Wagner Group Activity in Sudan

The Wagner Group has been operating in Sudan since 2017, long before the Sahel nation descended into its latest conflict. In the past Wagner acted as a private security firm for President Omar al-Bashir, but since his removal from power in 2019 Wagner has primarily focused on securing mining rights and its grip on illegal gold exports. Prigozhin’s first recorded speech after his failed mutiny, reiterated the importance of Wagner operations in Africa and indicated that they were set to continue, although it still remains unclear in what capacity. 

The Wagner Group was first invited into Sudan after a meeting between then-President Omar al-Bashir and the Russian premier Vladimir Putin. Al-Bashir, feeling his rule coming under threat, asked for Russian support to help maintain his grip on power. In return, he offered Russia a gateway into Africa through Sudan. Soon after, concessions were granted to M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold - both of whom the US Treasury Department considers covering entities for the Wagner Group -  to operate in Sudan. Al Jazeera reports that during this time Wagner guarded mineral reserves operated by Meroe Gold, and acted as a support force for al-Bashir’s government. However, DW reports show that behind the scenes Wagner had also begun nurturing ties with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) General Hemedti.    

After al-Bashir’s rule dissolved, the Wagner Group’s influence on government was slightly reduced, but it maintained strong ties with Hemedti, helping him (and his now enemy, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) topple the civilian-led government just two years later. The Wagner Group capitalised on its partnership with the RSF and the political turmoil to increase its control of Sudanese gold mines. The extraction of gold, manganese, silicon and uranium and the group’s spreading influence across the continent led the US Treasury Department to sanction Prigozhin, M Invest and Meroe Gold in 2020.  

In July of last year, a CNN report was published showing over 16 gold-smuggling flights from Sudan to a Russian military base in Syria. The gold was being exported out of the country to help the Russian Federation curb the effects of Western sanctions and to fund the war in Ukraine. That same report shows that in 2021 as much $1.9 billion worth of gold went unaccounted for, and evidence points to large quantities of gold bypassing the Sudanese treasury in exchange for Russian - and thereby Wagner - political and military support. 

Wagner’s strong partnership with Hemedti also helped secure the Russian Federation the promise of a naval base on the Red Sea. However, this plan was rejected by Heemdti’s rival General al-Burhan, only increasing the tension between the two.  

After violence broke out in Sudan between the RSF and the Sudanese military (SAF) reports quickly surfaced that the Wagner Group was providing military support to its ally General Hemedti. CNN reported that not only did Wagner provide Hemedti’s RSF with surface-to-air missiles, Hemedti himself flew to Russia days before the conflict began to advance relations between the two parties. Extensive satellite imagery in the report shows that Libyan General Khalifa Haftar and Wagner forces in the area were readying themselves to back Hemedti before the violence had erupted.  

Despite widespread reporting of Wagner operations in Sudan, and its recent backing of the RSF, in May Prigozhin claimed that no Wagner fighter had been in Sudan for longer than two years. "I can tell you with absolute certainty, and you can put my words in any protocols, in any highest instances, today there is not a single soldier of the PMC [private military company] "Wagner", I emphasise - not a single one, not in Sudan. And so it is more than two years. Not a single Wagner PMC soldier is present in Sudan for two years. And today there is not a single one. I think that this is the main thing that you need to know." This comes after Army general Yassir al-Atta told the Ashraq al-Aswat newspaper that Wagner was operating the Jebel Amer gold mine near Darfur and that General Hemedti had 53 tonnes of gold stored in Russia.  

Prigozhin denied these claims wholeheartedly, stating that any reports about Wagner supporting either General in the Sudanese conflict were attempts at provocation and nothing more. Moreover, the RSF denied receiving any support from Wagner, the Russian government or Libya. Regardless, there is evidence to show that the group has been supplying weapons to the RSF, enabling it to gain ground in the fight, and perhaps enhancing its capabilities in the long-term. The Wagner Group has a track record of human rights offences and tends to abuse international humanitarian law, thus experts are concerned that its support for the RSF will only prolong a conflict that has already left nearly 14 million children in desperate need of humanitarian aid.  

Given the opaque nature of the Wagner Group mutiny, it is unclear if the paramilitary group will continue to act as a proxy for the Russian state in Sudan, or if the Wagner forces will be folded into the state military. What is clear is that the political influence and economic control that the paramilitary group established in Sudan and neighbouring countries over the past several years is not something the Russian state is willing to give up. Moreover, the Wagner Group will have to tread carefully in the Sahel nation if it hopes to maintain its mining monopoly in neighbouring nations. If instability and conflict were to spread from Sudan to bordering countries the Wagner Group may lose its political influence and access to crucial mining areas which it can ill-afford given its newly fractured relationship with the Kremlin.  

Wagner News Update (25 September - 1 October)

Written by: Ridipt Singh

Summary

Wagner Group fighters are back in combat roles in Ukraine but operate under different pro-Russian units rather than an organized PMC. Vladimir Putin’s meeting with a former Wagner commander now working with the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) suggests a likely new leadership for Wagner. However, given his current position is in the Russian MoD, his appointment is likely to get Wagner fighters integrated with the MoD rather than revamp the organization.

Developments

• Wagner Group mercenaries are back in Ukraine fighting in Bakhmut under the command of multiple Russian military units. Their presence is scattered, does not form any organized force, and has no significant impact on the battlefield.

• Vladimir Putin met former senior Wagner commander Andrei Troshev (a.k.a “Sedoi” or “Grey Hair”) alongside Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to discuss how to use the Wagner “volunteer” units in Ukraine. In an earlier meeting, it was agreed that Troshev would be involved in the creation of “volunteer units for combat roles” to be deployed in Ukraine.

• President Putin mentions cash handouts as social guarantees through the “Defenders of the Fatherland” fund.

• Wagner fighters continue to operate in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali with autonomy but are facing complications in Syria.

• Dmitry Sytii, (formerly with the Internet Research Agency) is now the frontman for Wagner operations in the Central African Republic.

• Wagner logos, stickers, and patches were spotted across Europe near landmarks in France, Greece, and Italy. A Belarusian man was forced to apologize for accusing a post office visitor of wearing a Wagner Group chevron.

International Reactions

• The UK Defence Intelligence says hundreds of former Wagner fighters are beginning to redeploy to Ukraine under Russian forces or other PMC groups. Further stating that having fought in Bakhmut, their experience is in demand in the sector.

• UK Intelligence says Andrei Troshev is likely to be considered a traitor by Wagner veterans due to his involvement in encouraging Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the Russian MoD.

• Mykhailo Podolyak, advisor to President Zelenskyy, says that after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, Russia has tried to take full control of the group, and therefore Wagner does not exist as a private company anymore.

• Natia Seskuria of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) says the Kremlin’s confirmation of Troshev working for the MoD indicates that the “MoD is taking full control” of Wagner fighters in Ukraine.

• US military officials say multiple African nations regret giving access to Wagner. US defense officials earlier stated that there has been no meaningful withdrawal in the number of Wagner fighters in Africa.

Scenario/Lines of Analysis

• Wagner Group fighters are now redeployed in Ukraine but have no significant impact. The Russian government is assigning Andrei Troshev who at the time is working closely with the Russian Ministry of Defence to take command of the Wagner fighters in Ukraine. In the meeting with Troshev, President Putin mentioned that Troshev was tasked with creating volunteer units and managing them. Hence, the Russian government is likely trying to use the remaining Wagner fighters and their combat experience in the terrain.

• Andrei Troshev is currently employed by the Russian Defence Ministry. His meeting with President Putin with the Deputy Defence Minister has led to speculations that Putin is trying to regain and re-exert his influence on the mercenary group. Given Troshev’s position in encouraging Wagner mercenaries to sign contracts with the Defence Ministry, the Russian government is likely trying to make Wagner fighters more integrated with the MoD. The social guarantees from the Defenders of the Fatherland fund could very likely be a way of incentivizing former Wagner fighters to return to combat roles in Ukraine alongside the Russian forces.

• The future of Wagner as a PMC was under speculation after the death of Prigozhin. Currently, Wagner fighters are engaged in Africa, Syria, and are now redeploying to Ukraine. However, the Russian Deputy Defence Minister persuading African authorities to not cooperate with Wagner forces and the ongoing developments, likely suggest that the Russian government aims to reduce Wagner’s autonomy and exercise full control of Wagner fighters rather than revamp it as an independent PMC.

Wagner News Update (18-24 September)

By: Ciaran Murray

Summary:

The Kremlin is likely seeking to reduce the influence of Wagner domestically and internationally. Wagner remains active in a training capacity within Belarus, and former fighters appear to be returning to Ukraine under the Rosgvardia. Russia is increasing its diplomatic activity in Africa, likely trying to replace Wagner’s presence in various countries with its own. Discontent amongst Wagner mouthpieces is growing due to distrust and suspicion over Russian activity in Africa. Wagner’s influence in Africa is not lost as it continues to operate in Mali and maintains close relations with the Central African Republic (CAR) leadership.

Developments:

• The FSB is investigating Russian National Guard officers’ potential involvement in the Wagner rebellion.

• Wagner claims its fighters will soon begin training sessions for Cossack territorial defense volunteers in Rostov, Russia.

• Wagner continues to train Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs special forces units.

• Some former Wagner fighters have volunteered to return to Ukraine. Wagner sources stress that they are not operating under the PMC. Russia plans to pass legislation allowing volunteer units to join the Rosgvardia and fight in Ukraine.

• Wagner hints at, provides information about, and advertises for imminent deployments to Africa.

• Russian defense officials (Defence, GRU) seen in multiple African countries, meeting with state leaders. 

International Reactions:

• CAR President refuses Macron’s request to expel Wagner from the country and expresses support for the PMC at a memorial service for Ygevney Prigozhin.

• Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) takes responsibility for a 14/09 ambush between Qusa and Gao in Mali that resulted in Wagner fatalities.

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis:

• After reluctance to accept Russian MoD contracts, the Kremlin is likely trying to recruit former Wagner soldiers through its national guard, allowing them to return to Ukraine. The fighting experience of Wagner PMCs is highly valuable, and Russia is likely keen to retain as many Wagner fighters as possible during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. This has the bonus of removing individuals from the Wagner entity, reducing the threat they pose to the Russian state. There will likely be further attempts from the Russian government to incentivize Wagner troops to return to Ukraine under contract from the Kremlin in the near future.

• Russia is likely attempting to stem Wagner’s international influence indirectly and directly. Increased diplomatic visits to African states and tense confrontations between Wagner forces and Russian defense officials in Syria suggest that Putin is seeking to dissolve Wagner's global presence, replacing it with a more controllable and reliable force. This comes at the price of losing plausible deniability, as where Russia used to be able to separate itself from Wagner operations, its new approach is far more visible, likely deepening the rift between it and the West as competition for global influence grows. While Wagner continues vying for control in African states such as Mali, Niger, and CAR, the Kremlin's diplomatic power will likely win over African leaders, causing them to choose an alternative Russian force over Wagner.

• Over time, Wagner will likely significantly lose influence as it loses contracts, causing increasing numbers of unemployed mercenaries to take out contracts with Rosgvardia or the MoD.

• Friction between Wagner and the Kremlin has likely bred a sense of paranoia among Wagner channels, with many remaining openly critical of the Russian state. It is unlikely the former will be able to unify itself against the latter in such a way as occurred under Prigozhin due to the current power vacuum and general disorganization.

Wagner News Update (11-17 September)

By: Ridipt Singh

Summary

The United Kingdom (UK) has officially designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization amidst a leadership struggle after Prigozhin’s death. Former fighters from the group are absorbed into the Russian National Guard (RNG) after due process; others are reportedly divided and shifted to other commands, while some seek other job opportunities due to their convictions and involvement in the Ukraine-Russia war. While the Russian government tries to absorb Wagner fighters within the Ministry of Defence, the group is expanding by luring volunteers into combat roles. Amidst these developments, the group continues to face losses in its operations in Africa, and the organization's future remains uncertain.

Developments

• The UK has officially banned the Wagner Group and designated it a terrorist organization. The mercenary group is added to a list of organizations,  including Hamas and Boko Haram. Aiding the group in further supporting its activities, expressing support to the group, or showcasing the Wagner logo or flag could result in fines and prison sentences of up to 14 years. 

• Satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs shows tents in the Tsel military base used by the Wagner fighters in Minsk, Belarus being gradually dismantled.

• Internal strife continues within the Wagner Group due to a lack of trust between the commanders. Anton Yelizarov, calling Lotus, and a known loyalist to Prigozhin, is presently heading the group. This could result in a dysfunctionality in operations coordination, lack of clear vision and mission, and organization-wide structure.  

• President  Vladimir Putin intends to continue using the fighters and plans to shift the fighters into other groups. The Rosgvardiya i.e., the Russian National Guard has begun to recruit former Wagner mercenaries in their ranks after a due vetting process, concluding contracts with Wagner and documents of pardon for their convictions. These recruits occupy neither senior nor mid-level positions and are being deployed to protect “strategic objects” in occupied Ukraine.

• Some former members of the Wagner Group are left in a dire position to seek new job opportunities. An audio message from a Wagner representative has told fighters to seek new jobs as they will not be allowed to fight in Ukraine for “well known circumstances”. Upon being turned down for employment in defense enterprises or factories, some had to resort to working as taxi drivers or couriers for restaurants. In one such instance, Valery Bogdanov, a former member of the Wagner Group with five convictions for theft and robbery, started a taxi service company with the Wagner logo on the business cards. 

International Reactions:

• Following the UK’s decision to designate Wagner as a terrorist organization, UK Home Secretary Suella Braverman says "they are terrorists, plain and simple - and this prescription order makes that clear in UK law" highlighting that Wagner Group’s destabilizing activities only serve the political goals of Russia.

• Andrea Kendall-Taylor of the Center for a New American Security says that Wagner fighters might be integrated into the command of the Ministry of Defence, Russian intelligence agencies, or under other oligarchs adding, “but none of those assets will wither at the vine.”

• The US is putting sanctions on a Wagner affiliate - Pavel Pavlovich Shevelin, involved in transferring ammunition from North Korea to Russia, and another Wagner official Vitalij Victorovich Perfilev, for activities in the Central African Republic (CAR).

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis

• Following Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, Wagner members occupied themselves with odd jobs while others are absorbed into other units. Nevertheless, the Group is still operational but struggles in parts of Africa. In the CAR, Wagner is struggling to secure its presence while facing losses in its operations against the rebel forces in the region. In Northern Mali, the Group and the national army have lost control of camps and posts to the Tuareg rebels. Furthermore, to continue its existence, Wagner fighters are also trying to recruit volunteers in Central Asia to fight in Ukraine. In Kyrgyzstan, volunteers are lured through security job offers and sent for special operation tasks in Ukraine, citing “change in priorities”. This illustrates the Group’s dysfunctionality, resulting in increased losses and unclear priorities, likely deriving from the struggle to secure new leadership after Prigozhin’s death. 

