade routes. Traffickers are able to avoid security forces and international actors by using lesser known routes.  Flows respond to increasing demand for weapons as new conflicts arise across the region. This route is commonly used to transport arms into Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. One route passes through the Lake Chad region towards Mali, and another through Tillabéri and Tahoua in southern and western Niger. There is also a growing domestic market for illicit arms in Niger as gold-miners have begun to purchase weapons for protection. Climate change and competition for resources in Niger has also created demand for arms within rural communities. Government actors are involved in illicit arms trafficking, playing both direct and indirect roles. Connections between trafficking networks and institutional, political, and security authorities at all levels of the Nigerien government aid in facilitating the movement of illicit arms through the country. 

Mali

Mali acts predominantly as a destination for arms smuggling. Peace and security in the country were seriously undermined by the Arab Spring, during which diverted arms from Libyan stockpiles enabled widespread violent conflict from which the country has never fully recovered. Despite the deployment of two French military operations (2013-2022) and a UN peacekeeping mission, the country remains unstable and the demand for arms strong. Many arms that arrive in the country flow from Libya through Niger and into northern Mali (i.e. the towns of Kidal and Gao). Since the reemergence of high levels of violence in Libya, in 2014, the influx of arms from Libya has decreased. A counterflow of ammunition and weapons back into Libya began as internal demand increased. Arms are also trafficked into Mali through Mauritania. A number of illicit goods are trafficked from coastal West Africa and arms converge at cities on the Senegal River, constituting a major trafficking and smuggling hub. Weapons are trafficked from this hub, through Mauritania and into Foïta where they converge with arms being trafficked from the Western Sahara.

Guinea also serves as a source of weapons flowing into Mali. Guinea’s National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) insists that these weapon flows stem from illicit arms still in circulation from the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts in the late 1990s and early 2000s; however, there is evidence of diversion from Guinean army stockpiles. In 2016, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) identified the use of weapons originating from Guinean stockpiles in northern Mali. Some sources estimate that 60–80 per cent of the arms circulating in northern Mali were diverted from national stockpiles.Within Mali, limited state security presence aids the circulation of arms through many parts of the country. There are at least 15 key trafficking hubs within Mali. 

Guinea-Bissau

In Guinea-Bissau, high-ranking military officials have historically supplied the illicit arms market by providing military-grade weapons directly from government stockpiles. Consequently, the country’s largest source of trafficked weapons has been its own military stocks. Although significant flows of arms were trafficked from national stockpiles to separatists in the Casamance region in southern Senegal in the 1990s, this flow has largely stopped. Shotguns now make up the majority of guns trafficked in Guinea Bissau, trafficked by rural populations who use them to hunt, for self-protection, and occasionally for banditry. These weapons are often craft-produced in either Guinea Bissau or neighbouring countries. 

Tri-Border Area

Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Ghana constitute the tri-border area, and provide several key routes which are used to smuggle both legal and illegal goods between countries, including small amounts of concealed arms transported primarily by motorcycles. Some of these routes include Bondoukou–Bouna–Varalé–Doropo in Burkina Faso's southern region, bypassing Ivorian, Burkinabe, and Malian border posts, as well as 13 small crossing points near Tingréla in Northern Côte d'Ivoire. Additionally, smuggling hubs in Ghana, particularly in the towns of Bawku, Tumu, Hamile, Sampa, and Elubo, play a role in arms trafficking, albeit on a smaller scale compared to other routes.

Ghana and Guinea are both sources of arms and ammunition for small-scale traffickers, particularly for hunting cartridges, hunting rifles, craft weapons, and handguns. In Ghana, cross-border communal ties significantly influence local trafficking dynamics. Communities in North-Western Ghana, such as the Hamile and Tumu, share cultural links and a hybrid Ghanaian–Burkinabe identity with their counterparts in neighbouring Burkina Faso. Similarly, cross-border trade between Sampa in Ghana's Bono region and Bondoukou in Côte d'Ivoire further complicates efforts to identify and intercept trafficked goods, given the substantial movement of goods at the border.

Source: UNODC, 2022

Impacts of Illicit Arms Trafficking

The proliferation of arms has undoubtedly fuelled armed conflict in the region and seriously affected the security situation, especially in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The arrival and continued growth of jihadist groups in the region has increased demand for heavy weapons. Their presence has also been a driver of demand for lighter and small weapons which rural communities use to protect themselves from such groups. Violence in the region is fuelled by weak governments and security actors who either lack the necessary resources to make a lasting impact on the security situation or, in some cases, seek to exploit the instability for monetary gain. The circulation and trafficking of arms perpetuate a destructive cycle of rising tension and violence. Armed conflicts, combined with governments' inability to protect their citizens, push communities to acquire arms for self-defence, further exacerbating the situation. Therefore, in order to effectively address weapons proliferation, it is crucial to combine efforts supporting economic livelihoods with initiatives aimed at enhancing community security. 

Illicit arms and the instability caused by the violence they foment help to create an environment in which coups are prevalent. Mali, Burkina Faso, and, most recently, Niger have all suffered military takeovers. The consequences for the region are dire. Political chaos is encouraged by the insecurity and violence caused by arms trafficking, among other things. Communities living in the border areas are vulnerable to being exploited by traffickers and other criminal organisations operating in their vicinity. Coups create a dangerous precedent in the region and engender a culture of impunity. With members of the security services involved in the organisation and growth of arms trafficking in the region, military takeovers results in the further institutionalisation of arms trafficking. If this cycle of violence and impunity is not stopped the region will likely continue to descend into chaos. In the worst case scenario, countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger could become entirely ungovernable. Violence may also continue to spread towards the west coast of Africa.

Recommendations

Counter-proliferation measures have been taken to secure, mark, and record weapons in national stockpiles which make them easier to trace. However, weapons tracing efforts in the region could be strengthened further to limit the diversion of weapons from national stockpiles. In order to restrict the number of crossing into neighbouring countries, border guards should be issued enhanced training and equipment to enable them to increase seizures of illicit arms. Regional cooperation is limited in the Sahel for a number of reasons; if it were strengthened and intelligence sharing became commonplace, the flow of illicit arms across porous borders would likely reduce.

Now that MINUSMA has been told to leave the region, the international presence in the Sahel has drastically decreased. Future peacekeeping missions and foreign military operations need to take a more wholesale approach to tackling instability. It will be essential to learn from the successes and shortcomings of previous international missions such as Operation Barkhane or MINUSMA. The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea Bissau has demonstrated a more overt and strategic focus on countering arms and drug trafficking. Additionally, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has assisted in establishing transnational crime units (TCUs) in Guinea-Bissau to promote cohesive responses to drug trafficking and organised crime, with specific attention to border control and maritime security. 

A more balanced approach to tackling insecurity was launched in Côte d’Ivoire in January 2022. The program's goal is to improve civilians' living conditions by enhancing infrastructure and access to basic social services. It aims to reverse the perception of state abandonment in border communities and reduce vulnerability to exploitation. It focuses on improving education, health, electricity, water access, road maintenance, professional integration, youth employment, and social safety allowances. The program's initial impact has been positive but its true impact remains unclear as the security situation improved before its implementation. Neighbouring states and the international community should watch the implementation of these social programmes closely and assess their success. Cote d’Ivoire’s approach could be used as a framework across the Sahel to tackle insecurity, trafficking, and organised crime. By addressing the vulnerabilities of border communities and restoring their trust in the state, governments in the region could hinder the operations of traffickers.

It will be imperative to take steps to combat social and economic vulnerability, while supporting community mediation programming, good governance, and initiatives against violent extremism. Security sector support should be viewed as one element of a comprehensive approach based on a deeper understanding of the factors driving both the demand for and supply of illicit arms in the region. International, national, regional, and local actors need to recognise the importance of tackling the roots of arms proliferation in the Sahel. By taking cohesive and concerted actions to address community issues, these actors could contribute to promoting stability, security, and, eventually, prosperity in the Sahel region. 

Coup in Niger Likely to Further Destabilise the Sahel

On the night of the 26 July and into the following morning, the Niger’s presidential guard, led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, captured and detained President Mohamed Bazoum, declaring control of the country through a coup d’etat. The military junta set up the ‘National Council for the Salvation of the Homeland’ (CNSP), simultaneously suspending the existing constitution and installing a curfew and closing country borders. Officials have presented the past government’s inability to protect citizens from the threat of terrorist violence as a justification for the coup. This seems to be at least partially true, as reports show that the government has underestimated the security threat presented by Boko Haram in the south and armed groups with links to ISIL and al-Qaeda in the west. Additionally, there have been recent internal divisions between the presidential guard and the military, which is likely to have further pushed General Tchiani towards rebellion. After the coup was announced, protesters gathered in the capital, showcasing support for Bazoum. Estimates suggest the presence of hundreds of people, however, the crowd’s advances towards the presidential palace were met with a stern reaction from the presidential guard, which dispersed the protests through warning shots. 

African leaders have been seeking a peaceful resolution. Both the African Union (AU) as well as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - Niger being a member of both - have been vocal in condemning the coup in an attempt to reestablish stability. Benin’s president, Patrice Talon, has personally flown to Niger in order to evaluate the situation. Now both the AU and ECOWAS have given the new military leadership strict deadlines to cede power, reinstall Bazoum as head of state, and restore constitutional order under the threat of sanctions. ECOWAS has gone a step further in not ruling out the use of force if the new authorities refuse to cooperate.

Growth of ‘Coup belt’ weakens region, strengthens paramilitary groups 

The coup in Niger bodes poorly for western influence in the region. Niger has been called the “west’s only hope” in the Sahel region as it acted as a rare ally in the region under Bazoum. Both the EU and the US have been dedicating substantial financial resources to keep Niger secure and fit to combat the activities of regional paramilitary and terrorist groups, while also managing irregular migration from the sub-Saharan region. Revolts in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Sudan have created a wave of coups in the region, where predominantly pro-western leaders have been repeatedly replaced by heavy handed military juntas.

After a military takeover in Mali, the new anti-western regime expelled all French military staff from within its borders. Consequently, French troops relocated to Niger which served as a regional hub for western resources and troops fighting armed groups in the region. With Niger’s new military junta at the helm, the ‘coup belt’ grows and further reinforces instability in the Sahel. Without a strong and legitimately recognised leadership, groups like Boko Haram and networks of al-Qaeda and ISIL could potentially grow in strength and further weaken an already weak state.

Western woes mean opportunities for Russia

Military governments that lack democratic legitimacy have a tendency to coddle up to non-democratic global powers in order to stay in power and exert control over their territories. Russia, often through the hands of the Wagner group, has been benefiting from this phenomenen in Africa in recent years. Mali has been the most recent example where exiled western troops were replaced by Russian mercenaries. In Niger, Russia has a history of launching destabilising disinformation campaigns, which could indicate that Russia may also be interested in expanding its physical presence in the country.

Niger produces approximately 7% of the world's uranium. Historically, a significant portion of its uranium production has been channelled to France, primarily for use in the nation's nuclear power stations that account for around 70% of French power generation. Notably, France relies heavily on uranium imports, with about three-quarters of its supply coming from just four countries: Kazakhstan, Australia, Niger, and Uzbekistan. However, the dynamics surrounding Niger's uranium trade have been evolving. The country has diversified its customer base, reducing its dependence on traditional buyers like France, and has started selling significant shares of its uranium to customers in Canada and China, with companies from both of these nations operating their own extraction sites within Niger.

Wagner's history of accepting payments in natural resources and particularly valuable raw minerals is no secret. The coup in Niger has raised suspicions regarding Wagner's involvement and the potential objectives of the Russian government. Although information on the scale of alignment between the Wagner group and the Russian government is sparse, Yevgeny Prigozhin's decision to attend a Russia-Africa conference suggests that Wagner is deeply interested in the region. Below are two possible motives for that interest in Niger:

• Uranium for Wagner and Russian Interests: The coup might open up opportunities for Wagner to establish operations in Niger, likely in exchange for access to uranium resources. These uranium reserves could then be transported to Russia for military or civilian purposes or be sold on international markets. This would likely have a significant impact on uranium extraction businesses currently in operation in Niger.

• Disrupting the French Energy Market: Another speculated objective is that the coup may enable Wagner to divert significant amounts of uranium away from the French energy market. This disruption could potentially jeopardise the supply of uranium to France, leading to fluctuations in energy prices. The potential consequences of this disruption include an energy-related cost of living crisis in France, similar to what some European countries have experienced when dependent on Russian gas.

Given the geopolitical implications and potential economic repercussions, it is imperative for the international community to closely monitor the situation in Niger and collaborate to ensure stability, transparency, and accountability in the region's natural resource trade. Additionally, addressing concerns regarding Wagner's activities and their potential impact on global security and energy markets should be a priority for relevant international organisations and nations.

Too early to declare coup successful

The reason behind the exact timing of the rebellion remains unclear. The most probable scenario is that General Tchiani, who was installed as commander of Niger’s presidential guard by Bazoum’s predecessor, had been dismissed from office days prior to the coup and spearheaded the rebellion in an attempt to remain in power. Tchiani has declared himself the leader, however, it remains unclear exactly how much backing he retains within the militaty and business establishment. A financially sanctioned presidential guard with limited support from the military and civil society may eventually find itself in a weak and vulnerable position.

Conclusion

Once the current fluid situation becomes more clear and the structures of power become at least partially reestablished, Niger could become another African state involved in a wider international power struggle. The west, mainly represented in Africa by France diplomatically, and by the US financially, will want to retain Niger as a security buffer against military insurgent groups in the region. However, Wagner will aim to add Niger to its growing list of allies in the West African region.

Although Bazoum had a history of restricting democratic freedoms and was ultimately unable to ensure security across the country, his rule did see an increase in per capita income, improvement in humanitarian indicators, and at least partially competent inflation management. Conversely, frequent military coups in other countries have led to visible regressions in most of these areas, and it is difficult to find reasons why Niger will become an exception. If Tchiani is successful in securing his position as the new leader, Niger’s fate could closely resemble that of Mali, which has been characterised by worsening cases of violence against civilians, constitutional impasse, increasing Wagner activities, and the rise of militant groups.

The Expansion of the ADF in East Africa

On 16 June, eight people were kidnapped and 41 were killed in an attack on a school in Mpondwe, a small village in Western Uganda located in a mountainous region that borders the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) attributed the responsibility for the attack to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist rebel group active in the eastern provinces of DRC since the late 1990s. The group initially operated in Uganda, as it emerged as a force against President Museveni, but was then pushed into DRC after Ugandan forces conducted military operations against it. The attack occurred late at night, when around 20 attackers set fire to school dormitories and assaulted students, all between the ages of 13 and 18, with machetes and firearms. According to the UPDF, the attackers fled into the DRC towards the Virunga National Park. On 20 June, the UPDF announced that they rescued three of the kidnapped. Two ADF rebels were killed during the resulting firefight.

The day prior to the rescue, 20 people were arrested by the Ugandan security forces for cooperating with the ADF in planning the attack. In the aftermath of the attack, the commander of the UPDF announced that the assailants' efforts were supported by local residents, who showed them around the village before the massacre. A witness declared that they heard one of the attackers shout “Allahu Akbar” and “we have succeeded in destabilising Museveni's country." 

The education minister and first lady Janet Museveni commented on the attack, suggesting that there was a conflict between residents in Kasese, the district where Mpondwe is located, and the Partnerships for Opportunity Development Association (PODA), a Canadian NGO. The NGO built the school and currently retains control over its administration - part of the local population wants to administer the school themselves, which had led to increasing tensions before the attack. According to Janet Museveni, auditors from the PODA inspected the structure the day before the attack. It remains unclear whether these tensions played a role in the school massacre.