• The Russian government disrupted the landing of a plane belonging to Wagner, supposed to rotate Wagner fighters in Syria. This development occurred amidst reports of the Russian MoD, attempting to subsume Wagner operations. Former Wagner fighters are relocated into different units, and some fighters are not being pardoned for their convictions, likely suggesting the Russian government is wholly trying to control the group’s fate. On the other hand, Wagner representatives expand by luring volunteers into their ranks, likely suggesting the group is trying to maintain its existence as an independent group from the Russian government and its attempt to integrate the group into its structure.

Wagner News Update (4-10 September)

By: Vanina Meyer

Source: The New Humanitarian. Wagner Group mercenaries protect President Faustin-Archange Touadéra at a rally on 17 July 2023. The group has helped the government beat back rebels in recent years, but humanitarian needs remain high. Picture: Leger Kokpakpa/Reuters

Summary

Since Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, the founder and leader of the Wagner Group, the future of the mercenary group is uncertain. The question of a new leader remains uncertain, while it is likely that some soldiers join the Russian forces and presumably other mercenary groups might supplement the Wagner Group as a paramilitary force for Russia, at home and abroad. Russia’s influence in Africa is likely to be uncertain as Wagner and its leader had significant power and influence in the continent. On the international scene, the United Kingdom declared the Wagner Group a terrorist organisation.

Developments

• The leader of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, died with 9 other people including Wagner’s associates Valery Chekalov and Dmitry Utkin in a plane crash on August 23, two months after the mutiny, near the village of Kuzhenkino, Tver region, Russia. The Group had moved to Belarus to train their soldiers and pursue their mission to fight for Russia. 

• On September 6, the Al Qaeda affiliated Group in Mali, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), reportedly ambushed soldiers from the Wagner Group in the region of Segou in Mali on September 6. LSI Africa also reported the attacks; 11 Wagner group soldiers might have been killed, but the number is still subject to confirmation. 

• Private military companies (PMCs) such as Redut could replace the Wagner Group as “a key instrument of the Kremlin’s hybrid and conventional warfare”. It is a group under the direct control of the Russian Military Intelligence and reliant on the Kremlin for arms and ammunition supply. PMCs like Redut could likely be deployed to Africa. However, their lack of experience on the continent might be problematic in pursuing Russia’s goal of spreading its influence in Africa.

Source: Associated Press - A part of a private jet by the crash site, near the village of Kuzhenkino, Tver region, Russia, Thursday, Aug. 24, 2023. Russian mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the Wagner Group, reportedly died when a private jet he was said to be on crashed on Aug. 23, 2023, killing all 10 people on board. (AP Photo)

International Reactions

• The United Kingdom designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization under the Terrorism Act of 2000. The UK Home Secretary stated that the Group poses a threat to British nationals abroad as “Wagner has been involved in looting, torture, and barbarous murders”. Its operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Africa are a threat to global security”. Wagner’s activities and affiliation to the group will become a criminal offense; Wagner’s assets will be classified as “terrorist property”.

• The Pentagon spokesperson Air Force Brigadier General Pat Ryder declared that the “Wagner Group is essentially over” and that since it was the most powerful force deployed in Ukraine to fight the war, now Russia will have to turn and seek out “rogue regimes, to include Iran, attempting to try to obtain additional ammunition or weapons”.

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis

• After Prigozhin’s death, the group’s future is at stake. The group could likely be merged with Russia’s Defense Military or the military Intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU). Although the Wagner Group was never officially affiliated with the Kremlin, the group has been associated with the GRU. The group’s inclusion under the Russia MoD could likely impact the group’s organizational structure, and operations abroad. Wagner Group’s active members will likely be reluctant to join the Russian military and would prefer to be divided and remain associated with Wagner. Placing Wagner’s active members under the command of the Russian military would be very expensive due to their significant operations across the globe. Leadership-wise, Prigozhin’s prominent role in Wagner’s leadership will likely be challenging to replace, according to Steven Gruzd, head of the Africa Russia Project at the South African Institute of International Affairs. This is due to his long-standing career and the direction of Wagner, characterizing his personalism as a critical element, especially in propaganda distributed in social media sources.

• Wagner Group developed significant influence and power in Africa, making its operations likely difficult to sustain without its leader. For instance, Russia signed with the Central African Republic a deal in 2017 to deploy Wagner troops in the country. Their objective was to support the president in power, President Touadera, and to ensure his reelection. At the same time, the goal was to fuel anti-French sentiment and to develop support for Wagner and Russia among the population with disinformation campaigns. The group also controls the gold and diamond mining industries, which provides significant resources and money for further deployment of activities in the region. Hence, Russia is popular in Africa thanks to Wagner, and it is likely in Russia’s interest to continue to have Wagner’s “brand under Kremlin-approved leadership” to continue its operations in Africa.

The Lukashenko Factor: Decoding Belarus' Strategic Role in Resolving the Wagner Rebellion

Event Overview

On June 23rd, a 24-hour coup attempt involving the Wagner Group took place in Russia. The crisis was resolved swiftly as President Alexander Lukashenko played a prominent role in negotiating peace between the Wagner Group's Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin. Lukashenko's efforts led to an agreement in which Prighozin's Private Military Company - the Wagner Group, agreed to withdraw its personnel from Russia in exchange for amnesty in Belarus.

Lukashenko's Interest in Peace Negotiation Role

Lukashenko's interest in being a peace negotiator can be attributed to various factors. Following the contested 2020 election, which tarnished his legitimacy, Lukashenko's authority and image of power was significantly diminished. To navigate the ensuing political turmoil and widespread protests, he relied heavily on Moscow's intervention. However, this reliance also reduced Belarus’s autonomy and further alignment with Russian interests.

During this period, through frequent joint operations and cooperation, Belarus strengthened ties with Russia's Federal Security Bureau (FSB) and the Belarusian State Security Committee (KGB). This growing convergence signalled the erosion of Belarus's sovereignty and its closer integration with Russia.

In the context of the coup attempt, Lukashenko saw an opportunity to regain prominence and solidify his position in the eyes of Russian authorities. By successfully brokering a deal with the Wagner Group, he aimed to demonstrate his utility to Russian President Vladimir Putin and, in return, potentially gain access to resources and training for his troops from the PMC.

In summary, Lukashenko's involvement in the peace negotiations reflects his strategic bid to restore his standing and strengthen ties with Russia amid the challenges to his authority and Belarus's sovereignty.

Implications of Accepting Wagner Troops in Minsk

Accepting Wagner Group troops in Minsk could have significant implications for Belarus both domestically and in its relations with other countries. The Wagner Group is a Russian private military company known for its involvement in conflicts around the world, and its presence in Minsk could create various consequences:

Heightened Tensions with the West and Baltic States

Accepting Wagner troops may further strain Belarus's relations with Western countries. The Wagner Group's reputation for engaging in questionable activities and its connection to the Russian government could raise concerns about Belarus's alignment with Russia's aggressive foreign policy. This may increase diplomatic pressure and sanctions from Western nations and neighbouring countries. Ukraine and the Baltic states may perceive the presence of Wagner troops in Minsk as a potential threat. Given Wagner's involvement in conflicts in Ukraine and elsewhere, this move could trigger regional security concerns and heighten tensions in a delicate geopolitical environment.

Challenges to Sovereignty

Hosting Wagner troops could be seen as compromising Belarus's sovereignty and independence. It may raise questions about the extent of Russia's influence over Belarusian affairs and its ability to deploy forces on Belarusian territory without facing resistance from the government. If such arrangements continue or escalate, it could deepen Belarus's dependence on Russia for security matters and military support, potentially undermining its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Domestic Concerns and Popular Perception:

Belarus’s decision to welcome Wagner troops could fuel heightened resistance from citizens and political factions. This action might be construed as jeopardizing national interests and security, potentially triggering protests and demonstrations. This unrest amplifies the risk of regime instability and challenges the state's authoritative control. Furthermore, Lukashenko's credibility could suffer as the move might be seen as deepening his alignment with Russia, rather than pursuing authentic diplomatic resolutions.

Economic Ramifications

Depending on the response from the international community, accepting Wagner troops could lead to economic repercussions, such as trade restrictions and reduced foreign investments. These consequences could further strain Belarus's already struggling economy.

Suwalki Gap

Amidst these unfolding dynamics, the Suwalki Gap emerges as a strategic flashpoint. Positioned between Belarus and Kaliningrad, fears are taking root that Wagner troops, masquerading as either Belarusian border officers or asylum-seekers, could exploit this choke-point to facilitate migrant movement and further destabilize the border region. Consequently, Poland has begun erecting a formidable barrier along its border, while Lithuania contemplates a potential border closure. The Suwalki Gap's weight in this developing scenario is a stark reminder of the intricate game of influence and instability.

Overall, the coup attempt revealed Lukashenko's pivotal role in Belarus' strategy. Accepting Wagner troops holds intricate implications, from straining relations with the West and neighbouring states to risking sovereignty and triggering internal unrest. Amidst this, the Suwalki Gap's shadow underscores the high-stakes game of power. Belarus faces a critical crossroads, balancing its choices against the intricate web of global dynamics that shape its future.

Wagner News Update (01-07 August)

By: Vanina Meyer

Source: Bloomberg Belarussian border in Bialowieza, Poland, on July 8.Photographer: Omar Marques/Getty Images

Summary

Wagner troops’ arrival in Belarus increased tensions with the neighbouring countries, like Poland. Early this week, Poland accused Belarus of violating its airspace during military training, accusations which Minsk denied. This resulted in the intensification of deployment of Polish troops at the border. Furthermore, Lithuania and Poland convened an urgent meeting to denounce Belarus's role in providing support to Russia and the Wagner Group at the EU and NATO borders.

Developments in Russia - Wagner - Belarus

●Between 3,450 and 3,650 Wagner soldiers have travelled to a camp close to Asipovichy, a town in Belarus about 230 km north of the Ukrainian border according to the Belarusian Hajun Project, which monitors military activities in Belarus. According to the same group satellite images show that 700 vehicles and construction equipment arrived in Wagner convoys.

●According to the Independent, the leader of the Wagner Group Mr Prigozhin registered a “real estate management company” in Belarus under the name of Concord Management and Consulting.

●On August 1, according to Poland, two Belarusian helicopters allegedly violated the airspace of Poland during training exercises, accusations denied by the Belarusian defence ministry. After this alleged incident, the Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak ordered a military reinforcement at the border.

●Last week, the Polish Prime Minister warned that the Wagner group with 100 mercenaries moved towards the Suwalki Gap. According to Adam Audruszkiewicz, Deputy-Minister of Digitalisation in the Podlasie region, Poland decided to build a barrier along the entire border with Belarus to seal the border and increased the presence of the military at the Polish border. Poland also reinforced military units in Kilno, Grajewo, Siemiatycze and Czerwony Bor. The Polish PM stressed that Wagner fighters could pose as migrants to enter the EU.

Source: The New York Times President Gitanas Nauseda of Lithuania, left, and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki of Poland during a news conference on Thursday in northeastern Poland, near both countries’ borders with Belarus.Credit...Artur Reszko/EPA, via Shutterstock

International Reactions

● Poland interprets the Wagner’s movement troops as a provocation orchestrated by Russia to destabilise the region. “Our response to the provocation is to increase the size of the Polish Army on the eastern border of the country by redeploying troops from the west,” Poland’s defense minister, Mariusz Blaszczak, said on Thursday at a televised meeting with troop commanders in Bialystok, a regional capital near the Belarusian border. The Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, further stated that “this is certainly a step towards a further hybrid attack on Polish territory.”

● The President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nauseda, “cannot rule out such a threat” as for the presence of Wagner troops in the neighboring country of Belarus. Poland and Lithuania’s leaders met for an urgent meeting on August 3 in Suwalki, a town in the Suwalki Gap, warning about the possible increase in provocations from Russia at their borders. Both countries strengthened their military at their borders. For President Nauseda, the Suwalki corridor is a “vulnerable place” and “ remains a potential target of provocation by both Russia and Belarus”.

● Moving towards the Suwalki corridor can be seen as a possible attempt to put pressure on NATO and EU members. “NATO is closely tracking the situation along its eastern borders, including yesterday’s incident where two Belarussian military helicopters briefly crossed into Polish airspace at low altitude,” a NATO official said on customary condition of anonymity. “We are in close contact with the Polish authorities on this matter, and we will continue to do what is necessary to ensure all Alliance territory remains secure.”

● The head of Latvia’s State Border Guard, Guntis Pujats, told on August 2 that security risk at the border with Belarus increased since the country initiated an “hybrid warfare” with the arrival of migrants in the region to crowd the Polish border (among them could be Wagner troops) and the intensification of Wagner training centres in Belarus.

● The US ambassador to the United Nations, said earlier this month that the United States views the Wagner group as a threat. “And we have to ensure that the message is clear that any attacks by the Wagner Group will be seen as an attack by the Russian government.”

● The EU announced sanctions on Belarus amid providing help to Russia and crackdown on anti-government activists and on media personnel, travel bans and frozen assets on 38 Belarus officials and chemical companies.

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis

● Lithuania and Poland keep in mind the possibility of a scenario where Russian troops would be deployed to the Suwalki Corridor, cutting Poland and two Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, the access from Poland and other NATO allies. This scenario includes Russia using Belarus to reinforce its positions.

●The presumably deployment of troops near the Suwalki gap could provide a direct link between Russia and Kaliningrad, which makes it an asset for Putin. Such deployment could signal that Russia is ready for escalation and confrontation with NATO. Provocations at the border with NATO states could likely intensify, Russia using Belarus to use the patience of the West.

● Regarding national security, Lithuania and Poland are on high alert as per their urgent meeting and their declarations. For some critics, Poland uses security threats to position itself for the upcoming parliamentary elections this fall, according to the opposition leader Donald Tusk, using fear to win the elections.

●Experts are more moderate about the possibility of escalation of tensions. The Chairman of the Seimas National Security and Defense Committee, explained that the Wagner Group does not currently pose a “conventional military threat” and it will depend on further scenarios of how they are armed and the orders given to them.

Wagner News Update (24-30 July)

By: Marina Tovar

Summary 

Prigozhin’s recent appearance in the Russia-Africa Summit outlines the Kremlin-Wagner interconnectedness. Putin's decision to continue collaborating with Wagner is rational, as pursuing the Kremlin's interest in Africa outweighs Putin's potential decrease in credibility. 

Developments in Russia - Wagner - Belarus 

• A young Wagner fighter participating in the June 23’s attempted coup states “he and his fellow fighters did not have a clue of what was going on”. In this line but on another note, a former Russian colonel said Russian President Putin “just hid” during the attempted coup. For more information on Prigozhin and Putin’s support, can be found here

• Prigozhin has applauded the coup d’état in Niger, blaming the change of government on the “legacy of colonialism” and the role of Western countries in sponsoring terrorism in the country. He also pitched Wagner’s services to Niger, claiming to help establish order and destroy terrorists.

• Wagner fighters stationed in Russia are requested to “go back home” after getting drunk and loitering at train stations. Wagner fighters who are not receiving training reportedly “need to go home” on leave, but many have not made it. 

• Since July 19, military equipment and vehicles believed to belong to the Wagner group continue to move to a camp in the village of Tsel, Eastern Belarus, where the troops have settled after the attempted coup.

• Last week, a video circulated where Prigozhin allegedly was in Belarus welcoming his troops. On Friday this week, Wagner’s leader was photographed in St Petersburg during the Africa-Russia summit. The image was posted on Facebook by Dmitri Syty, who reportedly manages Wagner’s operations in the Central African Republic. 

International Reactions

• Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia say Belarus-EU borders may be closed if Wagner group serious incidents happen. This comes after Polish PM Morawiecki’s concerns of Wagner fighters around the area from Grodno, a city in Western Belarus close to Poland, known as the Suwalki gap or corridor.

• Tensions have grown along Ukraine’s northern border about the potential for new military attacks since Prigozhin’s relocation of troops to Belarus.

• CIA Director Bill Burns states that Prigozhin was likely improvising during the attempted coup. Further analysis can be found here.

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis

In line with Director Burn’s words, Prigozhin’s improvisation would likely explain the gaps in the direction Wagner fighters took during the 23 June attempted coup. Coupled with the young Wagner fighter’s declarations, this scenario is very likely as Prigozhin was not fully aware of the possible reactions or scenarios once he took Rostov-on-Don or headed to St. Petersburg. The scenario’s likelihood is high because the courses of action could vary depending on the military and Kremlin’s reactions. Therefore, Prigozhin acted with a degree of improvisation due to the unknowns on the military’s reactions and the support the group would have in the attempted coup. 

Prigozhin's unknown whereabouts and recent appearance at the Russia-Africa Summit reinforce the interconnectedness between the Kremlin and Wagner. Prigozhin's appearance very likely illustrates Wagner's operations' importance in Africa and the Kremlin's need for Wagner to pursue their geopolitical interests in Africa, including competition with the West in security cooperation, mining, and energy. Furthermore, Prigozhin's lack of criminal charges and political consequences after the attempted coup, coupled with Friday's appearance, illustrates the Kremlin's need to collaborate with Wagner. At the expense of Putin's credibility and alleged decline of popular support because of Prigozhin's lack of criminal prosecution, Putin's decision to continue collaborating with Wagner is rational, as pursuing the Kremlin's interest in Africa outweighs Putin's credibility.

International Reactions to the Wagner Group Rebellion

On Saturday 24 June 2023, Wagner Group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, seized control over the city of Rostov-on-Don, which has been a strategic command centre for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Wagner forces also appeared to have a presence in Voronezh located just 500km from Moscow, with a goal to head toward the capital city. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, condemned the actions as “treason” as it appeared that an internal conflict in Russia was about to take place between Wagner Group forces and the Russian military. As the events were unfolding on that day, it is worth looking into the initial reactions of relevant states during and immediately after the events of the rebellion unfolded.

United Kingdom, United States, EU, and NATO

While the British Ministry of Defence monitored the movement of Wagner forces, focusing on the group’s occupation of Rostov-on-Don and its objective to get to Moscow, it stated that the rebellion “represents the most significant challenge to the Russian state in recent times” expressing that the loyalty of the Russian military and National Guard would play a crucial role in how the events will play out. During the first hours of the rebellion, US President Biden and Vice President Harris were briefed about the situation while US officials monitored the situation and assessed the impact of a scenario where Wagner troops were to have made their way to Moscow. Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief, referenced Prigozhin as a monster of Putin’s own creation that sought to act “against his creator” and that the threat of rebellion revealed cracks and vulnerabilities within the Russian political system and its military power. Borell also took the time to express the need to continue supporting Ukraine in its counteroffensive efforts. NATO’s Jens Stoltenber said that the attempted rebellion reveals that Putin made a strategic “mistake” by launching the invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey, India, China, and Iran

Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, spoke to Putin as the events unfolded in Russia, advising him to act with common sense, and that Turkey would be there to help Russia with a solution to solve the situation. Erdogan expressed Turkey’s full support for the Russian leadership against the attempted rebellion by Wagner. In a telephone call with Putin, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, expressed India’s support for the Russian leadership and its response to the Wagner rebellion and upholding the rule of law in Russia, while also discussing the urge for diplomacy and dialogue over the conflict in Ukraine. Chinese officials supported Russian leadership in “maintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity” while also describing the rebellion as Russian “internal affairs”. China also accused the West of overblowing the situation, as the swift end of the attempted rebellion reassured Putin’s power remains strong in Russia. Iran reaffirmed its strong support for Vladimir Putin, with the Iranian Foreign Ministry stating that “Iran supports the rule of law in the Russian Federation” while also stating that the events were an internal matter for Russia. Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, spoke to his Russian counterpart and expressed Iran’s confidence in Russia in the face of the attempted rebellion.

Aftermath 

As the Wagner forces neared the Moscow oblast, just 2 hours away from the city, Prigozhin signalled that his forces would halt their efforts and turn around. In a voice recording posted on his Telegram Channel, Prigozhin said, “Understanding all responsibility for the fact that Russian blood will be shed on one side, we will turn our columns around and go in the opposite direction to our field camps, in accordance with our plan.” This came after Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, stated that he spoke with Prigozhin and Russian armed forces to negotiate a ceasefire and arranged for Prigozhin and Wagner Group forces to remain in Belarus.

After Prigozhin called off the rebellion, the reaction of Western allies was quite similar in that they continued to assess the events that unfolded, saying that the uprising revealed weaknesses within Russia’s leadership, and continued to express the importance of strengthening NATO and its support for Ukraine and its counteroffensive. UK Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, stated that the UK was ready for any scenario in Russia and that the rebellion revealed “real cracks” within the leadership of the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin’s regime. He also stated that it was too early to predict the outcome of the attempted rebellion. UK Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly, said that the actions by the Wagner Group “drove a coach and horses through President Putin’s case for war.” Biden reassured the public and international community that the US was “not involved” and had “nothing to do with” the rebellion, while declaring that the US would continue to assess the situation that unfolded as well as the implications that would result from it. Because of Wagner’s new presence in Belarus, Stoltenberg said that there would be an increase in military presence on NATO’s eastern flank to signal its commitment to protecting “every inch” of its member territories, in particular those that border Belarus. Polish and Lithuanian Presidents, Andrzej Duda and Gitana Nauseda both expressed their concerns and dangers over Wagner troops being based in Belarus. European Union leaders announced their continued commitment to strengthen the security of Ukraine. Josep Borrell stated that the EU should continue to increase training and army modernisation, as well as financial support for Ukraine.

Although Turkey, India, China, and Iran all reacted in the same way,  supporting Russia’s leadership against the rebellion, each of them took a different stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As a member of NATO, Turkey has played a unique role in the conflict by maintaining a relationship with both Kyiv and Moscow, by not imposing sanctions on Russia as all NATO members have, by providing Ukraine with drones, and by acting as a mediator in the conflict. This has allowed Turkey to continue its geopolitical and economic ambitions in the region. It must be noted however, that Erdogan’s quick decision to call Putin as the rebellion unfolded and show his support for Putin could have been a reciprocation to Putin’s support for the Turkish President during a coup attempt in 2016 that threatened to overthrow Erdogan. India has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, it has continuously expressed the importance of solving the conflict through diplomatic means and negotiations. While India has taken a neutral stance on the Ukrainian conflict, it continues to rely on Russia for defence needs and has taken advantage of sanctions imposed on Russian oil exports by continuing to purchase a large amount of oil from Russia at a lower price. China’s President, Xi Jinping, has often referred to his relationship with Putin as “dear friends”, and has not condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although China has often used similar talking points as Russia regarding the conflict, they continue to call for peace talks and have made efforts to become mediators as they have personally met with both Russian and Ukrainian leaders to discuss the need for peace. Iran and Russia rely heavily on each other to avoid sanctions imposed on them by the West, with trade worth around $4.9 billion in 2022. This includes trade in oil and weapons. Iran and Russia also share the same vision of a “multipolar world order”, with a reduced role for the US on the world stage. Therefore, any instability in Russia would not bode well for Iran’s economic, political, and foreign policy objectives.

Behind the Conflict: Support for Prigozhin and Public Reaction

A certain level of support from Prigozhin’s network, including various influential regional and federal actors, partly explains the rapid movement of Wagner’s troops towards Moscow on 24 June. Given the quality and quantity of weapons used in the “coup” attempt, it seems that Prigozhin had planned it in advance but was waiting for the right moment. In an interview Prigozhin did with Russian military correspondent Semyon Pegov in April 2023, the latter mentioned a perceived threat in Moscow to give Prigozhin more weapons due to Wagner’s autonomy and, indeed, “the possibility of attacking Moscow.” Therefore, if this warning was circulating in Moscow, no one in the Kremlin took it seriously, and Wagner’s capabilities were misjudged. 

The Russian Army’s Support for Prigozhin

Firstly, without assured backing, Prigozhin would have unlikely started his “March of Justice” due to the very high risk of Putin’s reprisal. It is likely that he received support from influential Russian oligarchs. However, it is hard to estimate who it could be. In the upcoming months, potential internal destabilisation in Russia could shed more light on the growing splits among the Russian elite.

Secondly, Prigozhin has privileged contacts with the military elite. One of them is General Surovikin, former commander of the Russian forces in the Russian-Ukrainian war until January 2023. According to Prigozhin, General Surovikin commanded Wagner’s operation in the Donetsk region after being replaced by Valery Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Troops of Russia. Meanwhile, General Mikhail Mizintsev, known for leading the siege of the city of Mariupol, became Wagner’s deputy commander in May 2023. Several media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, reported the detention of General Surovikin in the wake of the attempted coup. As stated, the general was aware of an upcoming uprising against Russia's military leadership but did not participate in it. 

Thirdly, both Surovikin and Mizintsev still enjoy great prestige among middle-ranking Russian officers. This could have positively influenced the perception of Wagner’s leader in the officers’ eyes, which was beneficial for Prigozhin. Months before the rebellion, Prigozhin changed his rhetoric into a more comprehensive critique of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s management of the war, shared by a growing number of low-ranking Russian soldiers. In sum, some soldiers' sympathy for Prigozhin and Wagner may have ensured a neutral stance towards Wagner's actions and the non-intervention of a large part of the regular Russian army and law enforcement agencies.

Prigozhin’s mercenaries did not face any resistance from the border officers at the entry points of Rostov-on-Don oblast or from the Russian army and police in Rostov and Voronezh. It indicates either the unpreparedness and inability to manage the crisis of  Russian security and law enforcement agencies or their support for Wagner’s actions. Indeed, both of these factors were instrumental in enabling the movement of Wagner’s troops within Russia. Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, mentioned that neither the Rosgvardia nor the Capital Police could match Wagner’s capabilities, equipment and arms. Moreover, the fact that senior and middle-ranking officers could stand aside and not react to direct military rebellion highlights the divisions within the Russian army and underlines the possible disloyalty of the military command to Putin. 

The Public’s Reaction to the Rebellion

The reaction of Russian society to the attempted “coup” remains uncertain. Unsurprisingly, people were disoriented when Wagner’s forces entered Rostov-on-Don, took over the administrative buildings and managed to move further on. Prigozhin insisted that Wagner had received strong support from citizens, who were allegedly disappointed when the “march” stopped, as they had hoped that the fight against bureaucracy and the resolution of other problems in the country would be pursued after the rebellion. Contrary to Prigozhin’s statements, Wagner mercenaries dispersed demonstrations against their “march” in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Therefore, on 24 June, the population of Rostov was divided with a big share of those ready to resist Wagner not to let them overthrow the legitimate government. 

Russian non-governmental research organisation Levada Analytical Center conducted a comprehensive social poll on the Russian public’s perception of the Wagner rebellion. Anxiety was the most common reaction on 24 June, but its level was not comparable to that of February and September 2022, when a partial mobilisation was announced. The report concluded that because it all happened so rapidly, people did not have time to be truly terrified. Moreover, most respondents (44%) followed the events on television, thus consuming the information as interpreted by the authorities.

As a result, the “coup” had relatively little effect on the Russian public’s perception of their government. Only the popularity rating of Sergei Shoigu, the main target of the rebellion, has been affected, while Putin’s indicators “as a whole” have remained the same as in the previous poll (no specific figure was mentioned; however, the last poll (22-28 June) concluded with a positive perception of 81%). The Levada Center has concluded that the failed rebellion has had no impact on the power of the Russian government. According to a third of respondents, society will continue to consolidate, and the state will become stronger. Conversely, the  Russian youth, traditionally more opposed to the government, is more inclined not to believe that the Kremlin's authority has not been affected.

Slightly different conclusions were presented by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, which is considered to be pro-government. Although sociologists claim that Putin is still trusted by 77.2% of Russian citizens, according to a poll published on 14 July, this is the lowest value since 27 February 2022. Notably, the indicators for trust decreased after Wagner’s rebellion (on 23 June, the indicator was 78,9%). 

The Russian government-backed media play a crucial role in keeping Putin's confidence indicators high, emphasising the Russian government’s success in preventing the Wagner troops from entering Moscow. They also downplayed Wagner's activities in Ukraine and tried to create an information vacuum about subsequent events concerning Wagner and the circumstances of 24 June in order to avoid raising the subject as a point of discussion among Russian citizens. Notably, Putin recently denied the very existence of Wagner, claiming that private military companies are forbidden in Russia and, therefore, cannot exist.

Conclusion

Prigozhin's rebellion ended the Russian government’s total control over critical viewpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian war and allowed these discussions to reach a larger section of the Russian public. The “March of Justice” has become a clear signal of Putin’s vulnerabilities and the uncertainties surrounding his inner circle and Russia’s senior military leadership. Moreover, the rebellion revealed the internal divisions between the Russian militaries and the growing discontent within the Russian army, specifically among senior and middle-ranking officers. However, now that Prigozhin has announced Wagner’s definite withdrawal from Ukraine, his instigations against the current Russian military leadership are likely to cease which will avoid fuelling conflicts within the Russian army and society. Moreover, it will be easier for the Russian Ministry of Defence to manage its war in Ukraine without an independent Wagner-style military force. At the same time, it would be wrong to believe that the rebellion has had a significant impact on Putin’s regime. Although the attempted “coup” has demonstrated the internal instability that Russia is currently experiencing, it had little impact on the way the Russian people perceive their government and the current course of domestic politics. Consequently, it is likely that Putin will retain public support even after the events of 24 June, reducing the possibility of a civil uprising.