ADF militants are not novices at targeting children. The ADF targets schools for recruitment and propaganda purposes. In most cases, attacks on schools and facilities that host children result in kidnappings. This allows the ADF to sustain its recruiting effort through the forceful assimilation of young people in its ranks. The use of children is advantageous to the group in several ways. Kids are considered more manipulable and therefore more obedient, but more importantly, they have less monetary and social ambition than adult fighters. This makes them a mostly-inexpensive and easily expendable force in an insurgent campaign. 

This was not the case in the Mpondwe school massacre, suggesting the group is more concerned with large-scale attacks that draw publicity. Children are regarded as the most vulnerable component of every society; thus, attacks in which many are killed have a strong media impact. These incidents make government authorities appear incapable of protecting vulnerable populations. As a result, this fuels ADF propaganda, portraying state institutions as inept and corrupt, which further stirs resentment among the population towards these institutions.

The United States and the UN sanctioned the ADF in 2014 for terrorist activities, including the targeting of minors. The group was condemned by the US Department of Treasury "for targeting children in situations of armed conflict, including through killing, rape, abduction and forced displacement." The Ugandan army leadership said the attack aimed to divert the focus of the Ugandan forces from the fight against the ADF in the DRC, where the UPDF are operating following an agreement with Kinshasa to counter the group’s activities. The attackers, who reportedly crossed the border into Uganda two days before the attack, were allegedly initially planning on targeting a military installation. It is still unclear what led them to change their target if this was the case.

Although the circumstances of the attack are still under investigation, especially relating to the possible local support that the attackers received, this event is indicative of the ADF’s growing presence and activity in the region. After intense repression in Uganda, where the group was founded, it now operates from the forests of the Congolese North Kivu province. In 2019, the Islamic State (IS) recognised the ADF as part of its international network of affiliate groups. Since then, the group has killed more than 4,000 people and is now comprised of around 2,000 members, some of whom were recruited through kidnapping.

The attack in Mpondwe points to an increase in attack capabilities by ADF militants. In November 2021, in a set of coordinated attacks, three ADF members detonated suicide vests in the Ugandan capital of Kampala, killing four people. This event was particularly effective in highlighting the group’s ties with the central authority of IS, as the latter claimed responsibility for the attack and used the footage of it to promote its presence in the region, praising the actions of the ADF.

The financial support provided by the Islamic State is enabling the expansion of the ADF in the DRC’s eastern provinces. The funding is conveyed through a complex scheme running through Somalia and South Africa; the UN documented that IS cells in South Africa are in direct contact with ADF leadership in the DRC. In recent years, the group has relied on the organisational and logistical support offered by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) militia in Mozambique, which also has direct links to the Islamic State. The expansion of the ADF’s network is likely strengthening the group and enabling it to conduct higher-impact attacks.

Additionally, the group has demonstrated the ability to adapt to Operation Shuja, a joint offensive by the Ugandan and Congolese armed forces. Following an intensification of military operations in North Kivu, ADF militiamen have begun to move into the province of South Kivu (further south) and Ituri (further north) in recent months. This expansion is also part of the group's strategy to pursue territorial gains along the border between Uganda and DRC. According to a United Nations report, the group aims to conduct attacks in the capital Kinshasa and in Haut-Uele province, north of Ituri.

A trend that is becoming more entrenched, as demonstrated by the school attack in Mpondwe, is an increasing targeting of groups and structures that attract media attention. This is reflected in high casualty incidents and the targeting of locations that were not previously considered to be at a high risk of attack. This approach particularly reflects the strategy of the Islamic State, which exploits images and videos of large-scale attacks to attract more recruits.  The self-representation of the ADF as a powerful, expanding group that is able to hit targets inflicting great damage, helps the group in its recruitment campaign, which is accompanied by a Salafist jihadist ideological communication campaign. The influx of foreign fighters from other countries in the region, such as Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Kenya, is exemplary of the success of the group’s recruitment efforts.

In recent years the ADF has been refining its combat tactics, especially from a technological standpoint. Since the group prefers an asymmetric approach in clashes with security forces, there has been an increased use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and drones. The latter is used for reconnaissance purposes and for collecting footage of combat scenes, which is then employed for propaganda purposes. The drones used are commercially purchasable and are usually manufactured by the Chinese company DJI. The ADF has also perpetrated an increasing number of IED attacks frequently targeting government security forces. The ADF also uses drones to defend key access points to strongholds while initiating ambush-style attacks.

The increasing penetration of the Islamic State in East Africa and the increase in collaboration among affiliated groups represent a growing risk. The Islamic State's propaganda and recruitment platform facilitates the seamless movement of militiamen, financial resources, and know-how between countries and groups, posing significant difficulties for security forces. The lack of cooperation among the states affected constitutes a dangerous flaw in counterinsurgency capabilities in the region. Further, the presence of vast areas with limited governance functions allows groups to more easily adapt, expand, and flourish, as the ADF has done in the Eastern DRC.

The school attack in Mpondwe confirms the vulnerability of Ugandan communities located near the DRC border. Attacks in Uganda allow the ADF to strike targets in Ugandan territory and then immediately return to their strongholds in DRC. The group's recent expansion into Ituri and South Kivu increases the extent of border territories where the group is able to mobilise militiamen and conduct attacks. It is consequently likely that in the short to medium term attacks such as the one on the school will increase in number.

The ADF’s expansion is also facilitated by the security crisis in the DRC's eastern provinces, which is aggravated by the presence of a multiplicity of armed groups. The increase in violence in recent months has resulted in an increase in the flow of refugees crossing the border into Uganda. The ADF is exploiting this uncontrolled movement of people to enter and exit Uganda without being intercepted by Ugandan security forces. In addition, the inability of the two countries' security forces to counter the violence of the ADF and other armed groups is exacerbating the population's resentment towards government authorities. The ADF will likely continue to exploit this resentment on both sides of the border in order to attract recruits and facilitate movement between the two countries.

Blood in the Batteries: Cobalt Mining in the DRC

As technology advances and global demand for sustainable products increases, the resources used to create batteries become more and more desirable. Over the last two decades, the use of cobalt in batteries has increased 26-fold, creating a drastic increase in cobalt mining activity. Many battery manufacturers source their cobalt from mines in third-world countries, where vast mineral wealth is extracted with loose regulations and poor working conditions, allowing for cheap prices. One of the most affected countries is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where cobalt miners suffer from extremely poor working conditions and staggeringly low pay, creating an environment where child labour, slavery, and human rights violations are prevalent. 

Powering the New World

Cobalt mining has become one of the main economic activities in the DRC, accounting for around 30% of the country's GDP and 95% of its exports. Cobalt mines in the DRC are responsible for 73% of the global cobalt supply, an industry with a yearly global market value of $9.6 billion. The profitability of this sector has caused rapid expansion throughout the country, facilitated in many cases by a lack of comprehensive regulation. In the past decade, these cobalt mines - and artisanal mines in partcular - have been host to a myriad of human rights violations. Artisanal mines, responsible for 15% of the world's supply of cobalt, are mostly independent and informal mines where miners work under precarious conditions. 

Workers in these mines often lack proper tools, meaning many dig into the earth with their bare hands. Cobalt mines sell to larger companies and, as they are informal in nature, are not governed by the regulations that do exist. These mines are mostly located in rural areas where poverty is rampant, causing the population to depend on mining activities despite low wages and poor working conditions. Bribes is widespread and regulations are rarely enforced, exacerbating the poor working conditions in these mines. Miners are also not provided with any protective gear, causing workers, and especially children, to be exposed to toxic chemicals that cause vomiting, nausea, cardiac issues, and even cancer. Various workers also suffer from infertility, with women present in mines being exposed to an increased risk of birth defects. Reports recount women working in mines with their babies wrapped around their backs and their older children working alongside them in pools of toxic chemicals. The diseases and deaths caused by these conditions are impossible to quantify, as accidents in mines are hardly ever recorded, let alone publicly recognised by the government. A mother of a worker who died in a mining tunnel accident highlighted the indifference toward worker deaths. This mine collapsed in Central DRC in September of 2019 and claimed the lives of 63 workers, yet no company or individual took responsibility for the tragedy. Most information regarding poor working conditions and accidents is anecdotal as mines engage in stringent oversight to prevent reporting; witnesses describe mining areas where secrecy is enforced by security personnel. 

The presence of children in cobalt mines has drawn the most attention internationally. Estimates show that 20% of small-scale artisanal cobalt mines employ child workers as young as three, paying them no more than two dollars per day. Research conducted by Amnesty International and Afrewatch has shown that children in cobalt mines work upwards of 12 hours per day, and are subject to the same poor conditions as adult workers. These children carry out arduous tasks, including hauling heavy metals and materials - with no overhead protection or gear to prevent injury. Much like adult workers, children are exposed to toxic substances and gases, yet they are especially susceptible as these ailments stunt their growth. A witness identified a Chinese-owned mine in Kasulo where children work in environments with radioactive minerals, contracting various diseases as a result. Children in these mines are forced to crawl into small spaces to extract minerals, often resulting in injury and death. 

Various international aid organisations have led initiatives to prohibit the presence of children in these mines. A collaboration between UNICEF and the Global Battery Alliance seeks to reintegrate children who worked in mines into education. Further efforts by UNICEF and RCS Global Group have developed tools to identify child-rights infringements, seeking to develop an efficient protective system for child slaves. Despite the advances provided by these initiatives, child labour is still prevalent in cobalt mines. Children work out of necessity, as their poverty-stricken families are unable to pay for food, clothing, or education. As long as poverty ravages villages near mines, children will be forced to resort to arduous labour to help keep their families afloat. 

Poor mining practices in formal and informal mines alike severely impact the environment. The chemicals created in cobalt mines are toxic and the improper disposal of these substances harms the health of those working in the mines, as well as those living near them. Chemicals from cobalt mines are often disposed of in rivers, polluting water supplies for nearby villages and towns. The contaminated water is often radioactive and contains carcinogens, gravely affecting those reliant on these rivers for drinking water. The river in Lubumbashi, a neighbouring city hosting over 2 million people, has become barren due to these chemical disposals. Various residents have reported a lack of fish in rivers due to the mines’ disposal of acid and waste, along with ailments from exposure to polluted air, including metabolic disorders and tumours. Pollution has spread to other areas, such as the Katapula, a main waterway of the Congo River, that is now littered with toxic metals. The people who use this river as a source of food or drinking water have contracted respiratory disorders and seen an increase in birth defects. The practice of improper disposal also harms crops and impacts soil fertility, leading to decreases in agricultural production and, in turn, food availability. The DRC's agricultural sector already faces setbacks and is unable to meet domestic food demands, meaning further hindrances to production could reduce availability for the 6.7 million food insecure people in the country.

Poor working conditions and improper disposals are prevalent due to the corruption that pervades the cobalt mining sector. In December 2022, Glencore, a Swiss mining company operating in the DRC, paid $180 million to settle claims of corruption, adding to the $1.6 billion in fines they faced due to fraudulent activity. The company has admitted to bribing African nations, namely the DRC. Applying fines and financial sanctions to companies that generate billions in revenue from cobalt mining practices is ineffective and will do little to prevent corruption. Despite the case against Glencore, the vast majority of cobalt-related corruption goes unchecked.

The involvement of international corporations in cobalt mining operations creates difficulties in enforcing regulations. China is one of the most prominent stakeholders in cobalt mining in the DRC. As of 2023, private and state-owned Chinese companies control 80% of all cobalt mining operations in the DRC. China, the largest refined cobalt producer in the world, is heavily invested in obtaining a constant flow of cobalt from the DRC. One of the ways they protect their investments is by supporting the DRC's military in their efforts to protect and monitor cobalt mines. Having influence over military forces and building relationships with military leaders has helped Chinese companies skirt regulations and ensure a constant flow of cheap cobalt. This impunity also extends to other countries, with tech giants in the US successfully dodging accountability for their abusive operations. In 2021, a US judge dismissed the case against Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and Tesla for the deaths of workers in cobalt mines, adding to the list of companies that ignored precarious working conditions in mines and escaped conviction. Of these deaths, many were children; as many as 11 children suffered broken limbs and spines, and five others died due to tunnel collapses or a lack of mine shaft protection. This lack of accountability has enabled mining companies to maintain poor mining infrastructure to reduce costs, causing further deaths.

Departing from Cobalt

The cobalt mining issue has gained international relevance over the past few years, prompting various companies that use cobalt to purchase less. As concerns for environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) increase, many companies are looking into the supply chains of their products to ensure humane and sustainable practices. Apple, the tech company with the second-highest sales revenue in the world, uses cobalt for all the batteries in its products. Their resolve to use 100% recycled cobalt in their products by 2025 would drastically reduce their reliance on cobalt produced in the DRC. While this would help to reduce worker abuses, it would also have a starkly negative economic impact on the Congolese that rely on mining employment to sustain themselves.

Other companies are also opting for cobalt-free battery alternatives in light of the human rights violations in cobalt mines. Many tech giants - including Samsung, Panasonic, and Tesla - have already begun their transition to lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries. Apart from having fewer ethical implications, these alternatives are cheaper, providing financial incentives for companies seeking to reduce costs. Tesla has increased the affordability of its products through the use of LFP batteries, and tech companies seeking to provide competitive prices are following in their footsteps. More alternatives to cobalt are in development; nickel is a prime candidate, boasting higher energy density and fewer emissions in its extraction.

Dependency and Withdrawal

Although these initiatives seek to eliminate the negative effects of cobalt mining, a drastic reduction in demand for cobalt could end up causing more harm than good. The combined decrease in demand has caused a 30% fall in cobalt prices as of June, with the possibility of prices dropping further as more companies adhere to ESG initiatives. These price reductions have resulted in reduced incomes for miners in the DRC. Nearly 200,000 people are directly employed by cobalt mines in the DRC, with a million more indirectly dependent on the sector. The loss in revenue and profits will directly affect those already earning low wages in the sector, and will consequently hurt the DRC’s economy, where 62% of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

Instead of intentionally reducing demand for cobalt, a source of subsistence for an entire country, companies should push for a remodelling of laws, regulations, and policies that will improve working conditions and reduce the mines’ impact on the environment. These regulations should also consider finding means to reduce foreign influence, in order to reduce corruption, as the tight-knit relationship between the Congolese military and outside actors has provided fertile grounds for bribery and regulatory misconduct. This is a tall task, especially for a region where legislation is rarely passed, let alone enforced. Pressure from international institutions and countries could help accelerate these processes, however, the impact of international efforts is likely to be limited. Restricting trade would directly impact the DRC’s food-insecure population. Pushing for change in mines through economic sanctions, such as embargoes, would also see little success, as the DRC’s main cobalt importer is China, which has so far shown little initiative in improving working conditions in mines. A more viable solution to this issue is to target the companies responsible for mining abuses in the DRC, seeing as the vast majority of cobalt mining operations in the country are privately owned, and incentivize them to improve conditions in their mines. Pushing for accountability in international courts could also be effective in punishing mining companies that do not adhere to regulations, which may incentivise companies to adjust practices to avoid losses in productivity and investment.