Wagner News Update

By: Ridipt Singh

Summary 

After the mediation Belarusian President Lukashenko and Russian President Putin had over Yevgeny Prigozhin's situation and Wagner troops, Wagner troops entered Belarus and started training. Prigozhin, after entering Belarus, addressed his troops regarding the PMC's plans for Belarus and Africa. Wagner's presence has raised security concerns among NATO members due to Belarusian special forces undergoing training near the Polish border. Putin's comments on defending Belarus further amplify the concerns, hints at invading the Suwalki Corridor and President Lukashenko's most recent meeting with Putin on 23 July. Such comments also lead to further speculations regarding the use of Wagner troops to extend the Russian invasion further into Eastern Europe, a very unlikely scenario practically speaking. However, Putin's remarks may signal to the world that he still exercises influence over Wagner and that the so-called mutiny has not changed the political dynamics between Prigozhin and Putin.

Developments in Russia - Wagner - Belarus 

• The Belarusian government has stated that Wagner mercenaries are ‘sharing their combat experiences with its armed forces’. 

• Voen TV, the state-controlled media house has covered video footage of Belarusian conscripts undergoing tactical combat and equipment training in a training camp in Osipovichi (56 miles/90 km south of Minsk). The media video shows instructors in black masks (covering faces has been consistent with Wagner mercenaries), said to be Wagner mercenaries. 

• Unverified sources cited by Ukraine’s Center for National Resistance claimed 240 fighters with 40 trucks equipped with heavy amounts of weaponry were present in the region. In this regard, the Belarusian defense ministry mentioned a “road-map” to manage joint exercises between its forces and the Wagner Group.

• In a newly surfaced video, Prigozhin addresses Wagner fighters in a camp in Belarus. The video is said to be captured on 18 July and posted on 19 July. Prigozhin mentions that Wagner fighters will not be participating in Ukraine for the time being but may return when it is ensured that they will not be “forced to shame themselves ”. He further stated to remain in Belarus for now and start a new journey in Africa. 

• It is reported that Wagner fighter Sergey, callsign “Pioneer” will take over command of Wagner forces in Belarus. An unidentified man is reported to have thanked the forces for their work. It is speculated that this man could be Dmitry Utkin, callsign “Wagner” who, alongside Prigozhin, is the founder of Wagner Group

• Satellite images appear to show the location of the Wagner troop and the route they took to arrive at the Tsel military base, Osipovichy. Belarusian traffic police escorted the column of Wagner troops arriving. The government has also set up a camp with a holding capacity of 15,000 personnel.

• Further, the Belarusian defense ministry stated that its special forces are undergoing training with armored vehicles and drones, 3 miles/5 km east of the Polish border. Polish civilians living alongside the border stated guns firing and helicopters could be heard. Earlier in July, 500 police personnel were deployed to the border to ensure security.

• These special forces units are being trained at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus. The training includes tactical maneuvers, movement under fire, camouflage, and modern combined arms tactics like use of drones for reconnaissance.

• Earlier on 17 July, Russia had threatened to use Wagner troops stationed at Belarus to invade the Suwalki Corridor or Suwalki Gap, a 60 mile/96 km strip of land at the Polish-Lithuanian border. This corridor holds massive strategic significance for NATO, EU and Russia, often dubbed “NATO’s weakest link” or “the most dangerous place on Earth” that could trigger World War III. 

• Senior officials from the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Department of State clarified that it is highly unlikely that Russia will use any tactical nuclear weapons and therefore do not need to rethink its nuclear posture. This clarification was made in response to an earlier statement made by President Lukashenko on 27 June that Belarus had acquired an unspecified number of nuclear weapons from Russia.

• On 22 July Putin publicly stated that any form of aggression towards Belarus would be considered an aggression towards Russia claiming that Poland has territorial ambitions in Russia. Poland denied the claim of territorial ambitions. Russian politician Andrey Kartapolov had already speculated whether Putin’s actual intentions behind allowing Wagner to move to Belarus is to prepare for an attack on Poland or possibly the Suwalki Corridor.

• On 23 July, President Lukashenko, during a meeting with President Putin, mentioned that Wagner fighters are stressing on invading Poland, stating that they “want to go West” into Poland. 

International Reactions

• The Polish government responded by deploying 1000 strong troops and 200 equipment from its 12th and 17th Mechanized Brigades towards the east of the country. Their defense ministry stated that their borders remain secure.

• The British government announced it would freeze assets and issue a travel ban of individuals linked with Wagner activities in Africa, including sanctions on 13 individuals and businesses in the Central African Republic, Mali and Sudan. These sanctions also target the leaders of the Wagner Group. Among the sanctioned are Ivan Maslov, head of the Wagner Group in Mali, Alexander Maloletko (allegedly a close associate of Prigozhin) and Mikhail Potepkin (director of mining company Meroe Gold).

• Within NATO, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reassured allies reiterating that it is prepared to defend “every inch of NATO territory”. He stated that increased military presence in the Eastern part of the alliance was deployed. Despite reassurances, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda cautioned against Wagner’s presence in Belarus, stating it to be a “greater danger of instability”. In this regard, Germany stated to be prepared for a permanent deployment of 4000 troops in Lithuania.

• In the US, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan also remarked that Wagner mercenaries are not fighting in Ukraine. Furthermore, CIA Director William Burns at Aspen Security Forum, Colorado has stated that the Wagner ‘mutiny’ exposed the fault lines in the authoritarian regime. This has damaged Putin’s public persona and that he will likely seek revenge from Prigozhin. UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly had earlier made remarks similar to Director Burns that Prigozhin’s actions revealed “cracks” in Putin’s regime.

Scenarios/Lines of Analysis

• In this video published on Telegram, Evgeny Prigozhin welcomes the Wagner soldiers in Belarus and explains that they “will stay here in Belarus for some time. During this time, we will make them, and I am sure of it, the second army in the world” before announcing their next goal as raising their level and going to Africa.

• Wagner has far been effective in securing a Russian foothold in Africa amidst a regional strategic competition. In this regard, neither Putin nor Prigozhin would want to adopt a hostile attitude towards one another, given Wagner’s significance in Africa and Prigozhin’s need to secure funding for its fighters. It should also be noted that Wagner troops are returning to the Central African Republic (CAR) just before its referendum scheduled on July 30.

• Despite the display of overt dissent, Prigozhin has maintained that Wagner fighters might return to Ukraine under conditions that they find suitable. Furthermore, the mercenaries currently in Belarus are favorable to Putin. It has been constantly speculated that Putin might use Wagner's presence in Belarus to advance its motives further. In the previous year, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, upon the invasion of Ukraine, had stated that the invasion is likely to extend further into Eastern Europe.

• The sudden comments from Putin regarding Belarus suggest that through these remarks Putin is trying to signal that he still exerts control over the Wagner Group in an attempt to damage or control his reputation.

Wagner focusing on Africa

In his first appearance since the failed mutiny in Russia, Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on Telegram that Wagner will be pulling their troops out of Ukraine and redeploying to Africa. In a video filmed at dusk, Prigozhin speaks to troops gathered outside in Belarus stating, “What’s happening now at the front is a disgrace and there’s no need for us to join in. And [we’ll] wait for the moment when we can show full-on what we’re made of. [...] We’re preparing for the future. We’re levelling up and we’re on a new path to Africa.” Prigozhin did state that they could return to Ukraine at a later date when they would be confident that they would not “shame” themselves. Prigozhin then introduced Dmitry Utkin, founder of Wagner, who has rarely been seen publicly. Utkin stated, “This is not the end, it is just the beginning of the biggest job in the world, which will be carried out very soon. And, well, welcome to hell!” 

After the speeches, the video continues with Prigozhin saying “We’ll go and wipe out the faggots. We’ll wipe out the faggots worldwide! Better BDSM than LGBT!” It is questionable as to why this latter part was included in the video posted as it appears to be an offhand remark to a few troops gathered nearby. Regardless, it is a terrifying omen for the LGBTQ+ population in Africa which already faces widespread homophobia, extreme anti-LGBT laws, and frequent extrajudicial killings with impunity. While Wagner does not currently have a presence in Uganda, recent developments between Uganda and the US could open the door to Wagner involvement. US President Joseph Biden has warned Uganda that it could face sanctions due to their anti-LGBT laws and has imposed travel restrictions on Ugandan officials. Additionally, the US is evaluating “implications” of the laws "on all aspects of U.S. engagement with Uganda”, which could lead to the cessation of AIDS funding to the country and revoke Uganda’s eligibility for the African Growth and Opportunity Act. While the US is still planning to provide $20 million in security assistance this year to the country, it is possible that Uganda may begin to cut ties with the US.

In response to the US warning, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni stated that he will not be swayed and defended the law as it was backed by ‘experts’ who informed him that homosexuality is not genetic but is a “psychological disorientation”. With US-Uganda relations waning and an attitude of homophobia and death as a solution shared between Wagner and Museveni, it is possible that Museveni may establish a counter-terrorism partnership with Wagner instead of the US. While this would complicate regional relations between the US and East Africa, hiring an entity to provide security while disregarding LGBT human rights would be a win-win for Uganda and Wagner. Such a collaboration could possibly lead to the government invoking Wagner’s assistance in targeting LGBT people, ultimately leading to a genocide. While using such terminology may sound alarmist, the LGBT community in Uganda believes the path to genocide is already underway. Steven Kabuye, Co-Founder of Truth LGBTQ, recently discussed the danger that he and others face living in Uganda, stating that the international community must continue condemning the government in order to stop the “oncoming genocide on the LGBTQI community in Uganda.” Whether or not Wagner begins a presence in Uganda, what is certain is that Wagner troops anywhere in Africa pose a significant threat to the LGBT community.

The Wagner Group has been present in a number of African countries, including Libya, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic (CAR). With an already deplorable track record in Africa, Wagner activity in Sudan could surge in the coming months. Wagner had been supporting Hemedti’s RSF before the war in Sudan even began, sending arms through supply routes that run through Darfur. Controlling gold mines in the country has been a significant funding source to the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine in order to dodge sanctions imposed by the US. Because of this, it is likely that Wagner has continued to send support  to the RSF since the conflict began in April to protect their source of income. Further meddling in Sudan by Wagner would be incredibly detrimental, exacerbating a civil war that is already becoming convoluted with tribal factions, foreign government support, and possible threats of terrorism.  

While Prigozhin’s speech implies that the pull from Ukraine and redeployment to Africa is his or Utkin’s decision, citing Moscow’s actions as a disgrace, it is questionable if this is an act of autonomy or actually a decision made by the Kremlin. In ‘The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint’, a report produced by Foreign Policy Research Institute this April, the writers state, “if the Russian General Staff shuts Wagner Group out of the Ukraine conflict, it could return to a place of relative success when it resumes missions in Africa.” Perhaps the redirection of Wagner is motivated by its (and Putin’s) failures in Ukraine and Prigozhin’s embarrassing coup attempt. The decision to focus on Africa, whether directed by Putin or Prigozhin, could be a tactic to appease Wagner troops who have become discouraged by deplorable conditions, limited ammunition in Ukraine, and casualties of their prisoner recruits at 50%. Switching to a battleground where they are more likely to succeed, while also having more freedom to commit abuses where international media has less of a presence, could increase troop morale and limit chances of desertion. 

With Wagner’s footprint expanding across Africa, an increase of 50,000 troops in the continent will no doubt put Western nations on edge. As some African governments are cutting ties with the West, Russia has established its disinformation campaigns in at least two dozen African countries. At a time when over half of the continent is undergoing electoral campaigns this year and next, the state of African democracy is in incredible danger as Russia continues its aim to deteriorate democratic developments. An increased presence of Wagner throughout the continent during this fragile time will no doubt increase instability and further democratic backsliding. Regardless of who is behind the redeployment decision, the expansion of the Wagner footprint in Africa will benefit Putin’s international power and deepen contentions in the New Cold War. While Ukranians will rejoice Wagner's withdrawal, Prigozhin’s announcement is a catastrophe for Western nations, international organisations, and, most of all, Africans already living in dire circumstances. 

Behind the conflict : Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defence

The events on the 24th of June in Russia left many unanswered questions and signalled more to come. This article focuses on why the Chief of PWC Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, announced his “March for Justice” and discusses his relations with the main target of the rebellion - Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. While Prigozhin attempted to adjust his deteriorating position and gain more attention from the Russian military and political decision-makers, his failed "coup" greatly reduced its influence in Russia through the physical relocation of Prigozhin and most of the ‘Wagnerians’ to Belarus, consequently cutting off access to the Russian media field. Putin is currently seeking to preserve “Wagner” as a cohesive fighting force; however, he is striving to separate it from Prigozhin. Thus, aiming to prevent the destruction of Wagner, Prigozhin ultimately brought this process closer to reality.

What Is Special About Wagner in The Russian-Ukrainian War

PWC “Wagner” gradually gained its reputation in Russia amid the Russian-Ukrainian war in Eastern Ukraine (2014-2022), the war in Syria and the resultant presence in Africa. Their influence was augmented following the failure of the initial plans of the Russian leadership to defeat Ukraine in February 2022. During the summer of 2022, Wagner’s Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, launched a successful recruitment campaign, and the number of Wagner mercenaries on the Ukrainian battlefield increased to approximately 50,000.

Exploiting its unique position outside the Russian law and military hierarchy, with independent access to the Russian information space, Prigozhin established a military system parallel to the Russian Armed Forces, evading the usual levels of accountability expected from conventional military units. This indicates that Prigozhin was unrestricted when making military decisions and planning Wagner operations, as stated in a former London Politica article by Olivia Gibson. Such a lack of coordination between Wagner and the Russian MOD could explain inconsistencies and mistakes on the frontline, thus further deteriorating the Russian war effort against Ukraine. Demonstrating a major issue for the MOD, as they are principally accountable for Russian war developments.

Additionally, Prigozhin’s enhanced popularity on social media (with his Telegram channel “Prigozhin's hat” or other Wagner-related channels) and publications belonging to his Patriot media holding have allowed him to promote himself freely and Wagner, whilst publicly criticising Russian military officials and their decisions/failures on the frontline. Indeed, there were registered cases when Prigozhin’s public activity contradicted the Kremlin’s official narratives about the course of the war, such as the security of the Russian Belgorod Oblast. Which substantially undermined the domestic trust in Russian political and military officials, especially among the more patriotic citizens of the country.

At the same time, PMC “Wagner” was not a fully independent military actor on the Ukrainian battlefield nor in its operation in Africa or Syria. Prigozhin and Wagner’s commanders were largely accountable to Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, Wagner’s mercenaries had been receiving exclusive provisions from the MOD. But when the Ministry could not keep supplying Wagner with the previous volumes and quality of arms and ammunition, Prigozhin started to manipulate the narrative.

Consequently, Wagner turned out to be a double-edged sword for Putin. On the one hand, the Russian president heavily relied on Wagner’s mercenaries on the front line in Ukraine, specifically Bakhmyt. On the other hand, as the practice showed, Prigozhin harmed Putin’s regime in the midst of war intensification.

A Brief History of Prigozhin-MOD Tensions

The conflict between Yevgeniy Prigozhin and the Russian MOD, namely Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov,  resulted in Prigozhin’s “March of Justice”. Prigozhin's clash with the Defence Ministry escalated in January 2023, particularly because of the change of the commander of the joint grouping in Ukraine when Valery Gerasimov replaced Sergey Surovikin. In addition, Prigozhin has been accusing the MOD of downplaying Wagner's role in Russian military achievements in Donbas.

For a while, a central point of confrontation was a lack of arms supply for PMC “Wagner”. In February 2023, Wagner complained about a shortage of arms and ammunition at the front, causing "hundreds" of soldiers to die daily. In early May, Prigozhin resorted to a radical approach on this ground and announced Wagner’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. The Ukrainian city of Bakhmut has played a strategic and more symbolic role for Ukrainian and Russian armies, as fierce fights have continued since August 2022.

The split between Prigozhin and Shoigu became more evident when in early June 2023, the Defence Minister issued an order requiring all formations that carry out combat missions to conclude a contract with the military by 1 July. This would have meant the end of Wagner’s autonomy on the Ukrainian battlefield and its overall weakening. Prigozhin announced that none of his soldiers would sign the contract and that Wagner would keep fulfilling the tasks assigned by Army General Surovikin (Gerasimov’s predecessor). Later, Prigozhin reported the shelling of Wagner's positions from the rear, suggesting that the command of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff were behind or knew about these events.

23-24 June: Prigozhin Against Putin? Or Against Shoigu?

On the afternoon of 23 June, Prigozhin's press service published his half-hour speech in which he lashed out with personal criticism of Shoigu and dispelled the core narrative of Russian war propaganda towards Ukraine. Prigozhin’s rhetoric complied with his long-lasting tensions with the Russian MOD, particularly Sergei Shoigu. At the same time, Prigozhin tried to justify and indeed defend Putin, who, according to Wagner’s Chief, received reports that "did not correspond to reality in any way" because the MOD "thoroughly deceived him".

Later, Prigozhin revealed the purpose of the "march", which was to prevent the destruction of the PMC “Wagner” and to bring to justice those who "with their unprofessional actions committed a huge number of mistakes in the course of the SMO (ed. - special military operation)". Overall, Prigozhin claimed that the “march” aimed at demonstrating their protest, not to overthrow the country's government. Although the rebellion was not explicitly against Putin, the vast majority of foreign observers agree that Wagner’s “coup” publicly exposed the weakness of the Putin regime and even the start of its gradual ending.

Did Prigozhin achieve any of his goals?

Right after the termination of the rebellion, Russian President’s Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that any cadre reshuffles in the Russian Defence Ministry were not the subject of negotiations, and Sergei Shoigu remained in his position as of July 15. Considering the failure of the “coup”, it was doubtful Putin would agree to these changes. Moreover, after circulating gossip around Gerasimov’s resignation, he publicly appeared during one of the meetings, refuting those speculations. 

Days after the “coup”, Vladimir Putin confirmed that Wagner received RUB 86 billion (around USD 954 million) from May 2022 to May 2023. Now budget expenditures might be directed to the needs of MOD. Besides, over 2,000 pieces of Wagner’s equipment have already been passed to the Russian Armed Forces, including hundreds of tanks, Grad and Uragan MLRSs, Pantsir SAMs, self-propelled artillery systems, armoured personnel carriers and other items. Russian Army also received over two and a half thousand tonnes of ammunition and about 20 thousand small arms. All equipment and weapons are being delivered to the rear areas for repair and combat preparation.

While Prigozhin intended to correct his shaken position, the failed “coup” provided a suitable opportunity for Putin and MOD to undermine a main internal competitor, the PWC “Wagner” in the hands of Yevgeny Prigozhin. Earlier, Prigozhin had enough capabilities and possibilities to harm MOD plans on the battlefield in Ukraine and inside Russia. As a result of the June 23-24 events, Wagner lost its reputation and support from Putin, and now the country is directing its power to eliminate Wagner’s autonomy and include it in the Russian military structure as a typical military unit.

The Triangular Tightrope: Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko

The intricate power dynamics in authoritarian regimes demand a nuanced comprehension of the multifarious relationships and political manoeuvres defining their leadership. A detailed analysis of Russia's recent political scene perfectly illustrates these complexities. It particularly highlights potential shifts threatening President Vladimir Putin's well-established power base, a structure built on loyalty, fear, and fiscal incentives. 

This article in particular hinges on the events of June 24, 2023, when a deliberate move by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a significant figure in Russia's military-industrial complex, revealed a potential rift in the Russian command. Prigozhin's audacious manoeuvres seemed to question Putin's supremacy, sparking queries about his ability to maintain control amid rising disputes within his administration. 

Putin's Russia is well known for its staunch tactics and dissent suppression. Opponents and potential threats are neutralised by legal or other means, with a clear message: loyalty yields rewards, while treachery attracts severe punishment. His inner circle, military, security forces, and wider bureaucracy are driven by prospects of wealth and influence, fostering a kleptocratic system where corruption and favouritism thrive. Public wealth is redirected to those in power, biassing the economy towards the elites, while a large segment of the population remains impoverished. Despite the stark socio-economic disparities this generates, Putin secures the loyalty of his subordinates by ensuring their stake in his regime's survival. 

The anatomy of a power structure

The interplay between Putin's strategies, Prigozhin's ambitions, and Lukashenko's actions paints a complex picture of power dynamics in authoritarian regimes. Claims that Putin's iron grip on power weakened due to the short-lived revolt of the Wagner mercenaries under Prigozhin merit a closer examination of how Putin’s power and relationships are truly calibrated. 

The unfolding chaos was initiated with an alleged assault on a Wagner camp by Russian regular forces. This surprise attack prompted Prigozhin to take control of the Russian armed forces' headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, and set into motion a troop mobilisation towards Moscow. However, these hostile activities were brought to a standstill through subsequent negotiations, which halted the advancement of the Wagner group. 

But the group was neither dissolved nor effectively exiled to Belarus. In reaction to this Wagner incident, Putin employed a strategic purge, disciplining those who either backed Prigozhin or facilitated his actions. Moreover, Russian media initiated a rigorous campaign against Prigozhin. This consisted of broadcasting footage from an FSB raid on his residences, and the portrayal of his business empire's downfall.

Rather impactful factors in this peculiar sequence of events: 

Power Dynamics: Putin and Prigozhin share a complex relationship and a long-time friendship. Prigozhin's capacity to leverage state resources for personal gain mirrors Putin's tactics. However, a pressing challenge for Prigozhin lies in securing sufficient financial backing to sustain the operations of the Wagner group.

Wagner's Role: The Wagner Group, a Private Military Company (PMC) led by Prigozhin, serves as an extension of the Russian state. Despite being heavily state-subsidised, the group has managed to extract mineral resources for its own benefit, hinting at a drive for autonomy.

Information Warfare: After Russia's strategic loss in Ukraine in 2023, Prigozhin capitalised on the nation's propaganda machine and claimed a victory for Wagner in Bakhmut, arguably attempting to take sole ownership in the media limelight. In response, Putin lauded Prigozhin--a tactic that is perceived as a public relations manoeuvre designed to keep Prigozhin within his limits.

Prigozhin's Accusations: Prigozhin's narrative about Putin's war motivations—purportedly resource-driven rather than a response to NATO enlargement or Ukrainian aggression—undermines Putin's credibility. At first glance, Prigozhin's actions and narratives certainly appear as a tangible threat to Putin's regime, underscoring a power struggle and the vulnerability of the Russian state.

Lukashenko-Prigozhin-Putin: The Lukashenko-Prigozhin-Putin triangle forms a complex nexus of power that influences the stability of the region. While certain aspects of their relationship are established, their future dynamics remain uncertain and subject to a multitude of internal and external factors. How each player responds to these pressures could significantly influence their alliances and power dynamics and the uniqueness of each context makes accurate forecasts immensely very difficult.

Yevgeny Prigozhin and Vladimir Putin

From a restaurateur in St. Petersburg to a pivotal figure in Russia's foreign policy, Yevgeny Prigozhin's ascent exemplifies the nuanced power dynamics within Russia, largely facilitated by his intricate association with President Putin. Despite lacking a formal role in Putin's administration, Prigozhin participated in high-stakes defence contract negotiations. His discreet involvement in a 2018 Kremlin meeting between Putin and Madagascar's then President, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, hinted at his growing influence. 

Prigozhin, through his association with the Wagner Group, has emerged as an effective tool for Russia's overseas interference and also places him as a cog in Russia's Ukraine strategy. Prigozhin's influence and control over a formidable military faction, coupled with his populist anti-elite rhetoric echoing that of Alexei Navalny, is met with–at least–scepticism within Russia’s political and military elite. His ascent presents an intriguing examination of the intricate and opportunistic power dynamics within Putin's Russia.

Essentially: Yevgeny Prigozhin, through his control over the Wagner Group, has become an influential figure in Russian foreign policy. His hatred for the elites combined with the ability to leverage state resources and command a formidable military faction positions him as a potential adversary within Putin's power structure.

Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin

The political bond between Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin is a blend of political necessity and mutual advantage. Lukashenko, ruling Belarus for nearly three decades, has relinquished significant autonomy to Russia. Despite this, he managed to preserve enough sovereignty to ensure his rule. Putin's instrumental support for Lukashenko during the 2020 pro-democracy protests in Belarus illustrates the alliance's reciprocal benefits. Belarus's strategic location allowed Russia to stage its invasion of Ukraine in 2021. Lukashenko's unwavering loyalty effectively transformed Belarus into a Russian vassal state, securing political stability and economic aid. 

The crisis involving Prigozhin further elucidates the Lukashenko-Putin alliance. Lukashenko's intervention to broker a deal with Prigozhin highlights his political relevance and utility to both domestic and international players. Belarus's future, under Lukashenko, is inherently linked to Russia and the evolution of the Lukashenko-Putin relationship. 

Essentially: Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin share a political bond that blends political necessity and mutual advantage. Their alliance has weathered various international and domestic challenges. Lukashenko's loyalty to Putin has transformed Belarus into a de facto vassal state of Russia, which has secured political stability and economic aid for Belarus.

Yevgeny Prigozhin and Alexander Lukashenko

Yevgeny Prigozhin has been noticeably absent from public sight since 24 June and Lukashenko decidedly distanced himself from Prigozhin, asserting that neither the Wagner CEO nor his forces are stationed in Belarus, with their future presence in the country remaining uncertain. 

Lukashenko is said to have intervened to resolve Prigozhin’s potential insurrection in Russia last month, a mediation allegedly made possible due to their personal acquaintance and friendship of close to two decades. For context, Prigozhin's persistent clashes with the Russian Defence Ministry culminated when he resisted their insistence that Wagner mercenaries enter contracts with the Russian government; Lukashenko made clear that if Wagner were to operate in Belarus as a consequence of the Putin-Prigozhin fall-out, its mercenaries would need to formalise their presence with the Belarusian government.

A critical concern shaping the relationships between Prigozhin and Lukashenko, as well as between Prigozhin and Putin, is the continued funding of the Wagner Group. That begs the question of whether Lukashenko would actually be willing and capable of picking up the tab for the Wagner troops.

Essentially: The viability of the Wagner Group hangs in the balance. Unless funding from Russia continues or another financier – like Lukashenko – steps in, the survival of Prigozhin's Wagner Group remains unclear. Ultimately, without financial support, their operations are unlikely to advance.

And its fault lines

The crux of this triangular stakeholder map lies in interpreting Putin's response to the Wagner incident, specifically the resulting purge. Does it reveal control at last or indicate serious cracks within his power structure?

Autocratic leaders often resort to purges to sustain their hold on power. However, the necessity for an extensive purge might point to substantial internal dissension. Putin's power structure, encompassing a complex network of security organisations, forms a crucial pillar of his regime. Yet, Prigozhin's brief insubordination suggests that Putin's control may not be absolute.

Further, Putin's broader power structure includes control over the state apparatus, media, economy, and the narrative of Russian imperialism. This comprehensive system, with Putin at its centre, has demonstrated resilience in the face of multiple pressures. However, its reliance on a singular figure may induce potential instability.

The Wagner incident, triggered by Prigozhin, exposed possible fractures in Putin's power structure. Nonetheless, Putin's rapid response to contain the threat also bears witness to adept leadership. The intricate network of control and loyalty forms the backbone of Putin's system, but whether it can withstand future internal or external pressures remains to be seen. This underscores the complexity of autocratic systems and the factors contributing to their longevity or rapid downfall.

One especially volatile stimulus is Putin's self-destructive quest for victory. His determination to reassert Russia's place in the world, notably through the annexation of Crimea and ongoing involvement in Ukraine, has resulted in international sanctions and a shaky economy. These actions, though initially boosting his popularity at home, are beginning to yield diminishing returns as the economic realities bite and the true pillars of his power structure, the self-interest of those involved, and their fealty towards him are increasingly strained. 

External pressures, such as the war in Ukraine, combined with internal dissent from figures like Prigozhin, could precipitate significant shifts in Russia's political landscape. Furthermore, Russia's internal power struggles have often spilt over its borders, impacting neighbouring states and international relations. The Ukraine crisis and Belarus's strategic predicaments are only recent examples. 

Putin's power matrix is thus a complex interplay of aspiration, fear, nationalism, and aggression. Each of these components serves a particular function in maintaining his control. However, this carefully constructed structure is far from invulnerable. The real test of its resilience lies in its ability to adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining its core power structure. Until now, it has withstood the pressures. However, fatigue infiltrates subtly, until collapse is imminent. 