The future of cobalt as the metal powering the world is uncertain. Conflicting predictions paint different landscapes in the upcoming years. Despite recent decreases in cobalt demand and prices driven by ESG initiatives, many experts believe that the demand for cobalt will continue to grow as the use of cobalt-based batteries increases. Some estimates show a growing global market for cobalt, with revenues and prices predicted to rise to $19.47 billion by 2030. In this case, the best solution to the pernicious effects of exploitative cobalt mines would be reforms of judicial entities aimed at purveying accountability and the adherence to stricter regulations.

Gradually parting from cobalt mining and switching to other economic activities could help reduce dependence in this sector without aggravating poverty or food insecurity.The government could seek to aid the transition into non-extractive activities by providing subsidies and regulations to incentivise growth in these sectors and create safe employment opportunities for those reliant on cobalt mining. The regions of North and South Kivu, for example, have great agricultural potential for domestic consumption and exports. Although investments in agriculture are already underway, the country’s vast arable land could be further exploited and operations could be developed to provide mine workers throughout the country with alternative and sustainable income sources. Focusing on providing formal employment in this sector is crucial to ensuring safe working conditions, as formal entities are binded by regulation.

The further development of the agricultural and mining sectors, alongside other activities such as foresting, would also require improved infrastructure to transport goods. The construction of roads, rail networks, and other forms of transport could also provide employment to those reliant on extractive activities. This alternative is not attractive to stakeholders in cobalt mines, many of whom have immense power and influence over the DRC. The government itself is investing in cobalt mining and continues to increase its involvement in the sector, meaning a full transition into non-extractive sectors in the near future is unlikely. The Congolese government could, however, consider undertaking the development of alternative industries in parallel to the development of cobalt mining activities.

Given the uncertainty around the future of cobalt, the DRC should consider a hybrid approach. Judicial reforms and stricter regulations will help Congolese citizens in any case. Further development of the mining sector without providing alternative employment opportunities would cause the country and its population to become increasingly dependent on cobalt. Although it remains unlikely due to global demand fuelled by tech advances, if ESG initiatives prevail before the DRC has properly addressed the concerns surrounding its mining industry, causing demand for cobalt to dwindle, millions of people will fall deeper into poverty. However, in a more likely scenario, the demand for cobalt will continue to increase throughout the foreseeable future; in this case, should the concerns around Congolese mines not be addressed, more and more Congolese will fall victim to abuses in the mining sector.

Scholz’s Visit to East Africa

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrived in East Africa on 4 May for a trip split between Ethiopia and Kenya, two of the region’s most influential actors, to discuss future environmental and political cooperation. The chancellor described the visit as preparation for a “multi-polar world.” Scholz’s recognition of the world’s increasingly complex international order has motivated a growing number of nations to develop relations with East African countries that are expected to grow in political and economic significance in the long-term. Germany’s decision to increase cooperation with East Africa follows a trend of major international actors dedicating infrastructure investment to a growing region facing economic headwinds. 

On the first leg of Scholz’s visit, in Ethiopia, he supported calls for the African Union to be represented at the G20. Germany has joined a growing list of G20 nations including China, France, and the United States, in advocating for more African representation in the G20. Only one African nation, South Africa, is currently a member. Representation in international organisations would act as a significant step towards fulfilling a “partnership of equals,” something much of the continent has been pleading for. Scholz recognised that a seat at the table allows for a “louder African voice” in the world, which may elevate African concerns on issues that may otherwise be ignored. 

During the second leg of Scholz’s visit, in Kenya, he pledged to provide $215 million to expand the Olkaria geothermal power plant in Nakuru. This investment into Kenya’s power grid provides a boost to Kenya’s ambitions of constructing a reliable and renewable electricity grid. Kenyan President William Ruto aims for the country to become fossil fuel free by 2030 - the country already satisfies 90 per cent of its energy needs via renewable sources. The transition to renewable energy has occurred fastest in Africa where levels of fossil fuel dependency are lower. Yet, advancements in renewable energy on the continent have not significantly negated Africa’s energy vulnerability during international crises. Approximately 43 per cent of Africa’s population remains without electricity. The lack of energy security which persists within the region remains a limitation to economic growth (For more detail on this topic check out our African Energy Crisis Report). 

At COP27 in November 2022, President Ruto advocated for ‘loss and damage’ relief funds, an initiative to mitigate the consequences of climate change for nations who are exposed to its worst consequences. Loss and damage funds proved a difficult topic of negotiation at COP27, exposing African frustration with the international system. Ruto held that delays in establishing the funds were “cruel and unjust” while former Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari had written to COP27 asserting; “don’t tell Africans they can't use their own resources.” Africa in total produces six per cent of global fossil fuels yet it faces disproportionately large climatic events. Berlin announced they would support the loss and damage scheme, with a contribution of $185 million. Scholz’s recent visit to Kenya, enhancing green technology cooperation with Ruto, embodied the “rise to the challenge” which Ruto petitioned for at COP27. Scholz’s support for environmental initiatives in Africa underlines Germany’s commitment to environmental action on the continent.

Scholz’s visit to the continent was his second in only 17 months in office. On the first visit in May 2022, he toured Senegal, Niger, and South Africa, focusing on private investment into sustainable energy production and the war in Ukraine. Scholz’s first visit to Africa was significant in timing. Both before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO member states have criticised Germany for failing to uphold NATO’s defence spending commitment and for hesitating to ship arms to Ukraine. Scholz’s widening of Germany’s diplomatic reach to include African nations furthers their commitment to multilateralism amid the Ukraine war, which has strained western relations with Africa.

While bilateral agreements have produced positive outcomes for African nations with German cooperation, Ruto’s frustration with the international system during COP27 has driven calls for the creation of a New Energy Pact at the African Climate Action Summit for September 2023 in Nairobi. Ruto’s claim that Africans were being “mistreated” during international conferences by non-African nations has inspired a pan-African response, where African problems are resolved by African solutions. The agenda of September’s Climate Action Summit includes: Energy systems, infrastructure, environment, and human development – important concerns in the midst of a cost of living crisis which has sparked demonstrations continent-wide. Ahead of COP28 in Dubai, Ruto’s focus on the African summit highlights the shift toward intra-African multilateralism, which may result in more constructive conversations between nations who understand Africa’s unique environmental challenges.

Ethiopia and Kenya are important nations in African affairs. The headquarters of the African Union is based in Addis Ababa and the regional office of the United Nations is based in Nairobi. This heightens the diplomatic status of both nations and has resulted in closer scrutiny of their economic management, which has drawn concern from Berlin. Loans used for infrastructure development have deepend concerns over the future economic stability of the region. Kenya, despite being at high risk of debt distress, has recently stabilised their debt load by maintaining resilient growth rates and cutting the budget deficit. According to IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva, Kenya is “definitely” not among sub-Saharan nations at an increasing risk of default. Though both nations were negatively affected by Covid-19, drought, and the Ukraine War, Ethiopia has faced additional economic pressure due to the two-year civil conflict in Northern Tigray. Coupled with the IMF projection that Ethiopia and Kenya will become the third and fourth largest sub-Saharan economies on the continent, capitalising on their increased productivity is of growing importance to foreign governments and multinational firms.

Despite Kenya and Ethiopia’s current growth challenges, it is likely that their governments will position themselves as crucial actors in the fight against climate change. Africa holds 40 per cent of the world’s total cobalt, manganese, and platinum, minerals essential for green technology. Utilising the continent’s material wealth allows its population to develop domestic industry and improve energy security. Insecure and inefficient access to energy has frustrated the development of key industries in Africa, increasing dependence on imports. Sub-Saharan Africa currently spends 26 per cent of GDP on the imports of goods and services. A regional focus on improving energy security would involve improved regulation, which left unresolved, may negate Africa’s material advantage. 

Scholz and Ruto’s common interest in the advancement of green technologies depends on levels of energy efficiency. Introducing building codes and efficiency standards which limit the use of inefficient appliances would contribute to a roughly 30 per cent fall in energy demand by 2030. Reducing total energy demand through improved efficiency would reduce energy imports and household expenditures, allowing more funds to be injected into home-grown infrastructure projects. Ruto’s ambition of making Africa the “clean, green factory of the world” centres on regional infrastructure projects which Germany has already invested in. With the African agenda increasingly focused on climate change, domestic technology development may allow Africa’s export volume to grow, relieving wider European and Asian dependency on Russian energy amid the war in Ukraine.

Backing Down from Controversial Third Term Bid Restores Democratic Standards

After a period of turmoil and widespread riots across the country, Senegal President Macky Sall has ruled out seeking a controversial third term. In Zimbabwe, a crackdown on opposition activities has been intensifying in the build up to the elections. And in South Sudan, President Kiir has stated that the country’s first elections will take place next year, although the legitimacy of this declaration is far from certain.

SENEGAL

Macky Sall Rules Out Third Term

President Macky Sall has declared that he will not be seeking a third term in the upcoming elections. The opposition leader, Idrissa Seck, has “commended President Sall for making the right and honourable decision” and described it as “a victory for the Senegalese people”.

The decision to run for a third term was seen as controversial and introduced tensions in one of the most politically and democratically stable countries in the region. Widespread riots earlier this year have been partially sparked by the president’s inability to rule out his candidacy.  

The decision has been widely praised throughout the West African bloc and the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, has stated that Sall’s decision “represents a very important example for his country and the world”. His declaration opens the door for a number of Sall’s close allies to seek the country’s top position in the upcoming elections. This decision will most likely have to happen fast as Seck has already been confirmed to be the leading opposition party’s candidate. 

ZIMBABWE

Government Cracks Down on Opposition Rallies as Elections Approach

As the August elections are approaching in Zimbabwe, state forces have been obstructing opposition activities throughout the country. Nearly 100 opposition rallies have been banned or interrupted during the campaign period. The police, who have been accused of allying with the government forces, have been fully banning opposition gatherings on the premise of what the opposition believes to be illegitimate reasons. On July 9th, a large rally 100km from the capital was banned at the last minute due to poor sanitation facilities and road access. The lower court upheld the police’s ban. The opposition has accused the government of using state apparatus to thwart its efforts at a legitimate opportunity to challenge the government in the upcoming elections. 

This trend falls into a wider pattern of continuous state behaviour aimed at facilitating the way for the governing party to stay in power. Recently, the ruling party has sent campaign messages to registered voters via text messages, even those who are not party members. The message signed with President Mnangagwa’s name went out to around a million out of the 6 million registered voters in the country. During the registration of voters, phone numbers were captured as one of the data points for voters, which have been mishandled in what seems like a deliberate data breach. Digital activists have voiced their concerns that data rights have been abused for political influence, which poses a significant threat to activists and journalists as voters also have to submit addresses when they register. 

As election day approaches, the more difficult opposition’s operations are becoming. Zimbabwe’s administration has long foregone even an attempt to present itself behind a democratic facade, with the elections unlikely to pose any form of challenge to the governing ZANU-PF and President Mnangagwa. 

SOUTH SUDAN

President Kiir Declares Intent to Organise Elections in 2024

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir has stated that the country’s first elections will take place in 2024. Originally, elections were to be held in February of this year, however, the clauses of agreement between the government and the opposition have not been met within the necessary timeframe. Last August, the transitional government of Kiir as president and his biggest rival, Riek Machar as Vice-President, was extended for another two years. 

Despite the president’s verbal promises, the UN has criticised his government for inciting violence and impeding democratic freedoms rather than attempting to install them. UN Envoy Nicholas Haysom has stated that South Sudan is “not yet ready” for free, fair, and credible elections in 2024. However, he has stressed that with enough political will, investment in the necessary resources and desire to commit to democratic mechanisms progress could be made. 

Instability in Neighbouring Sudan Causes Mass Returns 

The country finds itself in a state of both political and security crises. The civil war took hundreds of thousands of lives and resulted in over 2 million people fleeing the country. One of the main destinations for refugees has been neighbouring Sudan, which is now facing its own civil war and has forced many refugees to return to South Sudan. Around 159,000 people have already crossed the border back into South Sudan since the Sudanese conflict arose and the UN stated that over 90% are people returning back home. With so many people coming back into South Sudan, there is an increased level of movement within the country’s borders. The number of people seeking shelter and security remains very high, which provokes competition between communities for already scarce resources, leading to visible tensions. 

Conclusion

Senegalese President Macky Sall has ultimately sustained the status of a democratic leader in an extremely volatile region after ruling out an electoral bid for a third term. However, the delay in the announcement suggests that the decision was more likely caused by political pressure rather than an altruistic motivation to champion democracy. Although his critics may be right in saying that announcing this decision earlier could have potentially spared at least some of the lives of the people who died during recent riots, the decision itself is good news for democracy. 

Despite the fact that South Sudanese President Salva Kiir has confirmed elections for 2024, the country’s road to stability and democracy has been painfully long. In the 12 years since the country’s independence, around half have been dominated by civil war. Over 159,000 South Sudanese refugees are returning due to the conflict in Sudan and with a scarcity of resources and unstable power dynamics within a weak state, the country seems destined for tensions and grievances that will further South Sudan’s insecurity regardless of any electoral outcome. 

President Kiir’s governance has been dominated by a corrupt system of patronage, which has rewarded loyalty and severely punished resistance while enabling him to hold power continuously for the past 12 years. As the country’s only ever president in charge of the state apparatus and its revenues, it is unlikely that he will find a sudden desire for democratic reform and take the risk of submitting himself to a legitimate contest. 

The Influence of China’s Belt & Road Initiative on Kenya’s Economic Development

Africa’s economic development in the 20th and 21st centuries has been heavily influenced by foreign investment, most notably from the US, France, the UK, and China. Despite becoming involved in the 1980s, China did not become a significant investor until the beginning of the 2000s. The annual rate of Chinese compound investment in Africa increased by 18% per annum from 2004 to 2016 and peaked in 2015 at $55 billion. According to scholarly data, a 1% increase in foreign direct investment has equated to a 0.138% increase in economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that economic growth in African countries can be partially attributed to foreign investments and international projects. Such projects are vital for the development of African infrastructure, namely roads, rail networks, and dams. However, these investments come at a cost, with around 12% of the continental debt burden being owed to China and Chinese lenders. In some cases, debt payments have the potential to overshadow the benefits of international investment. Some countries, including China, are using financial leverage in Africa to win political favours and gain an economic foothold on the continent. 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Kenya

As of March 2020, 138 countries have signed cooperation agreements for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to facilitate connectivity and international trade, as well as boost financial integration. Between 2013 and 2019, sub-Saharan Africa received around 22% of all BRI related investments, which amounted to approximately $160.6 billion. Kenya has the largest economy in East Africa and is a major regional transportation hub, which is largely why it has become a major benefactor of BRI investments. Various ‘mega projects’, such as the construction of the Nairobi Expressway, the upgrade of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), and the formation of the Eldoret Special Economic Zone (ESEZ), which is part of the African Economic Zone project, have all been developed in close cooperation with China as part of the BRI. The expressway and the SGR upgrade are aimed at improving the transportation infrastructure linking Nairobi to key hubs in the country to boost trade and social mobility. The purpose of the ESEZ is to increase levels of technological development and attract manufacturing and service companies. 

Both the Nairobi Expressway and the SGR were contracted to the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). The expressway started trial operations in 2022 and is currently managed by Moja Expressway Company, another Chinese firm. Totalling 27km, the toll road was designed to ease city traffic and provide access to the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport. Since the trial operation in 2022, around 50,000 motorists have been using the road daily. However, because the CRBC’s government contract states the corporation will collect all proceedings for the first 27 years, the proceeds from the expressway will go to CRBC instead of the Kenyan government. As of February 2023, 10 million motorists had used the road and CRBC had collected around $14,396,538. The SGR, which is designed to connect the port in Mombasa to Uganda, is also predominantly financed by China. This new fast rail link project is designed to increase domestic and international trade and promote international cooperation, but is far from completion. While the Kenyan government has already spent $5 billion to upgrade the SGR, mostly financed by China, it still requires an additional $3.7 billion to finish the project. 