The Wagner Rebellion: Implications for the War in Ukraine

Recap 

​​The Wagner Group, under the command of Yevgeny Prigozhin, made headlines when they marched on Moscow in response to allegations that top Russian defence officials, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov had authorised the bombing of Wagner troops in Ukraine. Seizing control of parts of Rostov-on-Don, including the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) headquarters of the Southern Military District, the Wagner Group initiated its march towards Moscow. Prigozhin’s reported objective was to remove senior military leadership, but the Wagner troops’ advance halted 200 kilometres short of the capital. Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, intervened and mediated between Putin, Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. As a result, Prigozhin agreed to go into exile in Belarus, accompanied by any remaining loyal Wagner troops, and criminal charges against all involved were eventually dropped. Currently, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unclear.

Short-term

The 24-hour rebellion seems to have left minimal vulnerabilities for Ukrainian troops to exploit. Ukraine's troops could have been expected to look for weaknesses along the line of contact and possibly target sites in Russia to create a heightened sense of danger for the Kremlin. This could have forced Russia to divert troops and military assets from Ukraine to internal security. However, these actions have not materialised, indicating that Ukrainian forces remain focused on executing their counter-offensive plans.

Similarly, the Wagner forces had no major role to play in Russia's line of defence and instead played a central role in the Bakhmut conflict. However, as tensions arose between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defence, the troops had already withdrawn from the region. One further factor explaining why the rebellion had little effect on the war in Ukraine in the short term is that the mutiny ended without the need to withdraw Russian units from Ukraine to counter it.

Wagner troops in Belarus

On 11 July, the Belarusian Defence Ministry announced on Telegram that the Wagner mercenaries will train the Belarussian and Russian troops. Joint training would allow the Belarussian army to “benefit from the combat experience of Wagner commanders” according to Lukashenko.

Movement around the Russian training facilities in Belarus had added to speculation as to the future of what the partnership between the military structures of Belarus, Russia and the private structures would look like. On 27 June, satellite images showed activity at a disused military base near Asipovichy. The military dismantled training grounds in 3 locations: Abuz-Lyasnouski, Lepel and Repishch, and instead a larger camp with a capacity to host 15,000 soldiers was built in Tsel located 80 kilometres southeast of Minsk. 

By sending more Wagner and Russian troops to Belarus, the Kremlin could be seeking to distract Ukrainian intelligence services and sow doubt as to Russia's next steps. Indeed, Ukrainian President Zelenskiy convened a meeting to discuss bolstering the nation's defence along the border with Belarus on 5 July, reflecting growing concern about the increased presence of Russian troops in Belarus.

Wagner troops in Russia

Russia's Defence Ministry announced that the Wagner Group should surrender its supply of weapons, while Putin invited its fighters to join the Russian Army instead of leaving for Belarus. This follows an original plan announced mid-June which was to have all Wagner troops (dubbed "volunteer detachments") sign contracts with the Defence Ministry by 1 July to increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the Russian Army. This would have given the mercenaries legal status and effectively unified the military approaches. However, Prigozhin rejected signing such contracts, which further escalated tensions between him and the top military chiefs – particularly defence minister Sergei Shoigu –, ultimately contributing to the outbreak of the rebellion. As of 3 July though, Wagner Group was still officially recruiting to train in Russia’s Krasnodar region, thereby defying the truce brokered by Lukashenko.

Integrating Wagner fighters into the Russian army would be challenging, as Russian soldiers appear to be poorly or irregularly paid, undertrained, and suffer from low morale. In addition, mercenaries are relatively well paid and would struggle in respecting the chain of command. The nature of mercenaries remains self-serving, as highlighted in Olivia Gibson’s article. They are used to working independently from the Russian state and its chain of command, so collaboration could undermine rather than strengthen the Defence Ministry’s military goals. Because of these difficulties, it is more likely that the Wagner troops will continue to fight as mercenaries, possibly under a different name and with a new command, one far more subordinate to the Kremlin. 

A profound mistrust exists between the public and private entities. Still, the prospect of another mutiny attempt is highly unlikely. This implies that a majority of Wagner's soldiers will be prepared to accept an alternative leadership closer to, or even part of, the Russian Defence Ministry. On the day of the rebellion, Chechen leader Kadyrov expressed his support for Putin, and reportedly sent troops to counter Wagner’s march. Therefore, we can also expect Putin to replace some Wagner forces with Chechen soldiers.

Conclusion

Although no tangible military effects have been observed, Russian forces risk suffering a setback in Ukraine if Russia loses a large number of Wagner fighters in the long term. It is also likely that Wagner's rebellion will have a long-term negative impact on the already low morale of Russian front-line soldiers and on the cohesion of the command structure of the military operation. The repercussions, therefore, go beyond the immediate, as senior Russian officials could be diverted from the ongoing war effort should a government reshuffle occur at senior military levels. One might have expected Putin to assign responsibility for the failure to suppress the uprising at its outset and to imprison Prigozhin. However, he did not do so and met Prigozhin five days after the failed mutiny. Nevertheless, internal conflicts are likely to emerge, as the Wagner troops require tighter supervision, something that could weaken the management of the Russian army in Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian attack forces to exploit certain vulnerabilities.

The Kremlin's ability to effectively operate the Wagner troops in Prigozhin's absence will be crucial in ensuring that the rebellion does not have a long-term impact on the invasion of Ukraine. However, if the Kremlin concentrates on dismantling the Wagner group and assigning blame to its senior officials, Ukraine could benefit from Priogozhin's failed march.

Unleashing the Semistate: Russia’s dance with PMCs and the Geopolitical Game

 Russia’s increased employment of semistate forces raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic concerns, particularly regarding the state’s deliberate lack of accountability, transparency, and regard for international and humanitarian law. Given the successful operations of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria as well as their perceived effectiveness in achieving geopolitical objectives, it is highly probable that Putin's regime will continue to rely on Private Military Companies (PMCs) as a means to further its interests. Thus it is imperative to gain a more nuanced understanding of the risks and weaknesses associated with the dynamic relationship between Russia and PMCs.

Although Russian PMCs are officially designated as private entities, they are often owned by the Russian oligarchy and operated by former members of the Russian military or intelligence services who maintain close working relationships with the Kremlin. Consequently, a growing number of scholars and practitioners have adopted the phrase “semistate” to more accurately describe Russia’s PMCs. These semistate forces work outside of the conventional military and legal structures and can be employed to further state interests through kinetic and non-kinetic means. Russia's synergistic relationship with these semistate forces is marked by a complex interplay of power dynamics; an intricate web of connections upheld by the country's inherently vague legal structure.

Russia’s ambiguous legal framework is a key component for the facilitation of the state’s interconnected relationship with semistate forces. While PMCs remain illegal, Private Security Companies on the other hand are officially registered entities that have been legally operating since 1992. In essence, this provides a legal loophole for Russia’s private commodity powerhouses, such as Gazprom and Transneft, to employ security units authorized to engage in predominately law enforcement-like activities at the facilities and, increasingly, engage in war activities. Although PMCs remain illegal under Article 13.5 of the Russian Constitution, perversely it is the illegal status that has facilitated the growth of the PMC industry, as the vague legal framework is used as a leveraging tool to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin. Given that Russia operates under a patronage system, the ambiguous laws ensure Putin’s cronies, like Prighozin, remain loyal to the Kremlin’s power vertical while also guaranteeing a portion of the PMC’s accumulated wealth will be shared with the state, or more specifically its officials. 

 Under this ambiguous legal system, state power and influence are undoubtedly augmented, as the capricious application of law generates an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within the industry. Not to mention, evidence has revealed the oligarchy’s personal involvement in the funding and leadership of PMCs, with the most prominent example being the infamous Wagner Group reportedly funded by close Putin ally Yevgeny Prighozin. 

The Wagner Group is believed to have been established in 2014 to provide offensive capabilities during the annexation of Crimea, and subsequent combat support to separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner would then go on to continue cutting its teeth by gaining notoriety for their involvement in Syria, where it acted as a force multiplier for President Bashar al-Assad’s army and safeguarded valuable infrastructure such as oil and gas plants. By fighting alongside Syrian forces and propping up Assad’s regime, Wagner enabled Russia to extend its influence in the region and project power beyond its traditional sphere of influence while remaining below the threshold of direct military involvement. Moreover, the Wagner Group’s relative success in Syria empowered the Kremlin to further cultivate lucrative relationships with client states, particularly in Africa, as Russia’s semistate forces had presented themselves to be reliable partners in the sectors of counterterrorism, regime control, and either a formidable source of stability or instability depending on the client’s specific needs. 

Indeed Wagner’s status as a PMC has sanctioned operations that would be difficult for official actors to undertake, as the organization can deploy of militarily trained fighters to do the bidding of the Kremlin under the guise of ostensibly commercial PMCs to conflict zones that would normally require the approval of the Russian parliament. The group’s participation in conflicts also provides the Russian military with an invaluable testing ground for new weapon systems and tactics, which has serious implications for future disputes. The relationship between the state and its semistate forces is further complicated by the presence of a symbiotic relationship with military special forces operators. For instance, Dmitry Utkin, the former commander of Russia’s special forces foreign military intelligence agency, the GRU’s Spetsnaz, was found to be the true operator of the Wagner Group in 2014. Consequently, PMCs are an appealing marketplace for former military and intelligence professionals seeking to leverage their expertise for financial revenue. In this way, Russian military and intelligence agencies can amplify the state’s exertion of influence and control. Showcasing this dynamic relationship, reports have revealed the subordination of the Wagner Group, as it shares a military base with the GRU’s Spetsnaz near Mol’kino and has conducted training exercises in at least two camps affiliated with the elite unit. Overall, an ambiguous legal system and multifaceted relationship between state apparatuses, the oligarchy, and PMCs enable the Kremlin to employ expeditionary semistate forces with relative ease. This arrangement allows the state to operate outside the bounds of conventional legal frameworks and enjoy multiple benefits.

The employment of semistate forces offers Russia such benefits as plausible deniability; casualty avoidance, (as PMC losses are not subject to the same scrutiny as military losses); increased manoeuvrability associated with rapid deployment and withdrawal capacities; and cost efficiency, as PMCs often receive substantive funding through private channels. Moreover, the relatively inconspicuous, deniable operations undertaken by these security companies allow the state to conduct low-risk foreign policy experiments where new modes of international influence can be tried without much cost to the Russian state if they go wrong. For instance, the Wagner Group's unsuccessful attempt in 2018 to seize the Conoco gas plant in Deir al-Zhour was an effort to gain control of a valuable economic asset while gauging the United States' determination. Although the Wagner Group suffered substantial casualties, the Kremlin maintained political distance while gaining a better understanding of the political and military environment. Considering this litany of advantages, it comes as no surprise that a seven-fold increase from 2015- 2021 was found in the number of countries where Russian PMCs are conducting operations, most notably within Africa and the Middle East.

After the recent attempted Wagner military coup, which was supposedly led by Prighozin, Putin made a surprising announcement. He openly admitted that the Kremlin fully finances Wagner and has provided the PMC with nearly $1 billion in the past year. This marks a significant departure from the previous stance of the state, which always maintained that PMCs and the government were separate entities. This change in narrative seems to be a strategic move by Moscow to bolster Putin's authority while discrediting Prighozin. The Kremlin now claims that Wagner's leader has been lying about the company's independence from the state, launching an information campaign to that effect. The question arises whether the Wagner Group will be considered a state organ. Despite Putin's assertion that the group is "fully" funded by the state, Wagner also receives funds from various sources, including other states. As for the command relationship between the PMC and the state, it remains unclear and varies from operation to operation, even when the state appears to exert control. The recent rebellion further underscores Wagner's distinct identity and ability to act in its own interests, exemplifying the unreliability of PMCs self-serving opportunist nature. Moreover, the recent attempted Wagner coup serves as a poignant reminder that PMCs consistently retain the capability to act as regime usurpers, underscoring their potential to challenge and undermine the authority of established governments.

Wagner Intel Brief - 30/06 at 4:15 BST

Author: Marina Tovar

Source: Reuters. Satellite image of new facilities recently set up, at a military base southeast of Minsk, Belarus on June 27, 2023.

Current developments:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has “no doubts” that Russian citizens support the “decisions of the leadership of the Russian Federation”.

• The Kremlin has denied all claims involving a New York Times report stating US officials saying that Russian General Sergey Surovikin knew about Prigozhin’s rebellion plans. However, several sources, including Reuters, report that Russian senior military leadership, including Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top general, have dropped out of public view since the attempted rebellion. In this line, the Moscow Times and bloggers, as well as Twitter accounts, report that Surovinik was allegedly arrested by the FSB on June 25 under the suspicion of helping Prigozhin with the attempted rebellion. There is no evidence for these claims, and the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin have denied these allegations. The Kremlin has declined to answer questions about General Surovikin, whose location and status remain unknown.

• Wagner troops will no longer fight in Ukraine after Wagner forces will not sign contracts to bring them under the Russian defense ministry.

Wagner and Prigozhin in Belarus:

• Two planes (serial numbers RA-20795 and RA-02878) linked to Prigozhin are seen at the Belarus air base in the satellite image. These planes have been seen leaving Belarus and traveling around Russia and the former country between Tuesday and Thursday. US and European intelligence officials report Prigozhin is using a “deception tactic” as his whereabouts are difficult to track by plane. 

• Wagner Group’s chief whereabouts remain unknown since his last photos and videos were taken when he was leaving Rostov-on-Don, on Monday 24, June, and with his last appearance on Monday, 26 June television. However, Belarusian President Lukashenko in Belarusian state TV on Tuesday, 25 June, stated that “I see that Prigozhin is already flying on this plane (...), yes, indeed, he is in Belarus today”.

• Lukashenko highlighted that “Wagner had been offered some abandoned land inside Belarus”, but refused to build camps inside Belarusian territory for training and other purposes. Satellite imagery contradicts Lukashenko’s claims as a military base southeast of Minsk has new facilities, suggesting a new construction of a base for Wagner. 

International Response: Updates

• The United States announces new sanctions imposed related to gold dealing with funding the Wagner Group

• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “NATO is there to protect every ally, every inch of NATO territory”. In response, NATO has increased its preparedness and military presence in the Eastern Flank. 

• Switzerland expands sanctions on Russia in line with the European Union targeting individuals and organizations supporting the alleged illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. This follows the EU's last financial and travel sanctions on 71 Russians and 33 entities. 

• EU High Representative Josep Borrell says Putin has lost the “monopoly of force” and has been weakened. Borrell highlights that Russia is at risk of internal instability. 

Analysis:

Putin’s proposal to Wagner mercenaries to withdraw charges and integrate them into the Russian forces is very likely a way for Putin to take control over Wagner and reduce incentives to Wagner senior officials to make another rebellion attempt. Prigozhin’s statement of the non-signature of Wagner mercenaries into Russian forces almost certainly thwarts Putin’s stabilization attempts. As Prigozhin has refused to comply with the agreement made with Putin, the Russian President will likely reopen the criminal case against Prigozhin, pursuing a serious criminal investigation that could result in Wagner’s chief with criminal charges and a trial. If Putin were to act in this pathway, relations with Wagner and attempts to stabilize the internal situation would almost certainly lower due to increased mistrust. 

Putin’s recent appearances in public resulted in a change of tendency compared to previous years, as the Russian President avoided public meetings and gathering with large crowds. Putin’s public appearances are likely to reduce the apparent tensions in Russian society and display imagery of Putin’s support to reduce speculations about a divided Russia. Putin almost certainly is seen in public restating his authority, showing unity and solidarity under his leadership. As the media continues to comment on the divisions in Russian society, it is more likely that Putin will make more public appearances and public speeches through the media to address the false nature of those claims. 

Wagner Intel Brief - 26/06 at 23:30 BST

Authors: Matheus Mora Machado

Source: BBC. Yevgeny Prigozhin is pictured shaking hands with a resident of Rostov-on-Don, then occupied by Wagner PMC, as he leaves the city.

Putin’s First Words Since the Mutiny:

• In a short speech broadcast on state-owned television channel Russia-24, Putin remarked publicly about the armed rebellion for the first time since its conclusion on Saturday. Putin re-affirmed his statement during the rebellion that those who attempted to march on Moscow are ‘traitors’ that will be ‘brought to justice’. Contrary to Prigozhin’s message, Putin claimed that the organisers of the mutiny ‘wanted [Russian] society to be fragmented.’

• Further, Putin stated that ‘most’ Wagner mercenaries are ‘patriots’ who were ‘used’ by the ‘organisers’ of the rebellion. Putin assured Wagner mercenaries of three choices: to work for the Russian army, ‘go home’, or flee to Belarus. Putin thanked the ‘commanders of the Wagner company’ who made the decision to halt the march to Moscow. 

Prigozhin’s First Words Since the Mutiny:

• Prigozhin spoke publicly on Monday evening, via an eleven-minute audio-only message on Telegram, for the first time since the mutiny, stating that the ‘purpose of the campaign was to prevent the destruction of Wagner PMC and to bring to justice those who, through their unprofessional actions, made a huge number of mistakes during the special military operation’. It was ‘never our goal’, said Prigozhin, ‘to overthrow the current regime and legally-elected government.’

• Prigozhin pointed to Sergei Shoigu and the Ministry of Defence’s decision, on June 11th, to compel PMC soldiers to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defence as an existential threat to Wagner and the founding reason for the mutiny. Prigozhin stated: ‘[Wagner] was meant to stop existing on 1 July, 2023. “Employees all refused to sign the contract with the Ministry of Defense, only 1-2 per cent decided to join the Russian army.’

• Prigozhin clarified that the ‘original plan’ to transfer all of Wagner’s vehicles to the Ministry of Defense on the 30th of June at Rostov-on-Don. However, Prigozhin claimed that ‘[d]espite any aggression, Wagner suffered a missile attack, followed by a helicopter attack’, at the hands of the Ministry of Defense on the afternoon of the 23rd of June. These attacks ‘triggered an immediate decision to move out early and respond militarily’ to the Ministry of Defence’s aggression, in order to ensure the survival of Wagner. 

• The decision of Wagner forces to turn around and end the mutiny was driven by two factors, according to Prigozhin: ‘first, [Wagner] didn’t want to shed Russian blood. Secondly, they wanted to demonstrate their protest, not overtake authority in Russia.’ 

• Although the purpose of the mutiny was not to overthrow Putin’s government, the mutiny did reveal ‘serious security flaws across the country.’ Prigozhin also stated that Wagner ‘blocked all military units and airfields. In twenty-four hours, we covered the distance that corresponds to the distance from where Russian troops started on February 24th, 2022 to Kyiv and from the same point to Uzhgorod.’

• True to his rhetoric, Prigozhin’s audio message continued to call into question the competency of the Ministry of Defence and the Russian armed forces in general: ‘if the operation of February 24, 2022 was carried out by a unit of a similar level of training and moral composure such as Wagner then perhaps the “special operation” would have lasted one day.’

Developments on the Prigozhin-Putin Deal: Legal Charges and Investigations

• Russian State media outlet Ria Novosti, quoting a source in the Prosecutor General’s office, has reported that Prigozhin still faces charges related to his armed rebellion, in contradiction of the deal struck between Prigozhin and Putin, which had assured that all criminal charges against Prigozhin would be dropped, as claimed by Dmitry Peskov. 

• Prigozhin continues to face a separate investigation, launched on the 23rd of June, by the FSB on the pretext of instigating and launching an ‘organized armed rebellion’ under Article 279 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Although the FSB reported via Telegram it was opening the investigation on Friday evening, no official sources have affirmed the investigation since. Instead, reports of the investigation’s continuity have stemmed from Kommersant, a Russian business news outlet. 

The Status of Wagner and its Presence in Africa:

• Russian lawmaker Pavel Krasheninnikov has been cited by Interfax, a Russian State news agency, declaring that Russian PMCs will no longer be allowed to recruit criminals; criminals will be allowed to sign contracts exclusively with the Ministry of Defense. Krasheninnikov’s statement followed Dmitry Peskov’s assurance that ‘some’ Wagner troops may be able to ‘ink contracts with the Ministry of Defence’, as reported by Russian state-owned agency TASS. Despite the mutiny, Wagner headquarters appear to be operating normally: amongst regular day-to-day operations, the PMC is said to continue recruiting soldiers.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated Russia’s commitment to provide military support for African states, including Mali and the Central African Republic. The work of Russian instructors in the Central African Republic will continue, Lavrov said, but it is unclear whether such instructors will be from the Russian military or Wagner, leaving open the possibility that Wagner may continue to operate in Africa. 

Wagner and Prigozhin in Belarus:

• Following his exit from Rostov-on-Don on Saturday evening after the conclusion of his deal with Lukashenko and Putin, Prigozhin’s whereabouts remain unknown. It was reported that Prigozhin was leaving Rostov to head for Belarus, though Prigozhin’s arrival, nor his destination, has been confirmed. The audio message Prigozhin posted on Telegram on Monday afternoon gave no clues as to his location. 

• Highly speculative reports have surfaced on Telegram claiming that preparations are underway for the accommodation of Wagner troops in the Osipovichi region of Belarus, where a major operations base will allegedly be established to house Wagner mercenaries. 

Shoigu Makes First Appearance Since Mutiny:

• Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu made his first public appearance on Monday morning following the attempted mutiny. Shoigu was seen on a trip to Ukraine to inspect Russian troops. The video, which was broadcast on Russian state television, was undated, and the specific location of its recording is unknown. 

• Al Jazeera journalist Yulia Shapolova speculated that Shoigu’s public appearance may quell ‘theories of his possible resignation’. At most, the video suggests that the Prigozhin-Putin deal did not stipulate the resignation of Shoigu, as had been reported by some sources. 

International Response to the Mutiny: Updates

UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly’s Comments on the Mutiny:

• Foreign Secretary James Cleverly delivered on Monday afternoon a statement to the House of Commons concerning the events in Russia over the weekend. 

• Cleverly noted that ‘one of Putin’s protegés had publicly destroyed his case for the war in Ukraine’, stressing that the ‘rebellion is an unprecedented challenge to President Putin’s authority and it is clear that cracks are emerging in the Russian support for the war.’ 

• Cleverly also made clear that the UK has been in ‘close touch’ with its allies concerning the events in Russia. Cleverly spoke to his American counterpart, Antony Blinken, and other G7 colleagues, whilst British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak discussed the rebellion with President Biden, President Macron, and Chancellor Schulz.

• In response to a question concerning what preparations the UK and NATO have made to deter and respond to an attack on Kyiv via Belarus, Cleverly reiterated the UK’s position that ‘severe repercussions’ will follow for Belarus if it becomes directly involved in the Ukraine conflict. Notably, Cleverly highlighted that the sanctions package levelled on Russia is transposable to Belarus. 

European Union Raises Financing Ceiling for Aid to Ukraine:

• The European Union announced on Monday evening that it has reached an agreement to raise the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility (EPF), through which aid is being provided to Ukraine by the EU, by an additional €3.5 billion, according to a press release of the Council of the EU. 

• The press release noted that the increase was necessary because 92 per cent of the EPF’s  financial ceiling had been committed in 2023; the release did not tie the timing of the increase to events in Russia nor the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive. 

United States Set to Announce Additional Aid Package to Ukraine:

• According to Reuters, the U.S. plans to announce an additional military aid package to Ukraine worth $500 million as early as Tuesday. The package is said to include HIMARS munitions, Javelins, and, importantly, ground vehicles, namely 30 Bradley fighting vehicles and 25 Stryker armored personnel carriers, per two U.S. officials. 

Belarus’s Neighbours Tighten Border Security Amidst Prigozhin’s Relocation:

• Several of Belarus’s neighbouring States have tightened border security in light of Prigozhin’s purported relocation to Belarus. Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are reported by Euronews to have agreed to ‘coordinate and enhance’ border security. 

• Polish Foreign Minister Mariusz Blaszczak stated that Poland has strengthened its border with Belarus and is ‘responding by anticipating attacks’. 

• Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs stated that the Latvia-Belarus border has been ‘strengthened’ and that ‘visa or border entry from Russians leaving Russia due to current events won’t be considered.’ Indeed, Latvia will not issue visas to Russians, including humanitarian visas, nor will it amend pre-existing border crossing restrictions, reports Ukrinform. 

• Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda called for enhanced border security should Prigozhin or any part of Wagner end up in Belarus, and stated that tightening eastern borders concerns not only Lithuania but ‘undoubtedly… the whole of NATO.’

• German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has announced that Germany is preparing to send 4,000 Bundeswehr soldiers to Lithuania to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. Politico reported that the decision has support from both Germany’s ruling coalition and its main opposition. 

States Come Forth in Support of the Kremlin:

• The Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated its support for Russia’s leadership amidst the mutiny. A Foreign Ministry Spokesperson in a press conference on Monday affirmed Beijing and Moscow’s close ties, stating, ‘As Russia’s friendly neighbor and comprehensive strategic partner of coordination for the new era, China supports Russia in maintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity, and we believe in Russia’s ability to do so.’ 

• Putin held a call with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, an American ally, where Al Thani ‘expressed his support for the actions of the Russian authorities related to the events of June 24’, according to the Kremlin’s website. 

• Putin also held a call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on Monday, in which the Iranian President ‘expressed full support for the Russian leadership in connection with the June 24 events’. 

Analysis:

Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s long-time press secretary, declared on Monday evening that Putin’s then-forthcoming speech to the Russian public concerning the weekend’s events, ‘without exaggeration, will determine the fate of Russia.’ Putin subsequently delivered a short speech–barely longer than five minutes–that all but determined that fate. 

In his address, Putin sought to control the narrative surrounding the weekend’s events and to carve out Wagner’s power base in order to discourage further attempts to displace his power. On the one hand, much of Putin’s speech doubled-down on the position he adopted during the rebellion: those who took part are ‘traitors’ seeking to ‘fragment’ Russian society, and will be ‘brought to justice’. Regardless of the mutineers' efforts, the rebellion, said Putin, was ‘doomed to fail’. The rebellion appears for Putin, and he hopes for all of Russia, as a futile criminal power-grab aimed at destabilising Russian society. On the other hand, Putin shifted his tone, distinguishing between the rebellion’s ‘organisers’ and the Wagner ‘patriots’ whom the organisers ‘used’ to perpetrate the rebellion. Rather than being carried out by Wagner forces en masse, and with the support of some Russian citizens after-the-fact, the rebellion was led by elite Wagnerites. 

Putin was careful not to vilify ordinary Wagner troops who did not actively take part in the rebellion. Putin does not want to re-ignite any elements still set on rebellion, nor does he wish to entrench a desire for regime change that could prove fatal to his rule in the coming months. As such, Putin sought to cultivate national unity, emphasising the ‘civil solidarity’ that arose from the weekend’s events, and highlighting that the rebellion was quashed not by Lukashenko’s timely intervention, but by the ‘patriotic mood of the citizens, the consolidation of the entire Russian society’. Putin’s credit to the Russian people for the resolution of the rebellion is, it appears, false: Wagner troops were gleefully greeted by residents of Rostov-on-Don on Saturday. For this reason, Putin’s allusion to Russian unity is particularly striking, as he may very well believe that support for his rule is quickly fading. 

More striking still is Putin’s reference to the ‘consolidation of the entire Russian society’, which implies that Putin himself has consolidated his grip on power. The rebellion may have exposed weak allies, traitors within Putin’s government, and incompetent staff–all of which Putin will purge at will, once given the time. But the rebellion’s most important outcome was the presentation to the Russian people and its elites of an alternative leader, an alternative Russia. Alternatives have risen in the past–Alexei Navalny chief amongst them–but none have ever been presented so forcefully, in a manner that has exposed the weaknesses in the foundation of Putin’s regime. This seems to be the view of several of Putin’s domestic critics, including Igor Girkin, who commented that Putin’s speech was ‘pitiful’, alongside Putin’s international adversaries. 

Most notably, the Russian as a whole people may start–indeed may already have started–to doubt the legitimacy of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, intended to be the crown jewel of his rule. Prigozhin explicitly questioned the rationale for the ‘special military operation’ in the lead-up to the rebellion, though his most recent public statement shied away from decrying the basis of the war, and instead focused on the mistakes made by the Russian military in its course. This effectively represents a shift of responsibility for Russia’s failures in the war from Putin further onto Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov. That more cautious angle implies that Putin was somewhat successful in subduing Prigozhin’s perceived ambition for regime change, but the momentous symbolism of the weekend’s events will remain etched into the Russian consciousness for some time. 

Wagner Intel Brief- 25/06 at 16:45 BST

Authors: Vanina Meyer, Kateryna Anisova, Marina Tovar

Source: AlJazeera People gather to watch the Wagner troops load a tank onto the back of a lorry as they pull out from the headquarters of the Southern Military District [Roman Romokhov/AFP]

Current Developments

• Wagner group halts advance on Moscow amid a deal brokered by the Belarus President to drop charges of armed mutiny against Prigozhin. In exchange, the leader of the Wagner group would move to Belarus and Wagner fighters would face no action. As of June 24 evening, the Group was reportedly 200km from Moscow. CNA 25/06 01:46 BST This deal comes after Putin’s televised speech to the nation, calling the rebellion a “betrayal” and a “treason” and vowing to punish those behind the mutiny. 

• On late Saturday evening, following the deal with Putin mediated by the Belarus President, the Wagner Group pulled out of Rostov-on-Don with fighters and equipment. Residents reportedly cheered and chanted "Wagner! Wagner!" (Source Telegram video). Prigozhin was cheered and applauded by the population in Rostov when he was leaving by car. 