Kenya also accepted strict terms on their Chinese loans. The government borrowed $1.6 billion from China for the construction of the Nairobi-Naivasha portion of the rail network at a 2% annual interest rate, and signed an agreement that states that 42% of all revenues will be used to repay the loan. The agreement also stipulates that Kenya needs to approach China first if it wants to purchase any goods with the proceeds from the rail network. Such terms force Kenya into economically unviable decisions, of which China is the only beneficiary. If the SGR is not profitable, Kenya has to repay its debt to China, and if the SGR is profitable, Kenya has to repay its debt and purchase Chinese goods with the rail proceeds. Onerous contracts are incentivising Kenya to seek alternative funding from Europe to finalise the construction of the railway. Being unable to finance the construction of new tracks, the government decided to upgrade part of a 120-year-old track to Melba for $400 million, which was originally constructed by the British in the 19th century. With no additional funding, the country will not be able to finalise the construction of the SGR, which could impact its long-term profitability and consequently prevent Kenya from meeting its debt obligations in the future.

Kenya signed an agreement worth 200 billion Kenyan shilling with China for its Special Economic Zone project in Eldoret. The town is projected to become a major industrial hub, promoting technological innovation and attracting manufacturing and service companies. Kenya contracted the project to Guangdong New South Group Ltd. Five years since the project’s initiation, no progress has been made. From the beginning, water shortages and lack of road access halted progress, and whilst the government predicts that construction will finish within 10 years, the project’s profitability remains uncertain. The official website indicates that only one manufacturer signed a non-legally binding memorandum of understanding, and no additional companies have confirmed that they will operate in the SEZ. The details of the project’s financing remain opaque; however, the Kenyan Finance Act of 2022 might be an indication that the government intends to pay its debts through the Kenyan taxpayer rather than through project proceeds. 

Is China ‘Debt-Trapping’ Kenya?  

These Kenyan mega projects play a vital role in stimulating the domestic economy. Kenya estimates the projects will create thousands of new jobs. For example, the construction of the SGR created around 30,000 new employment opportunities, whilst the construction of the ESEZ added around 40,000. According to the Kenyan Investment Authority, Kenyans make up 95% of the workforce within 106 Chinese companies operating in the country. As of 2014, foreign contractors were also mandated to subcontract a third of their projects to Kenyan companies; however, Chinese companies often failed to meet this requirement. 

Kenya predicts that the successful completion of all projects will contribute to the diversification of the country’s economy. Despite the projects’ faults, the ESEZ attracted the world’s largest silk producer. If the agreement comes to fruition, the company will set up silk production facilities, in addition to contracting around 8,000 hectares of surrounding land for the production of mulberry leaves. The manufacturer is predicted to create a further 300,000 jobs. Economic cooperation with China can also attract Chinese investments in manufacturing plants, which would promote Kenyan exports and help diversify its economy. Currently, Kenya’s economy is reliant on agricultural production. Because Kenya has trade agreements with the US, the UK, and the European Union, augmenting Kenyan manufacturing would provide additional trade opportunities.

However, many of the projects remain economically dubious. The most significant issue is that new employment opportunities created by Chinese contractors are low paying. In addition, as Chinese companies fail to sub-contract Kenyan firms, local businesses miss out on lucrative infrastructure projects. Kenyan companies received only 0.9% of the 1.31 billion shillings for a road construction project from Kisumu to Mamboleo. Another difficulty is that the projects must be successful for Kenya to economically benefit in the long-term. The current state of the SGR indicates that projects may fail as the railway currently operates at a loss. Within three years, the SGR lost around $200 million mostly due to truck transportation, which is more efficient in Kenya. Kenya might have to look for alternative sources of financing to complete its projects and pay its debts to China, which might demand payment in other forms, such as natural resources, if the projects remain unprofitable. This is further worsened by the fact that Kenya’s debt is already substantial. In 2019, Kenya’s public debt was 55.5% of GDP. In 2022, due to mounting economic pressures, China began to request repayments. It also fined Kenya around $11 million for defaulting on one of its SGR payments. China’s ownership of a substantial part of Kenya’s national debt gives them leverage over Kenya, which is required to repay its debt in full regardless of the profitability of the projects. 

Consequences for China and the World

Economically, investments in Africa are beneficial for China. By providing loans for projects in various countries, China can secure trade agreements with its borrowers and assure a continuous stream of goods. In the case of Kenya, Chinese companies were not only chosen as contractors for the projects. All required materials were also sourced from China, increasing the revenues of Chinese companies. For instance, all locomotives and freight wagons for the SGR upgrade were purchased from Chinese companies. In addition to collecting financial proceeds, China also collects produced goods. Angola repays its Chinese loans in oil - in 2020, Angola exported 61% of its oil to China. This is an indication that debt ownership provides China with economic influence over African countries. 

China’s dominance in Africa can also manifest politically. Africa is a major voting power internationally; by providing economic support to African countries, China can secure African votes in its favour. A study in 2022 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute determined that $1 billion invested in Africa equates to around an 8% increase in political alignment with China based on “ideal points,” which is a metric constructed from the United Nations General Assembly voting data, indicating national voting preferences. The same study determined that as political alignment with China increases, political alignment with the US decreases by an average of 1.3% for every $1 billion invested between the years 2008 and 2012. 

There is evidence of pro-Chinese alignment and anti-US sentiments in certain African countries. Like China, many African countries have maintained a neutral stance with respect to the ongoing war in Ukraine, and together have pressured Russia and Ukraine to end the conflict. Simultaneously, many African countries criticise US hegemony and advocate for a multinational global order facilitated by a shift in the balance of power. In the past, African nations have also supported China in its domestic issues. In 2020, around 25 African countries supported Chinese suppression of the Hong Kong protests. In return for supporting China’s domestic policies, African nations not only hope to receive further economic aid and investment, but also legitimacy and political recognition. This is especially the case for nations that the West would consider undemocratic or abusive - undemocratic leaders laud China for not intervening in their domestic affairs. China’s rise in Africa could also increase its global influence. As China continues to win political support from Africa because of its economic influence over the region, China could dominate key resource sectors (as in Angola) and influence the global resource market through both trade and production. 

‘debt-trapping’ is in action that is hard to define, but there is evidence which indicates that China benefits from its economic sway over the region. Kenya owes billions to China and has signed agreements which gift most of the projects’ proceeds to the country over more than two decades. China benefits regardless of the success of the projects, as it receives debt repayments and political support. The growing importance of the African continent on the international stage will likely continue to incentivise other nations to invest in Africa, as well as to engage in mutually beneficial partnerships with African countries.

Over the last year, the United States Government, through a number of state linked development finance entities, has drastically increased levels of concessional financing to African countries, as Chinese investment in Africa has dwindled amid a domestic economic crisis and frustration derived from unprofitable projects on the continent. As the US and western partners are likely to maintain higher levels of development financing over the long-term to abate Chinese influence, western and African companies operating on the continent stand to benefit, particularly in countries with strong governance frameworks. These opportunities, especially if met with increased levels of FDI, will likely be particularly fruitful in the fields of trade logistics, mineral and resource extraction, healthcare, contracting, renewables, agriculture, and manufacturing.

Attacks on LGBTQ+ Rights in Uganda

Whilst communities worldwide celebrate Pride throughout the month of June, the Ugandan LGBTQ+ community has been forced into hiding. On 26 May, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni signed into law one of the world’s toughest anti-homosexuality acts. The bill has attracted widespread international condemnation. Most importantly, it has critically impacted the lives of LGBTQ+ individuals, both within Uganda and in the broader region.

LGBTQ+ Rights in Africa

Uganda’s newest legislation emerges within a wider context of widespread homophobia. The African continent still imposes more anti-LGBTQ+ laws than many other parts of the world. Few national legal frameworks offer basic protections for LGBTQ+ individuals, particularly from rampant discrimination in schools and workplaces. Most countries instead prescribe stringent and restrictive policies against LGBTQ+ communities. Fines and prison time are common penalties for same-sex relationships and gay sex. Nigeria imposes flogging as punishment, while other countries like Mauritania, Sudan, and Somalia, stipulate the death penalty. Ghana introduced a strict anti-gay bill in late 2022, while Kenya and Tanzania have recently introduced strict legislation alongside Uganda. Meanwhile, countries where homosexuality is decriminalised, like Egypt, have adopted “vague laws against prostitution [...] and ‘debauchery’” to surveil those deemed to be LGBTQ+. Legislation in African countries largely mirrors public sentiment; polls conducted by Afrobarometer between 2016 and 2018 found that 78% of Africans across 34 countries were intolerant of homosexuality. Analysts have pointed to several contributing factors, including the legacy of colonialism, the influence of the Christian and Islamic religions, and modern African electoral politics. To win support and downplay their failures, politicians have demonised LGBTQ+ identities as “contrary to culture norms” and as a “western import that threatens social cohesion.”

As a result, LGBTQ+ communities across Africa are frequent victims of violence, hate crimes, and long prison sentences. In many countries, the extent of violence is likely under-estimated, as many instances go unreported. LGBTQ+ individuals also suffer from limits on their freedom of expression, as governments ban LGBTQ+ rights groups from registering as NGOs and instruct police forces to raid pride events. Media outlets often spread disinformation about LGBTQ+ individuals, which perpetuates stigma. Additionally, gay men are disproportionately affected by illnesses like HIV, but refrain from seeking medical assistance out of fear.

Nevertheless, there has been some progress. Same-sex relations are currently legal in 22 of Africa’s 54 countries, up from 15 in the 1990s. Countries like Angola, Botswana, Gabon, and Mozambique have all decriminalised homosexuality in the last decade, while Namibia has recognised same-sex marriages abroad. An Afrobarometer poll found that majorities in Cape Verde and Mauritius are tolerant of homosexuality. South Africa remains the most accepting country in the continent, as its constitution uniquely safeguards LGBTQ+ people. It prohibits discrimination of LGBTQ+ communities and allows for same-sex marriage. However, a 2016 International LGBTI Association poll revealed that only 40% of South Africans approved of same-sex marriage and human rights activists have reported a lack of enforcement of LGBTQ+ rights.

Despite the extensive risks, LGBTQ+ communities across Africa have continued to push for social change, particularly in the midst of social unrest. In 2020, the Nigerian LGBTQ+ population capitalised upon the #EndSARS movement against police brutality to promote inclusivity. This was especially important for queer people, suffering disproportionately at the hands of police and security forces.

Uganda’s New Anti-LGBTQ+ Law

Counter to movements for social progress elsewhere in Africa, Uganda’s most recent bill virtually terminates LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights. Same-sex relations were already illegal in the country since Uganda’s colonial era. In 2014, a proposed anti-LGBTQ+ law was struck down on procedural grounds. Yet, the newly-passed legislation further represses the LGBTQ+ community. It imposes the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality,” defined as cases of homosexual relationships involving HIV-positive individuals, minors, and disabled persons. It stipulates life imprisonment for homosexuality and a 10-year sentence for attempted same-sex acts. It ordains a 20-year sentence for “promoting homosexuality.” Friends, family members, neighbours, and doctors are required to report any suspected homosexual individuals to the police and are otherwise liable to fines or imprisonment. Landlords also face prison time from renting to LGBTQ+ persons.

A draft of the bill was passed earlier in April. Yet, President Museveni returned it to the national assembly, noting that the “law should be clear so that what is thought to be criminalised is not the state of one having a deviant proclivity but rather the actions of one acting on that deviancy.” He also proposed that the bill should include a clause on the “issue of rehabilitation.” These amendments have done little to reassure the Ugandan LGBTQ+ community. A statement from US President Biden reveals that reports of violence and discrimination targeting LGBTQ+ individuals in Uganda have risen since the approval of the newest bill. Ugandans have been evicted from their homes and fired from their jobs. Many fear seeking medical attention.

This legislation forms part of Ugandan efforts to resist “outside interference” and to “protect Uganda’s values from Western immorality.” President Museveni commended lawmakers for “reject[ing] the pressure from the imperialists.” This evidences the west’s dwindling ideological sway over Uganda and the African continent more broadly.

International Consequences

Uganda’s anti-LGBTQ+ bill has provoked extensive international outcry from western governments and human rights organisations. US President Biden labelled the law a “shameful act” and a “tragic violation of universal human rights.” European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell criticised the bill for contravening international human rights laws, claiming it would negatively affect the country’s external relations. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Office firmly opposed the “deeply discriminatory” law, suggesting it will “increase the risk of violence, discrimination and persecution, will set back the fight against HIV/AIDs, and will damage Uganda’s international reputation.” Amnesty International had also urged President Museveni to veto the “draconian” bill in late April, to no avail.

Beyond verbal criticism, the United States has imposed travel restrictions on Ugandan officials, although it did not clarify which officials would be targeted. Meanwhile, the Biden administration is evaluating the implications of the anti-LGBTQ+ law on “all aspects of US engagement with Uganda.” The US may cease providing its $1 billion of annual assistance and its services under the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. The US government is also reviewing Uganda’s eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which provides sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the US market for a vast selection of goods. The US Department of State claims to be “develop[ing] mechanisms to support the rights of LGBTQI+ individuals in Uganda.”

Biden’s measures are likely to have little impact on Ugandan policymaking. After the 2014 bill was tabled by Ugandan officials, several western governments suspended some aid, imposed visa restrictions, and halted security cooperation. These policies had no effect on the law; it was repealed on procedural grounds, not because of international pressure. Further, western attempts to punish Uganda for passing anti-LGBTQ+ laws may backfire. External interference in Ugandan social affairs could trigger further violence and discrimination towards LGBTQ+ communities.

Domestic and Regional Implications

Alongside the widespread international condemnation, LGBTQ+ communities have pushed back against the newest law. Human rights activists have criticised the legislation for “legalising hate, homophobia, transphobia and alienating a section of Ugandan citizenry.” Medics have claimed that the law breaches “ethical codes and health policies,” while lawmakers have slammed the bill as “unconstitutional.” Others have branded the bill a “convenient distraction from widespread corruption and lack of public services.” Yet this resistance only represents a small minority. The law is widely supported within a very religious Uganda. The effects of this legislation will prove increasingly evident in the coming months, both in Uganda and across the broader region.

Within Uganda, the newest bill is likely to exacerbate existing harassment and discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community. This was witnessed after the now-scrapped Anti-Homosexuality Act was passed by the government in 2014. People faced a notable increase in arbitrary arrests, police abuse, extortion, evictions, reduced access to public services, and even torture because of their identity. In four cases, men accused of being gay were kidnapped and tortured. A few months after the bill was passed, a 17-year old boy committed suicide by swallowing rat poison and pills because he “felt his life had no further value.” Others were evicted on suspicion of “being indecent.” The newest bill virtually gives homophobes validation in their attacks on LGBTQ+ individuals and provides a “carte blanche” for the government to violate their human rights. UN agencies predict this law will prevent LGBTQ+ individuals from seeking education as well as medical treatments. Sexual Minorities Uganda, a local NGO, received an immense uptick in pleas for help after people were reportedly blackmailed and followed.

It is unlikely that this new law can be fully enforced. However, precisely because of this, even minor indications of culpability will be subjected to vigilant monitoring and penalties. Simultaneously, the mere rhetoric surrounding the law will encourage greater violence in a country where homophobia has been historically pervasive.

Many Ugandans have fled to neighbouring Kenya in search of safety. A 37-year-old gay man recounts escaping prison in Uganda and crossing the border into Kenya aboard a cargo truck, a journey that cost him 37,700 Ugandan shillings ($10). According to the UNHCR, Kenya currently hosts an estimated 1,000 LGBTQ+ refugees and remains the only country in the region to accept asylum-seekers fleeing persecution on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity.

Unfortunately, Ugandan LGBTQ+ refugees are unlikely to find greater protection in Kenya. The country has also proven to be highly homophobic. Landlords have started evicting LGBTQ+ tenants. One engineering student describes being attacked, and was told to move out of Nairobi for being “dressed like a lady [despite being] a man.” Meanwhile, lawmakers have proposed a total ban on merely discussing same-sex marriage and have prepared another bill imposing life sentences for persons “found promoting or engaging in homosexuality.” Most recently, several Kenyan policy makers have drafted a Uganda-style anti-LGBTQ+ law. It would introduce a 10-year prison sentence for gay sex and capital punishment for ‘aggravated homosexuality.’ It would also terminate asylum-granting on the basis of sexual orientation and thus, put an end to Kenya’s status as a a relative regional safe haven for the LGTBQ+ community. Both advocates and opponents claim there it is a decent chance that it may become law, given the successful enactment of the anti-LGBTQ+ law in Uganda and the well-organised and financed anti-LGBTQ+ voices within Kenya.

Policy makers in Tanzania and South Sudan have moved to introduce similar policies. This may be suggestive of a broader anti-LGBTQ+ trend in the region. Lawmakers have portrayed the issue as an “existential battle to save African values and sovereignty” from Western encroachment.


Conclusion

The widespread international condemnation of the Ugandan bill seems insufficient to counterbalance the strong anti-LGBTQ+ push from within the country and in the broader region. Western countries will need to tread carefully as they enact more stringent measures while risking to provoke greater anti-LGBTQ+ violence in Uganda as a result. They will also need to balance security imperatives alongside human rights concerns. Countering terrorism in the region remains a key priority for the US. Withdrawing aid to Uganda may hinder such efforts, while also putting the LGBTQ+ community’s rights at further risk. Indeed, the US is set to deliver $20 million in military aid despite the new law, according to a spokesperson with the US State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs. This may allow the US to maintain some influence over Ugandan policymaking and help encourage greater inclusivity in the longer run.

Uganda’s newest legislation may set a precedent for the enactment of increasingly stringent anti-LGBTQ+ measures across East Africa and will pose a growing obstacle to the enforcement of international human rights. As violence and discrimination increase within the country, and as neighbouring countries consider introducing similar policies, Ugandans will face ever-more limited options to ensure their safety. More accepting countries like South Africa can play a critical role here; welcoming Ugandan refugees and pushing back against the region’s growing intolerance may give the LGBTQ+ community some respite and hope. Yet widespread homophobia among the public, notwithstanding more inclusive national laws, will pose a critical challenge for the safe integration of LGBTQ+ refugees in countries of arrival. Further, these moves may also create rifts between more conservative and progressive African states and strain intra-continental relations. It will soon become clear whether regional and international actors’ political, economic, and security imperatives will overshadow concerns for human rights violations in Uganda.

Growing Food Insecurity in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is one of many countries in the Sahel region struggling with food insecurity. The nation is facing the 5th worst hunger crisis in the world and one of the fastest advancing displacement crises. Violence and climate conditions disrupt the already compromised food supply in the country, preventing Burkinabes, over 40% of whom live below the poverty line, from meeting nutritional needs. The expansion of violent conflicts and food insecurity threaten the livelihoods of millions, both at a national and regional level.

Violent Conflicts

Non-state armed groups are spreading throughout Burkina Faso, creating conflict that has so far displaced around 2 million people. For the past seven years, violence has contributed to food insecurity, threatening approximately 3.3 million people. An Al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist group known as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam al Muslimin (JMIN), has gained control of about 40% of the country’s territory, terrorising civilians persistently. On 18 May, 25 people were killed and many more were injured in raids in the north of Yatenga province. This follows a recent terror attack in which presumed jihadists killed 20 civilians near the border of Togo and Ghana. Civilians under occupation are faced with physical intimidation, abuse, and murder. Yet, the effect these groups have on the food supply has the most widespread consequences in the country.

Violent conflicts between armed groups and military forces damage infrastructure, making the production and transport of agricultural goods nearly impossible. These damages are not only unintended consequences of confrontations, as these groups purposefully target agricultural production, set up roadblocks, and damage infrastructure to reduce food availability. An estimated 86% of the population is dependent on agriculture as a form of subsistence, causing the disruption of agricultural processes to severely impact food security through shortages and decreases in income. In February of 2022, JNIM affiliated groups took control of the town of Djibo and set up major roadblocks throughout the northern region of the country. JMIN affiliated groups targeted the water infrastructure around the town, severely impacting the water supply in various areas. People in Djibo have been facing food shortages and rising prices for almost a year. Humanitarian organisations have been unable to reach the town and other affected areas in the northern regions of the country due to blockades and damaged roads. These organisations are relying on unconventional methods of transport, such as costly airlifts, to deliver food and medical aid to affected people.

On 1 June, military forces killed 50 Al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists. Military retaliation has contributed to the violence suffered by civilians. Human Rights Watch has reported abuses against civilians during counterterrorism missions, an issue that could erode trust in the government and delegitimise their efforts. The expansion of military forces also affects international relations. The United States has frozen $160 million in aid as a response to the military coup that occurred in January. As democratic processes are halted - ostensibly as a result of ongoing conflict - relations with countries and organisations could deteriorate, resulting in dwindling external support. The loss of international support, both financially and diplomatically, could significantly impair the Burkinabe government’s efforts to reduce food insecurity.

The government's response to insecurity, particularly in confrontations with armed groups, could also exacerbate the issue of food insecurity in Burkina Faso. In lieu of negotiations, the government has opted for a strong military response, which can instigate retaliatory attacks and incentivize a cycle of violence that perpetuates instability and undermines the agricultural sector. Diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace with armed groups have yet to see any success. If the government succeeds in its attempts to regain control of the country - which we assess is markedly unlikely in the short to medium term - violent conflicts would de-escalate, but a large military presence would still result in tensions and mistrust in affected regions. In the event that armed groups continue advancing and overwhelm the military force - which is neither likely, but more plausible than the first scenario - insecurity, both physical and nutritional, will increase. In any case, failure to de-escalate the conflict and restore security in Burkina Faso will exacerbate food insecurity.

Climate Conditions

Farmers are struggling with erratic climate conditions in Burkina Faso. Repeated droughts are affecting low-tolerance crops, leading to low yields that cause food shortages. The agricultural sector relies on rainfed crops for most of its production, causing concern for food supplies during long periods of little rainfall. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has issued warnings regarding the increase in drought frequency as a consequence of climate change. Burkina Faso’s poor soil quality and climate patterns preclude the production of various crops; farmers are unable to consistently produce rice and other grains, causing most of the country to rely on imports to meet local demand. This creates a dependency on imports that drives uncertainty around prices and food availability. 

In May, India temporarily lifted its ban on broken rice exports, helping to drive down import prices for Burkina Faso and providing a much-needed influx of food. Prices may soon rise again as the ban on rice is likely to be reinstated. Further disruptions to the food supply could be caused by food shortages in neighbouring countries and main trading partners, causing Burkina Faso’s import costs to rise. Administrative issues further limit the agricultural sector's ability to flourish. Strict regulations around seeds and fertilisers prevent many farmers from maximising their crop yield. These regulations help protect an already arid and shallow soil that is vulnerable to deterioration, but they limit yearly production and contribute to the food shortages that ravage the country.

Future climate conditions do not instil hope in farmers. A report by the Red Cross predicted that Burkina Faso would see heightened climate change effects in the future. Rainfall is set to decrease in upcoming years, with some estimates showing a 10% decrease in precipitation by 2100. Burkina Faso is also set to experience a substantially higher temperature increase than average, with a 3-4 degree increase expected by 2080-2099, causing drier seasons and hindering crop yields. The shift in soil caused by the loss in rainfall and higher temperatures could also make soil more susceptible to erosion, severely impacting production capacity. As long as current farming practices are maintained and the country continues to depend on imports and rainfed crops, climate change will likely continue to destabilise the food supply and contribute to hunger.

Future Prospects

Countries in the Sahel region are undergoing similar food insecurity crises due to the arid and varying climate. The lack of external and humanitarian aid could also affect the situation. The United Nations has struggled to raise half of the $800 million required to aid Burkina Faso, meaning it is unlikely international organisations will be able to provide sufficient aid to other countries in the region. The UN response plan created for the crises in Burkina Faso and neighbouring nations has obtained just 16% of the $4.6 billion required. If armed groups expand their control and continue to occupy more territory, the strain placed on international aid organisations would likely cause various regions to be neglected.

The Burkinabe government is attempting to promote agricultural growth to combat food insecurity with an approved $36 million plan to cultivate 11,000 hectares (1 hectare = 10,000 sq metres) of farmland. This plan focuses on rice cultivation, an investment that seeks to reduce the country's over-reliance on imports. This plan would not, however, shift the country away from dependence on rainfall and consistent climate conditions. Several projects have created climate-smart villages that use varying practices to adapt to climate change. Climate change activist organisations seek to foster productivity growth and sustainability in farms in Burkina Faso, creating various production opportunities while taking climate variability into account. The development of sustainable farming practices and the proliferation of technology in Burkina Faso’s arid conditions could help mitigate food insecurity in various other countries. Advancements in production could create export opportunities, providing a supply of agricultural goods for countries in the region suffering from food insecurity. This could also incentivise other countries to adopt similar practices, providing grounds for advancements in agriculture that could benefit the whole region. The benefits of these projects are still not seen on a large enough scale to aid the insecurity crisis. 

In order to foster agricultural production, Burkina Faso must invest in rebuilding its agricultural infrastructure by developing irrigation systems, promoting sustainable farming techniques, and providing farmers with access to modern tools and technology to counteract the effects of climate change. In order to succeed in these initiatives, farmers must have safe working conditions, and there must be uninterrupted internal supply chains throughout the country. The latter is particularly unlikely in regions affected by violent conflict. The displacement of farmers, destruction of crops and livestock, and lack of access to markets, both for the purchase of supplies and the sale of products, render these initiatives useless. In order for these efforts to succeed, Burkina Faso must prioritise peacebuilding efforts in order to establish a stable and secure environment for agricultural and infrastructural development. These efforts would require transparency in governance, international support, and a significant increase in funding. 

International Observers Question the Legitimacy of Electoral Results

International observers raise their doubts around the legitimacy of the Sierra Leonean elections. What was predicted to be one of the most closely contested democratic run-offs on the continent this year resulted in a controversial first-round win for the incumbent president, Julius Maada Bio. In Mali, the referendum seeking to change the constitution has been passed by an overwhelming majority and in the DRC, the opposition is refusing to take part in elections that they are already declaring fraudulent. 

SIERRA LEONE

Surprising first round win as opposition calls foul play

The official results saw incumbent president, Julius Maada Bio, receive 56% of the votes while his biggest rival, opposition leader Samura Kamara, obtained 41%. Pre-electoral analyses predicted that under free and fair conditions, the margin between the two candidates was likely to be much smaller and would almost certainly trigger a second round of voting. Sierra Leone has a high threshold of 55% for an election to be completed in the first round, which suggested that a second round was to be expected under fair electoral conditions. The opposition has called the election a “daylight robbery”. Kamara has highlighted that the electoral agents for his party were forbidden from authenticating the ballot counting process and has rejected the results, labelling them as illegitimate. 

National Election Watch, a coalition of civil society organisations, has published a statement expressing scepticism in relation to the accuracy of the official results. They have conducted their own calculations and came to the conclusion that the turnout was actually between 75-79%, rather than the official 83%, and that President Bio received between 48% and 53% of the electoral vote. According to their calculations, the opposition candidate should have received between around 44 - 49% of the votes. In each possible scenario, the organisation’s analysis suggests that the elections should have progressed into a second round. 

International agencies do not accept the results

This is a view shared by numerous international observers, who have undermined the integrity of the electoral process. They have called out “statistical inconsistencies” in the official results and have demanded for the electoral commission to publish disaggregated results per polling station.

The issues identified were discrepancies between the historic average volume of valid votes per polling state and the 2023 results. An unusually low number of invalid ballots and a strikingly high turnout in certain districts were additional occurrences which sparked distrust among observers. A number of countries and institutions, including the US and the EU, have published a joint statement expressing their concerns around the lack of transparency in the Sierra Leonean electoral process.

The country’s chief electoral commissioner Mohamed Kenewui Konneh, who has been accused by the opposition of being “the ruling party’s agent”, has informed that the disaggregated results will be published “in due course”. However, President Bio has already been sworn in for his second term in office, meaning that the disaggregated results are unlikely to change the outcome of the elections. 

The runoff to the elections has been dominated by violence

The elections have been dominated by civil unrest throughout the campaigning period. The week leading up to the elections has seen both sides of the political spectrum report cases of physical threats from followers of the opposing side. The All People’s Congress (APC) has claimed that one of its supporters has been shot dead by the police, a claim that has been denied by officials. The party also stated that another one of its supporters was killed by the security forces who were trying to disperse a crowd gathering around the APC headquarters in the capital. Simultaneously, members of the President’s SLPP party have also claimed that they have been assaulted by opponents during the campaign period. Taking into consideration the intensity of the political dispute in the run up to the elections, the streets of the Sierra Leonean capital remained relatively quiet after the results were published. 

MALI 

Malians have approved changes to the constitution

In Mali, the referendum seeking to make amendments to the constitution has been approved with 97% of the vote. The turnout was just below 40%. The military junta, which is currently serving as the country’s transition government, praised the results stating that it is a stepping stone in paving the way for elections in early next year and a return to civilian rule. 

Opponents have raised their concerns around the changes giving too much power to the president, while proponents have stated it would strengthen the democratic mechanisms of a currently weak state. There were a number of security incidents reported during the vote with gunmen entering voting centres and forcing voters to flee. Little voting took place in rebel-controlled northern regions. 

Under the new constitution, it will be the president who will “determine the policies of the nation”,  a right which was previously reserved for the government. The president will also be able to hire and fire the prime minister and cabinet members “and the government will be answerable to him and not to parliament, as is the case currently.” In an attempt to reduce corruption levels, politicians will have to declare their wealth. Other clauses would give amnesty to perpetrators of prior coups. 

The process of conducting the referendum was marked by a period of turmoil. There was a delay in the publication of the results due to violence against electoral authorities. Before the referendum, the ruling junta asked the UN peacekeeping mission to leave the country. This was done on the accusation of “espionage”, following a UN report which very strongly criticised the governing regime for killings and massacres taking place at the hands of Malian troops and their allies. 

DRC

Largest opposition party to boycott elections if conditions not met

The leader of the largest opposition party in DR Congo, Martin Fayulu, has declared that his party will not take part in the upcoming elections if the electoral procedures are not revised to fulfil democratic standards. According to Fayulu, the voter identification and registration processes are being carried out illegitimately and as a result are preparing for fraudulent elections. The politician, who came second in the last presidential elections in 2018, has stated that his party will not be fielding any candidates in the upcoming vote unless an external audit verifies the legitimacy of the current processes. The country’s electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), included international experts in its last review of the electoral list, who have deemed the electoral process as reliable. However, the US, EU, and other Western countries have claimed that the procedures have not been independent and transparent enough. 