• All restrictions on highways have been lifted according to the TASS news agency on Sunday morning after traffic restrictions had been imposed on the M-4 “Don” expressway in the Moscow and Tula regions.

• The current whereabouts of the Wagner military leader is for the moment unknown after a compromise was found with Putin.

• A fuel tank fire at an oil refinery near the city of Voronezh was extinguished according to the Ministry of Emergency Situations, destroying a 5,000-ton tank of aviation kerosene. According to the local governor, Alexander Gusev, on Sunday morning the Wagner Group was leaving the region of Voronezh. The origin of the fire is unknown but social media videos showed at least one military helicopter in the vicinity. 

• Chinese and Russian diplomats to meet and discuss ‘issues of common concern’ in Beijing.

Source: The New York Times

Negotiations

• According to the press service of the Belarusian head of state, following the agreement between Alexander Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin, Belarussian President held talks with the head of the Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in agreement with the Russian president throughout the day of June 24. 

"Yevgeny Prigozhin has accepted the proposal of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to stop the movement of armed forces of Wagner in Russia and further steps to de-escalate tensions," the report says. "At the moment there is an absolutely beneficial and acceptable option of resolving the situation on the table, with security guarantees for the fighters of the Wagner PMC," said the press service of Lukashenko.

Reactions

Russia

• According to the Kremlin’s Spokesman, Peskov, the goal of the deal was “avoiding bloodshed, internal confrontation, and clashes with unpredictable results was the highest goal”.

• Igor Girkin-Strelkov - a Russian army veteran and former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer who played a key role in the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and occupation of Easter Ukraine - is disappointed with Prigozhin's decision. He believes that "nothing is over yet". Image 1 Translation: I don't believe in any "agreements".  I hope to be wrong. The only possibility is that Prigozhin has explained that he is going to be personally rubbed in a wet place right now. And that is not a fact. Published: 18:42 BTS (source).

• Image 2 translation: Even assuming that "That's it, let's split up", it remains to be said that the coup d'état has succeeded.  The second (de facto) man in the state has been forcibly removed from power.  Published: 19:31 BTS (source)

• According to Peskov - Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation - an agreement has been reached that the Wagner PMC will withdraw to its field camps and Prigozhin himself will move to Belarus. The authorities will not prosecute those Wagnerians who took part in the insurgency, given their front-line credentials. Consequently, the criminal case against Prigozhin was terminated. 

• No personnel reshuffle in the Defence Ministry was discussed during talks with Prigozhin, Dmitry Peskov said, according to an RBC correspondent.
  

Ukraine

According to Ukrainian President Zelenskiy, the mutiny of the Wagner Group and its advancement towards Moscow show that "the masters of Russia control nothing. And that means nothing. Simply complete chaos. An absence of any predictability" said a video address. The Adviser to the President, Mykhailo Podolyak stated on Twitter “Prigozhin humiliated Putin/the state and showed that there is no longer a monopoly on violence…”

• While Russia claimed the rebellion had no impact on its Ukraine campaign, Kyiv said the unrest offered a "window of opportunity" as the nation pressed its long-awaited counter-offensive.

International

• US agencies were already closely monitoring the situation in mid-June with regard to Yevgeny Prigozhin's actions against Russia. Tensions had grown this week and became alarming, with concerns rising for the US and Europe about chaos in a country with a powerful nuclear arsenal. 

• News outlets in Europe depict the Wagner mutiny as the “gravest threat to Putin’s presidency”, and “terror turns on dictator” and shows the current crisis Putin is facing to hold on to power. 

• The Japanese National Security Secretariat, Takeo Akiba, discussed with his UU counterpart, Jake Sullivan, to discuss the situation in Russia, including the military mutiny of the Wagner Group, and agreed to cooperate and monitor the situation closely together. 

• The French President, Emmanuel Macron discussed with President Andrzej Duda of Poland on Saturday stating that they “discussed the possible impact of ongoing events in Russia on the war in Ukraine. They also confirmed their commitment and determination to support Ukraine to enable it to recover its full sovereignty”. President Macron also got on a call with US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

Results

• Losses-people: Fifteen servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were killed in fighting with Wagner PMCs on June 24. Thirteen of them were pilots.

• Losses-equipment: Mi-8MTPR REB helicopters (3); Mi-8 helicopter (1); Kamov Ka-50 helicopter (1); Mi-35 helicopter (1); Ilyushin Il-22 helicopter (1).

Analysis

The leader of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin, reportedly said that the “march on Moscow” was a march for justice intended to remove the corrupted and incompetent Russian military commanders especially the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the chief of the general staff, Valery Gerasimov, accusing them of incompetence and of withholding ammunition from his fighters. On Saturday, he announced that the Group would stay in Rostov and move towards Moscow until they had the two Russian military as per a video reported by the New York Times. The leader of the Wagner group launched a mutiny on Friday after the military allegedly killed a fighter in an air strike which was denied by the Defence Ministry. CNA 25/06 01:46 BST 

This event shows that Putin cannot control the country, from raids in Belgorod to the Wagner military action, systemic, military, and intelligence systems tensions are resurfacing. Also, people in Rostov were friendly to the Wagner Group which is a troubling sign for the power in place. The support Wagner received from the population in Rostov on June 24, very likely illustrates a discontentment with Putin’s policies, and possibly with the developments on the “special operation” in Ukraine. Tensions and divisions are arising and Russia is not on a unified front anymore.  This apparent fraction could potentially hinder Putin’s reelection on March 17, 2024, as Putin’s concessions to integrate Wagner members not participating will join the Russian Defense Ministry and no one would be prosecuted. Putin’s concessions and lack of “severe punishment”, could likely hinder the regime's stability. The 1917 and 1991 events were drawn from a divided elite, a public that was dissatisfied, and a lack of fear of an uprising. Today’s events have illustrated the Russian citizens’ dissatisfaction by providing clear support to Wagner troops in Rostov-on-Don. It could be a window of opportunity for Ukraine and Europe, also in the context of the weakness of the Russian army and its soldiers on the Donetsk front. The morale of the troops was at its lowest and the Wagner Group was the strongest asset of the Russian army, namely in the town of Bakhmut.

Prigozhin likely staged an “attempted coup” to pressure Putin into dismissing Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov after tensions between the “military elite” and Wagner’s chief. Initial declarations from Prigozhin would back this scenario as he directed his claims against Gerasimov stating he was responsible for “scrambling warplanes to strike Wagner’s convoys”. Furthermore, as part of the conditions for Wagner’s withdrawal from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin likely requested Shoigu and Gerasimov dismissed, to which Peskov responded that “personal changes in the Russian Defence Ministry would be Putin’s competence in accordance with the Constitution”. 

A division in Russian elites? Throughout the war in Ukraine, the Russian elite has been divided into those supporting Putin’s “special operation” and others who would have not taken that route, and would have been in favor of a rougher more assertive action in Ukraine. Although Prigozhins potential supporters have not backed him, as General Surovikin and Chechen leader Kadyrov backed Putin, this division is also evident as Rosgvardia leader Zolotov backed Prizoghin’s actions. Hence, Prigozhin’s lack of support likely resulted in the tactical retreat and opening to discussions. Other scenarios include, Analyst Velina Tchakarova’s scenario of Putin using this staged coup to blame the military leaders for the results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine leading to elections in 2024. Velina’s scenario is a likely one as the Russian elite, but Putin’s support is one of the highest since 1993. If Putin sought to blame the military for Ukraine’s failures, Putin’s “willingness”  to appear victorious has not been successful as it has evidenced fractures in Russian society and divisions in Russian elites. Nevertheless, in this alternative scenario, Putin’s goal to “have an excuse” for removing Gerasimov and Shoigu would be completed. Due to the unprecedented turn of events, this destabilizing situation for Moscow could have an important impact on Wagner's presence in the MENA and Africa region. 

Published around 16:45 BST

Wagner Intel Brief- 24/06 at 13:04 BST

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Yevgeny Prigozhin called for a rebellion against the army on June 23rd, and urged the army not to resist, calling it a "march of justice”. This came after Prigozhin claimed that Wagner military sites in Ukraine were attacked by Russian artillery on Chief of General Staff Gerasimov's orders after a meeting with Defence Minister Shoigu, where they decided to eliminate Wagner. 

Wagner forces have been vital in Russia's Ukrainian war, capturing the city of Bakhmut. However, Prigozhin has repeatedly criticised Russia's military leaders for incompetence and neglecting his troops' needs.

Yevgeny Prigozhin speaking inside the headquarters of the Russian southern military district in the city of Rostov-on-Don

Russian government response

• Immediately after, security services called for the arrest of Prigozhin. Security was heightened in Moscow and in Rostov-on-Don (“Fortress operation”).

• Putin denounced a “treason” and “mutiny” but denies calling it a military coup.

• A counter-terrorism regime was introduced in Moscow, the Moscow region and Voronezh region (9AM BTS).

• Governors of Sverdlovsk and Bryansk regions introduce high alert regime - Russian media (12PM BTS)

Military developments

Rostov-on-Don

• Evening of 23rd: Wagner surrounded military HQ and the city of Rostov-on-Don, “no resistance from Russian military” and in spite of alleged roadblocks put in the place by the military (tweet)

• Announcement of Prigozhin from the HQ of the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don which Wagner PMC now fully control (video). He states that he has full control of the military installations to ensure that the Russian air force are attacking Ukrainians, and not Wagner troops. He calls for Shoigu and Gerasimov to be given up by the Russian authorities.

• A Wagner convoy near Voronezh controls the Don highway (video).

• Wagner installs mine barriers made of TM-62 anti-tank guns in Rostov-on-Don.

• Wagners are mining the streets of Rostov-on-Don, setting up roadblocks and firing positions, Russian public media reports, citing eyewitnesses at the scene (video).

Voronezh

• Wagner column seen 2 km from Buturlinovka, Voronezh region (video).Voronezh is located between the Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don and Moscow. So as  Wagner forces are expected to head towards Moscow, Russian Air Forces are allegedly attacking Wagner convoys along the M4 highway (other source).

• At the Bugaivka border crossing in the Voronezh region, another 180 Russian soldiers and law enforcement officers agreed not to interfere with the Wagner action and laid down their arms. It is not the only report made by Progozhin about the support from the Russian border control officers’ side.

• The battle was filmed in the Voronezh region. Judging by the sounds in the video, there was an active firefight between the Russian army and Wagner (around 9am BST). https://t.me/lachentyt/30933.

• The road towards Voronezh is heavily damaged (Telegram post with video). It is reported that the Russian Armed Forces were shooting. The video shows that a civilian car was damaged.

• Images of Russian soldiers surrending in Voronezh.

• Heavy convoy in Voronezh, at 9:30 BST, the convoy is about 445km from Moscow.

• Another video showing column moving towards Moscow

• In Rostov, explosions ripped through the headquarters of the Southern Military District (around 12 BST).

• Explosion 1672544456929693696 - geolocated

Moscow

• The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation take up positions near the bridge over the Oka River near Serpukhov, where the M2 "Crimea" highway runs towards Moscow (around 10:00 BST).

• Checkpoints with APCs have been set up at the entrance to Moscow, local media reports say.

• The movement of the Wagner military column towards Moscow (11:30 BST)

• Video confirmation of Counter-Terrorism Committee (branch of the FSB) buildup in Moscow

  • Translation: “I have a dream in which Moscow is burning. Good luck, not a step back” (Sheik Mansur Battalion)

Unconfirmed (mainly happening in the Voronezh region)

• A warplane, likely a transport aircraft, was shot down over Voronezh. So far, it looks like Wagner was responsible. Allegations that the plane was carrying hundreds of Kadyrov soldiers.

• Oil depot in Voronezh was bombed by a helicopter (video, video). The attacker responsible for the fire in unknown.

• The Wagner PMC destroyed 4 helicopters of the Russian Armed Forces and one AN-26/Su-25 (other video, video, video)

• A military convoy wan noticed moving towards Krasnodar.

• Medvedev and his family have allegedly escaped from Moscow?

• Situation updates

• Map of Wagner progress

Other actors:

• Ramzan Kadyrov - Head of the Chechen Republic - supports Putin and calls Wagner’s operation a military coup.

• Fighters from the Storm-Z group endorsed Prigozhin & are willing to join Wagner if they require their assistance. On June 19th, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced it was replacing the Wagner Group convict troops with its own Storm-Z battalions and Chechen special forces. This initiative sparked allegations of the “Russian army 'on verge of civil war'.

• Kalinowski's Regiment prepares an address to the Belarusian people at 17:00 Minsk time. (The Kastusia Kalinouski Regiment (Polk Kastusia Kalinouski) is a volunteer regiment (formerly a battalion) formed in February 2022 to defend Ukraine against Russian invasion)

• Russian Volunteer Corps is interested in the developments and asks Russian people share the footage with the location of checkpoints, equipment to their Telegram bot.

Translation:

Friends, members of the Russian Volunteer Corps are very interested in what is happening in their hometowns today.

• Sheik Mansur Battalion - Reports of increased tension in the Republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia as orders restricting movement outside of the regions are put into effect - Source

Translation - “Collaborators of the occupied Checnya and Ingushetia start to fuss. Orders are being received not to move outside the republics, even if neigboring regions ask for it. Fear…tremble enemies of the freedom-lovers

You can send photos/video information showing roadblocks, equipment and other attempts of the regime to defend itself to the bot of our channel.

We are most interested in Moscow, Rostov and Voronezh.

Reaction:

- Дума statement:

 “The history of Russia has shown that external challenges and threats have united our society. Together we are able to overcome any difficulties.

The problems and troubles of the country have always occurred only because of betrayal, internal division and betrayal of the elites.

The deputies of the State Duma, representing the interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation, advocate for the consolidation of forces, support President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin — our Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

The Wagner fighters must make the only right choice: to be with their people, on the side of the law, to protect the security and future of the Motherland, to carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander.

Anything else is a betrayal!

We are confronted by a common external enemy that promotes the ideology of Nazism — destroys Russian citizens, threatens the security of our country.

In this situation, it is necessary to unite even more and do everything to win”

Ukrainian reaction and comments:

• Moscow is preparing for a siege. The city is virtually isolated by police and military units. All military equipment that has remained in reserve and border regions is being moved to Moscow - the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine

• Security forces have received permission to:

• Listen to any conversations and checking correspondence

• Conduct detentions and searches without additional approvals

• Forceful access to private and official premises

• Use motor vehicles of citizens and organisations

• Disconnect all types of communication

• "Removal of individuals from areas and objects".

  • Published: around 12:15 BTS.