The lead up to the elections, which will be taking place in December this year, have been dominated by tensions, anti-government demonstrations, and complaints from opposition candidates who have stated that they have been disadvantaged due to irregularities in the process. The country is also facing significant challenges in the eastern regions which are dominated by rebel groups. Registration in those areas has proven to be increasingly difficult and elections could become difficult to carry out. 

Conclusion

The elections in Sierra Leone were expected to be one of the most closely contested on the African continent. President Bio beat his biggest rival by a very narrow margin of around four percentage points five years ago. A similar outcome in which the two candidates would face each other in a high-contested second round was anticipated. Instead, the incumbent president's first-round victory has failed to convince civil society organisations, electoral observers, and the international community. This has sent a deeply alarming signal about the state of the country’s democracy, which without the lack of a universal consensus around electoral procedures severely erodes its legitimacy. In Mali and the DRC, the respective governments are struggling with conducting elections in areas dominated by rebel groups. The two fragile states are unable to fully control its borders, which has a damaging effect on the population’s access to democratic procedures.   

The Somali-Led Offensive Against Al-Shabaab

In August 2022, Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared an ‘all-out war’ against Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group seeking to topple the central, western-backed government and establish a political rule based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law. This move has constituted an attempt to deepen and reinvigorate previous, largely unsuccessful efforts to eradicate the group’s influence across the country and in the wider region.

Over the past 10 months, Somalia’s offensive has gained significant traction, yielding the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s. It has dislodged the militant group from swathes of Central Somalia, including major cities and key strategic locations such as the port of Harardhere. The government has forced the Islamist insurgency to retreat towards the south of the country, which has become the focus of the offensive’s emergent second phase. The Somali government has been utilising growing popular discontent with the non-state group, largely resulting from heavy taxation and coerced recruitment, to encourage participation in the war against Al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, the security forces have increased their defensive measures in the capital, with checkpoints established on the city’s outskirts. 

The offensive’s progress has evidenced the Somali government’s ability to shoulder increased security responsibilities, particularly at a time when regional and international partners are looking to gradually withdraw. The United States, Turkey, and the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) have thus far crucially supported the operation both militarily and financially. Yet, ATMIS troop reductions are planned for the end of the month and in September 2023. Nonetheless, other actors have recently stepped up as possible allies in the fight against Al-Shabaab. After having exited 16 years ago, Eritrea rejoined the East African bloc, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in an effort to rebuild ties with its neighbours and assist in the promotion of peace and stability in the region; however, its potential contribution to the Somali-led offensive should not be overstated. Political strains between Eritrea and its neighbouring countries could compromise the coalition’s cohesion and the offensive’s success. Similarly, tensions with the US over alleged human rights abuses both domestically and in the Ethiopian Tigray region may instigate discord. Further, as part of Russia’s broader efforts to extend its influence in the African continent, Moscow has also signalled its willingness to supply Somalia’s army with military equipment in its war against Al-Shabaab. However, existing political strains between Russia and members of the Somali-led coalition may once again fragment the anti-Al-Shabaab front.

The role of state-led initiatives must not obscure clan militias’ key contribution to the offensive’s success. Clans are refusing to comply with Al-Shabaab’s doctrines and are jointly mobilising to push back against the group. Communities are providing the government with fighters who know local terrain and can offer a crucial link to the local population. Cooperation between the central regime and clans is simultaneously allowing for greater government penetration of rural areas, often targeted by Al-Shabaab for recruitment and financing. As such, clans are importantly undercutting Al-Shabaab’s material and ideological support.

Despite critical successes in Central Somalia, the second phase of the offensive concentrated in the states of Jubaland and South West has gotten off to a slow start, and will likely face a unique set of challenges. First, the Somali government will need to simultaneously retain control of its recent territorial gains in Central Somalia. Neglecting this imperative and risking overreach will allow Al-Shabaab to exploit the security vacuums left behind, rendering previous efforts futile. An additional challenge for the considerably weak and perennially under-resourced government is not defeating Al-Shabaab itself, but rather what comes after; who will be tasked with holding onto and governing recently reconquered areas? This remains an open question. Soldiers and security forces have been trained for offensive operations. They are therefore not well-suited to ensure the effective and equitable provision of goods and services, nor to nurture popular support for the Somali government in communities that have been under Al-Shabaab’s control for over a decade. Central regions will continue to be major theatres of operation as Mogadishu will need to devise a long-term governance strategy as Al-Shabaab strives to reverse the Somali coalition’s gains. This may impair efforts to move southward.

The offensive will face another major challenge. To resist and subvert Mogadishu’s advances, Al-Shabaab will increasingly rely on guerrilla tactics and its ability to stage attacks on civlians, even in regions beyond its formal control. On 9 June, Al-Shabaab staged a large attack on the Pearl Beach hotel in the Somali capital, killing 6 civilians, 3 security personnel, and leaving at least 10 injured. The location was popular among government and foreign officials. This event came only days after Al-Shabaab attacked an African Union peacekeeper base in the southern town of Bulo Marer, killing 54 Ugandan soldiers deployed as part of the ATMIS mission. Since then, the Uganda People’s Defense Force has reconquered the base. These latest attacks highlight Al-Shabaab’s resiliency, flexibility, and its likely strategy in response to coalition gains.

Clans in the south will likely play a lesser role in the second phase of the offensive, as levels of discontent with Al-Shabaab and clan military capabilities appear to be lower than in Central Somalia. Many communities have not taken up arms against Al-Shabaab, nor revealed the group’s hideouts despite government prodding and consistent attempts to delegitimise the group’s claims of religious authority. Other clans have instead cut deals with the group to forge a form of coexistence as they find the costs of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. This will likely deprive the government of the community-level assistance and impetus that was central to its success in Central Somalia. The government will need to secure support from local communities before making further advances in its southward offensive. Southern provinces also evidence greater inter-clan diversity, which diminishes the prospect of a unified and coherent offensive. Political fissures at the state and federal level, as well as within foreign partner states, may undermine the mission’s effectiveness. After Al-Shabaab’s recent attack on the ATMIS base, there have been pressures from within Uganda to end its involvement in Somalia, a development that would deprive the coalition of vital logistical and military support.

Even if such difficulties are tackled and the campaign proves largely successful in dislodging the group from its stronghold in southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab and its ideology will likely survive. The group will remain a significant security threat for years to come, both within Somalia and across the wider region. The group already appears to be adapting to the government’s offensive, dropping its coercive tactics and emphasising the need to promulgate Islamist values. The Somali government should therefore consider the option of negotiations as a means of de-escalating the war. It could use the bargaining power it has recently gained from its military victories to extract concessions. A diplomatic resolution may be particularly helpful given the ever-increasing resources dedicated to the anti-Al-Shabaab offensive, which are diverted away from the humanitarian exigencies across Somalia. Nonetheless, reaching an agreement with Al-Shabaab would be exceedingly difficult.

Ultimately, recent advances give reason to believe that Mogadishu’s offensive will continue to sustain gradual, but important gains in the near future. Yet, while it is tempting to claim that this campaign marks the end of Al-Shabaab, this assessment is overly optimistic and premature. It risks encouraging a dangerous overconfidence in an offensive fraught with challenges and resisted by a still very influential and resilient Al-Shabaab.

Political Instability on the Rise as Elections Approach

Elections across the African continent are continuing to create tensions and unrest. In countries where political settlements have to be made distributing the power across multiple parties, there is a growing risk of instability that could aggravate political turmoil. In places where electoral support is divided and the incumbent’s rule is threatened, we can observe a high level of civil unrest with demonstrations becoming an element of the political landscape.


SENEGAL

Lack of Approval for Extending Presidential Term Limits

Earlier this month, Senegal experienced a period of civil unrest, which resulted in the death of at least 16 people. Although the country has now returned to relative stability, the political crisis has not been fully resolved. One of the reasons which further escalated the demonstrations was President Macky Sall’s unwillingness to rule out his candidacy in the upcoming elections, which in practice would mean that he would be seeking a controversial third term. 

Public opinion surveys have shown that 79 per cent of the citizens want presidents to respect the existing term limits, which in Senegal currently stands at two. From the responses received as part of the study, it is clear that uncertainty regarding the state of the country’s democracy is rising under Sall’s rule. The percentage of citizens who claim that Senegal is ‘not a democracy’ or ‘a democracy with major problems’ has increased by 8 percentage points since 2021, now surpassing over 50 per cent of respondents. 

In 2012, Sall came to power in a spirit of democratic change when he beat Abodulade Wade who tried to impose a controversial third term. Now, Sall could extend his own mandate to a total of 15 years. The president’s lack of willingness to explicitly declare his decision is sparking further uncertainty in the country. Future protests cannot be ruled out as Sall’s opponents are experiencing a growing sense of frustration. Furthermore, disqualified opposition leader Ousmane Sonko’s supporters have affirmed that they will keep fighting for as long as he is released, which could further fuel the extent of any demonstrations in the near future. 

GUINEA-BISSAU

Opposition Coalition Wins the Legislative Elections

Legislative elections took place in Guinea-Bissau on June 4. These were the first legislative elections since the National People’s Assembly was dissolved over a year ago by President Umaro Sissoco Embalo. The Terra Ranka opposition coalition consisting of five different parties, led by the largest African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) party, has won the election securing over 50 per cent of the parliamentary seats. According to the electoral commission results, they have won 54 out of the 102 possible seats with the president’s G15 party gaining 29 seats. Over 20 political parties competed for seats, but only 5 managed to secure at least one place in the National People's Assembly.

Elections Encourage Praise from International Observers 

Despite the president’s controversial track record around civil freedoms, the elections have been hailed as "free, transparent, and calm" by the numerous foreign observers monitoring the event. Over 200 international observers were involved in the election. Although several candidates have complained about challenges with getting the correct accreditation and reported physical attacks by other party members, the procedures were overall highly praised by the observers. According to their reports, 93 per cent of the polls opened on time and despite certain minor incidents, no “serious incidents” affected the democratic credibility of a challenging election. 

Political System Creates Challenging Settlement of Power

Parliament was dissolved by the president due to what he believed were “persistent and unresolvable differences” in the context of a political crisis and that organising elections was an opportunity to “give the floor back to Guineans”. However, the president has been heavily criticised for appointing his own government officials without a formal procedure in place during the transition period. His critics have also highlighted his efforts to reduce civil freedoms and restrict free press, as a result of which independence of governing bodies has deteriorated.

Around 900,000 people out of the country’s population of 2 million were eligible to vote in the elections. Domingos Simoes Pereira, the leader of the PAIGC party, is likely to become the next Prime Minister. President Embalo has expressed his readiness to appoint Pereira to the role. 

The future PM was the runner-up in the previous presidential elections, in which he lost to Embalo in 2019. With the semi-presidential structure in place and two rivals holding the two most important positions in the country, political stability might prove difficult to secure. The current president’s mandate is valid until at least 2024, which means that the political turmoil which the elections were aimed to resolve could in fact potentially provoke even further tensions.

SIERRA LEONE

Two-Horse Race for Presidency Dominated by Economic Woes

Sierra Leoneans will be casting their ballots on June 24 to elect their president. Although 13 candidates are officially taking part in the race, it is most likely going to be a direct contest between incumbent President Julias Maada Bio and leader of the main opposition party, Samura Kamara. 

The main axis of Kamara’s campaign has revolved around fixing the economy as alarming unemployment levels and poor economic conditions are increasing the risk of protest in the lead up to the event. The poor economic conditions of the country and widespread poverty has led to grievances that have pushed people out to the streets last year.  Despite the economic difficulties the country has been facing, investment in education and reduction of the levels of corruption are highlighted as successes of Bio’s presidency. However, due to poor global expansion and high inflation within the country, economic challenges are unlikely to be resolved regardless of who becomes the victor. 

Controversy Over the Chief Electoral Commissioner’s Independence

This week, the Electoral Commission published a public notice informing that soldiers and Muslim pilgrims were able to cast their vote on the 15th of June, nine days before the actual election day. The Commission claims it holds the necessary constitutional mandate to establish such a ruling, yet the main opposition has also published its own note stating that it has not been consulted. The National Election Watch criticised the Commission saying that although its right to set and hold elections is undeniable, this has to be done with enough notice to make the voter registrars available to all parties involved. 

The Chief Electoral Commissioner has been under constant criticism from the opposition party with accusations intensifying in the build up to the election. In his latest speech, Kamara has called the commissioner the ruling party’s “agent” and further condemned the alleged role of the security forces interfering with the fairness of the election. He accused the government of “arbitrary arrests and detention of opposition members without trial” and that through their military form of governance have “set to kill and bury hard-won democracy”. 

Kamara has requested for the chief and all regional commissioners to be replaced by an “independent internationally accredited team” as he puts forward accusations of publishing unreliable data, not respecting deadlines regarding data publication, and lack of commitment to managing free and fair elections. Bio dismissed these claims as “preposterous” and claimed that they were an attempt of destabilising the country and compromising peaceful and legitimate elections.

Razor-Thin Margins Could Result in More Unrest

With a significant increase in the number of voters since 2018 and fewer candidates taking part than  the last election five years ago, it is almost certain under fair and free electoral conditions a second round will be required in order for a candidate to reach the required 55 per cent majority. With so much at stake and the minimal margins means that both camps are unlikely to accept a loss. The opposition’s distrust in the electoral system is clear and its willingness to undermine the government’s legitimacy in ensuring free and fair elections creates a fertile ground for the results to be contested in case of Bio’s win. Simultaneously, the president and his party have not shied away from thwarting demonstrations and critical voices. Local media reports have claimed that groups of protesting youth were arrested as a result of protests in multiple cities calling the Chief Electoral Commissioner to resign. Tensions in the country are brewing and could result in further protests and arrests in the last week leading up to the elections. With the electorate closely divided, no result on June 24 is likely to bring conciliation.

Conclusion

Elections across the continent are predominantly raising hostilities between political camps and have been accompanied by civil unrest and demonstrations in many countries. In Guinea-Bissau, the electoral procedures have been praised for their fairness by international observers. Although the elections were proposed by the president as a solution to the existing political turmoil, the consequent cabinet reshuffling that gave a strong electoral mandate to the largest party opposing the president is unlikely to bring political stability in the following months. 

In Sierra Leone and Senegal, two countries where the opposition supporters have taken to the streets to voice their disapproval of the government’s actions, animosities are growing as the election date approaches. Where the incumbents have been unable to maintain stable support, civil freedoms are being undermined and democratic mechanisms being weakened have become a recurring phenomenon. There is an increased effort on the part of incumbents to erode democratic processes when elections show any promise of transitioning power. The risk of further instability and contesting election results is increasingly possible, particularly in Sierra Leone. 

South Africa’s Strategic Balancing with Russia

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered more pronounced non-alignment in the global south. Africa represents a relevant example, as demonstrated by the abstention of 26 African countries during a March 2022 vote at the UN General Assembly to condemn the Russian invasion. Abstentions by African countries have drawn the attention of the United States, causing the US to become weary of growing Russian and Chinese influence in Africa. South Africa’s abstention is particularly notable because of its leading role on the African continent. It has the second largest economy, after Nigeria, and the fifth largest population. What the South African political leadership refers to as non-alignment - while Western actors see it as an increasingly pro-Russian stance - originated well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

In a world where the rise of China and its growing alignment with Russia now challenges American unipolarity, South Africa is trying to keep itself in a position where it can benefit from relationships with both polarities. Non-alignment requires a diplomatic balancing act that is difficult to manage. South Africa, after abstaining at the UN assembly, has made several choices that have caused it to lurch further into the Russian camp, arousing US and European discontent. In February 2023, coinciding with the anniversary of the Russian invasion, the South African navy participated in a joint exercise with the Russian and Chinese navies. The timing and actors involved made the decision to participate in the military exercise seem contradictory to non-alignment. The exercises allowed Russia to demonstrate that it could still rely on relations with two key global powers. The same exercise conducted in 2019 (before the war) did not receive criticism from the United States and European partners.

In May 2023, South Africa decided to grant Putin diplomatic immunity to allow him to attend the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit to be held in August 2023 in Johannesburg. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president. The Rome Statute, the court's institutive treaty to which South Africa is a signatory, obliges South Africa to arrest Putin in the event he steps on South African soil. The decision to provide Putin with diplomatic immunity represents a further snub to the United States and Europe, who aim to isolate Russia internationally. At the same time, it demonstrates South Africa's need to capitalise on its presence in the BRICS bloc by maximising the benefits of its relationships with other member states. 

In December 2022, South Africa reportedly indirectly supported the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to U.S. intelligence, a Russian ship, the Lady R, transported arms and ammunition from Vivino naval base in Cape Town to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. The ship had been placed on the  US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control’s sanctions list in May 2022 for alleged arms shipments. The Lady R, which departed from the same Russian port on October 3, 2022, circumnavigated Africa, stopping at several ports. Once past the Cape of Good Hope, the ship reportedly turned off its transponder, making it untraceable. However, some residents identified the ship as being in close proximity to Simon's Town naval base near Cape Town. This raised suspicions as cargo ships seldom dock at naval bases. On the night of December 7, 2022, the ship’s contents were unloaded and reloaded. This is the moment when arms and munitions were purportedly loaded onto the vessel. 

South African authorities have been unable to provide a concrete explanation for the allegations surrounding the Lady R, and President Cyril Ramaphosa has called for an investigation to ascertain what happened. This is more likely the result of poor communication between different ministries than a desire to conceal information. Communication between South African institutions has often been problematic, affecting the handling of sensitive dossiers that require a collaborative response. The Foreign Ministry communicated that it was not aware of the Lady R's arrival. Although the South African authorities continue to deny the allegations; if confirmed - this incident would undermine the credibility of the African country's professed non-alignment. 

Regardless of the outcome of the investigation launched by President Ramaphosa into the Lady R incident, South Africa is growing increasingly close to the Kremlin. While China, in strengthening its relationship with South Africa, has focused on trade and economic aspects, Russia cannot offer as much. Consequently, Russia has mainly focused on the political and ideological aspects of its relationship with the African country. This was done through an effective communication campaign aimed at putting distance between African states and Western governments. The main themes revolve around colonial legacies and perceived political interference by Western states. Russia presents itself as an actor untainted by a colonial past that is not interested in interfering with the internal politics of African states. This rhetoric has been very successful in states that were left in the background during the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, only to be called upon to act in defence of Western interests during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

The Zambian President Visits Paris

On 10 May, Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema flew to Paris to meet Emmanuel Macron and discuss future cooperation between the two countries. Hichilema asked his French counterpart to advocate for a faster restructuring of Zambian debt to the Paris Club of Creditors Committee and the G20. This represents the latest effort by the former Chief Executive Officer of both Coopers Lybrand Zambia and Grant Thornton Zambia to drive Zambia past its debt problems and towards long-overdue social and political reforms. Hichilema said that the country needs to “close this long overdue debt restructuring, put it to bed, and release resources and time and attention to the development side of our agenda.” 

Zambia became the first African nation to default on its financial commitments in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. Before 2020, Zambia had borrowed heavily and owed an estimated $17.3 billion to its creditors. The country’s already fragile economic situation deteriorated as the global pandemic caused a decline in export earnings, remittances, and tourism revenues. As Zambia became unable to pay a coupon on one of its Eurobonds, consequently sparking cross-defaults on its other pending Eurobonds, its credit rating was downgraded to default by major credit rating agencies.

Since then, the Zambian government has attempted to negotiate with its creditors to find a solution to the sovereign debt crisis. In February 2022, Hichilema successfully negotiated a three-year extended credit facility of $1.3 billion with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This financial package was accompanied by an economic reform plan for Zambia, including measures to stabilise the macroeconomic situation, reinforce the country’s eroded rule of law, and improve debt management. The first tranche of financial help is scheduled to be distributed soon, according to an IMF announcement made on 5 May, and is anticipated to provide the Zambian economy with a much needed boost. At the end of April, Lusaka also sent a debt-restructuring proposal to its government creditors. 

Managing the country’s debt crisis is the first step in Hichilema’s comprehensive plan to reform the country. The Zambian President was elected on a promise to revamp the nation’s healthcare and agriculture systems whilst taking measures to combat entrenched corruption. Hichilema aims to move the copper-rich country past its over-reliance on primary resource extraction and towards a more diversified economy, thereby improving the lives of the 20 million Zambians living in poverty.

The Zambian President is pursuing this ambitious program through a well-designed network of economic partnerships, both with western countries and Chinese investors. The west sees potential in Zambia as a strong democratic ally in Southern Africa. Hichilema’s visit to France demonstrates and further solidifies his commitment to partnering with the west to restructure his country’s debt. Zambia notably signalled its amicability when it voted with the United Nations (UN) against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, contrary to its neighbours Zimbabwe and South Africa, who abstained from the vote. Although some of his critics have accused him of pursuing a neo-colonialist relationship with European powers, Hichilema has emphasised that he is seeking a partnership of mutual interest.

The Zambian President has also engaged with China through balanced diplomacy and has taken a strong but friendly stance to reinforce the great power’s investment in the country. In an interview for the Chinese media channel CGTN, Hichilema stated that “China and Zambia’s working relationship, strategic working relationship is so cardinal to the achievement of our own objectives, our own developmental agenda to better the lives of the people of Zambia. And obviously, we believe this is also mutual.” According to the Chinese, Hichilema had a phone conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2022 and decided on the creation of the first China-Zambia investment forum, which was held in September 2022, and brought together state ministries and private companies from both countries. According to Christopher Vandome and Professor Stephen Chan OBE of Chatham House, Hichilema has “displayed regional leadership – demonstrating the merits of ‘positive neutrality’ in pursuing policies that run across global geopolitical divides for the benefit of the national interest.”

Despite having assumed power just over a year ago, Hichilema’s plan has rejoiced international investors. His politics have favoured a climate of confidence and incentivised foreign investment in the country. For instance, the African B2B e-commerce company Wasoko has recently announced a $1 million investment in the creation of a central hub in Lusaka, that it will use as a platform for future expansion into Southern Africa. Its founder, Daniel Yu, justified the choice of Zambia due to its “pro-business government administration keen on expanding the country’s digital economy.” On 11 May, the United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding to boost tourism to Zambia.

These recent changes could boost the Zambian economy and provide an anchor of stability in Southern Africa; however, the country still faces many challenges. Programs of fiscal consolidation, public expenditure management, and structural reforms can be hard to implement as they require strong state capacity and an efficient administrative system. Zambia’s endemic corruption, reinforced under President Lungu’s term from 2015 to 2021, and the country’s significant reliance on copper exports, which represents an unreliable financial input as commodity prices are highly volatile, could amount to significant obstacles for Hichilema’s ambitious reform program. Zambia’s finance minister, Felix Nkulukusa, recently projected 4.2 per cent GDP growth in 2023 – a decrease compared to last year’s 4.7 per cent. Yet, Hichilema's measures have so far been widely praised for their positive impact on the country's development.

Protest Clashes & Continued Oppressions on Freedom

Civil unrest in Senegal has brought a crisis to one of the most politically stable countries in the West African region. Uncertainty around the electoral procedures and treatment of political opponents has created civil unrest in a country, which for years has been heralded as a model of democratic stability for the region. Additionally, approaching elections in other countries on the African continent are also increasing tensions as controversies over the opposition’s right to fair elections have been doubted. 

SENEGAL

On 1 June, Ousmane Sonko, one of the Senegalese opposition’s most prominent politicians, was sentenced to two years in prison. Sonko was charged and convicted with “corrupting the youth” by having intimate contact with someone younger than the age of 21. Although Sonko denied the allegations, his conviction means he is now disqualified from taking part in the February 2024 election. Sonko was also charged with raping a woman and making death threats against her but was acquited on those charges. Feminists in Senegal are in fear that the acquittal of rape charges will set the country back in its fight for gender equality as the court dismissed a rare chance in attaining justice for victims of sexual violence. Aminata Libain Mbengue of the Feminists’ Network of Senegal stated, “This trial is a huge setback that will leave its mark on the history of women’s rights.”

His detention has sparked widespread protest in multiple cities across the country, with Sonko supporters accusing the government of using the judicial system to instrumentally eliminate potential opponents for the upcoming elections. Violence began at a central university campus in Dakar and spread into other cities. Among the sites targeted by the protestors were homes of ministers, foreign-owned supermarkets, and petrol stations. As of 10 June, there have been 16 deaths as a consequence of the riots. 


Protest Motives

The protests were not purely caused by the arrest of Ousmane Sonko alone. They were incited by President Macky Sall’s attempt to secure a controversial third term. He was elected for the first time in 2012 and then reelected in 2019. The constitution was amended in 2016 and states that the president cannot serve “more than two consecutive mandates”. President Sall is claiming that an update to the Constitution during his time in office exempts his first term from the rule. He has not yet officially declared a desire to run, but has not ruled it out, sparking concerns over the condition of the country’s democratic legitimacy. 

This situation resembles the conditions in which the current president came into power over 10 years ago. His predecessor, Abdoulaye Wade, tried to secure a third term by claiming that his first term was exempted from the laws first implementing a limit on presidential terms in 2001. In 2012, Sall’s victory put an end to those plans. His win occurred in the spirit of a civil movement which pledged resistance against Wade’s regime and also sparked protest. Now, President Sall is using the same argument as his predecessor. Taking into consideration that the Senegalese elections are scheduled to take place in February, Sonko’s detention rules out a key rival for the president. Opposing voices claim that the judicial decision to punish the opposition leader is a purposeful attempt at eliminating the president’s fiercest opponent before any official campaign has even begun. However, this has been denied by the government.


Detention

Sonko is under house arrest in his home in Dakar. Sall acknowledged the protests and condemned “unprecedented violence” in his message earlier this week, but did not mention anything about Sonko nor about his personal plans of pursuing the presidency. Others who have expressed support for Sonko and tried to visit his house have also been detained. As a result of the protests, the government has cut out internet access across the country. Whatsapp and social media users have been unable to log into the respective platforms. Officially, this was done “to stop the dissemination of hate and subversive messages". Sonko currently remains “effectively under house arrest” and his supporters have warned that they will continue the fight for his release. 


Consequences for Citizens 

Since the most deadly days of the riots, the protests have been subdued and unrest has diminished. Despite the unrest reducing, the consequences for the citizens are still very much real. Few petrol stations have remained open “in fear of attack”, with many banks still remaining closed. Many citizens still have to queue for hours in order to withdraw their money. Demonstrations are economically unsustainable for many residents. Significant groups have been unable to go to work due to the scale and intensity of the demonstrations causing a security threat to their livelihoods. 


Tensions Likely to Rise Again

As long as President Sall does not rule it out, pursuing a third term remains an option on the table. He is expected to share a decision at the end of the month. One scenario is that he does not seek a third term but instead extends his current term to 2026, postponing the election by an additional two years. This option has been divisive and has not been met with the opposition’s approval. 

Internationally, Senegal has been celebrated for stability and democratic maturity in a region often tainted by political unrest. However, the detention of Ousmane Sonko is likely to be a heavily politicised event for both sides of the political spectrum. Opposition supporters are likely to return to the streets, as a lack of declaration from the president will only increase tensions in the build up to the elections. 


ZIMBABWE

On 31 May, the Zimbabwean government passed the ‘Patriotic Bill’, which raised concerns around further restrictions put on the opposition’s ability to campaign. Although the bill is yet to become law, it has already raised significant controversy due to the list of actions that are expected to become penalised on its merit. The Patriotic Bill prescribes punishment as harsh as the death penalty for “damaging the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe”. 


Threat to Freedom of Expression

Human Rights groups have expressed concerns that the bill will criminalise Zimbabweans taking part in meetings outside of the country and that its “extraterritorial application” will have a significant effect on reducing civil society activities abroad. Other potential punishments for “anti-patriotic” behaviour could include prison sentences for up to 15 years, citizenship annulment, and banishment from taking part in elections. The opposition highlights how the bill could be used instrumentally in order to abuse the government’s authority and clamp down on opponents by impeding freedom of expression. It is deliberately broad and covers an unspecified scope of punishable offences. Human rights groups and opposition forces are worried how it can give the government additional instruments to penalise activism and civil society actions.


SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone will be holding its combined presidential, parliamentary, and local representative elections on 24 June. The vote will be a rematch of the 2018 elections where current president Julius Maada Bio beat opposition leader Samura Kamara by a narrow margin. President Bio will need over 55 per cent in the first round in order to secure his reelection without a second round. However, two political parties whose candidates together earned around 10 per cent of the votes five years ago are not fielding candidates in the upcoming elections, which could make the margin between Bio and Kamara even closer. 


Revision of Electoral Procedures

Changes were made to the parliamentary and local electoral system in 2022 with a district proportional representation system replacing the previous first-past-the-post process. The reform was controversial upon introduction, but was ultimately deemed legal by the Supreme Court. As a result, the new system favours the two main parties and increases the risk of smaller parties being swept out of parliament. Opposition has also been raising concerns around the voter registration process, which according to them disadvantages certain electorate groups and as a result could tip the vote in favour of the incumbent president. 


Kamara’s Court Case

Samura Kamara has been accused of mismanagement of public funds during his years as a foreign minister between 2012-2017. The court case first began in 2021 and has been extended for more than two years. The case will be heard in July, which according to critics is not coincidental and the slow pace is aimed at giving the opposition leader an additional distraction throughout the intensive campaigning period. 


Razor-thin Margins

The country already experienced protests in August of last year, which resulted in over 20 deaths. The manifestations were provoked by an increase in cost of living and an overall poor economic condition of the country. Although the scale of the protest is unlikely to repeat, clashes between supporters as well as the security agencies cannot be ruled out. With a highly contested election, grievances around electoral procedures and lack of economic stability are likely to generate high levels of tensions throughout the political spectrum. Four years ago, Julius Maada Bio beat Samura Kamara 43.3 per cent to 42.7 per cent in the first round, 51.8 per cent to 48.2 per cent in the second round. The razor-thin margins could become even thinner between the two candidates in the elections later this month.


Conclusion

Protests in Senegal have brought unrest to one of the most politically stable countries in the West African region. The detention of one the opposition’s most prominent politicians pushed his supporters out to the streets, yet the president’s lack of transparency around his potential bid for a third term further adds to the civil unrest. The protests serve as a reminder that when a realistic transition of power appears on the horizon, tensions can escalate regardless of the existing maturity of the democratic system. 

In many countries across the continent the incumbents hold an imbalanced level of influence over state structures, which deprive the opposition of a fair challenge. Zimbabwe serves as an example of a country where the government’s control of the legal and political sphere in reality minimises opportunities for a legitimate transition of power. The risk of these mechanisms leading to unfair elections remains high throughout the continent.

The Nile Negotiations

Since 2011, Ethiopia has been in the process of constructing an immense hydropower dam that has the potential to make the country energy independent, and influence the entire East Africa region. Once fully operational, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), located on the Blue Nile River, is expected to generate 15,692 Gigawatt Hours (GWh) of electricity and store around 74 billion cubic metres (BCM) of water. In contrast, the largest water basin in Ethiopia, Lake Tana, has only around half of this capacity. When successfully constructed, the dam is expected to supply electricity to around half of the Ethiopian population, and any excess energy will be exported to neighbouring Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. The project - worth around $4.7 billion - has created thousands of employment opportunities in the region and stimulated infrastructure growth, such as the construction of transmission lines and roads which are necessary for future power exports. 

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 

The GERD is part of a broader redevelopment plan from 2012, titled the Green Development Strategy. The plan aims to tackle poverty in Ethiopia through a series of projects that will stimulate employment and provide necessary electricity to the population, whilst also reducing the national carbon footprint. However, the strategy has not been fully implemented since its formulation 11 years ago. According to a UN report from 2021-2022, Ethiopia ranks 175th out of 191 countries on human development. This can be broadly attributed to past crises, namely armed conflict and famines. At present, Ethiopia’s northern regions are facing famine, in part brought on by the war in Tigray, which has also caused severe population displacement. Repeated conflicts and economic hardship are partly why Ethiopia is considered one of the most educationally disadvantaged countries in Africa. Levels of access to healthcare in Ethiopia are some of the lowest on the entire continent, which leads to higher mortality rates and hinders development. Health outcomes are worsened by poor electricity access, as only around 40 per cent of the country has access to power. The GERD will likely help Ethiopia to address poverty, and presents it with an economic opportunity to become a major hydroelectric power. However, the GERD’s completion faces significant diplomatic obstacles, which if not addressed have the potential to lead to armed conflict. 

The Negotiations  

Since the beginning of the GERD’s construction, Egypt has been the largest critic of the project, arguing the dam poses a threat to its water security. Since circa 3000 BC, Egypt has relied on the Nile. Today, around 90 per cent of Egypt’s fresh water is supplied by the river, which stimulates agricultural production and fishing, as well as supplies water to urban dwellings. Most of Egypt’s settlements are located along the Nile, as the remainder of the country lacks sufficient access to fresh water. The Nile has two main tributaries: The Blue Nile and White Nile Rivers, which intersect in Khartoum, Sudan. Of the two, the Blue Nile is more crucial as it makes up approximately 85 percent of the Nile’s waters during the rainy season. Egypt and Sudan are therefore dependent on these tributaries to provide enough water to satisfy demand. 

The GERD when fully operational will not obstruct water flow and will have the capability to regulate supply downstream during dry seasons. However, the filling of its 74 BCM storage during construction could disrupt water flow downstream, depending on how fast Ethiopia decides to finish the project.  A compromise is required for Ethiopia to fill the dam without compromising the water supply downstream. In 2015, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt signed a Declaration of Principles which stipulated that the filling and the operation of the GERD must be agreed upon by the three parties. 

Since the declaration, none of the parties have been able to agree on the details of how the GERD should be operated and how long it should take to fill. The Nile plays a key role in narratives around domestic identity in both countries, which makes any bilateral negotiations a zero-sum game. For Ethiopia, the project is a symbol of renewed socio-economic hope, with the potential to revolutionise the country’s energy production and transform it into one of the greenest economies on the continent. Whilst for Egypt, the Nile is a symbol of ancient power as well as its primary source of freshwater. 

In 1929 Britain signed a colonial agreement with Egypt which stated that Egypt had the uncontested right to 48 BCM of the Nile’s annual flow. The same agreement gave Sudan the right to 4 BCM. In 1959 Egypt and Sudan revised the document in a bilateral agreement, agreeing to a split of 55.5 BCM and 18.5 BCM respectively. The 1959 agreement did not consider any other nation that benefited from the Blue or  White Nile, and Egypt received the right to veto any projects that could impact its share of 55.5 BCM. For this reason, Egypt has demanded that the GERD’s filling cannot impact its annual water flow. But Ethiopia refused to accept this demand on the basis that it was not part of the 1929 nor the 1959 agreement. To find a compromise, Ethiopia sanctioned an independent scientific study of the GERD by the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) to determine the impact of any future filling plans. Although the study was endorsed by the three countries, Egypt disregarded the group’s findings and in 2019 demanded that Ethiopia release 40 BCM of water from the first filling. It also demanded that Ethiopia obtain approval from Egypt on any subsequent fillings. Ethiopia countered the proposal in 2020, presenting a two-stage plan for the first filling of the GERD; 4.9 BCM in the first year and 13.5 BCM in the second year. As the plan was again refused by Egypt, the negotiations came to a halt and in May 2020 Egypt took the matter to the United Nations Security Council. 

International Involvement 

After Egypt made its case to the Security Council, Ethiopia began the two-stage filling of the dam in June 2020 and later in 2021. It did so without reaching an agreement with either Sudan or Egypt. Egypt has since warned that any disruption to its water supply will have a devastating effect on its population, hinting that a decrease in water supply may lead to an increase in illegal migration to Europe. In doing so, Egypt is trying to pressure European nations to get involved in future negotiations. Simultaneously, Egypt wants the United Nations to acknowledge that the issue of the GERD violates the standards of Article 34 of the UN Charter. In response, Tunisia drafted a resolution demanding that Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt resume negotiations mediated by the African Union, and resolve the dispute within six months. But adoption of the resolution has the potential to escalate the issue into a military conflict. If an agreement is not reached within six months, Egypt may opt to use military force to satisfy its demands. In 2021, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a public statement warning Ethiopia that if water flow into Egypt decreases, Egypt might have no choice but to use military force; however, a case can be made that Egypt wants to abate the possibility of an open conflict with Ethiopia, as it did not pressure Tunisia’s resolution.      

Possibility of Conflict 

It has been over 10 years since the construction of the GERD commenced. With no resolution in sight, the possibility of conflict remains. Egypt already made threats in the case that diplomacy fails and has the military capability to carry out an assault. The CIA Factbook estimates that Egypt has around 450,000 armed personnel, including 325,000 ground force, 18,000 Navy, and 30,000 Air Force personnel. In contrast, Ethiopia has around 150,000 troops, which includes around 3,000 Air Force personnel. Egypt has the military capacity to attack and destroy the GERD, securing its downstream water flow and preventing any future disruptions. Such an attack would unlikely be without consequences. Any Egyptian offensive action would not only impact Ethiopia, but also every member of the Eastern African Power Pool (EAPP). In the case of an attack, EAPP countries might support Ethiopia in protecting their own power supply from the GERD. Whilst it remains highly unlikely in the short to medium term, this could result in a cross-national armed conflict on the scale of  The Great War of Africa (Second Congo War). A conflict of this magnitude in Ethiopia would kickstart a cascade of humanitarian crises. It might also instigate further internal conflict in Ethiopia. 

Although there is no mediation plan for the Nile negotiations, foreign investors have taken an interest in the GERD. China has invested heavily in the GERD’s construction. In 2013, China granted a $1.2 billion loan to Ethiopia for the construction of power transmission lines to deliver electricity produced by the GERD, and an additional $1.8 billion in 2019, for the expansion of the Ethiopian energy sector. Chinese contractors, such as Sinohydro, the Gezhouba Group, and Voith Hydro Shanghai have also worked on the project. Whilst China has been expanding its military presence across Africa, namely in South Sudan, Djibouti, and Mali, an intervention in Ethiopia remains unlikely. This is due to China’s non-interventionist policy and lack of interventionist precedent outside of the Korean War. However, China’s military presence in Africa gives China a strategic advantage in terms of troop deployment, which it could use to pressure a diplomatic resolution to protect its financial interests. Possible foreign intervention - direct or indirect - in this issue is significant, as conflicting geopolitical interests in Africa are playing a growing role in the continent’s affairs. If international economic and political interests clash in Ethiopia, they could spark further proxy-wars, the likes of which we are currently witnessing in Sudan and Yemen.

The GERD’s ability to deliver electricity to the majority of Ethiopians has the potential to change the country’s global economic position and stimulate further socio-economic growth. Simultaneously, Ethiopia could become a leading energy exporter in the region. These two factors are the primary reasons why Ethiopia is unwilling to agree to Egypt’s demands on the GERD’s filling. The pursuit of energy self-sufficiency and security is also a primary reason why Ethiopia does not accept Egypt’s water claims, which it perceives to be backed by unlawful colonial agreements. But the Nile dispute could also have a detrimental effect on Ethiopia if Egypt opts to respond militarily. Although it remains unlikely, the destruction of the GERD would not only prevent Ethiopia from delivering valuable power to its people but also would cost the country billions in lost investment. Any such conflict would further underline geopolitical risk in East Africa, potentially driving foreign investors elsewhere. 

Elections Already Declared Rigged

Several African countries are struggling with insecurity as they prepare for elections this year. Backlashes against corruption and impunity are rising, with protestors facing oppression and violence. Opposition leaders and civil society activists are facing enormous challenges to have their voices heard. Unfortunately, the outlook on upcoming elections is grim as voting procedures are already being ruled as unfair.

ZIMBABWE

President Mnangagwa declared that he will announce the official date for the 2023 elections this week. Having an official date will conclude a lengthy period of speculation around the electoral calendar. Previously, the only piece of information known to the public has been an indication that the elections are likely to take place in July or August. As the official date will be announced, all sides of the political spectrum will begin an intensive campaigning period in the coming weeks.

One of the main axes of the existing campaign is the economic stability of the country. Zimbabwe has been facing high levels of inflation, poor economic performance and alarming level of food insecurity. The opposition's narrative is that the current regime is entrenched in corruption and that only a new government has the capability to stimulate a much needed economic upturn. The government claims that it has been able to guide the country through difficult economic decisions, which have yielded positive results and that they deserve another mandate to further promote growth and stability. The true scale of support for both the government as well as the opposition forces is unclear. However, fair democratic elections are unlikely due to the level of control President Mnangagwa’s allies have in the electoral process.


Audit Declares Zero Confidence

The Research and Advocacy Unit conducted an audit of pre-election procedures in the country and concluded that “there cannot be any confidence in the forthcoming elections” and that  “conditions for a free and fair election are absent”. The report highlights political influence on the electoral commission, restrictions on freedom of expression, and challenging registration procedures, especially for the opposition urban voter base as some of the main irregularities present in the current process. 

Controversial Procurement Law

President Mnangagwa is receiving backlash from opposition leaders and activists during his attempts to distance himself from a recent law passed that is aimed at concealing how taxpayers’ money is spent in the health ministry. “The notice published in the government gazette in early March declared that construction equipment and materials, biomedical and medical equipment, medicines and drugs, and vehicles – including ambulances – are among the list of items of national interest and shall not be publicly disclosed.” Civil society organisations were moving to challenge the law in court, declaring the statute as unconstitutional and demanding transparency. 

Mnangagwa claimed that the document was published without his approval, indicating an environment of “confusion” within the top levels of the government. “While further investigations are underway, the government wishes to advise the public that, on the instruction of His Excellency the President, the document in question has been rescinded as it has no standing at law, in policy and in terms of set government procedures. It thus should be disregarded,” stated Chief Secretary Misheck Sibanda. Concern is rising regarding the published law, causing worry that political leaders can act with “impunity”. According to political analyst Rashweat Mukundu, “What we are dealing with is a mafia that feels they are above the law that uses state power to abuse national resources. So regardless of the fact that this was withdrawn, the mere fact that someone sitting in a government office thought about this tells us of the level of the collapse of state management in this country.”

Military Intimidation

The military and intelligence forces have been heavily involved in controlling state structures, which has enabled them to informally campaign for the incumbent President. They have been accused of intimidating voters, preventing opposition candidates from campaigning in the government’s strongholds, heavily influencing the electoral bodies, and holding control of the electoral technological infrastructure. 

These elections do have the potential to cease ZANU-PF’s domination on Zimbabwean politics. Yet, the true scale of the opposition’s support will only become clear in the coming months. The election is likely to be closely contested. A recent poll based on 1,000 phone respondents has shown that currently opposition leader Nelson Chamisa is leading the incumbent President by over 10 per cent. However, these figures should be taken with extreme caution and cannot serve as any form of indication of what the final result will look like. The scale of the government’s interference in the electoral procedures as well as their ability to maximise outcomes in its rural base are likely to be key factors in the final results. With so much control over governmental instruments, a transition of power away from President Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF in a legitimate and democratic process is highly unlikely.

DRC

Attacks on Protestors

Security forces in the DRC have used tear gas to thwart anti-government demonstrators last week. Approximately 10 protesters have been detained, nearly 30 police officers were injured, and three policemen have been detained for using violence against a minor - an act which was condemned by the country’s human rights minister. The protest was called for by opposition leaders and people came out onto the streets in order to express their disapproval of reported infringements in voter registration for the 2023 December elections.

The opposition leaders have been accusing the government of not following constitutional procedures in appointing judges, nominating partisan members into the electoral commission and obstructing registration for voters in opposition stronghold regions. Grievances of the protesters were further exacerbated by the rising costs of living and lack of state control over the activities of militia groups in the east, where violence has been a significant threat to the security of citizens. The elections are about six months away and with a prevalent security crisis within its borders, electoral irregularities and reported ethnic discrimination of voters, tensions are likely to remain high throughout the campaign period. 

LIBERIA

Voter Registration Ended

Earlier this month, the Liberian National Elections Commission (NEC) ended its voter registration process. It was the first time the country used a biometric registration system in order to reduce the number of double registrations. However, the Elections Coordinating Committee (ECC) identified a number of irregularities that could impede the fairness of the democratic process. The NEC’s lack of consistency in conducting eligibility checks, as well as instances of voter trucking (the movement of voters to different locations in order to affect election results) and voter violence have all reduced the legitimacy of the procedures. 

The elections will take place on October 10th and due to Liberia’s strict requirement of 50 per cent majority means that the winner will most likely be chosen on the basis of their ability to build political alliances. Incumbent President Weah has been facing pressure due to accusations of corruption against senior allies, weak provision of public goods and services, and lack of adequate investment in the country’s infrastructure. However, he maintains a strong mandate from the ruling Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) party, especially in the face of a fragmented opposition. 

ANGOLA

President Cutting Russian Ties

President João Lourenço appears to be severing ties with Russia in order to deepen relations with the US. Lourenço is pushing for a meeting with President Joseph Biden this year in order to gain Western support as rumours are spreading that Lourenço is seeking a controversial third term. Lourenço stated in December that he wants the country to replace Russian military equipment with American, marking a significant development that could heighten US-Russian tensions in Africa as Angola is Russia’s fourth largest market for arms. 

Conclusion

Countries across the region are facing irregularities in their electoral processes. In the cases of Zimbabwe and the DRC, state mechanisms are creating an unfavourable environment for opposition groups. As a result, regardless of the true levels of support for the opposition, current governments hold significant levels of control over the electoral procedures. An indication that a transition of power in these countries is highly unlikely. Furthermore, state weakness continues to create a significant security risk in the DRC where the government’s inability to control militias in the eastern regions is likely to further exacerbate mistrust in the government. With the declaration that ‘free and fair’ elections are unlikely in some states, electoral violence is expected to be heightened and widespread.